

**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LIFE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCE OF UKRAINE**

VASYL STRILETS

HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD

Textbook

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The discipline “History of Ukrainian statehood” aims to introduce students majoring in Philology and other fields to a wide range of themes covering the development of socio-political order at different stages of national history; system of government and administration in Ukraine from ancient times to the present. The textbook which corresponds to the curriculum will facilitate students’ acquiring basic knowledge and appropriate skills necessary for mastering the discipline.

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PREFACE

The purpose of studying “History of Ukrainian statehood” discipline in higher educational institutions is:

- to develop students’ national self-consciousness;
- to foster their patriotic, moral and ethical values, a sense of belonging to the millennial history of the Ukrainian people;
- to teach students to deal with historical sources and literature, do scientific analysis, aimed at ensuring independent understanding of the laws of historical development;
- to develop their skills to apply the acquired knowledge of history in everyday activities, to be versed in socio-political life, assess social phenomena and events.

The course “History of Ukrainian Statehood” is based on the need to solve the following tasks:

- using the latest achievements of historical science in the teaching of national history;
- raising the scientific and educational level of teaching;
- ensuring the implementation of the principles of historicism and objectivity in assessing facts, phenomena, and events;
- providing humanistic nature of historical education, its focus on the priority of universal values;
- achieving continuity of historical education at the stage of higher education and its consistency with secondary education stage.

As a result of studying the discipline the student must

- know the theoretical basis, important key issues of the curricular topics, general patterns of historical development; complex and contradictory phenomena, processes in the history of socio-political and cultural life of Ukraine in connection with world civilization; trends in the economic development of Ukraine, in particular, in its agrarian sector; be well versed in historical sources and the latest scientific literature;
- be able to synthesize the acquired knowledge into the appropriate worldview and high political culture; creatively apply the acquired knowledge of the history of Ukraine in everyday activities for evaluating social phenomena and events; form their own scientific standpoint on current political issues; independently comprehend the patterns of historical development.

The textbook is designed in accordance with the requirements of the credit-module system of the academic process organization. Its structure corresponds to the curriculum of the course “History of Ukrainian statehood”.

The textbook is adapted to the peculiarities of training students majoring in “Philology. Germanic languages and literatures (translation included)” (English and second foreign language; German and second foreign language) and students of other specialties mastering English language programs.

TOPICS OF LECTURES AND SEMINARS

CONTENT MODULE 1.

UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD: ORIGIN, FORMS, TRENDS

LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE “HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD” (2 hours)

1. Subject, tasks, methodological principles and sources of studying the course “History of Ukrainian statehood”. Scientific periodization of the history of statehood in the lands of Ukraine.
2. The beginnings of statehood in the Ukrainian lands.
3. Diversity of scientific concepts and hypotheses of the Ukrainians’ ethnogenesis and their state formation.

Seminar 1. Introduction to the course (2 hours)

1. Preparing for seminars.
2. Organization of self-study and independent work.
3. Criteria for assessing students’ knowledge and skills.
4. History of NULES of Ukraine.

Seminar 2. State-building traditions on the territory of Ukraine in ancient times: hypotheses and evidence. (2 hours)

1. Initial knowledge about man and the environment in the ancient world. Neolithic revolution.
2. The beginning of the formation of human civilization on the territory of modern Ukraine.
3. Concepts of Slavic ethnogenesis. Versions of Ukraine genesis.
4. Formation and development of statehood of the Eastern Slavs.

LECTURE 2. GENESIS OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD IN THE MIDDLE AGES: SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY (2 hours)

1. Theories of origin and stages of the Kyivan Rus state formation.
2. Features of the Kyivan Rus political organization.
3. The historical fate of Ukrainian statehood in the European context.

Seminar 3. Kyivan Rus in Ukrainian and world history (2 hours)

1. State and political system of Kyevan Rus.

2. Characteristics of qualitatively different stages of historical development of Kyivan Rus: socio-economic aspect. Galicia-Volhynian principality.

3. Agriculture and agricultural tools of the Middle Ages.

4. Multi-vector international politics of the princely period.

5. Lessons of the princely period.

LECTURE 3: THE LATENT PERIOD OF UKRAINIAN STATE FORMATION: DIVERSITY AND CONTRADICTION OF INTERPRETATIONS (2 hours)

1. Historical and political aspect of foreign expansion into Ukrainian lands

2. Ukrainian society in the processes of integration of Lithuania and Poland and the creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

3. Evolution of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The phenomenon of the Zaporizhzhya Sich

Seminar 4. Ukrainian lands as part of foreign countries of the XIV - 1st half of the XVII century. (2 hours)

1. Incorporation processes in the Ukrainian lands (XIV-XVII centuries).

2. State and political system in the Ukrainian lands in the Lithuanian-Polish era (XIV - I half of the XVII century.). Scientific revolution in natural science of the XVII century and its impact on agricultural development.

3. Genesis and development of the Ukrainian Cossacks as a social and state-building force.

LECTURE 4. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLE (MID-SEVENTEENTH CENTURY). COSSACK-HETMAN STATE: PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RETHINKING (4 hours)

1. Ukrainian national revolution: debatable issues.

2. The Age of Ruin and the loss of territorial integrity in the late seventeenth century.

3. Elimination of the Ukrainian statehood institution by tsarism in the eighteenth century: regularity or colonial policy.

Seminar 5. Ukrainian statehood in the second half of the seventeenth century (2 hours)

1. Cossack-Hetman state: socio-political and socio-economic organization.

2. Ukrainian-Russian relations: trends and nature.

3. Ukrainian-Polish confrontation: features and consequences.

4. Agricultural knowledge in the Enlightenment period of the XVIII century. The beginning of the industrial revolution.

LECTURE 5. REVIVAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IDEA AND STATEHOOD IN THE XIXth CENTURY (2 hours)

1. Ukrainian national-state thought in the period of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires' rule
2. Modernization processes in the Ukrainian lands: administrative-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational spheres
3. Issues of Ukrainian statehood in the socio-political movement

Seminar 6. Functioning of state mechanisms on Ukrainian lands in the eighteenth century (2 hours)

1. The permanent nature of the political crisis of the Hetmanate.
2. Changing the political and legal status of the Right Bank.
3. Development of national liberation ideas in Western Ukraine.

LECTURE 6. NEW TRENDS IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE OF UKRAINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURY.

1. Politicization of public life: formation of political movements and parties
2. Alignment of socio-political forces on the eve of the national liberation struggle. Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary
3. State-building models in the program documents of Ukrainian political parties and movements

Seminar 7. Socio-political movement in Ukraine in the XIX century (2 hours)

1. The evolution of the opposition movement in the context of Ukrainian statehood in the 1st half of the XIX century.
2. Western lands in the vanguard of national revival.
3. Features of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the second half of the XIX century in Dnieper Ukraine and western Ukrainian lands.

Seminar 8. Competition of national-democratic forces for Ukrainian statehood (early twentieth century) (2 hours)

1. The Ukrainian question in the context of the revolutionary events of the early twentieth century in the Russian Empire.
2. Ukrainian factions in the parliaments of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires.

3. The Ukrainian question during the First World War.
4. The science revolution at the turn of XIX - XX centuries and its impact on the formation and development of higher agricultural education and science.

CONTENT MODULE 2

ON THE WAY TO THE REVIVAL OF STATEHOOD (XX - early XXI century)

LECTURE 7. EVOLUTION OF UKRAINIAN STATE FORMATION IN 1917-1920

1. Historical circumstances of the Ukrainian statehood revival.
2. Search for optimal models of state building.
3. Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920: achievements and failures in state-building competitions

Seminar 9. The struggle for the restoration of the statehood of the Ukrainian people (1917–1920) (2 hours)

1. Parliamentary form of statehood in the Central Rada period.
2. The Ukrainian state of Pavlo Skoropadsky: the main directions of foreign and domestic policy.
3. Organization of state power of the Ukrainian People's Republic during the Directory period: from democracy to military dictatorship.
4. Formation of Ukrainian statehood in Western Ukraine in 1918-1920.

LECTURE 8. THE SOVIET FORM OF STATEHOOD IN UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1921–1939) (2 hours)

1. Historical conditions for establishment of the Soviet form of statehood in Ukraine (1917-1920).
2. Soviet Ukraine in the federal system.
3. Contradictory nature of political and economic development of Dnieper Ukraine in the 20-30s of the twentieth century.

Seminar 10. Nation-state building in the USSR in the interwar period (2 hours)

1. Political and legal situation of the Ukrainian SSR.
2. Return to the policy of “socialist transformation”
3. The repressive nature of Stalin's totalitarian regime and its consequences for future generations.
4. Stalin's repressions against famous figures of agrarian education and science.

Seminar 11. The struggle for Ukrainian statehood in Western Ukraine in the 20-30s of the twentieth century (2 hours)

1. Ukrainian lands in Poland (political and legal status and socio-economic development).
2. Ukrainian lands as part of Romania (political and legal status and socio-economic development).
3. Ukrainian lands in Czechoslovakia (political and legal status and socio-economic development).

LECTURE 9: UKRAINE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A NEW PARADIGM (2 hours)

1. The Ukrainian question in international relations on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War.
2. The contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over Nazism.
3. Historical and legal consequences of the Second World War for Ukrainian statehood.

Seminar 12. State building on Ukrainian lands during the Second World War (2 hours)

1. The Ukrainian question in the policy of the Nazi Reich.
2. Attempts to spread Ukrainian power in the conditions of Hitler's occupation.
3. Features of the Soviet resistance movement in the occupied Ukrainian territory.

LECTURE 10: CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF UKRAINE (second half of the 40s - the 80s of the XX century)

1. Features of the postwar period: objective conditions and subjective factors.
2. Attempt to liberalize the political regime (1953-1964)
3. The growth of crisis phenomena in the political life of Ukraine in the 60-80s of the twentieth century.

Seminar 13. Ukraine on the Road to Independence: Socio-Political Transformations (1945–1991) (2 hours)

1. The contradictory nature of the "Sovietization" of the western Ukrainian regions.
2. Reforms of the 50-60s of the twentieth century and their consequences in Ukraine.
3. Formation and activity of public organizations and movements.
4. Activity of agrarian higher educational institutions in the Soviet era.

LECTURE 11: HISTORICAL FEATURES OF STATE-BUILDING PROCESSES IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE (since 1991) (2 hours)

1. Independent Ukrainian state: ways to legitimize.
2. The historical dimension of the constitutional process and its role in the political reform of Ukraine.
3. Ukrainian vectors of international politics.

Seminar 14. Theory and practice of state building under the conditions of Ukraine's independence (2 hours)

1. Deployment of state-building processes: the creation of a legal framework, the formation of power structures and multiparty system.
2. Foreign policy of independent Ukraine.
3. Socio-political development and advance of civil society.
4. Outstanding Ukrainian scientists and inventors.

LECTURE 12: MAIN STAGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. UKRAINE'S EXPERIENCE (2 hours)

1. The role and place of education, science and technology in the development of society
2. Education in Ukraine: history and modernity

LECTURE 13. UKRAINE AND THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE (2 hours)

1. Sovereign Ukraine in the modern geopolitical space.
2. Ukraine and the European integration process
3. International relations and foreign economic activity of agricultural universities
4. Eastern and Western Ukrainian diaspora in interstate relations.

LECTURE 14. PROSPECTS OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE IN THE XXI CENTURY (2 hours)

1. The concept of sustainable development and strategic prospects of Ukraine
2. Political system of Ukraine: ways of democratic transformations
3. Socio-economic factors of national development in the XXI century

Seminar 15. The Ukrainian state at the present stage (2 hours)

1. The Ukrainian state: internal confrontation as a factor of unification.

2. Ukraine as a factor in international politics.
3. Modern problems of national economic development and ways to solve them.
4. The contribution of NULES scientists in the development of domestic science and technology.

LECTURE 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE “HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD”

1. Subject, tasks, methodological principles and sources of studying the course “History of Ukrainian statehood”. Scientific periodization of the history of statehood in the lands of Ukraine.

2. The beginnings of statehood in the Ukrainian lands.

3. Diversity of scientific concepts and hypotheses of the Ukrainians’ ethnogenesis and their state formation.

1. Subject, tasks, methodological principles and sources of studying the course “History of Ukrainian statehood”. Scientific periodization of the history of statehood in the lands of Ukraine.

The history of Ukrainian statehood is one of the components of historical science that studies the patterns of formation and development of the Ukrainian people’s statehood, its struggle for national and state independence.

The subject of the course is a complex process of the statehood formation and development of the multimillion Ukrainian people, its activities in the political and state spheres from ancient times up to the present.

History helps to understand the present through the analysis of the past.

At the same time, historical thinking is an important factor in social activity.

Methods, principles and sources of studying the history of Ukraine:

1. The principle of objectivity. It proceeds primarily from the civilizational view of history as an objective process. At the same time, this principle requires relying on the facts in their true form, without distortions, adjustments to predetermined schemes.

2. The principle of historicism. It involves, first, consideration of each phenomenon in terms of how it arose, what are the main stages in its development. Secondly, it requires that each phenomenon must be considered in connection with others, its place in the system of social relations must be determined, and that the mutual influence and interdependence of historical phenomena must be clearly traced. Third, it involves the consideration of each phenomenon through the prism of a specific experience of history, provided that the causal links between different phenomena and events are preserved. Historicism permits to enter history, to understand it, to evaluate the motives of actions and the actions of historical figures, to find out their meaning.

The history of Ukrainian statehood as a branch of historical science uses general scientific methods, including historical and logical. The application of the first permits to trace historical phenomena at all stages of development,

taking into account the specificity of the course in specific conditions of place and time. The logical method opens opportunities for the analysis of historical events, phenomena at the final stage of their development, when all their basic properties have acquired a complete form. Historical and logical methods of cognition are intertwined, complementary.

When studying the history of Ukrainian statehood, interscientific or interdisciplinary methods are also used (especially by foreign historians): the method of specific research, mathematical methods, methods of mathematical statistics, etc.

The set of historical sources is classified into five main types:

1) material sources - monuments of material culture, i.e, archaeological findings: means of production, household items, coins and architectural monuments;

2) ethnographic sources - monuments that contain data on the peculiarities of life, culture, customs of a particular people;

3) oral sources - folk songs, historical thoughts, legends, folk proverbs, sayings, etc;

4) written sources - chronicles, documents, etc., which are the basis of historical knowledge.

Ethnos (from the Greek, ethnos - people, group, tribe) - a stable, historically formed in a certain area community of people - tribe.

Ethnos appears as a socio-economic organism that regenerates itself as a result of ethnically homogeneous marriages and the transmission to new generations of language, culture, customs, traditions, faith, processes of natural and artificial (violent) assimilation, interethnic integration. For the stable existence of the ethnos requires the creation of its own state.

Nationality - linguistic, territorial, economic and cultural community of people, historically formed and preceding the nation. The first nationalities were formed during slavery (ancient Egyptian, ancient Hellenic, etc.). The process of their formation was especially widespread under feudalism (Old Russian, Polish and others - within Europe). They usually consisted of relatives by origin and language. Less frequently - from multilingual tribes and ethnic groups, which mixed as a result of conquering each other. In the process of nationalities formation and the degree of strengthening economic and cultural ties between their individual components, the language of one of them became common, others became dialects or disappeared altogether. One of commonality indicator, was a new single name.

People (Greek - ἔθνος (ethnic group)) - a multifaceted concept that can have the following meanings:

The people is the population of the state, the inhabitants of the country.

The people is a socio-political force on which the official government in the country relies.

People is a form of national and ethnic unity (nation, nationality, sometimes tribe).

The people are people in general, mostly in large numbers.

Nation (from the Latin. (Latin) natio - tribe, people), the historical community of people, formed during the formation of their territory community, economic ties, literary language, some features of culture and character that make up its features.

Nations are defined by a number of characteristics that apply to both individual members and the nation as a whole. Such characteristics must have both a unifying function - a community of people that has nothing in common, can not be a nation, and a separate - that distinguishes this nation from its neighbors. Any of these characteristics can be debated, but denying the existence of determinants includes denying the existence of individual nations.

The state is a sovereign political-territorial organization of society, which has power, which is exercised by the state apparatus on the basis of legal norms that ensure the protection and coordination of public, group, individual interests.

2. The beginnings of statehood in the Ukrainian lands.

At the time when mankind switched to the use of bronze (II millennium BC), it was already divided into large cultural communities - language groups. Among them were those with whom the history of our country is more or less connected: Indo-Europeans (Aryans), Finno-Ugric peoples, Turks. According to most Ukrainian scholars, it was Ukraine that became the ancestral home of the ancient Indo-Europeans (Aryans). From here, from the edge of the ice shell, they moved in large streams for thousands of years on the planet - reached Central Asia, Tibet, India, Iran. They passed on to the local indigenous peoples their agricultural culture, language, including written - Sanskrit. This language is the basis of the languages of the Slavic, Germanic peoples, Persians, Tajiks, etc. The ancestral homeland of the Finno-Ugric peoples was the area around the Aral Sea. Later, these peoples went north, settled west of the Urals, on the banks of the Volga. Later, one of them, the Hungarians, moving to the West, occupied the region of Pannonia near the Danube (modern Hungary), and the other part reached the shores of the Baltic and White Seas (Finns, Estonians, Karelians). In the II-I millennium BC on the territory of present-day Ukraine, according to some scholars, there were three "worlds". These were three ethnic and cultural zones, which differed in the origin of the population, way of life and beliefs. These zones were Polissya, Steppe and Forest-Steppe. Descendants of autochthonous Paleo-European tribes lived in Polissya. Tribes of the Finno-Ugric ethnic group lived next to them. Life in the forest thickets did not contribute to rapid cultural development. Nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes lived in the steppes between the Don and the Danube. It is probable that these were Indo-European ethnopolitical tribes of local origin. Part of the population came here from the eastern steppes and the Caucasus. They formed a large Indo-Iranian ethnic group between the Dnieper and the Southern Volga, which included the Aryans and Iranian tribes, as well as the Scythians and Sarmatians. Finally, the lands in the forest-steppe between San in the west and the Dnieper

in the east, Pripyat in the north and the Carpathians in the south were of crucial importance in Ukraine. In the heyday of the Bronze Age, related tribes already lived here. The formative force was the spontaneous integration of more or less close tribes. Most likely, they were Proto-Slavs, ancestors of Eastern and Western Slavs.

Thus, the characteristic features of the social order in this period were: significant migration of the population; strengthening trade ties; formation of private property; gradual property differentiation of society; transformation of a family into a business unit; ousting the tribal community territorially; separation of hierarchically structured military elite, formation of military-political associations and unions; the birth of statehood. One of the first ethnic groups in the territory that later became part of modern Ukraine were the Cimmerians (IX - first half of VIII century BC). The Cimmerians occupied a large area between the Dniester and the Don, as well as the Crimean and Taman peninsulas. Although the question of the ethnic origin of the Cimmerians remains open, most scholars are inclined to conclude that they were a branch of the ancient Iranian nomadic people, genetically close to the Scythians who formed and came to these lands later. The Cimmerians were the first in Ukraine to move from settled to nomadic pastoralism, as well as the first to start smelting iron from bog ore in these lands. In the VII century B.C. a powerful wave of numerous, cohesive and active Scythian tribes drove the Cimmerians out of the Black Sea. As a result, Cimmeria disintegrated. Probably one part of the Cimmerians settled in the northern Black Sea coast or migrated to the Middle East, the other was assimilated by the Scythians. The Cimmerians are mentioned in Homer's Odyssey, in the Bible (the Book of Genesis), and in Herodotus' History. In the second half of VII century B.C. the Scythians formed a politically consolidated union of tribes - Greater Scythia.



In the picture: Scythian warriors on an electrum bowl from the Kul-Oba mound

The territory of this state formation was quite large and had the shape of an equilateral quadrangle, which, adjacent to the Black Sea coast, was located

between the Danube and Don rivers. The entire population of Scythia was divided into two large groups: migrating tribes (Scythian nomads, royal Scythians) and settled tribes (Scythian farmers, Scythian plowmen). In the V century B.C. the patriarchal Scythian tribal union turned into a slave-owning state headed by the king. The king's power was not absolute and was limited to the council of Scythian tribes and the people's assembly of all soldiers. The Scythian plowmen were the ancestors of the Slavs, the Proto-Slavs, our distant ancestors.



In the picture: Ancient states of the Northern Black Sea and Crimea

In the second half of VII century B.C. on the coast of the Black and Azov Seas, new peculiar state formations appear - Greek cities-colonies: Istria, Borispshen, Olbia, Pantikapaion, Feodosia, Thira, Chersonese. The main centers of ancient civilization in the Black Sea region were the areas of the Dnieper-Bug and Dniester estuaries, South-Western Crimea, Kerch and Taman peninsulas. Each city-state was a separate slave-owning democratic republic. The supreme power belonged to the people's assembly, the executive - to the boards and magistrates elected by open ballot. With the exception of slaves, foreigners, and women, all residents had broad political rights. Greek cities developed on the basis of the slave-owning mode of production and became centers of developed economy, handicrafts, trade and ancient culture. In 480 BC. the Bosphorus Kingdom emerges on the Kerch and Taman Peninsulas. In the I century A.D. Olbia, Chersonese, the Bosphorus Kingdom was conquered by Rome. They housed Roman legions. Roman fortresses were built on the shores of the Black Sea, from which the sea and the steppe were watched. Bosphorus Kingdom in the I-II centuries A.D. experienced a certain political and economic upsurge, which ended with the conquest of the Crimean Scythians and Tauri. The invasion of

the Goths weakened the Bosphorus kingdom and the Greek city-states, and the Huns finally overcame them. Most of the cities-colonies left the historical arena, only Pantikapaion and Chersonese survived, which eventually came under the rule of the Byzantine Empire. Thus, the ancient city-states left a deep mark in the history of Ukraine and the whole of Eastern Europe. During the Greek colonization, the democratic system was transferred to the local soil, which contributed to the formation of the state tradition in the territory of modern Ukraine. Greek settlers not only passed on to the local population advanced technologies of agriculture and handicrafts, but also actively involved them in commodity-money relations. The emergence of ancient city-states led to the development of the Black Sea coast urbanization. Various contacts of local tribes with the colonists contributed to the spread of experience and achievements of the most advanced ancient culture at that time.

At the beginning of our era, the East Germanic tribes of the Goths invaded the territory of modern Ukraine from the lower Vistula. They formed a state - the Gothic kingdom. The capital of this state was the city of Danparstad (Dnieper city, IV century.). According to many scholars, this city was the predecessor of Kiev. The neighbors of the Goths were the East Slavic tribes of the Antes. For a long time there were good relations between the Goths and the Antes. Speaking together, they successfully opposed the strongest countries in Europe. Together with other Germanic and Slavic tribes, the Goths and Antes successfully fought against the Roman Empire. Thus, they contributed to the destruction of slave-owning civilization and the formation of feudal relations in Europe.



In the picture: Distribution of Gothic tribes (approximately)

However, later there were serious contradictions and armed conflicts between the Goths and the Antes, as both peoples inhabited the forest-steppes of the Dnieper. In the IV century an invasion of Huns began, who, leaving

Transbaikalia, moved to the West. At the same time, they drew other tribes into the orbit of their movement. In 375 the Huns crossed the Don and invaded the possession of the Gothic kingdom. The Huns did not threaten the existence of the Antic Union, so the Antes sided with them in the war against the Goths. In 385 they destroyed the army of the Goth king Vinitaria. But the following year, the Goths inflicted a crushing defeat on the Antes' leader of God, captured him, and crucified him along with his sons and 70 nobles. In response, the Huns completely defeated the Goths. Part of the Goths rolled back to the Crimea, the second went to the Danube. Having encamped in the Danube plain, the Huns waged devastating wars with neighboring states for a long time and formed a huge state - Guniland, led by King Attila. However, Attila's empire some time after his death, in 453, fell into disintegration and disintegrated into separate kaganates (possessions). Scholars believe that in the lands of the Dnieper from IV to IX centuries. successively there were three Turkic-speaking formations: the state of the Huns Guniland, then Greater Bulgaria and then Black Bulgaria. On the ruins of the Hun state in the late VI century Greater Bulgaria (Bulgaria) was formed. The ethnic basis of this formation was the Bulgars, formerly part of the Hun tribal union. Khan Kubrat was an outstanding baltavar (supreme ruler) of this Khaganate. Under him, Greater Bulgaria was able to defeat its main enemy - the Avars and expand the state's borders to the Danube. It is believed that it was on his orders that Kyiv was founded.

3. Diversity of scientific concepts and hypotheses on ethnogenesis of Ukrainians and their state formation.

The history of the nation is the core of the national consciousness, on the basis of which the Ukrainian people was formed. And the lack of clear ideas about the time and circumstances of the emergence of the subject of Ukrainian national history inhibits the formation of the national consciousness of Ukrainians, which, in turn, hinders the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation. Today there are three main concepts of ethnogenesis of Ukrainians: Trypillia, post-Soviet late medieval and early medieval. The problem of ethnogenesis of Ukrainians turned out to be quite debatable and delicate.

The main obstacle to establishing a true version of the origin of Ukrainians, which would be based not on amateur fantasies or political speculation, but on scientific arguments, is its excessive politicization. According to Ukrainian historian L.L. Zaliznyak, this is because the problem of the ethnogenesis of the Eastern Slavs directly affects the acute political issue of the legitimacy of the accession of Ukrainians and Belarusians with their ethnic lands to the Russian Empire. It is one thing if it was a voluntary unification of parts of the once unified ancient Rus ethnic group, it is another if it was the seizure of the lands of individual peoples by Imperial Moscow. These aspects of this issue have led to its deep politicization, and therefore require detailed research, which is currently quite relevant.

The basis in the history of Eastern Slavs is the cultural and historical heritage of Kyivan Rus, which became the main object of geopolitical ambitions of the rulers of the states that emerged from its ruins. The state traditions of princely Kyiv spread far beyond Southern Rus-Ukraine and later, in the Middle Ages, significantly influenced not only the formation of state institutions of the Grand Duchy of Kyiv or the Cossack state of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, but also the formation of the principality of Lithuania and Moscow [1]. At the time of the rise of the state of Rus, the middle Dnieper was already inhabited by Ukrainians at the medieval stage of development. This opinion, as we know, was expressed by M. Hrushevsky in 1904. The researcher explained that “the Kyiv state, law, culture were the work of one nation, Ukrainian-Rus; Volodymyr-Moscow - the second, Great Rus ... Kyiv period did not pass into Volodymyr-Moscow, and in the Galician-Volyn XIII century ... Volodymyr-Moscow state was neither the inheritor nor adherent of Kiev, it grew at its root ... All-Rus history can not exist, as there is no all-Rus nation”. And since “Kyiv state, law, culture were the work of one nation, Ukrainian-Rus”, the latter, apparently, appeared before Kyivan Rus, and according to M. Hrushevsky comes from the Antes of the IV-VI centuries. [2]. Several generations of Ukrainian historians, archeologists, ethnographers, and anthropologists contributed to the development of the early medieval version of Ukrainogenesis - M. Kostomarov, V. Antonovych, M. Drahomanov, M. Dashkevych, M. Hrushevsky, F. Vovk, V. Petrov (1992), M. Braychevsky (1995, 2000), M. Chubaty (1963), J. Dashkevych (1993), J. Isaevych (1995), V. Baran (1998), L. Zalizniak (1994-2006), V. Balushok (2005) etc. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century the right of Ukrainians to the cultural and historical heritage of Princely Kyiv was to some extent recognized not only by Ukrainian but also by a significant number of Russian scholars. These include K. Kavelin, O. Pypin, O. Presnyakov, M. Lyubavsky, M. Pokrovsky. The new rise of the Russian Empire in its Soviet atmosphere in the postwar years of the mid-twentieth century led to an intensive search for neo-imperial historical schemes that would legitimize Moscow’s control over the peoples of Eastern Europe. A new post-war version of the origin of the Eastern Slavs was formulated by V. Mavrodin (1947) - the concept of the ancient Rus people. Its essence was that the state of Rus with its capital in Kyiv was founded not by Ukrainians or Russians, but allegedly by representatives of a separate East Slavic ethnic group - the ancient Rus people [3].

Scholars of the “Soviet” era claimed that Kyivan Rus went down in history as the cradle of three fraternal peoples: the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. Born by a single mother, the ancient Rus people, they developed along the same historical path as the branches of a single tree, taking the sap of life from a single powerful root. Without denying the process of consolidation of the Eastern Slavs at the end of the first millennium BC, many Ukrainian historians insist that the “ancient Rus people” was not the single ethnic group. The Mongol-Tatar invasion did not interrupt the development of the population of Rus (and did not lead to such mixing, which could give a new

ethnic group), and the differences between Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, who were part of the same state and after the invasion, its consequences cannot be explained. This is evidenced by the list of tribal names given by Nestor's Tale of Past Years, according to which some researchers believe that Ukrainians come from Polyans, Severyans, Derevlyans, Dulibs, Buzhan-Volyns, Ulychis, Tivertsys, and White Croats. Belarusians, respectively, from Dregovychis, Krivichis, Polotsks, and Russians from Slovenes and Vyatichis.

According to M. Popovych, the separation of the Eastern Slavs into a separate territorial cultural zone is not a consequence of their original unity, but the result of later history. There was no single "Eastern" or "ancient Russian" group in the original Slavic community. The Slavic population on the territory of Ukraine gathered from different parts of primitive Slavia and carried different historical and cultural traditions and influences [4]. The original version is the opinion of L. Zalizniak, who proposes to reconcile the ethnogenesis of Ukrainians with the universal laws of ethnic development in medieval Europe. In Eastern Europe, the influences of Greco-Roman civilization spread through the ancient colonies of the Northern Black Sea, mainly within Ukraine. Therefore, the ethnohistorical development of Ukraine was ahead of the more distant from the ancient centers in the forest belt of Eastern Europe and approached the pace of historical development of Western and Central Europe, which developed under the strong influence of Greco-Roman civilization. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the continuity of ethnocultural development in the Ukrainian ethnic lands between the Carpathians, Pripyat and Kyiv Dnieper, as well as in the lands of other large European ethnic groups located in the area of Rome influence, can be traced from the end of the V century.

Data from archeology, linguistics, anthropology, and written sources convincingly testify to the longevity and continuity of the development of a single ethnic organism in Northwestern Ukraine, from the Dulibs, Sklavins, and Antes, to modern Ukrainians (Rus) ethnic groups.

Just as Ancient Rome Romanized its barbaric periphery, so princely pro-Ukrainian Kyiv Russified (from Rus, not Russia) the forest north of Eastern Europe. In accordance with the universal laws of ethnic development of backward provinces, on the barbaric periphery of the Roman Empire appeared a spectrum of Latin-derived young Romanesque ethnic groups (Spaniards, Portuguese, French, Romanians). As a result of the colonization efforts of pro-Ukrainian princely Kyiv, young ethnic groups of Belarusians, Pskov-Novgorodians, and Russians were formed on the far northern periphery of the empire. As the Romanesque group of peoples emerged as a result of the synthesis of language and culture of the Romans and ethnocultures of the colonized peoples, so the Belarusians, Pskov-Novgorodians and Russians - the product of the synthesis of proto-Ukrainians of Southern Rus and colonized Balts and Finns in Eastern Europe. As the own ethnic history of the Romanesque peoples began after the collapse of the Roman state, so the young Rus ethnic groups enter the historical arena in the process of the disintegration

of Kyivan Rus. Continuity of ethnocultural development in ethnic Ukrainian lands from the Antes and Sklavins of V-VII centuries through Southern Rus, Cossack Ukraine to modern Ukrainians convincingly testifies to their birth in the early Middle Ages. Thus, the problem of the ancient Rus people is not a purely scientific issue. It directly affects a wide range of political issues not only in Ukraine but in the whole of Eastern Europe. Without its solution, it is impossible to find out the real time of the appearance of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians. And without this, the concept of the history of Eastern Europe remains incomplete.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Explain the meaning of the terms “historical consciousness”, “historical memory”.
2. Explain why the Ukrainian people are considered indigenous to their land.
3. Discover the main periods of the process of the Ukrainian nation’s formation.
4. What does the concept of “Ukrainian national idea” contain?
5. When does the history of mankind begin?
6. Name the region where the resettlement of peoples began.
7. Identify ways to settle the territory of modern Ukraine.
8. Identify the main periods of ancient Ukraine.
9. Describe the development of primitive society in the Paleolithic period.
10. Discover the essence of the Neolithic revolution.
11. Identify the main features of Trypillia culture.
12. Explain how and why the lives of ancient people changed in the Iron Age.
13. Describe the socio-economic and political system of the Cimmerians, Scythians, and Sarmatians.
14. Identify the reasons for the founding and death of ancient colonies in the Northern Black Sea coast, describe their development.
15. What underlies the periodization of primitive society?

TESTS

1. The essence of the Neolithic revolution is:
 - a) in the transition from collective to individual hunting;
 - b) in the transition from appropriative to reproductive forms of economy;
 - c) in the transition to the use of metals;
 - d) in the mastery of fire by man.
2. Specify the concept to which the following definition corresponds: An association of several families living in a certain territory and having common authorities, spiritual and material culture.
 - a) Family municipality;
 - b) Primitive human herd;

c) Tribe.

3. Option, which correctly indicates the order of origin in social organizations of ancient people:

- a) primitive herd, tribal community, tribe;
- b) tribal community, primitive herd, union of tribes;
- c) neighboring community, primitive herd, people;
- d) primitive herd, tribe, tribal community.

4. Indicate the period when the transition from hoe to arable (with a plow) farming took place in the Ukrainian lands:

- a) Neolith;
- b) Eneolithic;
- c) Mesolithic;
- d) The Bronze Age.

5. Determine the correct chronological sequence of ancient human history:

- a) Paleolithic, Mesolithic, Eneolithic, Neolithic, Bronze Age, Iron Age;
- b) Paleolithic, Neolithic, Eneolithic, Mesolithic, Bronze Age, Iron Age;
- c) Paleolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic, Eneolithic, Bronze Age, Iron Age;
- d) Paleolithic, Neolithic, Mesolithic, Eneolithic, Bronze Age, Iron Age.

6. Trypillia culture developed in the territory of Ukraine in the following era:

- a) Eneolithic;
- b) Bronze Age;
- c) Neolithic;
- d) Paleolithic.

7. Forms of appropriative economy of ancient people:

- a) agriculture, cattle breeding, weaving;
- b) gathering, hunting, fishing;
- c) gathering, hunting, cattle breeding;
- d) hunting, weaving, fishing.

8. No matter how invincible seemed Cimmerian warriors, from the second half of the 7th century BC they were conquered by tribes of

- a) Cimmerians;
- b) Sarmatians;
- c) Goths;
- d) Scythians.

9. Choose statements about the Scythians (3 correct answers)

- a) "Animal style";

- b) "Each of them is a horse archer";
- c) Engaged in agriculture;
- d) They buried their dead in mounds.

10. The ancient name of the Dnieper is:

- a) Borisfen;
- b) Tiras;
- c) Tanais.

11. Sarmatians ruled in Ukraine in:

- a) III century BC - III century AD;
- b) VII century BC - III century AD;
- c) V century BC. – II century AD;
- d) III century BC - II century AD.

12. Who described the Scythians and Sarmatians:

- a) Homer;
- b) Aristotle;
- c) Herodotus;
- d) Diogenes.

The Sarmatians lived in camps in:

- a) tents, which were insulated in winter;
- b) in semi-earthen wooden houses covered with straw;
- c) in stone houses.

13. Sarmatians fought against: (three answers are correct)

- a) Romans;
- b) Cimmerians;
- c) Pontic army led by King Mithridates;
- d) with ancient polises: Olbia, Thira, Nikonika.

14. What branch of the economy was leading among the Cimmerians?

- a) agriculture;
- b) livestock;
- c) craft
- d) trade.

15. The emergence of which tribes in the south of Ukraine coincides with the beginning of the Early Iron Age?

- a) Cimmerians;
- b) Scythians;
- c) Sarmatians;

d) Goths.

16. Which people drove the Scythians from the Black Sea steppes in the III century AD?

- a) Cimmerians;
- b) Sarmatians;
- c) Goths;
- d) Huns.

17. What are the names of buildings in which nomadic peoples who lived in the Black Sea steppes, buried their dead leaders, kings, etc.?

- a) pyramids;
- b) temples;
- c) mounds;
- d) necropolis.

18. Sarmatians are considered to be related to:

- a) Cimmerians;
- b) Goths;
- c) Scythians;
- d) Huns.

LECTURE 2. GENESIS OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD IN THE MIDDLE AGES: SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY

- 1. Theories of origin and stages of the Kyivan Rus state formation.**
- 2. Features of the Kyivan Rus political organization.**
- 3. The historical fate of Ukrainian statehood in the European context.**

1. Theories of origin and stages of formation of the state of Kyivan Rus

The question of the Old Russ state origin is debatable. In the historical literature there are two theories of state formation in the Eastern Slavs: Norman (its representatives are German scholars Z. Bayer, G. Miller, A. Schlotzer) and anti-Norman (M.V. Lomonosov and M.S. Hrushevsky).



In the picture: a monument to the founders of Kyiv

Norman theory

It should be noted that the discussion was largely directed in the linguistic field and concerned the etymology (linguistic origin) of the word “Russia”. In historical sources, this term is interpreted differently. Some researchers are trying to prove its Finnish origin, others are looking for its roots in the Swedish language. Anti-Normanists associate the name “Rus” with the names of rivers in

central Ukraine - Ros, Rostavytsia, Rusa, thus proving its local, Slavic origin. Moreover, they claim that no tribe or people called "Rus" was known in Scandinavia and is not mentioned in ancient German sources, including sagas. Most Russian and Ukrainian Soviet scholars held anti-Norman views. It is known from historical sources that the Normans or Vikings appeared in the lands of the Eastern Slavs from the middle of the VIII century. The local population called the Scandinavians Vikings, who in search of new lands went on long journeys, engaged in trade, piracy, raids. In fact, the Vikings are not an ethnic group, but a way of life in representatives of different tribes, mostly of North German origin. In Scandinavia itself, the Vikings were called Vikings, in Europe - the Normans. The Vikings laid and mastered the trade route through the Slavic lands to Byzantium – "from the Vikings to the Greeks." Along the way, they came into contact with the Slavs, traded with them, and often settled on their lands. The first princes of the Old Rus state also had Scandinavian names. It should be noted that at the initial stage the discussion was based on erroneous principles, which were the basis of the concept on the one hand and on the other. The parties considered the emergence of the state, firstly, as an instantaneous culminating act, and secondly, as a direct consequence of a particular historical figure's activities. Each position had its own argument, which led to a further deepening of the discussion, its periodic outbreaks. At the same time, the explanation of the statehood process as a consequence in the long evolution of social development, comprehensively substantiated statements of historians and archaeologists about the emergence of socio-economic and political preconditions for forming the state for the Eastern Slavs, even before the arrival of the Vikings, (improvement of agricultural technology, promotion of crafts, revival of trade, decay of the primitive communal system, class differentiation, separation of the army led by the prince into a privileged corporation, formation of a common culture) and the fact that East Slavic society already had its proto-state formations, created grounds for modern, qualitatively new vision of the Slavic state. At the beginning of the ninth century, in the north of Eastern Europe there were already well-developed in economic, cultural, political fields Slavic city-states, among which the cities of Novgorod and Pskov were well known. However, in 862, for some unclear reason, the inhabitants of Novgorod, the Ilmen Slovenes, invited Varangian prince Rurik, who founded the Rus dynasty, which then ruled for several centuries in those lands. The veracity of this version, as stated above, has always been questioned by many historians. Most likely, only the very fact of Rurik's rule is true, but the establishment of this rule took place by the traditional method of that time - the insidious capture of cities. And later the court chroniclers of the Rurikoviches slightly "corrected" the history to prove the legitimacy of their masters' power. Thus, Rurik could not create a state because he did not have such experience, secondly, states were created long before his appearance in the Slavic lands. Rurik, and later Oleg did not create a state, but seized power in the states that had already existed before them. Through Rurik's

son Igor (Ingvar - Scandinavian), as will be shown later, the Rurik dynasty was formed, which ruled Rus and then Russia for several centuries. Thus, the sprout of statehood was not brought to us by the Vikings or Khazars. Statehood grew on local soil, long before the arrival of the Vikings due to the complex and long-term socio-economic and cultural development of ancient Slavic society. At the same time, in the ninth century, the process of unification of the East Slavic tribes around Kyiv took place. Kyiv was a significant trade, cultural and military center. Like most large cities, Kyiv owes its magnificence to its favorable geographical location. Gradually, it became the main transit hub of the trade route from Scandinavia to Byzantium. He was destined to become the political center of the Slavic world. This is what the well-known Soviet historian B.O. Rybakov said: "If we look at the map of Eastern Europe, we will immediately realize the important strategic role of Kyiv in the era when thousands of Slavic migrated to south to the rich Byzantine cities and fertile cultivated lands. All the largest rivers of the Dnieper basin converged to Kiev: upstream from Kiev flowed into the Dnieper Berezina, Sozh, the huge Pripyat and Desna, Teterev. The basins of these rivers covered the lands of the Drevlians, Dregovichs, Krivichs, Radimichs, and Northerners with a total area of about a quarter of a million square kilometers. And all this huge space, all the roads from it to the south, to the Black Sea, were blocked by a fortress on Kyiv Hill. Consolidation of East Slavic tribes around Kyiv. In 882, Prince Oleg of Novgorod and his wife went down the Dnieper, took Smolensk, Lyubech, approached Kiev, cunningly captured it, killed Prince Askold of Kyiv and began to rule in Kyiv. Oleg's origin is not completely clear: who he was - a prince, boyar or leader of his squad. Most historians believe that he was the regent of the young Igor, the son of Prince Rurik of Novgorod, who died in 879, and possibly a relative of Rurik. The consolidation of Kyiv and Novgorod in the second half of the ninth century marked the beginning of a single early feudal state. For the first time in history, Southern Rus united with Northern Rus. The reign of Oleg in Kyiv (882-912) was the beginning of the East Slavic tribes consolidation around Kyiv and the strengthening of the early feudal state - Kyivan Rus. Oleg's power extended to Kyiv, Novgorod, Chernihiv, Pereyaslav, Smolensk and other cities. All the tribes paid tribute to the prince and were obliged to provide him with military assistance. Kyiv became the "mother of Rus cities", and the Kyiv prince became the "grand duke", "under whose arm" were other princes. Oleg, expanding his possessions, was forced to enter into a military conflict with the Khazars, from which he emerged the victor. The Rus prince and merchants were very interested in constant and peaceful trade with Byzantium. But Byzantium itself tried to maintain control and take a leading place in its foreign trade, and therefore did not allow foreigners into their country, did not open the markets of their cities, or imposed a huge duty on foreign goods. Oleg made two victorious campaigns in Constantinople in 907 and 911. The Russo-Byzantium Treaty of 911 provided for the payment of a significant contribution by Byzantium, duty-free trade, granting preferential terms to Russian merchants in Constantinople,

and so on. According to Arab sources, after the resounding victories over Byzantium, Oleg made several campaigns against the Arab Caliphate on the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea. During one of them (912) he died. After Oleg's death, Rurik's son Igor (912-945) became the head of the Kyiv state. He spent most of his time on military campaigns. He annexed to Russia the territory between the Dniester and the Danube. In 915, Igor was the first to face the Turkish-speaking Pechenegs, signing a peace treaty with them, which was broken 15 years later (because of Byzantium, which was not interested in strengthening Rus). Defeated by Byzantium in 941, Igor captured Derbent and the Southern Caspian (Byzantine allies).

He won a small victory over Byzantium in 944. Due to the high cost of military campaigns, Igor increased the tribute, which led to his death (killed in 945 by the Drevlians for trying to collect tribute a second time). After Igor's death, his wife Olga (Helga) (945-964) took the throne of Kyiv. She avenged the murder of her husband, destroying 5,000 Drevlians. She carried out tax reform, determining the amount of tribute – “uroks” (lessons) and places of tribute collection – “pogosts” (graveyard). She personally converted to Christianity and established diplomatic relations with Germany, raising the prestige of Kyivan Rus. Olga was replaced by her son Svyatoslav (964–972), the first prince of the Varangian Rurik dynasty with a Slavic name. He spent most of his life in military campaigns, using offensive tactics, speed and suddenness. Svyatoslav defeated the Khazar Khaganate, Volga Bulgaria, Danube Bulgaria, and others. He introduced the tradition of appointing his sons as princes in other cities (to strengthen the consolidation of Rus), wanted to move the capital from Kyiv to Pereyaslavets on the Danube (crossroads of trade routes), but was defeated in 971 at Dorostol by the Byzantines, therefore renounced claims to the Danube land. In 972, returning to Kiev, he died in battle with the Pechenegs near the Dnieper rapids. Although there is another version: he, being a pagan, actually died at the hand of a murderer who was sent by supporters of Christianity or rivals for the princely throne. Thus, the characteristic features of this stage in the history of Kyivan Rus were: the entry of the Old Rus state into the international arena, constant mobility of its borders, expansion of the country, the focus of the state not on domestic but on foreign policy; manifestation of the state elite activity (prince and his squad) mainly in the military sphere, which gave it land, wealth, markets, power; insufficient consolidation of territory and state; the weakness of the Grand Ducal power, which was not yet clearly organized and centralized.

Anti-Norman theory

Ruling of Volodymyr and Yaroslav. After Svyatoslav's death, as a result of a long struggle between his sons, Volodymyr, nicknamed the “Great” or “Holy”, took the throne. The reign of Volodymyr the Great (980–1015) was the beginning of a new stage in the history of Kyivan Rus, a stage of prosperity. Sitting on the Grand Ducal table, the new ruler proved to be an authoritative politician, a courageous warrior, a far-sighted reformer, a subtle diplomat. He

allegedly embodied a qualitatively new level of government. With the military campaigns of 981–993 against the Yatvyags, Vyatichi and Horvaths, Volodymyr completed the long process of forming the territory of the Kyiv state. Stretching for almost 800,000 km, the ancient Rus state became the largest country in Europe. Volodymyr fought seven victorious wars with the Pechenegs, as reported by “The Tale of Bygone Years” and other sources. This strengthened the authority of the Grand Ducal government in ancient society. The final stage in the formation of ancient statehood required significant social changes aimed at consolidating the country. That is why Volodymyr carried out several reforms. The administrative reform consisted in the transfer of the principality lands, where the local rulers were dependent on the Grand Duke rule, to the twelve sons of the prince, the grand ducal officials and close boyars. As a result of the separatism break in the tribal elite, the tribal division of ancient Rus society was replaced by territorial division, which is one of the main features of the established statehood. Military reform was aimed both at strengthening the country’s defense capabilities and strengthening the personal power of the Grand Duke. Its essence was the liquidation of “tribal” military associations, merging of the military system with the system of feudal land tenure. These reforms required changes in the field of ideology. Religious reform began with an attempt to modernize paganism. However, the old pagan faith did not contribute to the process of forming new social relations, its state-building potential was clearly insufficient for such a large and polyethnic state as Kyivan Rus. That is why the most important achievement of Volodymyr was the baptism of Rus in 988. Christianity became the state religion. The Reformation legacy of the Grand Duke included the introduction of a new set of laws of oral customary law, called the chronicler “earth Charter”, which later formed the basis of the first written collection of legal norms in Rus – “Truth of Yaroslav” (1016). After Volodymyr’s death, conflicts arose among the Rurikoviches. Eventually, the Grand Duke became Yaroslav, who later, a few centuries after, was called Wise by historians. The reign of Yaroslav (1019 - 1054) was the time of the highest development and the greatest rise of Kyivan Rus. The Grand Duke directed all his efforts to continue the cause of Volodymyr - strengthening unity, centralization of the state, its Europeanization. Yaroslav was a prince-builder, a prince-educator. Yaroslav paid considerable attention to the security of state borders. First of all, he undertook to strengthen the southern borders. In 1036 he finally defeated the Pechenegs. Yaroslav managed to return the lands in the west, which were captured by the Poles, to conquer the Baltic tribes. Yaroslav the Wise’s foreign policy was based on the word of a diplomat, not on the sword of a warrior. An important place in the international politics of the Kyivan prince was played by a kind of “family diplomacy”, i.e. the conclusion of favorable alliances and agreements through dynastic marriages. This allowed Yaroslav to become an influential European politician. During the reign of Yaroslav Volodymyrovych, the internal development of the state intensified.



In the picture: Portrait of Yaroslav the Wise on a two-hryvnia banknote of 1992

The name of this prince is associated with the creation of the first written code of laws of “Rus Truth”, which regulated the internal feudal relations. Yaroslav initiated the development of education, because he introduced schools in churches. He supported the church: many monasteries and temples were built in Kyiv. In 1051, without the knowledge of the Constantinople Patriarch, Yaroslav appointed Hilarion head of the Russian Church, which aimed to liberate the national church hierarchy from the control of Byzantium. Yaroslav the Wise left behind a possession that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the Oka to the Carpathian Mountains.

2. Features of the political organization of Kyivan Rus.

Kyivan Rus is an early feudal state with a monarchical form of government. During the IX-XIII centuries power has undergone a complex transformation.

For a long time, the original democratic institutions continued to exist - the People's Assembly (Chamber) and the Council of Elders. Over time, the National Assembly turned into a meeting of soldiers and military leadership. Military democracy gradually turned into a military-hierarchical government - the reign. Bodies of public self-government were transformed into bodies of domination and suppression. The military leader of the great union of tribes became the state ruler - the prince. Gradually, the role of the People's Chamber, which previously decided all the most important cases, is declining: now it is convened when the prince needs it. The importance of the people's militia is lost. At the same time, the role of the prince's squad is growing - professional

soldiers who served the prince, helping him in implementing domestic and foreign policy. With the help of his squad, the prince conquered new lands, collected tribute, brought order to the annexed lands. The prince settled with the warriors part of the tribute (IX - early XI century.). From the second half of the XI century senior warriors increase their land holdings and real estate. They gradually formed a class of large feudal landowners, boyars, who received from the prince patrimony for the service (large land holdings, which the boyars could inherit). The noblest warriors, together with the court aristocracy, formed the Boyar Rada (Council) a permanent advisory body of the prince. The standing army consisted of a younger squad. Part of this army - the prince's bodyguards and servants - was employed directly in the household at the prince's court. From this part of the squad over time formed the prince's court - the nobility, with whom the prince had a closer relationship

At the stage of the state formation a squad statehood was formed: on the basis of the prince's squad a primitive government, justice, and tribute apparatus was formed. During this period, the squad performed not only the role of the army, but also advisers. The central figure of this statehood form was the Grand Duke, who showed himself more as a military leader than as a statesman. At the stage of the Kyivan Rus rise, a centralized monarchy was formed: all power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Grand Duke, his squad takes a back seat to public affairs, and the prince's decision is influenced only by part of the senior warriors and natives of the old tribal aristocracy – Boyar Rada (Council). During the formation of the Kyiv state, a significant role was played by the viche - the people's assembly of the adult male population, which decided important public and state affairs. During the whole period of Kyivan Rus' existence, the princely power dominated, but in the moments of its weakening, the boyar power and the viche came to the fore. Thus, the defining features of this stage in the history of Kyivan Rus were:

- 1) completion of the state territory's formation;
- 2) shifting the attention of the princely power from the problem of land conquest to the problem of their assimilation and keeping under control;
- 3) breaking the separatism of local tribal elite and strengthening centralized power;
- 4) replacement of the tribal division of ancient society by territorial;
- 5) introduction and spread of the state consolidating ideology - Christianity;
- 6) emergence of written codified law;
- 7) The Rus state became a typical early feudal monarchy, a full member of the Christian European community.

3. The historical fate of Ukrainian statehood in the European context

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries in history went down in history as a period of feudal fragmentation. After the death of the Grand Duke of Kiev Mstislav, son of Volodymyr Monomakh, Kyivan Rus split into many

principalities and lands. Undoubtedly, the main reason for the split of the great centralized state was the lack of local princes and boyars interest in the strong power of the Grand Duke of Kyiv. The development of separate land tenure and the possibility of inheriting land made them full-fledged owners, independent of Kyiv.

Serious reasons for fragmentation include the large size of the state and the associated difficulties of governance, the lack of a clear system of succession and princely strife.


In the process of decentralization, Kyiv, Chernihiv-Siversky, Pereyaslav, Volyn, Halych, Volodymyr-Suzdal, Polotsk and other principalities are distinguished.

Local princes reform the state apparatus, create their own armed forces - squads. Principalities are now divided into volosts (parishes), where the prince appointed "posadnyks" (mayors). The role of the people's council gradually decreased. Although in Novgorod and Pskov the form of government was a boyar republic.

The Kyiv principality remained the national center, which housed the residence of the metropolitans. In fact, there was only a change in the form of government. Some scholars call it a federal monarchy, because the main issues of domestic and especially foreign policy were decided collectively by the most influential princes. An important argument in favor of such a policy was the constant threat from the Polovtsians. In the 60-70 years of the XII century there are two centers that are trying to unite the Rus lands - Kyiv and Volodymyr-on-Klyazma. But strengthening of the nobility's influence, which put their own local interests above the national, again causes aggravation of inter-princely relations and acceleration of fragmentation.

At the end of XII - beginning of XIII century, in Central Asia, a powerful military-feudal Mongol state was formed. In 1206 it was headed by Temuchin, proclaimed as Genghis Khan. Immediately, wars of conquest against neighbors began, and then the Tatar-Mongols gradually advanced to the borders of Kyivan Rus. In 1223, on the Kalka River, the 25,000-strong Tatar-Mongol army inflicted a crushing defeat on the squads of the South Rus princes, who, even in the face of formidable danger, could not step over the strife and act together. The next campaign against Rus was started by the Tatar-Mongols in 1237 under the command of Genghis Khan's grandson Batu. During 1237-1238 the lands of Ryazan, Volodymyr, Suzdal, and Yaroslavl were seized.

In 1239 Batu captured Pereyaslav and Chernihiv and moved to Kyiv, where Danylo Halytsky's voivode ruled - Dmytro. In the autumn of 1240 the assault began. With the help of wall-breaking machines, the conquerors invaded Kyiv, but the townspeople continued to defend themselves bravely. The last point of the defenders' resistance was the Church of the Tithe. The city was looted and destroyed. According to legend, Voivode Dmytro was saved for his courage. Then Kamyanets, Izyaslav, Volodymyr, and Halych became the prey of the conquerors.



In the picture: Destruction of Kyiv by the Mongol-Tatars

Due to the large number and strong organization of Tatar-Mongol troops, on the one hand, and scattering, military unpreparedness of Russian troops, on the other, Batu was able to join his empire - the Golden Horde, which covered the territory from the Urals to the Black Sea, almost all of Rus.

In addition to the Tatar-Mongols, Rus preferred to conquer the Crusaders, Polish and Hungarian feudal lords. However, Danylo Romanovych, the prince of Galicia and Volhynia, managed to quell their encroachments.

The Tatar-Mongol invasion greatly slowed down the socio-economic, political and cultural development of ancient Rus. Feudal fragmentation was virtually preserved, and there could be no question of reviving one's own statehood.

Having played the role of a buffer for the countries of Western Europe (the Tatar-Mongols no longer had the strength to obtain it), Rus was under the yoke for many years. Only the Galicia-Volyn principality formally managed to maintain limited independence, recognizing, however, the power of the Horde. Other lands have lost all independence. The princes were forced to recognize themselves as vassals of the Golden Horde, from the hands of the khan took the right to rule (label) and paid a heavy tribute.

Galicia-Volyn principality. After the death of Yaroslav the Wise with the beginning of feudal fragmentation, the Galician principality separated from Kiev. The first Galician princes were the descendants of the grandsons of Yaroslav the Wise - Rostyslavychi, and in Volhynia - Mstyslavychi, who traced their lineage to Volodymyr Monomakh. A feature of the political life of Galicia

was the significant influence of the nobility, which was formed not from the prince's squad, as in other lands, but from the tribal nobility. It was the Rostyslavychi, seeking to establish their dynasty in Galicia, who brought the boyar elite to power, giving them positions and estates. In addition, a significant source of enrichment of the Galician nobility was the salt trade. In general, the political situation during the rule of the Rostyslavychi ensured the dominance of the nobility, which could afford to keep even their own fighting squads.

The unification of Galicia took place under Prince Volodymyr (1124-1153), and the Galician principality flourished under his son Yaroslav Osmomysl (1153-1187). Then new cities and fortresses are built. Yaroslav's campaigns against external enemies were successful. Thus, in 1183 he captured 12 Polovtsian khans. After the death of Yaroslav Osmomysl (1187), his illegitimate son Oleg took the Galician throne. However, Galicians rebelled against him in favor of the legitimate ruler - the eldest son of Yaroslav - Volodymyr. Boyars, dissatisfied with his ruling, tried to invite to the principality of Volyn Prince Roman Mstyslavych. However, Volodymyr Yaroslavych, relying on the support of German Prince Friedrich Barbarossa and Polish King Casimir, regained the prince's throne.

After the death of the last Rostyslavych - Volodymyr (1199), Roman Mstyslavych, relying on warriors, burghers and part of the nobility, united the Galician and Volyn lands into a single principality, which gradually became the successor of Kiev.

Forming a centralized state, Roman Mstyslavych resolutely opposed the Galician nobility, which opposed him. Having made successful campaigns against Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and the Polovtsians, Roman Mstyslavych raised the international prestige of the state. In 1202-1203 he extended his power to the Kyiv and Pereyaslav regions. In 1205, during the war with Poland, Roman Mstyslavych was ambushed and killed. After that, the powerful state formation actually disintegrates.

The Galician boyars were not interested in the restoration of a single Halych-Volyn principality and organized a revolt, as a result of which Roman Mstyslavych's widow Hanna and her young sons Danylo and Vasylo were forced to flee from Halych to Volodymyr-Volynsky and then to Poland. The period of internecine wars and foreign intervention began. Only in 1238 Danylo was able to capture Galicia, defeating the combined forces of the local nobility, Hungarian and Polish feudal lords. Volyn received the Volyn lands, although both principalities existed as a whole. Danylo Halytsky's domestic policy was aimed at strengthening the state. Cities were built, new ones appeared - Lviv, Kholm. In 1239 Kyiv was annexed to the principality. The Orthodox Church was strengthened, culture developed.

However, Danylo Halytsky's activity was interrupted by the Tatar-Mongol invasion. As early as 1223, Galician troops took part in the battle with Genghis Khan on the Kalka River. However, Danylo Halytsky no longer had the strength to harm Batu's invasion. In particular, large cities were lost - Halych,

Volodymyr, Kamyanets. Later Danylo Halytsky made successful trips to Lithuania and Poland. In 1243 he captured Lublin and the land of Lublin. In 1246, Danylo went to Sarai - the capital of the Golden Horde, where he received from Batu a label for the reign. But when he returns home, he begins to prepare to fight the Horde, concluding military agreements with Polish princes and the Hungarian king. Pope Innocent IV provided active support to Danylo Halytsky in his anti-Tatar policy. In 1253, in the town of Dorogozhyn, Danylo was crowned papal legate.



In the picture: King Danylo Romanovych

But the main ally of Danylo Romanovych in 1251 was Volodymyr - Suzdal Prince Andriy Yaroslavych. The Horde decided to defeat the Rus alone and sent a huge army to Andriy. And in 1258 the Horde, led by Burundai, forced Danylo Halytsky to destroy his own great fortresses - Lviv, Volodymyr, Luchesk.

In 1264 Danylo Romanovych died. The gradual decline of the Galicia-Volyn principality begins. Until 1270, Volyn was owned by his brother

Vasylko, and Galicia and Kholm by Danylo's sons Lev, Mstyslav and Shvarpo. Lev (1264-1301) moved the capital of the principality to Lviv. Having agreed with the Tatars, he made expeditions with them to Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary, annexing Transcarpathia with Mukachevo and Uzhhorod. After Lev's death, his son Yuri I (1301-1308 or 1315) again headed the united Galicia-Volyn state, because after Vasylko the Romanov dynasty in Volhynia did not actually continue. Volodymyr-Volynskyi became the capital of the principality.

The sons of Yuri I, Andriy and Lev II (1308 or 1315 - 1323) were the last of the Romanovych family of Galician-Volyn princes and ruled together. They concluded peace treaties with the Crusaders, Lithuania, and Poland. Died in battle against the Tatars.

Galician boyars invited to the prince's table Andriy's and Lev's nephew Boleslaw, who after the conversion from the Catholic faith to Orthodoxy was named Yuri II Troydenovych. He settled relations with the Golden Horde and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, making a joint campaign with the Tatars in 1337 to Lublin. This, in turn, repulsed Poland and Hungary. Yuri II was forced to sign the Visegrad Agreement that after his death the throne would pass to Polish King Casimir III. After that, the Galician boyars, wasting no time, poisoned the last Galician-Volyn prince.

Later, the Galician boyars restrained the pressure of Poland and Lithuania, trying to win the independence of the Galician-Volyn state. In 1349, Galicia was captured by Polish King Casimir III, and before that Lithuania annexed Volhynia. The Galician-Volyn state ceases to exist.

The role of the Galicia-Volyn principality as the main political center of all Ukraine after the decline of Kyiv was very significant. It formed the idea of statehood in the Ukrainian lands, protecting them from enslavement by neighboring states. Continuing the best traditions of Ukrainian national culture, the Galicia-Volyn principality at the same time provided a fruitful influence of Western European civilizations on this culture.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Explain the main provisions of Norman theory. What role did the Vikings play in Kyiv state?
2. Which prince is associated with the emergence of Kyivan Rus? Why?
3. Show the state-building activities of the first Kiev princes.
4. What was the contribution of Volodymyr the Great in strengthening Ukrainian statehood?
5. When was Christianity introduced in Rus? Why Volodymyr stopped at the church Byzantine model?
6. What was the significance of Christianity introduction?
7. What facts can you confirm with that under Yaroslav the Wise Kyivan Rus

reached the peak of its power?

8. Explain the reasons for the feudal fragmentation of Kyivan Rus. Why Volodymyr Monomakh only managed to slow down the process of disintegration?

9. What is the significance of the Kyiv period of statehood in the history of Ukraine?

10. Why exactly in the territory of Galicia and Volhynia found their continuation state-building traditions of Kyivan Rus?

11. Under what circumstances was formed the Galicia-Volyn principality?

12. Explain the causes of “unrest” in the history of the principality after the death of Roman Mstyslavovych 1205?

13. What were the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Ukrainian statehood?

14. Describe the formation of the Golden Horde and the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

15. What was the contribution of Danylo Romanovych in strengthening Ukrainian statehood in the territory of Southwestern Rus?

16. Why is the reign of Danylo Romanovych called “the first Ukrainian kingdom”?

17. Determine the historical significance of the Galicia-Volyn principality.

18. Why in the fourteenth century the Ukrainian people were not lucky enough to preserve their statehood?

19. Identify the main stages of formation and development of Galicia-Volyn Russia.

20. What are the features of the Galicia development in X-XII centuries.?

21. What princes of the Rostyslav dynasty in Galicia do you know?

22. What did the Lyubetsky Congress mark?

23. Who is Prince Yaroslav Osmomysl and what are the main features of his domestic and foreign policy?

24. What are the features of Volyn development in the X-XII centuries.?

25. What princes of the Mstyslavych dynasty do you know?

26. Why were the Volyn princes, and not the Galician ones, able to unite the two principalities - Galicia and Volhynia?

27. Who is Roman Mstyslavovych and what is his role in the formation of Galicia-Volyn Russia?

28. Who is Prince Danylo Halytsky and what is his role in the development of Halych-Volyn Rus?

29. Give an analysis of the Mongol-Tatar invasion impact on the development of Galicia-Volyn Rus?

30. Describe the political system and socio-class structure of Galicia-Volyn Rus.

TESTS

Choose the correct answer.

1. When was Kyivan Rus founded?

- a) in VII-VIII centuries;
- b) in VIII - IX centuries;
- c) in IX-X centuries;
- d) in IX century.

2. Who and when introduced Christianity in Kyivan Rus?

- a) Olga; a) 960;
- b) Volodymyr the Great; b) 987;
- c) Yaroslav the Wise; c) 988;
- d) Volodymyr Monomakh. d) 1113

3. When did Kyivan Rus split into separate independent principalities?

- a) in the XI century;
- b) in the middle of the XII century;
- c) at the beginning of the XII century;
- d) in the second half of the XIII century;

4. Which of the Kyiv princes said: “Let Kiev be the mother of Russian cities”?

- a) Oleg;
- b) Igor;
- c) Olga;
- d) Yaroslav the Wise.

5. Which of the Kyiv princes historians call the test of Europe?

- a) Volodymyr Monomakh;
- b) Yaroslav the Wise;
- c) Volodymyr the Great;
- d) Svyatoslav.

6. Monk Nestor wrote “The Tale of bygone years”:

- a) in 1113;
- b) in 1125;
- c) in 1068;
- d) in 1037;

7. The first tax reform was carried out:

- a) Olga;
- b) Yaroslav the Wise;
- c) Volodymyr Monomakh;
- d) Svyatoslav.

8. When and in which cities of Kyivan Rus were built famous monuments and

- a) in Kiev, X century.
- b) in Chernihiv, 1128
- c) in Chernihiv, 1031-1030.
- d) in Kiev, 1037

9. When Danylo Halytsky joined the Halych-Volyn principality to Kyiv principality?

- a) in 1228;
- b) in 1238;
- c) in 1239;
- d) in 1237

10. Galician principality separated from Kyivan Rus:

- a) at the end of the XI century;
- b) at the beginning of the XII century;
- c) in the second half of the XII century.
- d) in the XIII century.

11. The Polish historian Jan Dlugash wrote about this Galician-Volyn prince: "He was a man of agility and nobility, generous to the clergy. During his reign, Rus enjoyed the benefits of peace and great prosperity"?

- a) Yuri I;
- b) Lev Danylovych;
- c) Andriy and Lev II;
- d) Roman Mstyslavovych

12. In what century Galicia-Volyn state is declining?

- a) in the middle of the XIV century;
- b) at the beginning of the XIV century;
- c) in the 15th century;
- d) in the sixteenth century.

13. Which of the Galician princes for great intelligence and agility nicknamed the Eightfold?

- a) Yaroslav (1153-1187);
- b) Volodymyr (1124 - 1153);
- c) Volodymyr (1187-1199);
- d) The ruler (1097 - 1124).

14. What is the time of the first written mention of Lviv?

- a) 1256;
- b) 1240;
- c) 1264;
- d) 1253p.

LECTURE 3: THE LATENT PERIOD OF UKRAINIAN STATE FORMATION: DIVERSITY AND CONTRADICTION OF INTERPRETATIONS

1. Historical and political aspect of foreign expansion into Ukrainian lands

2. Ukrainian society in the processes of integration of Lithuania and Poland and the creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

3. Evolution of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The phenomenon of the Zaporizhzhya Sich

1. Historical and political aspect of foreign expansion into Ukrainian lands

Ukraine in the early XIV century found itself in a difficult situation: the Mongol-Tatars devastated Rus land, exhausted the people, dispersed the Rus princes, established a cruel yoke of the Golden Horde; Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Turkey, and eventually the Principality of Moscow began to fight for Ukrainian lands. It should be noted that the conquest of Ukrainian lands took place in various ways, from dynastic marriages to seizure of these lands by force.

Having emerged in the middle of the 13th century, the Lithuanian state gradually increased its influence and expanded its territory. Thus, under Prince Gediminas (1316-1341), it captured a large part of Belarus, and his sons Olgerd and Keystut annexed the Chernihiv-Siverskyi region (1357-1358), Podillya (1363), and Kyiv region (1362). From now on, the history of Ukrainian lands becomes connected with the history of feudal Lithuania.

All power in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was concentrated in the hands of the Grand Duke. Unlike Kyivan Rus, the principalities in Lithuania did not have autonomy, and gradually the local princes were replaced by Lithuanian governors. The system of direct relationship between military service and land tenure enabled the Grand Duke of Lithuania to have a significant army and control virtually all resources of the state.

One of the main foreign policy tasks of the Lithuanian state was the struggle against the Golden Horde. A significant event was the victory of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian-Belarusian army over the Tatar-Mongols in the Blue Waters in 1362. In fact, the Tatar-Mongol yoke in the Ukrainian lands was abolished during the reign of Vytautas, son of Keystut (1392-1430). But there was a real threat from the Teutonic Order. In addition, after the battle of Kulikovo field (1380) the influence of Moscow increased. All this led to the choice of Lithuania's ally in the person of Poland, which also became dependent on the Kingdom of Hungary.

The secret of such a rapid development of the Lithuania Grand Duchy was, first, that the state actually expanded due to the merger of dynasties: the old

- Rurykovich and the new - Gediminovich. From the point of view of unwritten medieval international law, the extension of power of Lithuanian princes to Ukrainian (Russian) lands was legal, because due to dynastic ties they turned out to be the closest relatives of the Galician dynasty, which ceased to exist after the death of Yuri II (Boleslav). Second, the Gediminoviches, who united different peoples under their rule, did not produce the advantages of any one of them, but formed a polyethnic state. Third, the Lithuanian princes pursued a prudent and cautious policy of preserving the existing Rus state and cultural traditions. In all principalities the old, time-tested political and administrative apparatus continued to operate. "We do not destroy antiquities and do not introduce novelty" - this was the slogan under which the penetration of Lithuanian power took place. Fourth, Lithuanian princes began to renounce paganism and accept the Christian faith. Therefore, according to the ideas of those times, Lithuanian princes were not "foreigners" but "friendly" for the local population. Fifth, the establishment of Lithuanian power over southwestern Rus dates back to the crisis of Tatar-Mongol statehood, which facilitated the liberation of Rus lands from Tatar-Mongols and increased the authority of Lithuanian rulers as liberators of Christians from infidels. Sixth, representatives of the Gediminovich dynasty usually married Rus princesses, spoke Rus, and were half Rus by blood. Thus, the presence of Ukrainian lands in the Lithuanian-Russian state had the following political features: 1) all Ukrainian lands that were part of the Lithuanian state were considered the property of the Gediminas dynasty, retaining, especially at first, the previous political and administrative system, some autonomy, legal tradition, ancient local customs, the Orthodox faith, which was actively adopted by Lithuanian rulers. 2) Rus princes and boyars on the basis of agreements with the Grand Duke of Lithuania served him as vassals. 3) there was a prospect of further development of the new state as an Orthodox Lithuanian-Ukrainian state.



In the picture: Grand Duchy of Lithuania

A large part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania consisted of East Slavic lands, where local feudal lords, as a rule, preserved their estates. Lithuanians borrowed the previous structure of government, military organization, judicial system, and so on. Although it should be recognized, first, that since the XVI century Lithuanian statutes, codes of medieval law of the Grand Duchy, operated in the Ukrainian lands. Secondly, despite the fact that Lithuanian lands actually accounted for only about one tenth of the entire state, Lithuanians did not assimilate into the East Slavic ethnic group, but, on the contrary, further intensified centralist tendencies.

On July 1, 1569, in Lublin, the Sejm approved a union act proclaiming the unification of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the formation of a new federal state, the Rzeczpospolita. Some Ukrainian nobles opposed the union for a long time - Oleksandr Chortoryyskyi, Konstantin Ostrozkyi, Bohdan Koretskyi, Kostyantyn Vyshnevetskyi. The latter delivered a speech in the Sejm, which is worth quoting in full: "We declare to Your Royal Grace, we join as voluntary and free - so that we are not degraded in our noble honors, for we are a nation so noble that we will not give way to any other nation in the world. We have princely families especially glorious and respectful by their origin - we would be sorry if their honor had to be violated by anything. Therefore, we ask that they be left in their honor. Also, we belong to different religions, especially Greek, not to be humiliated and not forced into another religion". After some Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian magnates, dissatisfied with the Polish project of the union, tried to gather a noble militia to fight for their rights, King Sigismund III Augustus annexed the Ukrainian lands - Podlasie, Volhynia, and then Kyiv and Bratslav, equalizing aristocracy of these lands in rights and privileges with the Polish nobility. The rebels were forced to return to the Sejm. Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania signed an act of state union and took an oath of allegiance to it. This meant the creation of the new state: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (literally from the Polish language - a common cause). It was to have an elected king, a Sejm, a single foreign policy, a common treasury. Lithuania's autonomy was preserved only in matters of local self-government, the organization of the armed forces and in the legal sphere. Ukrainian lands were not even part of the Lithuanian autonomy, but were included in the Polish voivodships - Rus (Lviv), Belz (Belz), Volyn (Lutsk), Kyiv (Kyiv), Podil (Kamyanets), Bratslav (Bratslav). The voivodships were headed by appointed Polish magnates.

2. Ukrainian society in the processes of integration of Lithuania and Poland and the creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The Union of Lublin in 1569 contributed to the strengthening of Polish social, national, religious, and cultural expansion. Most of the Ukrainian lands were occupied by the largest Polish magnate families, who became unlimited owners there. Serfdom is intensifying. The Lithuanian Statute of 1588, which was in force in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth together with Polish

feudal law, finally enslaved the peasants who had lived on the land of the feudal lord for 10 years. Unlimited serfdom and the prohibition of transition were recognized.



In the picture: Polish – Lithuanian – Ruthenian Commonwealth (1658)

After the signing of the third Lithuanian statute in 1588 and the resolution of the Sejm of the Rzeczpospolita in 1573, the peasantry became permanently enslaved and completely dependent on the power of the feudal lord. According to these two laws: Polish lords became the owners of all the lands of the Commonwealth; the peasants were attached to the lord's estates; the peasants were forbidden to move to another place without the permission of the lord; the ladies searched for the fugitives and punished them; the owners had the right to punish all disobedient peasants; serfs had to work unlimited serfdom in the estates of the feudal lords; the right of patrimonial (lordly) court over peasants is finally fixed for landowners; peasants no longer had the right to appear in court independently; a single class of serfs was created by merging enslaved servants with other categories of dependent peasants; the right of inheritance belonged to the sons, daughters could receive no more than a quarter of the property in the form of a dowry. The serfdom remained natural, but commodity-money relations developed, which undermined its isolation, and gradually the subsistence economy of the peasants, whose labor maintained the estate, was replaced by the commodity economy of the landlords - filwarks. However, such farms could not exist without the forced labor of dependent peasants - serfdom. In addition to farming and cattle breeding, which were the main occupations of Ukrainian and Lithuanian peasants, filwarks also developed industries, including beekeeping, milling, brewing and distilling. Trade in the products of these industries also gave significant profits to landowners. Such filwark economy led to the landlessness of the peasants, the spread of serfdom and the development of serfdom.

In 1557, the King of the Commonwealth Sigismund II Augustus approved the law "Charter for drags" - a legal document on agrarian and financial and tax reform in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This document contained 49 articles. The reform was carried out in the Grand Ducal possessions in Lithuania, Belarus and partly in Ukraine. According to the "Statutes for drags", all land holdings of the Grand Duke were measured and divided into equal plots - drags with an area of 16.8 to 21.8 hectares, depending on the area. These plots became the only unit of taxation. The best arable land was allocated for farms, the rest was distributed among the peasants.

The cities devastated during the Mongol-Tatar invasion were gradually rebuilt. Over time, they became centers of crafts, trades and trade, as well as political and cultural life. Polish kings saw the cities as a source of income, and also sought support to combat the arbitrariness of the nobility, so they gave some cities charters of Magdeburg law (first appeared in the XIII century in Magdeburg (Germany)). In the XIII-XVIII centuries. Ukraine). According to this charter: the authorities had no right to govern the city and judge its inhabitants; the burghers could independently choose the court and the city self-government bodies (magistrate) headed by the viit. After the election of the magistrate, the city formally left the power of the mayor and magnates; the population of cities had the right to regulate the activities of shops and merchant corporations, as

well as to resolve issues of guardianship, inheritance of property, etc; social inequality among the burghers was legitimized. According to their status, they were divided into the rich (merchants, moneylenders, owners of handicraft workshops, guilds, wealthy artisans) and the urban poor (apprentices, students, servants, hirelings, non-guild artisans); also in the cities peasants, soldiers, Cossacks, gentry, clergy lived. In the XIV-XVII centuries Lviv, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Lutsk, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Bratslav, Chernihiv, and other cities had Magdeburg rights. The first among them was Lviv - 1356, and Kiev began to use the Magdeburg law only in 1494-1497 pp. Thus, after the conclusion of the Krevsk Union (1385), the Ukrainian lands finally lost the remnants of autonomy, and from 1480 fell into the epicenter of the Moscow-Lithuanian confrontation. When the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was formed (1569), they became an integral part of Poland, which led to the forced polarization and catholicization of the Ukrainian people.

3. Evolution of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The phenomenon of the Zaporizhzhya Sich

The question of when the Ukrainian Cossacks arose, who can be considered the first Cossacks, what are the social sources of the Cossacks, etc. has long attracted the attention of both domestic and foreign researchers. Over time, a number of versions of the Cossacks' origin:

- 1) come from the ancient Goths or Khazars;
- 2) are descendants of the Turkic tribe of black hoods, which existed in ancient times;
- 3) the ancestors of the Cossacks were Cherkasy (Circassians), who during the existence of Kyivan Rus lived in one of its provinces - Tmutarakan;
- 4) the first Cossacks were Tatars, who separated from their horde;
- 5) the first Cossacks were brovniki - robbers of Kyivan Rus times and others.

Most of these theories were based on the fact that the first mention of the Cossacks is contained in the Mongol chronicles of the thirteenth century. (1240). However, they did not take into account the difference between individuals or small groups who led a specific way of life, and a large social stratum that opposed itself to other segments of the population - peasants, burghers.

Instead, Soviet historiography ignored another well-known fact - the first mention of the Cossacks as a large part of the population dates back to the fifteenth century. (1489), is contained in the chronicle of M. Belsky in connection with the description of the Polish king's campaign against the Tatars. Despite the fact that enslavement of the Ukrainian peasantry took place only in the sixteenth century, most Soviet historians linked the emergence of the Cossacks with the enslavement of the peasantry, increasing economic, political, national and religious oppression by the Polish nobility, which pushed the peasantry to mass escape to free lands and self-organization in new places of residence. The main reason for the emergence of the Cossacks was considered to be the class struggle of the peasantry against Polish feudal exploitation, and the

main social source of the Cossacks' formation - the serfs. Another picture seems more realistic. Indeed, some "Cossacks" may have appeared in ancient times. They could be Khazars, Brodniks, black hoods, Tatars and Polovtsians.



In the picture: The founder of the Ukrainian Cossacks was Baida Vyshnevetsky

However, the emergence of new social strata of the population, no doubt, should be associated with large social processes. Such a process was the transition of Russian (Ukrainian) lands under the rule of the Lithuanians, as a result of which a large number of Rus warriors, representatives of the princely administration, lost their jobs. Under the circumstances, they had no choice but to look for a place to live outside the Lithuanian state. In particular, in the Dnieper. This itself can explain, for example, the fact that at the head of the Cossack battalions were, as a rule, noble people, even princes (D. Vyshnevetsky). It is difficult to imagine that the prince agreed to lead a peasant herd. On the other hand, we can assume that at the new place of residence professional Rus soldiers are forced to coexist with the local Turkic-speaking population - Tatars, Polovtsians, to assimilate it. Hence the Turkic self-name – "Cossack", and the peculiarities of the military tactics of the Cossacks, and some characteristic elements of Turkic clothing (for example, trousers), the Cossack "herring", which has long been in vogue among the steppe dwellers, and so on. Another thing is that later, when rumors began to spread about the

existence of a free Cossack society, seekers of free life and adventure from various Ukrainian lands and even other countries began to flock to it. Among them were representatives of various population segments - the bourgeoisie, the clergy, the petty gentry, as well as, as an exception, the peasantry. Among the reasons that led to the rapid growth of the Cossacks, we can highlight the following: - social (strengthening the feudal exploitation of the Ukrainian population by Lithuanian and Polish magnates and gentry, legal registration of serfdom of the peasantry from the feudal lords); - economic (lack of arable land, the need for colonization of free lands of the Wild Field - the steppes beyond the Dnieper rapids); - political (the desire of the Polish administration to attract the Cossacks to the service to protect the southern borders from the Tatar threat); - national-religious (opposition to the policy of colonization and Catholicization of the Ukrainian population, the Catholic Church's attack on the rights of the Orthodox); - strategic (threat from the Crimean Khanate).



In the picture: Accompanying Ukrainian Cossacks to war

The military factor had a significant influence on the formation of the Cossack state. In the XV-XVII centuries the south of Ukraine was engulfed in flames of continuous struggle against the Tatar-Turkish invaders. For defense, fortifications were built of cut down and chopped logs. Among the first organizers of the Cossack detachments were the elders of the border towns: Ostafiy Dashkovych, Bernard Pretvykh, as well as the sons of the magnates Zaslavskyi, Koretskyi and others. From the middle of the XVI century the pace of formation of the Cossack stratum is accelerating. The founding of the

Zaporizhzhya Sich played an important role in this process. In the middle of the XV century. Zaporizhzhya Sich (that is, fortifications on the rapids), founded by Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, became the center of Ukrainian Cossacks unification, and the army was named Zaporizhzhya. At different times, Sich was located on different islands. In total, there were 8 Siches on the territory of Ukraine: Khortytska, Bazavlutska, Tomakivska, Mykytynska, Chortomlytska. Oleshkivska, Kamyanska, Nova or Pidpilnenska. Fugitives began to gather here not only from Ukraine, but also from Poland, Belarus, Moldova, and Rus. Very soon Zaporizhzhya turned into a mighty fortress surrounded by a high fence with cannons. Gradually, the Cossacks were divided into different Cossack strata: Sich Cossacks (almost all the time were in the Sich, belonged to a certain hut), registered Cossacks (were in the service of the Polish king, received pay and land for their duties, as well as exempt from taxes), palanquin Cossacks (family Cossacks who lived on farms and winter quarters, belonged to a certain palanquin), unregistered Cossacks (not included in the registers of the Cossacks, the poorest and most active in social demonstrations of the Cossacks). The Zaporizhzhya grassroots army had the features of a democratic republic. The Sich Rada (Council) was the highest legislative and administrative body. It considered issues of domestic and foreign policy, tried criminals, elected the government - military and palanquin officers (camp chieftain, judge, osavul, clerk, hut chieftains, military officers, cornet and others). In the Sich there was no feudal ownership of land, serfdom, formal equality between all Cossacks on land, participation in councils, but between the sergeant and ordinary Cossacks there was social inequality, which caused dissatisfaction of the poor Cossacks (gray). Zaporizhzhya Sich had a kind of military-administrative organization. The Zaporizhzhya army had two divisions - military and territorial. The army was divided into 38 huts (Pashchuk, Pereyaslav, Kaniv, Irkliiv, Korsun, etc.), and the territory was first divided into 5 and then into 8 palanquins. The name "hut" comes from the words "smoke", "to smoke". It was used in the sense of hundreds, regiments, parts of the army. Palanka literally means "small fortress" in the Tatar language. The military Kleinods of the Cossacks consisted of a mace, a pen, a bunchuk, a korogva, a seal, and cauldrons or timpani.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Which states were Ukrainian lands divided between in the XIV century?
2. Why is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania called the latent form of Ukrainian statehood?
3. Explain the content of Krevsk and Gorodel unions.
4. What was the policy of Prince Svydrygailo?

5. How was the Commonwealth formed? What were the consequences of this event for the Ukrainian lands?
6. What was Poland's policy towards Ukrainian lands?
7. How did the situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church change in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries?
8. What were fraternities?
9. Evaluate the activities of Prince K. Ostroh.
10. What are the reasons that led to the Brest Union? Analyze different points of view on this event.
11. Pick up the facts that testify to the struggle for the preservation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the first half of the seventeenth century.
12. Describe the reform activities of Metropolitan Peter Mohyla.
13. What is the role of the Crimean Khanate in the history of Ukraine?
14. Discover the origin of the word "Cossack".
15. Describe the preconditions and causes of the Ukrainian Cossacks?
16. Describe the reform activities of Metropolitan Peter Mohyla.
17. What is the role of the Crimean Khanate in the history of Ukraine?
18. Discover the origin of the word "Cossack".
19. Describe the preconditions and causes of the Ukrainian Cossacks?
20. What factors contributed to the transformation of the Cossacks into a new Ukrainian national elite?
21. Prove that the Zaporizhzhya Sich was a state and political formation of the Ukrainian people. And can there be an opposite point of view?

TESTS

1. What external factor played a decisive role in the accession of the lands of former Kyivan Rus to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania?
 - a) Mongolian yoke;
 - b) expansion of the German Crusaders;
 - c) dynastic union of Lithuania and Poland;
 - d) formation of the Moscow state.
2. The struggle of Poland and Lithuania for the Galician-Volyn heritage ended:
 - a) division of possessions of the principality between the two states;
 - b) entry of all possessions of the principality in Lithuania;
 - c) devastation and depopulation of lands, turning them into the Wild Field;
 - d) preservation of the Galicia-Volyn principality as a vassal of Poland.
3. As a result of which event the Grand Duchy of Lithuania secured Kyiv, Podillya, Pereyaslav?
 - a) Battle of the Blue Waters

- b) battle on the river Vorskla
- c) Battle of Wilkomir
- d) Battle of Grunwald

4. What region is mentioned in the passage from the source?

“After the death of King Casimir, this region came under Hungarian rule. However, after the conclusion of the Krevsk Union, Poland regained its strength and finally annexed it to its possessions.”

- a) Volyn
- b) Galicia
- c) Podillya
- Transcarpathia
- d) Question 5

5. Who in the late XV - early XVI centuries was called the “uncrowned king of Rus”?

- a) Constantine of Ostroh
- b) Yuri Drohobych
- c) Fedor Koriyatovych
- d) Yan Dlugosh

6. The Battle of the Blue Waters was decisive in:

- a) the struggle of Lithuania and Poland for the Galician-Volyn heritage
- b) transition of Ukrainian lands under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- c) establishing the Golden Horde rule in Rus
- d) in the process of liquidation of the specific Ukrainian lands’ system

7. Which Ukrainian lands became part of the Kingdom of Poland earlier than others?

- a) Galicia
- b) Western Podillya
- c) Volyn
- d) Right Bank

8. The Crimean Khanate was formed as a result of disintegration:

- a) Kyivan Rus
- b) Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- c) Ottoman Empire
- d) Golden Horde

9. Collection of the law norms of Kyivan Rus XI-XII centuries. “Russian Truth” was actively used in court proceedings:

- a) Commonwealth

- b) Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- c) Crimean Khanate
- d) Kingdom of Poland

10. An example of the struggle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against the Golden Horde for the heritage of Kyivan Rus is the battle:

- a) on the river Blue Water
- b) near Dorogochyn
- c) on the river Kalka
- d) near Yaroslav

11. Prince Costyantyn Ivanovych of Ostroh became famous as a military leader in the wars with:

- a) Crimean Tatars and the Moscow Empire
- b) Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- c) Kingdom of Hungary and the Principality of Moldavia
- d) Ottoman Empire and the Teutonic Order

12. The final liquidation of the Volyn and Kyiv principalities in 1452 and 1471 led to:

- a) expansion of voivodship administration in the Ukrainian lands
- b) abolition of Magdeburg law in Ukrainian cities
- c) introduction of serfdom in Ukrainian lands
- d) entry of Ukrainian lands into the Kingdom of Poland

13. Ukrainian lands became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a result:

- a) conclusion of the Krevsk Union
- b) struggle of Lithuanian princes against the Mongol khans
- c) long struggle of Lithuanian princes against Moscow princes
- d) conclusion of a dynastic alliance with the last Galician-Volyn prince

14. As a result of the Moscow-Lithuanian wars of the XV-XVI centuries:

- a) the Kyiv and Volyn principalities of Lithuania were abolished
- b) The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland concluded the Kreva Union
- c) Chernihiv-Siversky lands became part of the Moscow state
- d) the Orthodox population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania came under the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate

15. Which state was the Crimean Khanate in the vassal dependence of from 1478 to 1776?

- a) Commonwealth
- b) Moscow Kingdom

- c) Ottoman Empire
- d) Grand Duchy of Lithuania

16. The Krevsk Union is an agreement that provided for:

- a) unification of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into the federal state of the Commonwealth
- b) return of princely lands to Prince Vytautas and recognition of him as the “lifelong ruler” of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- c) the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland and the marriage of Prince Jagiello to Queen Jadwiga
- d) restoration “forever” of the Kyiv and Volyn principalities within the Kingdom of Poland

17. During the reign of which prince in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was included most of the Ukrainian lands?

- a) Gediminas
- b) Olgerd
- c) Lubart
- d) Vytautas

18. As a result of the conclusion of the Krevsk Union:

- a) Lithuania and Poland were united into a single state, the Rzeczpospolita
- b) there was a split in the Orthodox Church and the formation of the Greek Catholic Church
- c) the internal political struggle in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania intensified
- d) Ukrainian lands managed to get rid of Mongol rule

19. Who is considered the founder of the Crimean Khanate?

- a) Haji Giray
- b) Islam Giray
- c) Mangley-Girey
- d) Davlet-Girey

20. Which separate principality in the Ukrainian lands was finally liquidated by the Grand Duke of Lithuania in 1471?

- a) Volyn
- b) Podolsk
- c) Chernihiv
- d) Kyiv

21. The capital of the Crimean Khanate was the city:

- a) Bakhchisarai
- b) Coffee

- c) Digging
- d) Gezlov

22. At the end of the XV century the Crimean Khanate became a vassal of:

- a) Ottoman Empire
- b) Commonwealth
- c) Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- d) Austrian Habsburgs

Lecture 4 UKRAINIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLE (mid-seventeenth century). COSSACK-HETMAN STATE: PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RETHINKING

- 1. Ukrainian national revolution: debatable issues.**
- 2. The Age of Ruin and the loss of territorial integrity in the late seventeenth century.**
- 3. Elimination of the Ukrainian statehood institution by tsarism in the eighteenth century: regularity or colonial policy.**

1. Ukrainian national revolution: debatable issues.

The main achievement of the National Liberation War was the establishment of the Ukrainian state - the Hetmanate. The peculiarity of the Cossack state was its military nature. It was conditioned both by the need to fight for independence and by the traditions of the Zaporizhzhya Army. During the summer and autumn of 1648, Ukrainian central and local authorities, judicial institutions were formed on the liberated Ukrainian lands, a new principle of administrative-territorial division was introduced, and a new socio-economic structure was gradually formed. Various strata of the Ukrainian society of that time (Cossacks, Ukrainian Orthodox nobility, bourgeoisie and clergy) were involved in the development of the state.

Since 1648, the system of public authorities of the Cossack state was developed as a holistic, hierarchical, with a fairly clear structure and functions. This system had three levels: general, regimental and hundredth. The first consisted of the highest state power and administration bodies: the highest collegial bodies - the General (military) council, the council of officers, the hetman as head of state and the general (hetman) government. The second were regimental Cossack councils, colonels, regimental governments. The third were hundreds of Cossack councils, centurions, hundreds of governments. In large cities, the administration was carried out by magistrates, in small (privileged) - atamans, in ordinary cities – elected policemen, and in villages - village atamans. Accordingly, the branched judicial system of state courts was built: hundreds, regimental courts (boards) and the general court; estates and special courts.



In the picture: portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky

The Ukrainian state was headed by a hetman elected by the general military council in the Zaporizhzhya Sich. This tradition of his election by the General Council will be preserved in the Hetmanate until 1750. The terms of the hetmanship were not set. Hetman was elected “for term of his life”, i.e. for life.

Hetman had broad powers delegated to him with the election of the General (General) Council. He was the head of state, he had legislative, supreme administrative and military power, he acted as the highest appellate court against the existing judicial bodies, approved court verdicts, often appointed a sergeant general and colonels, had the right to distribute state lands.

The most authoritative collegial body in the Cossack state was formally recognized as the General Cossack (military) council, which with the change of its state and legal status became known as the General. It was traditionally held to address the most important and urgent issues of domestic and foreign policy. The competence of national councils of Cossack customary law and hetman's universals included constituent, legislative and control powers: election of the hetman, general sergeant and general government or their elimination, authorization (adoption) of laws, decision-making on war and peace, conclusion of agreements with other states, administration of justice. Thus, in 1648 there were several meetings of the General Cossack Council - on the election of

Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, resolving issues of military action against the Commonwealth, the terms of the armistice it, relations with the Crimean Khanate, Russia, etc. During the war, the General Councils attached great importance to the preservation of the state, peace, and the conclusion of military alliances. Such issues were considered at almost all councils in 1648-1654. According to the Cossack custom, the council had the right to make decisions on military strategy, to authorize or annul resolutions of the council of elders or decisions of the hetman, to control their activities.

The territory of the Cossack state in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv consisted of the lands of the former Kyiv, Chernihiv and Bratslav voivodships and covered 200 thousand square km - from the Sluchi River in the west to the Moscow border in the east and from the Pripyat basin in the north to the steppe strip in the south.

Chyhyryn became the capital and hetman's residence.

The Polish administrative system was abolished in the liberated lands. Voivodeships and counties were liquidated, and regiments with their own territorial divisions were created instead. In 1649, the entire territory of the Ukrainian state was divided into 16 regiments (on the Right Bank - 9, on the Left Bank - 7 regiments).

The center of the regiment was one of the significant cities of the regimental territory.

Each regiment was headed by a colonel who was elected by the regimental council or appointed by the hetman. The colonel concentrated in his hands military, judicial and administrative power on the territory of the regiment, that is, he was not only the military leader, but also had power over all the inhabitants of the regiment.

The territory of the regiment was divided into 10-20 and even more than a hundred. Hundreds, like regiments, differed in area and number. The administrative centers of hundreds were cities, towns and large villages.

Military-administrative power in the territory of hundreds was exercised by hundreds.

The cities that had the Magdeburg right (Kyiv, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, Pereyaslav, Starodub, Hlukhiv, Poltava, Baturyn, etc.) were governed by magistrates headed by viyts. In the villages, the affairs were handled by the elders elected by the peasant community, and the affairs of the Cossacks by the atamans elected by them.

Zaporizhzhya Sich was a separate administrative-territorial unit in the state.

The Hetmanate had one of the strongest armies in Europe at the time, which was created by the efforts of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and an experienced Cossack officer in the first year of the war by uniting disparate peasant and Cossack detachments.

The People's Liberation Army numbered more than 100,000 soldiers and was organized on the regimental-hundredth territorial principle: a certain territory exhibited several hundred Cossacks, who united in a regiment.

The army consisted of representatives of various segments of the population. The majority were Cossacks and burghers. However, the core of the army was the registered and Zaporizhzhia Cossacks.

The structuring of the army, its material support, combat training and personnel policy were also carried out according to the traditions of the Zaporizhzhia Army.

The basis of the Cossack troops was infantry. On the initiative of the hetman during the National Liberation War, a Cossack cavalry was created, which in 1649 successfully resisted the enemy. The active army also included units of intelligence, fortification and border services, and guard detachments. Special units provided supplies of weapons, ammunition, food.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky managed to attract talented commanders to the Cossack army. They came from different social classes, but all of them were united by an extraordinary devotion to the ideas of the national liberation war and personally to Khmelnytsky.

Filon Jalaliy, Fedir Veshnyak, Ivan Girya, Maksym Nestorenko, Maksym Krivonis, Tymysh Nosach, the Vyhovsky brothers, Nechay, Ivan Bohun, Ostap Gogol (ancestor of Mykola Gogol), Antin Zhdanovych, and Martyn Nebaba were the closest hetman's entourage. For example, Fedor Veshnyak was called Khmelnytsky's adviser, and contemporaries wrote about Philon Jalaliy that he was always with the hetman.

Many Cossack officers came from the nobility. In particular, Kyiv Colonel Mykhailo Krychevsky, who took part in all the battles of 1648 - the first half of 1649, came from the Ukrainian nobility of Brest. The ancient family of Ukrainian Orthodox nobles the Hulyanytskyis gave Ukraine three colonels - Gregory, Ivan and Cyril.



In the picture: Cossacks in battle

Immigrants from the nobility, having become Cossacks, often got to the General Chancellery, because for the most part they had a good education, knew the laws and diplomatic etiquette.

There were representatives of burghers and peasants among the Cossack officers. Former Korostyshiv burgher, and later Chernihiv colonel Martyn Nebaba, was considered by foreign diplomats to be one of the best colonels in Khmelnytsky.

The organization of the state apparatus, the maintenance of the army, and diplomatic activity required considerable funds. Bohdan Khmelnytsky was directly in charge of money affairs in the Cossack state.

There were several sources of income for the Military Treasury, and above all - the land that was transferred to the use of the Treasure, agricultural industries (mills, breweries, etc.) and rent. A lot of money came from trade (fees for auctions and fairs, border duties, etc.). There were general taxes in the state.

The peculiarities of the payment and acquisition of taxes were determined by the hetman's universals. The unit of taxation was the yard, i.e. the farm.

Of the banknotes, the most common were Polish coins, followed by Moscow and Turkish coins. According to contemporaries, at the end of 1649 the minting of state coins began; however, those coins were not found.

The Cossack state had its own system of justice. It consisted of the General Court, regimental and hundreds of courts.

The highest judicial institution was the General Military Court under the Hetman. He considered appellate cases of regimental and hundreds of courts, as well as some cases with which petitioners appealed directly to the hetman.



In the picture: Hetman Ukraine in 1649 - 1654

The General Court consisted of two general judges and a court clerk.

Local courts were presided over personally by colonels or centurions. Not only Cossacks, but also burghers and peasants were subject to Cossack courts.

City courts operated in cities with Magdeburg law. In addition, there were also ecclesiastical courts in Ukraine, the force of which extended to the internal affairs of the clergy.

The establishment of the Ukrainian Cossack state - the Hetmanate - took place against the background of profound changes in economic and social life.

Large and medium-sized secular land tenure, filwark and serfdom management system, and serfdom were abolished.

Instead, Cossack, peasant, and state land ownership was formed.

As a result, the social structure of society has changed. Polish magnates and the Catholic nobility, the Catholic clergy, were forced to leave Ukraine, the strata that held power in their hands until the beginning of the National Liberation War.

The Cossack status began to play a leading role in the life of society.

Power and basic wealth were concentrated in the hands of the Cossack officers.

Cossack officers were formed from representatives of various social strata.

The indisputable conquest of the Cossack status was the personal freedom of the vast majority of peasants and burghers, who, moreover, were free to join the Cossack state.

The vast majority of peasants became Cossacks and began to run a free Cossack economy.

The situation of the burghers also improved due to the fact that the dominance of foreigners in the cities was eliminated and national and religious barriers to crafts, industry, trade, and participation in self-government were removed.


2. The Age of Ruin and the loss of territorial integrity in the late seventeenth century.

After B. Khmelnytsky's death, his son Yuriy Khmelnytsky, elected hetman, was replaced by I. Vyhovsky by the decision of the council of elders and sent to Kyiv to complete his studies. Thus, the Khmelnytsky dynasty was removed from power. Violation of the principle of hereditary hetmanship created a temptation among the officers to fight for power. Many scholars consider this fact to be one of the main reasons for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood of that time.

In domestic politics, I. Vyhovsky initially advocated the priority role of the nobility, ignoring the ancient principles of social organization of Ukraine, based on the traditions of the Cossacks. He also made serious changes in foreign policy. Dissatisfied with the interference of Russian officials in Ukraine's

affairs, he began peace talks with Poland. At the beginning of 1658 Vyhovsky gave the Polish King Jan Casimir consent to the recognition of suzerainty.

An outraged Cossack officers under the leadership of Kosh leader J. Barabash and Poltava Colonel M. Pushkar gathers an army and actually starts a civil war. The hetman defeated the rebellion and severely punished its participants. In September 1658, negotiations with Poland were continued, and on September 16 the Treaty of Hadiach was signed, according to which Ukraine as a “Russian principality” was part of the Commonwealth as a formally equal subject of the federation. The Ukrainian state was recognized within the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Bratslav voivodships. Authorities were formed on the Polish model. The state was headed by an elected hetman. Ukraine could have its own court, army, and treasury, but at the same time it was deprived of the possibility of international relations. The rights of the Catholic and Orthodox churches were equalized, and one version of the agreement even referred to the liquidation of the union.



In the picture: I. Vyhovsky

Vyhovsky's pro-Polish orientation did not find support among the Ukrainian people. And the Cossacks were openly preparing for the attack. At this time, Russia is starting a war against the hetman. With the help of the Crimean Tatars, Vyhovsky defeated Russian troops near Konotop in July 1659. But the hetman could not take advantage of the victory, as another rebellion

arose against him - led by I. Bohun and I. Sirko. Supported by Russian troops, the rebels defeated Vyhovsky, and he was forced to escape to Poland.



In the picture: Anniversary coin dedicated to the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop.

In September 1659, at the Bila Tserkva Council, Yu. Khmelnytsky was again proclaimed the hetman. He signed with the tsarist government the new Pereyaslav Articles of 1659, which, in contrast to the March Articles of 1654, in fact recognized the status of Ukraine's extremely limited autonomy within Russia. The election of a hetman without the king's permission and foreign relations were forbidden. Moscow voivodes settled in Kyiv, Pereyaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, Bratslav, and Uman. The Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitanate was subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate.

Pereyaslav's articles and relations with Moscow caused extreme dissatisfaction in the right-bank officers, which ultimately led to the division of Ukraine on a territorial basis.

But in 1660, after a failed campaign of Russian troops in Lviv, Yu. Khmelnytsky severed ties with Moscow and signed the Treaty of Slobodyshche with Poland, which almost repeated the Treaty of Hadiach, i.e. Ukraine returned to the Commonwealth on autonomous grounds, losing political independence. This provoked a mixed reaction from the Ukrainian people, and Ukraine was effectively divided into two parts - the Right Bank under the Polish protectorate and the Left Bank under the Russian protectorate.

In 1663 Yu. Khmelnytsky renounced the hetmanship, and his place was taken by the Pereyaslav colonel P. Teterya. In the same year, at the "Black Council" in Nizhyn, I. Bryukhovetsky, the leader of the Zaporizhzhya Sich, was elected the left-bank hetman. In 1665 he signed with Russia the Moscow Articles, which further restricted the rights of the Ukrainian people. This led to a rebellion in which I. Bryukhovetsky was killed (1668).

At this time, an anti-feudal uprising broke out on the Right Bank of Ukraine, which led to the collapse of the hetmanship of P. Teterya, who pursued a pro-Polish policy. Colonel P. Doroshenko of Cherkasy (1665-1676) was

elected the hetman. His main goal was the liberation and unification of Ukraine. To do this, he proclaims a union with Crimea and Turkey.

In 1667, Russia and Poland concluded the Andrusiv Armistice behind Ukraine, which, in violation of the March Articles of 1654, divided Ukraine. Left-bank Ukraine with Kyiv remained part of Russia, and Smolensk and Siverska Zemlya returned to it. Right-bank Ukraine passed to Poland. Zaporizhzhya was under the rule of both states.

In order to strengthen its position within the country and secure popular support, Doroshenko is systematically convening a military council. Independence from the Cossack officers was to be ensured by a mercenary army, the so-called serdyuk regiments. The settlement of the edges of the Right Bank, which were previously a wasteland, begins.

Relying on the support of the Tatars, Doroshenko is trying to oust the Poles from the Right Bank. In the autumn of 1667, in front of the united Cossack-Turkish troops, the Polish king recognized the sovereignty of the hetmanate in the Right Bank Ukraine.

Having established himself in the Right Bank, Doroshenko prepared a campaign in the Left Bank, where in 1668 he proclaimed himself the hetman of all Ukraine. But at this time the military activity of Poland resumes. Therefore, leaving Colonel D. Mnohohrishnyi, Chernihiv's acting hetman, in the Left Bank, Doroshenko returned to the Right Bank.

In March 1669, at the Glukhiv Council, Mnohohrishnyi was elected the hetman, and at the same time the Glukhiv Articles were approved, according to which the number of Russian voivodes in Ukraine decreased, and Ukrainian delegates could take part in Moscow's diplomatic affairs. Mnohohrishnyi and part of the Cossack officers turn to Russia.

Meanwhile, in the Right Bank, in addition to clashes with Polish troops, Doroshenko had additional problems - new contenders for the hetman's mace: J. Sukhoviyy, who relied on the Cossacks, and M. Khanenko - a protege of the Commonwealth.

In this situation, Doroshenko was forced to strengthen the anti-Turkish orientation, officially accepting in 1669 the protectorate of Istanbul.

In 1672, Turkey started a war against Poland and won with the help of the Cossacks. The Buchach Peace Agreement, signed the same year, marked the entry of Right-Bank Ukraine into Turkey. P. Doroshenko was proclaimed the ruler of Ukraine within the Bratslav and Kyiv regions. At that time, the government in Left Bank Ukraine was changing. Instead of D. Mnohohrishnyi, who had been exiled to Siberia, I. Samoylovych was elected the hetman in 1672.

The emergence of Turks in Ukraine deprived Doroshenko of the people's support. In 1674 10 right-bank regiments passed to I. Samoylovych.

Under such circumstances, in September 1676, P. Doroshenko relinquished the hetman's powers and surrendered to Russia. At the council in Pereyaslav, I. Samoylovych was proclaimed the hetman in both sides of the Dnieper.

Turkey, trying to maintain its control over Ukraine, re-elected Hetman Yu. Khmelnytsky (1677-1681). But his hetmanship ended tragically: he was executed by the Turks themselves.

In January 1681, Russia, Turkey, and the Crimea signed the Bakhchisaray Peace Treaty, under which Left-Bank Ukraine and Kyiv were part of Russia, Podillya, and part of the Kyiv region remained behind Turkey, and the territory between the Dnieper and the Southern Bug was to be neutral.

But in 1686 Poland and Russia signed the so-called "Eternal Peace", according to which the Moscow state included the Left Bank, Kiev and Zaporizhzhya, and the Commonwealth - the Right Bank, Galicia, Northern Kiev and Volhynia. Turkey received Podillya, while Southern Kyiv and Bratslav remained neutral.

Thus, by the end of the XVII century Ukraine has lost its territorial indivisibility. The inconsistent policy of the Ukrainian nobility and Cossack officers, the relentless struggle for the hetman's mace destroyed the statehood of Ukraine.

The national liberation war of the Ukrainian people ended in de facto defeat. Its main reasons were:

- the struggle between individual groups of officers for power, the priority of personal or group interests over the state;
- the embryonic state of the national state idea;
- weakness of the central government;
- Weakness of the socio-economic policy of Ukrainian governments, which eventually led to a civil war.

One cannot ignore the external factor - constant aggressions aimed at eliminating any manifestations of the independence in the Ukrainian state.

But at the same time the national liberation war of the second half of the XVII century led to the creation of a national Ukrainian state, strengthening the traditions of struggle against foreign, social, national and religious oppression, developing in the Ukrainian people a sense of national identity.

3. Elimination of the Ukrainian statehood institution by tsarism in the eighteenth century: regularity or colonial policy

At the end of the seventeenth century the Left Bank has become the center of political and cultural life in Ukraine. Ukrainians called this region the Hetmanate, and the Russians called it Little Russia. The sergeants in fact ousted ordinary Cossacks from high positions and removed them from participation in government, striving to obtain special privileges for the king.

On July 26, 1687, the Cossack council on the Kolomak River elected General Secretary I. Mazepa the hetman. A new agreement with Moscow was signed here - the Kolomak Articles: the hetman had no right to change the general sergeants without the tsar's permission, a regiment of Moscow riflemen was stationed in Baturyn, and fortress cities were built in the south to provide

protection from the Tatars. At the same time, the articles did not allow Russian voivodes to interfere in Ukrainian affairs.

Once again, Ukraine's autonomy was asserted in a reduced volume. In addition, due to the restriction of the hetman's power, the position of the Cossack sergeants was strengthened.

I. Mazepa was a highly educated politician. He knew several languages, amassed a rich library, and went down in history as a great philanthropist: with his help, more than 20 great temples, buildings for the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium, and others were built and restored.

In executing domestic policy, the new hetman relied on the Cossack officers - gave them land, arranged taxes, land ownership. Trying to strengthen the hetman's power, I. Mazepa introduces a new category of Cossack officers - Bunchuk's comrades, completely dependent on him.

In foreign policy, Mazepa refused to focus on Poland, Turkey and Crimea. Hoping to preserve its autonomy and expand its borders to the south and west, he pursued a pro-Moscow policy. In addition, the hetman was a close friend of Peter I.

At the end of the XVII century Mazepa and his army took part in Peter I's campaigns against Turkey. The fortresses of Kizikermen and Islamkermen were captured. But in 1700 Peter I made peace with Turkey, starting the Northern War with Sweden for access to the Baltic Sea. The Peace Treaty of Constantinople was signed, according to which the Dnieper fortresses were to be liquidated. Azov passed to Russia, but it did not get access to the Black Sea.

Gradually, Peter I dragged Ukraine into the Great Northern War.

As early as 1699, after the decision of the Polish Sejm to liquidate the Cossacks, an rebellion broke out there in Right Bank Ukraine under the leadership of S. Samus, S. Paliy, and A. Abazyn. They repeatedly turned to Russia for help, but aid to the insurgents was clearly contrary to its foreign policy plans, as Poland was in fact Russia's only ally in the Great Northern War. In 1704, by order of Peter I, Mazepa's left-bank regiments were redeployed to the Right Bank. The rebels took it as help from Russia, but the hetman in his universal revealed the meaning of this action: to help the Polish king to restore order in the country. However, the rebels did not stop the resistance, and only the arrest of Pali and Mazepa's capture of the main cities in the Right Bank put an end to it. Mazepa established himself in the Right Bank, increased the number of regiments, and distributed land to a Cossack officers.

The Great Northern War increasingly oppressed Ukraine's interests. Thousands of Ukrainians died in the campaigns, on the construction of fortresses and the new capital - St. Petersburg.

In 1708, Ukraine was threatened by an attack by Poland and Sweden. At Mazepa's request for help, Peter I refused. It became clear that the further centralization of government in Russia and the existence of the Hetmanate were incompatible. In addition, the participation of the Cossacks in the Great Northern War revealed that their fighting capacity was less than that of the

regular Russian army. When rumors spread of Peter I's intention to reorganize the Cossacks and replace the hetman with a Russian protege, both the sergeants and Mazepa became agitated. Such actions of Peter I freed Mazepa from a legal point of view, because under the terms of the agreement of 1654, Russia was obliged to provide military support to Ukraine.



In the picture: Ivan Mazepa on an engraving of 17-18 centuries

Here Mazepa makes his historic choice and begins negotiations with Sweden. He promises Charles XII winter apartments in Ukraine for the Swedish army, supplies of food and fodder, and military aid in exchange for freeing Ukraine from Moscow's influence. At the end of October 1708, Mazepa left Baturyn to meet the Swedes. Later, an agreement was concluded between Ukraine and Sweden, according to which the latter acted as a guarantor of Cossack liberties and the inviolability of Ukrainian borders. Mazepa's calls to revolt against the Russian tsar did not find support among peasants and Cossacks who were afraid of regaining the power by the Polish nobility. Therefore, instead of the promised 50,000 troops, Mazepa was able to bring with him only about 2,000.



In the picture: Charles XII and Mazepa on the Dnieper after Poltava

Peter I takes decisive action. The Glukhiv council convenes, where a new hetman is elected - I. Skoropadsky. The Cossack capital Baturyn was destroyed, and its inhabitants were completely exterminated.

The Cossacks sided with Mazepa under the command of Kosh Ataman K. Gordienko. For this, Peter I in 1709 liquidated the Zaporizhzhya Sich.

The decisive battle between the opponents took place on June 27, 1709 near Poltava. The armies of Charles XII and Mazepa were defeated, and they retreated to Moldavia under Turkish rule. Here, on September 22, 1709, I. Mazepa died.

The alliance with Sweden and the defeat in the war with Russia certainly played a fatal role in the history of Ukraine. The main reasons for the failure of Mazepa's policy can be considered primarily the narrowness of the social base on which he relied, and the overestimation of Sweden's forces. This made it impossible to preserve the optimal version of Ukrainian autonomy in the most difficult domestic and foreign policy conditions.

In 1710 P. Orlyk was elected the Hetman by the remnants of the Cossack army (1710-1742), a former general secretary under I. Mazepa. Trying to secure support, Orlyk created a project called "Pacts and the Constitution of the Rights of Liberties of the Zaporizhzhya Army" - an agreement between the hetman, sergeants and the Cossacks. The articles of the constitution provided for the establishment of national sovereignty, ensuring democratic human rights, unity and interaction of the legislative, executive and judicial branches.

Foreign policy provided for an alliance with Sweden and the Crimean Khan. Mr. Orlyk advocated the inviolability of the borders of the Zaporizhzhya Army, defined by the Agreement of the Convention.

In the historical conditions of that time, the proclamation of rights was purely declarative. Orlyk, supported by Charles XII, entered into an alliance with Turkey and the Crimea and in early 1711 organized a joint campaign of Cossacks and Tatars against Russian troops in Ukraine. However, the offensive was unsuccessful, and Orlyk was forced to return to exile.

During I. Skoropadsky's rule, Moscow's control over Ukraine intensified. A. Izmailov, a resident, was appointed to the hetman. In 1715 Peter I abolished the election of officers and colonels. In 1721 Russia was proclaimed an empire. After the end of the Great Northern War, Peter I took measures to eliminate the autonomy of Ukraine. In 1722, the Malorossia Collegium (1722-1727) was established, headed by Brigadier S. Veliaminov. It consisted of six Russian officers and a prosecutor and shared power with the hetman. After the death of I. Skoropadsky, a ban on the election of the hetman was introduced. Ukrainian issues are transferred from the Board of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Senate. The appointed hetman P. Polubotok led the struggle against the remnants of the Hetmanate autonomy and obtained from the Senate a certain restriction of the Malorossia Collegium's functions. But in the middle of 1723 he was arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he ended his life.

The death of Peter I in 1725 and the threat of war with Turkey changed the political situation in Russia. Under the pressure of O. Menshikov, who owned large estates in Ukraine, in 1727 Peter II liquidated the Malorossia Collegium and allowed the election of a hetman. D. Apostol was elected by him, but soon the so-called "Decisive Points" appeared, which determined the status of Ukraine as part of Russia. And for the first time this document arose not in the form of an agreement, but a royal decree. The hetman had no right to diplomatic relations, officers and colonels were approved by the emperor, all customs revenues of Ukraine were to go to the state treasury. In other words, it was only a matter of a formal restoration of autonomy, although this delayed the full integration of the Hetmanate into the structure of the Russian Empire. After D. Apostol's death in 1734, Empress Anna Ioanivna (1730-1740) did not allow the election of a new hetman and handed over all power in Ukraine to Prince Shakhovskiy and the so-called Board of the Hetman's government.

In the middle of the XVIII century Cossack officers began to seek the restoration of the hetmanate. On February 22, 1750, by the decision of Yelyzaveta Petrivna, the Board of the Hetman's Government was dissolved and K. Rozumovsky, the younger brother of the Empress's favorite, was elected the Hetman. Razumovsky managed to expand Ukraine's autonomy by returning its affairs from the Senate to a foreign board. Kyiv and Zaporizhzhya were again subordinated to the hetman. Razumovsky also restored the composition of the general foreman and the court.

But in 1754 one of the important signs of autonomy was eliminated - the state customs on the border between the Hetmanate and Russia. And in 1761 Kyiv came under direct imperial rule.

The new Empress Catherine II, seeking to unify and centralize public administration, in 1764, after Razumovsky's request for the introduction of hereditary hetmanship and the expansion of his rights, again liquidated this institution in Ukraine. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Second Malorossia Collegium president (1764-1786), Governor-General P. Rumyantsev. The board consisted of four Russian representatives, four Ukrainian officers, a prosecutor, and two secretaries (a Russian and a Ukrainian). In the early 1780s, the regimental system in the former Hetmanate was abolished. In 1776, Catherine II liquidated the Sloboda Cossacks - most of the wealthy Cossacks were transferred by order to the Hussars, and some - to the peasantry. The sergeants received the rank of officers and the status of the nobility. The Sloboda-Ukrainian province with its center in Kharkiv was created in the territory of the Sloboda regiments.

After the conclusion of the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhi peace, Zaporizhzhya Sich lost its significance as a military outpost against Turkish and Tatar aggression. In addition, the Cossacks took an active part in the Haydamak movement. The troops of Tsarist General Tekelya, returning from the Crimea, suddenly surrounded Sich. P. Kalnyshevsky - the last Kosh ataman - capitulated and was later exiled by the tsarist government to Solovky. Cossack sergeants received officer ranks in the Russian army. A large part of the Cossacks moved to the borders of Turkish possessions and formed the Transdanubian Sich.

In 1781 the regimental-hundred system was liquidated, and the Left Bank was divided into three governorates - Kyiv, Chernihiv, Novgorod-Siversky (later - Malorossia Governor-General).

In 1783, the Ukrainian National Army, consisting of 10 regiments, was transformed into regular Pikemen regiments on the model of the Russian army. In the same year, serfdom was extended to the Ukrainian peasantry. In 1785 a "Charter to the Nobility" was issued, according to which the Ukrainian nobility received noble rights and privileges.

In the second half of the XVIII century in Ukraine, the socio-political system characteristic of the entire Russian Empire is being established. All organs of the Ukrainian state were finally destroyed.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Discover the causes, nature and driving forces of the national liberation war.
2. Name the years of the national liberation war.
3. What periodization of 1648-1687 events do historians give?
4. Name the main battles of the war initial period.

5. When was the Zboriv Peace Treaty signed?
6. When was the Bila Tserkva Peace Treaty signed?
7. Compare the terms of the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva peace treaties.
8. When was the Ukrainian-Russian agreement signed?
9. Explain the content of the "March Articles".
10. What is the assessment of the treaty of 1654 given by historians?
11. Evaluate the activities of B. Khmelnytsky.
12. Describe the domestic and foreign policy of I. Vyhovsky.
13. When was the Hadiach Agreement signed? Its conditions.
14. Describe the policy of Yu. Khmelnytsky.
15. Pereyaslav articles of 1659, their content and consequences.
16. When was the Andrusiv Armistice signed? Its consequences.
17. Evaluate the activities of P. Doroshenko.
18. What are the reasons for the defeat of the national liberation war?
19. Discover the historical significance of the national liberation war.
20. The period of 60-80-ies of the XVII century entered the history of Ukraine as the time of Ruin. Why?
21. What periodization of the 1648-1687 events do historians give?
22. Name the main battles of the initial period of the war.
23. When was the Zboriv Peace Treaty signed?
24. When was the Bila Tserkva Peace Treaty signed?
25. Compare the terms of the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva peace treaties.
26. When was the Ukrainian-Russian agreement signed?
27. Outline the content and consequences of the Pereyaslav articles of 1659.
28. When was the Andrusiv Armistice signed? What were its consequences?
29. Evaluate the activities of P. Doroshenko.
30. What were the reasons for the defeat of the national liberation war?

TESTS

1. When was the Zaporizhian Host (Cossack Hetmanate) formed?
 - a) in September 1648;
 - b) in February 1649;
 - c) in August 1649;
 - d) in May 1649.

2. Which of the voivodships were included in the newly formed state?
 - a) Belzke;
 - b) Kyiv;
 - c) Chyhyryn;
 - d) Bratslav;
 - e) Chernihiv.

3. Who or what was the highest authority in the state?

- a) General Government;
- b) Hetman;
- c) General Council;
- d) Council of Elders.

4. Who acted as the central body of executive power in the Hetmanate?

- a) General Government;
- b) General Council;
- c) Cossack starshyna;
- d) Hetman.

5. From the positions listed below, select the one that did not belong to the General Government

- a) judge;
- b) clerk;
- c) colonel;
- d) treasurer.

6. Choose the correct answer about the territorial division of the Zaporizhian Host:

- a) voivodship - regiment - hundred – county;
- b) kosh - hundred – regiment;
- c) regiment-hundred;
- d) voivodship-county-regiment.

7. How many regiments were in the Cossack Hetmanate at the time of its creation?

- a) 7;
- b) 9;
- c) 16;
- d) 18.

8. Which court judged disputes over land ownership of peasants?

- a) provincial;
- b) submarine;
- c) city;
- d) Cossack.

9. In which courts were criminal cases (murders, robberies) judged

- a) fodder;
- b) Cossacks;
- c) city;

d) zemstvo.

10. The regimental sergeants did not include

- a) clerk;
- b) osavul;
- c) centurion;
- d) judge.

11. B. Khmelnytsky's foreign policy pursued the goal of:

- a) preventing the creation of coalitions of states led by Poland;
- b) providing the most favorable conditions for hostilities;
- c) finding allies, first of all the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire;
- d) forming a coalition against Poland.

12. Choose false statements:

- a) Hetman was elected to govern for a term of 5 years;
- b) Representatives of the Cossack starshyna, who were at the place of residence, gathered in the capital at the request of the hetman;
- c) The convoy, which took care of the material support of the army, rose to the rank of general sergeant;
- d) All power over the peasants was exercised by the viyt;
- e) According to the universals received by the Polish nobles from B. Khmelnytsky, the nobles were not to exert any coercion on their subject peasants.

13. Relations between the Ukrainian Hetmanate and Sweden were established in:

- a) 1650;
- b) 1649;
- c) 1652;
- d) 1651.

14. The main task of the international policy of the Ukrainian state was the successful end of the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the unification of all Ukrainian lands:

- a) Yes;
- b) No;
- c) ending the war and accepting the protectorate of Moscow;
- d) annexation of Polish lands to the Zaporizhian Host.

15. The functions of the diplomatic service of the state were performed by:

- a) General Military Council;
- b) General Military Office;
- c) clerk I. Vyhovsky;
- d) diplomatic embassy.

LECTURE 5. REVIVAL OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IDEA AND STATEHOOD IN THE XIXth CENTURY

- 1. Ukrainian national-state thought in the period of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires' rule**
- 2. Modernization processes in the Ukrainian lands: administrative-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational spheres**
- 3. Issues of Ukrainian statehood in the socio-political movement**

1. Ukrainian national-state thought in the period of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires' rule

The colonial policy of Russian tsarism in Ukraine led to an increase in opposition to this policy on the part of the nationally conscious strata of Ukrainian society, the intensification of the Ukrainian national movement in both political and cultural forms. Together, these processes were called the Ukrainian national revival of the late XVIII-XX centuries. The objective purpose of those processes was to consolidate the Ukrainian nation and restore Ukrainian statehood.

The history of the Ukrainian national revival is divided into three stages: 1) heritage collection or the academic stage (end of the XVIII – the 40s of the XIX century); 2) Ukrainophile, cultural stage (the 40s of the XIX century - end of the XIX century); 3) the political stage (late XIX - 1917 p.).

The Ukrainian national revival was based on the previous achievements of the Ukrainian people, in particular, the traditions of national statehood, material and spiritual culture. The social basis for the potential revival was the Ukrainian countryside, which retained its main value - language. Based on this, the starting conditions for the revival were better in the Dnieper region, as it still preserved the traditions of the recent state-autonomous system, political, rights, remnants of the free Cossack state, which was not affected by serfdom, and most importantly - here at least partially its own leading class was preserved. - the former Cossack starshyna, however, was transferred to the nobility.

The revolution of the end of the XVIII century in France, which proclaimed the “rights of peoples” had a significant impact on the beginning of the Ukrainian national revival. It stimulated interest in the main features of their community, such as folklore, history, language and literature.

The spread of romanticism as an artistic trend in literature and art also contributed to the national revival.

The national-cultural revival developed in several directions, among which ethnographic, literary-linguistic, theatrical-dramatic, and historical should be distinguished. *The first stage* of the national Ukrainian revival began with the publication of folklore collections. In 1777 in St. Petersburg the ethnographic collection of G. Kalinovsky “Description of Ukrainian wedding folk rites” was

published. In 1798, Aeneid by I. Kotlyarevskyi was published, with which the beginning of the Ukrainian national revival is most frequently associated.

The former Cossack elite became the main source of supply for the figures of the first wave in the Ukrainian national revival. They tried to defend their rights and privileges, to confirm their noble origin, but at the same time defended the idea of Ukraine's autonomy. The need to document the rights of Cossack officers aroused interest in its history and became the impetus for national revival. Dissemination of historical knowledge about the past of Ukraine was the most significant factor in the establishment of mass national consciousness. It united people with an awareness of their historical destiny commonality, cultivated patriotism, and supported the traditions of the struggle for national liberation and statehood.

The national revival was based on the active collection and publication of historical sources and monuments of historical thought, publication of magazines and almanacs, creation of historical societies, and writing of generalizing works on the history of Ukraine. An important role in the national revival was played by the work "History of the Rus" (the author is unknown, first published in 1846). It describes the historical development of Ukraine from ancient times to 1769. The author worked in the tradition of Cossack chronicles, and he used these chronicles, supplementing the exposition with his own memoirs, and sometimes (XVII century) - documents. Ukrainians are called Ruses in it. The main idea of the work is the natural, moral and historical right of each people to an independent state and political development, and the struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation is the main content of the book. The central figure in the History of Rus is Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whom the author praises. In fact, the History of the Rus is a political treatise embodied in historical form.

The second stage. Changes in the socio-economic development of Ukraine, the deepening crisis of the feudal system led to changes in socio-political life. In the 40s of the XIX century the opposition struggle against the existing system included not only the advanced representatives of the nobility, but also dissidents (intellectuals, officials). The national idea is gradually developing - an idea connected with the national-state prospects of Ukraine's development, with the growth of national self-consciousness, the awareness by the Ukrainian people of themselves as an ethnic community. There are political organizations, whose members aimed not only social but also national liberation of the Ukrainian people. The first such political organization was the Cyril and Methodius Society (named after the first Slavic educators - Cyril and Methodius), founded in January 1846 in Kyiv. It consisted of 12 people and several dozen (according to some data - up to 100) sympathizers. The organizers and most active members of the society were M.I. Kostomarov, a professor of history at the University of Kyiv, the son of a landowner and a serf; P.A. Kulish - a talented writer, author of the first Ukrainian historical novel "Black Council"; M.I. Gulak - a scientist-lawyer, a co-worker of the Governor-

General's Office; V.M. Bilozersky - a teacher of the Poltava cadet corps. In April 1846 Taras Shevchenko joined the society. According to their views, the members of the society were divided into two groups: moderate (led by Kostomarov and Kulish) and radical (Shevchenko, Gulak).



In the picture: members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood

The members of the society developed several program documents, including the “Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People” and the Statute. In these documents, progressive ideas were put forward: the republic - as the main form of political system; overthrow of the autocracy; equality of citizens before the law; abolition of positions as factors of inequality in society; liquidation of serfdom; national liberation of the Slavic peoples; dissemination of education. Considerable attention was paid to the national question, which was considered in the context of Panslavism. That theory became widespread at that time, its main thesis was the desire to unite all the Slavic peoples into a federation like United States of America. At the same time, each Slavic people would retain its independence. Ukraine was divided into two states: Eastern (Left Bank) and Western (Right Bank); other Slavic peoples would also form a state each. The federation would be headed by a general Sejm of representatives of all Slavic peoples. Kyiv was not supposed to belong to any state and would serve as a meeting place for the General Sejm. Each state was to have its own Sejm and its own president elected for four years. The supreme central power would belong to the All-Union President, who was also elected for four years.

Cyril and Methodius members believed that the creator of history was God, and its driving force was the Christian religion. Society, in their opinion, should be built on the principles of early Christianity (equality, goodness, justice, the 10 commandments of God).

In their program documents, the members of the society idealized the past of Ukraine, embellished the history of the Cossacks and social relations ("eternal democracy and unity of the Ukrainian people"). Ukraine was given a messianic role: it was to become the center of the Slavic union.

Tactics for achieving goals in different movements of society differed significantly: moderates considered it possible to implement them in an evolutionary way, through reforms, propaganda, and education. The radical part, led by Taras Shevchenko, advocated a revolutionary path – the uprising of the people.

Members of the society, in addition to developing theoretical documents, were engaged in practical activities. It was associated with propaganda of their views and dissemination of the fraternity program documents, the revolutionary works of Shevchenko, educational activities, attracting new members, establishing ties with activists of other opposition movements.

The Cyril and Methodius Society did not last long (until March 1847), so it could not expand widely. A traitor reported his activities to the tsarist authorities, and members of the society were arrested and exiled to various Russian provinces under police supervision without the right to return to Ukraine and banned on engaging in educational activities. Taras Shevchenko, who was given to the soldiers and banned on writing and drawing, was the most severely punished.

The significance of the society's activity is that it developed the theoretical foundations of the national revival of Ukraine, put forward democratic, anti-serfdom, anti-tsarist slogans, and became the first Ukrainian political organization.

The third stage. National revival of the western lands began in the 30s of the XIX century. During that period, Lviv became the center of the national movement, and the public and cultural association "Ruthenian Triad" (Ruska triitsia) (1833) – its vanguard. Its founders, Markiyan Shashkevych, Ivan Vahylevych, and Yakiv Holovatsky, students of Lviv University at the time, spoke the Ukrainian ("Ruska") language, hence the name of the association. They fought against political, social, and spiritual oppression, standing for the development of national identity of the Ukrainian people. The research and journalistic activities of the Ruthenian Triad were focused on that. They advocated the development of the national literary language on a national basis and were strongly against attempts to Latinize writing. A characteristic feature of their literary activity was its being carried out in the spirit of romanticism. In 1836, in Budapest, they published the almanac "Rusalka Dnistrovaia" (the Dniester Mermaid), which in content (glorification of Ukrainian history, poeticization of folk heroes - Morozenko, Dovbush) and form (folk language, phonetic spelling) was a bright phenomenon of literary and socio-political processes. This work was highly appreciated by T. H. Shevchenko and I. Ya. Franko. The Austrian government confiscated almost the entire edition of the almanac and placed the publishers under police surveillance.

The activities of the Ruthenian Triad ushered in a new stage in the development of the national movement in the western Ukrainian lands, the transition from culturological to socio-political problems.

2. Modernization processes in the Ukrainian lands: administrative-political, socio-economic, cultural and educational spheres

The crisis of the feudal system, which manifested itself in the decline of landed estates, the inability of landlords to continue to effectively solve their socio-economic problems through serfdom, significant growth of the peasant movement were the main reasons for the 60-70s reforms. They were triggered by defeat in the Crimean war, which demonstrated the backwardness of feudal Russia to the whole world. The government decided to implement reforms from above, by itself, rather than waiting for it to be done “from below” by the people themselves. The basic principles of peasant reform were set out in the tsarist manifesto of February 19, 1861 and the “General Provisions on Peasants Freed from Serfdom”. The documents addressed the main issues related to the abolition of serfdom:

- elimination of personal dependence of peasants on landlords;
- land allotment to peasants and determination of duties for it;
- redemption of peasant holdings.

Serfs ceased to be the property of the landlords. They were subject to economic rights, according to which they were previously recognized for free persons: to buy and sell property, to open various enterprises.

Peasants were not fully equal in rights with other social strata, their right to travel was limited, passports were only issued to them for a year, while other social strata were granted permanent passports. The humiliating punishment – birching – remained. The peasants had to pay a per capita tax, to serve as conscripts. The community and the circular guarantee in the payment of taxes and performance of duties were preserved.

The land issue was decided in the interests of the landlords. They remained owners of the land they owned. However, for peasants to perform their duties (work or money), landlords had to provide them with an estate and a field allotment. Peasants had the right to buy the estate and the field allotment only with the consent of the landlord. Until they redeemed it, they were considered temporarily obliged to perform certain duties indefinitely. Only from January 1, 1883 (22 years later!) peasants were obliged to buy field plots. Those who redeemed became peasant owners and ceased to perform their duties. Thus, a large part of the peasants for a long time was dependent on the landlords.

In determining the size of allotments they also proceeded from the interests of landlords. The calculation was as follows: where the land yielded insignificant profits, allotment rates were set higher (it was more profitable for landowners to receive a ransom than to run a low-income farm); in those regions where the land was more profitable and fertile, most of it remained in the

possession of the landlords, and the peasants got a small part. As in most of the six provinces of Ukraine the land was of high quality, the norms of peasant allotment were set lower than in other regions of Russia (for example, in the Kharkiv province it ranged from 3 to 4.5 tenths). In addition, the landlord had the right to reduce peasant holdings. As a result, peasant land use in Ukraine has decreased. In the Kharkiv province, “segments” accounted for 28%, in Poltava - 37% of those lands that were previously used by peasants. In addition, the landlords kept the best land, and the peasants were given the worst, depriving them of forests, meadows and other necessary lands.

A redemption operation was also carried out in the interests of the landlords. The basis for determining the redemption was not the market value of land and not income from the economy, but the cash rent of the peasants. It was determined in such a way that the landlord could receive capital that would give him a profit in interest equal to the amount of the peasant's dues. It was a typical usurious calculation, very unprofitable and unfair to the peasants. In practice, the redemption amount was determined by capitalizing the annual render from 6%, which was multiplied by 16.67. Since the peasant could not pay the full amount at once, and the landlords wanted to get their money at once, the state provided the peasants with a loan of 80% of the ransom, which passed to the landlord. The remaining 20% of the peasants paid directly to the landlord, and the state repaid the loan for 49 years at 6% per annum. In general, the peasants had to pay a ransom of four times the market value of the land at that time. It was a direct robbery. In fact, the peasants paid not only for land but also for their freedom. After the reform, 94% of peasant farms had plots of up to five tithes, which was much lower than the norm required to support a family and run an economically viable farm.

The reform was carried out in the interests of the landlords, but contributed to the development of capitalist relations.

Subsequently, reforms were carried out in the political sphere. In 1862 *the police reform* was implemented. In each parish (povit), a parish police department was established, headed by a director appointed by the governor. The parish was divided into smaller administrative and police units: estates, precincts (hundreds), settlements. In the estates, the police were headed by district police officers, there were 2-4 of them in the parish. In 1878, assistants - subaltern officers - appeared in the district police officers' estates. They were from 100 to 200 people in the province. The city police was created in the cities, headed by a police chief. Cities were divided into parts, sections and suburbs. Units were headed by city district police officers, precincts – by the precincts. Since 1862 the personnel of the police was recruited on the principle of free employment. Pensions were introduced for police officers.

The purpose of this reform was to improve the work of the general police, narrow its competence, eliminate secondary functions, and increase professionalism. The police were to oversee the implementation of laws, protect public order; monitor “due obedience to the authorities”, etc. Freed after the

reform from resolving economic issues and landscaping, the police retained control over the economic activities not only of public bodies, but also of individuals. As before, there was virtually no issue in the city or parish that was not subject to police review. The practical activities of the police were permeated with formalism, bordering on arbitrariness and lawlessness, bribery and forgery were widespread.

In 1864 the government carried out *a zemstvo reform*. Zemstvo institutions (provincial, district) –and councils were created. Assemblies consisted of councillors, who were elected for three years from landowners, urban and rural communities. The electoral system provided an advantage to the landlords. Zemstvos took care of schools, hospitals, prisons, roads. By 1917, they had done useful work, especially in education and health care. But their activities were under the control of the tsarist administration.



In the picture: House of Poltava Provincial Zemstvo

In 1870 *a city reform began*. In cities, city councils were elected for a term of four years. Members of the Council – councillors – elected the mayor and city council. Taxpayers who have reached the age of 25 could take part in the elections to the Council themselves. The electoral system provided an advantage to the rich elite of the cities. The competence of city councils included the same issues as the competence of zemstvos. They also depended on and were under the control of the tsarist administration.

A *judicial reform*, the most progressive of all the reforms of the 60s and 70s, was carried out in 1864. Instead of a class court, a classless court was introduced; instead of a closed court – a “public” one, with the competition of the parties – defense counsel and prosecutor. The court was separated from the administration and declared independent. The guilt of the defendant in the district court in serious criminal cases was determined by jurors, appointed by lot of the population representatives, taking into account the property qualification. However, not all population strata representatives had their cases to be heard in these courts: for the peasants there was a parish court, for the clergy – consistories, for military and state criminals – special courts. The execution of death penalty remained public.

In 1862-1874 a *military reform* was carried out. The country was divided into 15 military districts, the army was rearmed, and the system of military schools was reformed. Military gymnasiums and cadet schools were established, and the number of places in military academies increased. Instead of conscription, general conscription was introduced in 1874 for all men who reached the age of 21 (persons with higher education, the clergy, and some non-Russian peoples were exempted from it). This eliminated lagging behind the advanced countries (in France, conscription was introduced in 1796, and in Germany – in 1814). Service life was significantly reduced, from 20 years to 6 - in the ground forces and up to 7 – in the navy. The transition from smoothbore to rifled weapons began. In 1868 the Berdan rifle was adopted, the first rifled guns appeared, and the replacement of cast iron and bronze guns with steel ones began. The Disciplinary Statute was first introduced (1868), and inviolable food supplies were created in case of war. In 1881 the number of recruits reached 235 thousand people, and the army consisted of 32 thousand officers, 900 thousand soldiers and 800 thousand reservists.

In 1862 a *financial reform* began. All management of the monetary economy was concentrated in the Ministry of Finance, and great powers were given to the established State Bank. The system of redemption of territories and indirect taxes (for wine, tobacco, salt), which began to be collected instead of private individuals from relevant government agencies, were eliminated. The publicity of the budget was established. The main burden of taxes was still borne by the peasantry.

The needs of the economy necessitated *educational reform*. The number of schools of different levels increased, it was allowed to open private ones. Education was divided into classical (gymnasiums, which trained in universities) and real (schools, which prepared in technical institutes). Autonomy was granted to universities, which could independently decide their administrative (election of rectors, deans), scientific, financial, educational issues. However, the increase in tuition fees, the ban on women receiving higher education at universities, and restrictions on Jewish education were of negative value.

In 1865, *a reform in the field of censorship* was carried out, which was also aimed at maintaining the existing state system. To prevent the penetration of advanced, including revolutionary ideas into the masses through the printed word, the tsarist government established particularly strict supervision of the press and to this end reorganized censorship institutions. Under the new censorship statute, they were removed from the Ministry of Education and subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, which included the Main Directorate for Press Affairs and the Central Committee for Foreign Censorship. Church censorship continued to operate. Small publications intended for the mass reader were subjected to particularly strict supervision. They were subject to prior censorship. Large original books with a volume of more than 10 printed sheets and translated more than 20 printed sheets were exempted from such verification, but in case of violation of censorship requirements, their publishers were prosecuted through the courts.

Periodicals were exempted from previous censorship only on condition of a cash deposit in the amount of 2,500 to 5,000 rubles. These publications, in violation of censorship requirements, provided for administrative measures in the form of warnings, suspension and, finally, a ban on publication. All provincial publications were subject to prior censorship.

Thus, the reform of censorship, like all other reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, although a step forward, came to a halt. After the reform, the remnants of the old, feudal order remained, which hampered the further social and cultural-educational development of the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of the empire.

After the assassination of Alexander II and the onset of political reaction during the reign of Alexander III, counter-reforms were carried out, especially in the judiciary. The courts were largely dependent on the tsarist administration, and the publicity of the proceedings was strictly limited. Steps back were also taken in matters of local self-government. The governor's power was significantly strengthened, and the powers of the police and gendarmerie were expanded.

However, in general, the reforms were important. There was a certain liberalization of society, which contributed to the progress of the country, opened up prospects for its development on the path of transformation from a feudal to a bourgeois monarchy.

3. Issues of Ukrainian statehood in the socio-political movement

The process of formation and consolidation of the Ukrainian nation on an ethnic basis, which began in the times of Kyivan Rus, manifested itself in relief during the Liberation War and significantly accelerated in the middle of the XIX century as a result of bourgeois-democratic reforms that took place in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. The whole Ukrainian ethnos took part in the objective process of nation-building throughout its centuries-long

residence, but the center of the Ukrainian nation consolidation became Dnieper Ukraine. The formation of the Ukrainian nation was accompanied by an increase in the number of Ukrainians, the development of Ukrainian culture, especially the Ukrainian language, an increase in the share of national intelligentsia, consolidation of economic ties between regions of Ukraine, increasing national identity.

In the XIX century the problem of national reunification of the Ukrainian people remained unresolved; the ruling circles of Russia and Austria-Hungary pursued a policy of denationalization. National oppression was combined with political and socio-economic ones. In 1863, Tsarist Minister Valuev publicly declared that “there had not been any special Malorossian language|” and issued a circular, according to which it was strictly forbidden to publish in the Ukrainian language both books of “spiritual content and textbooks”. Even more reactionary was the Ems Ukaz (Decree) of Alexander II, which prohibited the importation of books in Ukrainian, the publication of original works, such as lyrics, music, stage performances and public readings in Ukrainian.


All the above factors led to the emergence and development of the national movement in Ukraine. In the 60s, the centers of this movement became communities – amateur, semi-legal socio-political organizations of the liberal-democratic intelligentsia. The first - originated in Kyiv in 1859. It consisted mainly of Kyiv University students, who later became famous public figures and scientists: V.B. Antonovych, M.P. Drahomanov, P.P. Chubinsky, T.R. Rylsky and others . Later communities emerged in Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Odessa. They were not sufficiently organized, did not have programs or statutes. They included representatives of various movements: conservative, liberal, democratic. They were also multinational in composition (although Ukrainians predominated) and diverse in social status.

Their main task was education and the introduction of culture. For the fact that members of the communities advocated the protection of the peasants and the development of education in the countryside, the nobles called them “khlopomans” (thugs), and they called themselves Ukrainophiles. Their ideologist was V. Antonovich, who advocated the abolition of tsarism, serfdom, the establishment of a democratic republic on the basis of a voluntary union of Russians, Ukrainians and Poles.

In St. Petersburg, members of the community gathered around the magazine "Osnova" (M.I. Kostomarov, P.A. Kulish). It published scientific works on the history of Ukraine, ethnographic materials, works by Taras Shevchenko, Marko Vovchok, L.I. Hlibov. In connection with the onset of the political reaction the community and the magazine “Osnova” ceased to exist in 1862-1863.

The ideas and activities of M. Drahomanov (1841-1895) had a significant influence on the development of the Ukrainian national movement. M. Drahomanov's concept was based on two principles: “social socialism” (general democratization, destruction of exploitation, association of workers in

grassroots societies – “communities”; “public federalism” (All-Slavic unification of national territories, unions of communities). This provided for a program of federalization of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, which would provide Ukrainian lands with autonomous rights.



In the picture: Mykhaylo Drahomanov

The most influential current in the socio-political movement of the 70's were the populists - the movement of various intellectuals, the ideology of peasant democracy. There were two movements in populism - revolutionary and liberal. According to tactics, the revolutionary movement was divided into propagandistic (ideologist P. Lavrov), rebellious (M. Bakunin), and conspiratorial (P. Tkachev) directions. The populists considered the peasantry to be the main revolutionary force; capitalism was assessed only negatively, it was believed that Russia had its special way, and it will bypass capitalism. They hoped that the peasant community would not become the center of socialism, exaggerating the role of ideas and individuals in politics.

The first populist circles appeared in Ukraine in 1873 in Odessa and Kyiv. In 1874, the populists used the tactic of “going to the people” - disguised in simple clothes under the guise of teachers, paramedics, shoemakers, etc., they went to the villages, promoted socialism, campaigned for the revolution. But this campaign was defeated. About 1000 people were arrested. In 1876, a new organization was created in St. Petersburg, which in 1878 was called “Land and Freedom”, which set the task of political struggle against the autocracy. Since the populists believed that the latter had no support in society, it could be overthrown by terror. In 1879, “Land and Freedom” was divided into two organizations: “People's Will” (Narodnaya Volya) and “Black Redistribution” (Chorny Peredil). Populists from Ukraine played a leading role both in

Narodnaya Volya (Zhelyabov, Frolenko, Kibalchich) and in Chorny Peredil (Axelrod, Deich, Zasulich). In 1879-1881 pp. "People's Will" organized 8 assassination attempts on the tsar. Finally, on March 1, 1881, the People's Volunteers managed to assassinate the king. But in place of Alexander II came a more reactionary Alexander III. The situation in the country has not changed for the better. The populists were the first to turn to the political struggle against the autocracy, managed to create an illegal political party, but their activities showed the futility of political terror. Their leaders were executed. The organization of the revolutionary populists was finally defeated in 1883. In the 1880s and 1890s, liberal populism continued to exist, abandoning the revolutionary struggle against tsarism and advocating the improvement of the peasantry through reforms: increasing allotments, providing cheap loans, and so on.

The development of industry, growth in the number of workers, difficult working and living conditions led to the intensification of the labor movement. In 1875 in Odessa on the basis of several circles there is a 'South Russian Union of Workers' led by E. Zaslavsky. It included about 60 members and 200 persons of sympathizers. It was the first proletarian organization in Ukraine. The program document of the union - the Statute - pointed to the injustice of the existing system, the need to fight against it, the unification of the workers in the region, the conquest of political freedoms. The members of the union issued and distributed proclamations and led strikes. Six months later, the gendarmes defeated the union and its activists were sentenced to hard labor.

The development of the workers' movement and the crisis of populism created the preconditions for the spread of Marxism (named after its founder, Karl Marx), a movement that had already become influential in Western Europe. The works of Karl Marx and his supporters were distributed, and the first Marxist circles were created. The first social-democratic circle appeared in Kyiv in 1889. In the 1890s, such circles appeared in Odesa, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Poltava. These circles at that time were fragmented and influential.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Outline the essence of the national revival of Ukraine.
2. Describe the reasons that contributed to the rise of the national liberation movement.
3. What universities operated in Ukraine in the XIX century?
4. What was the cultural activity of the Ukrainian intellectuals in the early nineteenth century?
5. Name the Decembrists' organizations.
6. What are the policy documents of the Northern and Southern societies? Who are their authors?

7. Enlist members of the Cyril and Methodius Society.
8. What was the name of the Decembrist Society, which operated in Novograd-Volynsky? Who was the head of the society?
9. When did the Cyril and Methodius Society exist?
10. What were the program documents of the Cyril and Methodius Society?
11. What did the Cyril and Methodius members fight for?
12. Name the communities that operated in Ukraine.
13. Outline the essence of the “social socialism” concept, developed by M. Drahomanov.
14. Define program goals and analyze the practical activities of citizens.
15. Compare the vision of the role and place of Ukraine in the documents of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and the Decembrists.
16. Prove that the nineteenth century became a period of true national revival of Ukraine.
17. What alternatives for the development of society matured within the socio-political movement prevalent in Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth century?

TESTS

1. The social class, which led the national revival in Western Ukraine, was:
 - a) Greek Catholic clergy;
 - b) Orthodox clergy;
 - c) Catholic clergy;
 - d) intellectuals
2. Ukrainian lands, which were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the first half of the XIX century included:
 - a) Galicia, Bukovina, Podillya;
 - b) Bukovyna, Podillya, Zakarpattia;
 - c) Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia;
 - d) Galicia, Bukovina, Polissya.
3. Head of the peasant movement in Bukovina was
 - a) Lukyan Kobylytsia
 - b) Oleksa Dovbush;
 - c) Ustim Karmelyuk;
 - d) Volodymyr Antonovich.
4. The city where the “Society of Galician Greek Catholic priests for the spread of education and culture letters among the faithful” acted.
 - a) Lviv;
 - b) Przemyśl;

- c) Belz;
- d) Stanislav.

5. The Opryshkiv movement in the Ukrainian Carpathians gained momentum in:

- a) 1810-1825;
- b) 1813-1835;
- c) 1843-1844;
- d) 1846-1847.

6. Almanac "Rusalka Dnistrovaia" was published in:

- a) 1816;
- b) 1834;
- c) 1837;
- d) 1840.

7. The member of the Society of Greek Catholic Priests was:

- a) Ivan Vahylevych;
- b) Ivan Mohylnytsky;
- c) Mikhail Luchkay;
- d) Markiyan Shashkevych.

8. The "Ruthenian Triad" did not include:

- a) Markiyan Shashkevych;
- b) Ivan Mohylnytsky;
- c) Ivan Vahylevych;
- d) Yakiv Holovatsky.

9. Which city was "Rusalka Dnistrovaia" published in?

- a) Budapest;
- b) Lviv;
- c) Przemyśl;
- d) Vienna.

10. What Ukrainian cultural and educational society emerged in Western Ukraine during the revolution of 1848-1849?

- a) "Galytsko-Ruska matytsia";
- b) "Ruska Besida";
- c) "Prosvita" (Enlightenment);
- d) T. Shevchenko Literary Society.

11. When did the abolition of serfdom take place in Eastern Galicia:

- a) 1789;
- b) 1831;
- c) 1848;

d) 1861.

12. What event gave impetus to the creation of the Main Russian Council?

- a) reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II;
- b) Polish uprising of 1830;
- c) revolution of 1848-1849;
- d) peasant uprising led by L. Kobylytsia.

13. What were the consequences of the European “Spring of Nations” events for the Western Ukrainian peasantry?

- a) gaining broad suffrage;
- b) serfdom abolishment;
- c) receiving the right to emigrate;
- d) easements abolishment.

14. What purpose was the society “Galytsko-Ruska matytsia” founded for:

- a) to organize the peasantry for the anti-feudal struggle;
- b) to publish cheap books and distribute them among the people for educational purposes;
- c) to liberate Ukrainian lands from Austrian rule;
- d) to liberate Ukrainian lands from Russian rule.

15. Representatives of the Ukrainian national revival in Transcarpathia in the first half of the XIX century were called:

- a) “Masons”;
- b) “Awakeners”;
- c) “Populists”;
- d) “Citizens”.

16. The Ruthenian Triad cultural and educational group was active in ...

- a) 1830-1831;
- b) 1833-1837;
- c) 1846-1847;
- d) 1863-1864.

17. The Main Russian Council was operating in

- a) 1830–1833;
- b) 1833–1837;
- c) 1848–1851;
- d) 1846–1847.

18. Who was called an “awakener” of Transcarpathian Ukrainians?

- a) L. Kobylytsia;
- b) O. Dukhnovych;

- c) M. Shashkevych;
- d) M. Maksymovych.

19. In 1837 in the city of Buda “Ruthenian Triad” published an almanac

- a) “History of the Rus”;
- b) Zorya Halytska;
- c) “Rusalka Dnistrovaia”;
- d) “History of Ukraine-Rus”.

20. The center of the Ukrainian national movement during the events of the “Spring of Nations” was the city of...

- a) Kyiv;
- b) Lviv;
- c) Kharkiv;
- d) Chernivtsi.

21. The Przemyśl Cultural and Educational Center activity is associated with

- a) the emergence of the Ukrainian press in Galicia;
- b) genres of fables and romantic ballads appearance in the new Ukrainian literature;
- c) development of new Ukrainian literature in the western Ukrainian lands;
- d) the first wave of Ukrainian national revival in Galicia.

LECTURE 6. NEW TRENDS IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE OF UKRAINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURY.

1. Politicization of public life: formation of political movements and parties

2. Alignment of socio-political forces on the eve of the national liberation struggle. Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary

3. State-building models in the program documents of Ukrainian political parties and movements

1. Politicization of public life: formation of political movements and parties

Intensification of socio-political life contributed to the formation of the first political parties in Ukraine. In 1891, a secret society “Brotherhood of Taras” was founded, which included representatives of young intellectuals from Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, Poltava. The ideologists and leaders of the society were Ivan Lypa, Borys Hrinchenko and Mykhailo Kotsyubynsky. Their program contained the requirements of broad political autonomy of Ukraine, protection of the rights of the Ukrainian people. Members of the society criticized the older generation of Ukrainophiles for their indifference to politics and cultural limitations. The society existed until 1898.



In the picture: composer Mykola Lysenko

University professors and the democratic intellectuals opposed the persecution of the Ukrainian language. The real Ukrainian cultural events were the unveiling of a monument to the founder of Ukrainian literature I. P. Kotlyarevsky in 1903 in Poltava, and the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the composer M.V. Lysenko's musical activity in the same year.



In the picture: Unveiling of the monument to Ivan Kotlyarevsky in Poltava. 1903

In 1905, a revolution began in the Russian Empire. The Revolution of 1905-1907 was bourgeois-democratic by nature because its immediate task was to overthrow tsarism, establish a democratic republic, resolve the agrarian problem, improve working conditions (eight-hour working day, etc.). The bourgeois revolution reflected the needs of capitalism development, as it

expanded and deepened the development of its foundations. Therefore, the revolution could not but reflect the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, workers, peasants and the intellectuals were also interested in it, as the revolution was aimed at eliminating the remnants of serfdom, overthrowing the tsar with its police regime, expanding democracy, etc.

The Revolution of 1905-1907 had its own characteristics, i.e. differences from previous revolutions in other countries. First, it was the first revolution of the twentieth century, when the contradictions of capitalism reached their apogee, and the Russian Empire became the center of those contradictions. Secondly, although the revolution was bourgeois in nature, the bourgeoisie of the empire could not play a decisive role in it, as it had done in European countries before, because it was insufficiently organized and too attached to tsarism. Thirdly, in that revolution there were not two political camps (revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, governmental, as in Europe), but there were three, in addition to the above, a liberal-bourgeois camp. This complicated the political struggle.

Periodization of the revolution: 1) the rise (January - December 1905 p.); 2) recession (January 1906 - June 1907 p.).


The tactics of the parties in the revolution were also different. The Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries advocated an armed uprising as the main means of solving the problems of the revolution (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in addition, also advocated terror). Mensheviks, cadets, leaders of Ukrainian national parties stood for the parliamentary path through the elections to the State Duma. The Black Hundred parties were in favor of unquestioning the preservation of the existing system, that is, against any change.

The main events of the revolution in Ukraine were:

- workers' strikes - 177 strikes (January-March 1905 – 170 thousand participants);
- uprising on the battleship Potemkin (June 14-25, 1905);
- general political strike (October 1905 - 120 thousand participants);
- creation of trade unions (November 3, 1905; in 1907 - 280 organizations);
- peasant demonstrations (in 1905 - 4 thousand participants in 7 thousand villages);

Along with political parties there were cultural and educational organizations – “Prosvitas”, which were led by democratic and liberal figures of the Ukrainian intellectuals (M. Kotsyubynsky, B. Hrinchenko, P. Myrnyi, L. Ukrainka). They founded libraries and reading rooms, organized literary and musical evenings, lectures, performances, and established schools with instruction in the Ukrainian language. Teaching the history of Ukraine begins at the University of Odessa, and the history of literature in the Ukrainian language at Kharkiv University.

The Ukrainian issue was also discussed in the State Duma. Elections to the First Duma took place in the spring of 1906. There were 102 deputies elected from Ukraine, most of them were Cadets - 36 people. The “Ukrainian Duma community” was formed in the Duma, which united 45 deputies. Its main demand was to grant autonomy to Ukraine. Elections to the Second Duma took place in January 1907. 102 deputies were again elected from Ukraine, and the “Ukrainian Duma community” was re-established. The Second Duma turned out to be even more left-wing than the First Duma. The Duma community has somewhat expanded its requirements by proposing to introduce the Ukrainian language into the system of education and public administration. To do this, they considered it necessary to establish departments of Ukrainian language and history in universities, to introduce the Ukrainian language in teachers’ seminaries. The activities of the Duma community were actively assisted by the prominent Ukrainian historian M. Hrushevsky, who moved to St. Petersburg specifically for this purpose. With his participation, the magazine “Ukrainian Herald” and then the newspaper “Ridna Sprava” (“News from the Duma”) were issued, where deputies’ speeches and articles on topical political issues were published. The composition of the Duma community was very diverse and heterogeneous, and, moreover, in the conditions of the revolution decline and the reaction intensification, it was almost impossible to achieve any democratic changes.



In the picture: the tsarist police’s documents concerning Mykhailo Hrushevsky

After the revolution defeat, a period of political reaction began, which, named after the head of the tsarist government, was called Stolypin. Duma II was dismissed, a new election law came into force, according to which 80% of the population was deprived of suffrage. This mainly concerned workers, peasants, and non-Russian peoples. The Third Duma was reactionary, with a majority of Black Hundreds and Octobrists in it, which enabled the tsar to govern it successfully. 111 deputies were elected from Ukraine, including 64 landowners. By party affiliation, most of them did not belong to right-wing and Russian nationalists (55). National Democratic Parties of Ukraine were unable to introduce their representatives to the Third Duma.

Repression intensified considerably: martial law was in effect in most provinces of Ukraine, and punitive detachments were raging. In 1909, there were 170,000 revolutionaries in the country's prisons. In fact, trade unions and other public organizations were defeated. If in 1905 there were 245 thousand members of trade unions, in 1909 there were only 13 thousand.

After the abolition of serfdom in 1861, Stolypin's agrarian reform was the next major step in the evolutionary development of the Russian Empire, its gradual transformation from a feudal to a bourgeois monarchy. It accelerated the development of capitalist market relations, social differentiation in the countryside, improved the state of agriculture, but did not solve the agrarian question in general. Therefore, the participation of the peasantry in the new revolution with all its consequences became inevitable.

On the eve of the war, tsarism significantly intensified national oppression: Ukrainian schools, Prosvitas, magazines were closed, and works by Ukrainian writers, including Taras Shevchenko, were confiscated. Ukrainians, like all other non-Russian peoples, were declared "foreigners". They were forbidden to sing native songs not only at concerts, but also in the streets of towns and villages, to read poems by national poets. Thus, the national problem on the eve of the war became much more acute. The national problem is a problem of elimination of all national oppression, achievement of nationalities' equality, free self-determination and development of the big and small people. The reasons for the aggravation were the political reaction in the country, desire of tsarism to suppress any liberation movement, including national; rampant chauvinism in connection with the preparations for war and the corresponding reaction to it by the national democratic forces; connection of the national problem with the agrarian one, because the majority of the population of the national regions were peasants, for whom these two issues were intertwined; legal and theoretical crudity of national problem.

2. The alignment of socio-political forces on the eve of the national liberation struggle. Ukrainian movement in Austria-Hungary

At the beginning of the XX century. all western Ukrainian lands continued to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. More than 4.6 million Ukrainians lived here. Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainian population lived

administratively, was united with Western (Polish) Galicia into the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. The whole region was divided into 50 parishes. A separate administrative territory was Bukovyna, which included 10 parishes. Transcarpathian lands consisted of 4 Ukrainian committees.

At the beginning of the XX century in Western Ukraine, the struggle for reform of the electoral system, which was part of the national liberation movement, broke out. As a result of a rather fierce struggle (for example, in January 1906 alone, about 300 rallies and gatherings took place in Galicia, in which almost 500,000 people took part), the Emperor of Austria-Hungary issued a decree introducing a new election law. However, it did not bring significant changes, as the law still provided benefits for the Austro-Hungarian and Polish bourgeoisie. The undemocratic system of curial elections to local authorities persisted. Only in 1914 did the Seim pass a new electoral law, according to which Ukrainian parties were given 27.2% of the seats, and Ukrainians were allowed to hold positions of government officials in the parishes of Galicia and Bukovina. However, the system of local elections was not changed, and Ukrainians have been on an unequal footing with other national groups.

At the beginning of the XX century in Galicia, three areas of political thought were identified:

- 1) Moscovophile, which slowly declined;
- 2) Austrian ultraloyalism, i.e. orientation to Austria-Hungary and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty;
- 3) independent, for the creation of the Ukrainian independent state.

A Metropolitan of Galicia (Greek Catholic Church) Count Andrew Sheptytsky (1900-1944) began to play a significant role in the socio-political life of Galicia at that time.



In the picture: Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky

The struggle for national education, in particular for Ukrainian university, was an integral part of the national liberation movement of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine. This struggle took place in conditions of fierce confrontation with Polish chauvinists, which led to armed clashes. In 1902, the Sich organization was founded, which set the task of physical education of Ukrainian youth. Earlier (in 1894) in Eastern Galicia there were similar societies called “Falcons”.

3. State-building models in the program documents of Ukrainian political parties and movements

The first Ukrainian national parties emerged in the late XIX century. In 1890, S. Danylovysh, I. Franko, and M. Pavlyk founded the Russian-Ukrainian Radical Party in Western Ukraine. The party's program was based on the principles of democracy, socialism and the unity of the Ukrainian lands. The party set the task of gaining Ukrainian autonomy as part of Austria-Hungary, and in the long run it aimed at creating an independent Ukrainian state. In 1899, Yu. Bachynskyi, M. Hankevych, S. Vityk, and other Marxist activists who founded the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party left the ranks of the RURP. At the same time, I. Franko, K. Levitsky, V. Okhrimovych, T. Okunevskyi and others left the party to create the National Democratic Party, which was closer to the interests of the peasantry. It soon became the largest Ukrainian party in Galicia.

Circles of “conscious Ukrainians” were emerging in Dnieper Ukraine, seeking to transform the cultural and educational movement into a political one. In 1892, the Brotherhood of Taras was founded with the participation of I. Lypa, Mikhnovskyi brothers, O. Chernyakhivskyi, and others. The members of the fraternity set the goal to struggle for self-determination of the Ukrainian people, for the revival and development of the native language, culture, education. In 1897, the communities that existed in many cities of Ukraine merged into the General Ukrainian Organization, which sought to direct the national movement in its traditional cultural and educational stream.



In the picture: Brotherhood of Taras

Three years later (1900), the first political party in Dnieper Ukraine, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), emerged. It was founded in Kharkiv on the initiative of D. Antonovych, M. Rusov, O. Kovalenko, M. Kaminskyi, D. Poznanskyi, and others.

The party united different generations and strata of Ukrainians in the struggle for national and social liberation. It had six organizations - in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Lubny, Pryluky and Katerynoslav - and a foreign committee in Lviv. The program goals of the party were formulated by M. Mikhnovskyi: "single, united, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus". The immediate task was to restore the Ukrainian rights guaranteed by the Russian tsar in 1654 under the Treaty of Pereyaslav.

There were several factions within the RUP. Most members of the party, led by M. Porsch, V. Vynnychenko, S. Petliura, believed that the party's composition should be purely national. According to them, it should unite both nationalism and Marxism, that is, the movements which were probably difficult to combine. Another faction of the RUP was headed by M. Mikhnovskyi. The faction took a clear nationalist standpoint, not without a certain categoricalness ("For independent Ukraine", "Ukraine for Ukrainians", etc.). Another intra-party group was headed by M. Melenevskyi. Its members believed that the RUP should abandon its national orientation and become an autonomous component of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. In 1903, the RUP moved to social democratic positions, and its de facto leader was M. Porsch. The official periodicals of the party were the monthly "Slogan", the magazine "Peasant", the newspaper "Labor".

The Ukrainian People's Party was founded in 1902 by M. Mikhnovskyi, M. and S. Shemet, O. S. Makarenko, and others. The political orientation of the party was set out by M. Mikhnovskyi in the so-called "10 commandments": an independent democratic republic, the dominance of the Ukrainian language, customs, culture, and so on. The main slogan was "Ukraine for Ukrainians". UNP was the only party in Dnieper Ukraine that consistently defended the idea of state independence of Ukraine.



In the picture: Mykola Mikhnovskyi

The Ukrainian Democratic Party was founded in 1904 by S. Yefremov, Ye. Chykalenko, B. Hrinchenko, and others. It had a liberal orientation. Among its demands were granting Ukraine autonomy within the Russian Empire and establishing a constitutional monarchy. The convening of the regional Sejm, the Ukrainization of the administrative apparatus, education, and culture were envisaged. In general, the political platform of the UDP in many ways resembled that of the party of constitutional democrats of Russia.

The “Union” (Ukrainian Social Democratic Union) was established in 1904 on the basis of a part of the RUP. Its leaders were M. Melenevskiy, O. Skoropys-Yoltukhovskiy. They wanted the party to represent all Ukrainian workers, regardless of their nationality. In 1905 the party joined the Russian Mensheviks as an autonomous organization.

The Ukrainian Radical Party, which emerged in 1904 on the initiative of B. Hrinchenko, S. Yefremov, and D. Doroshenko, and the Ukrainian Democratic Party, founded in 1904 under the leadership of A. Lototskyi and Ye. Chykalenko, were small in composition, and by political orientations close to the liberal-bourgeois views of the Russian cadets.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. What testifies to the intensification of the revolutionary liberation struggle?
2. What parties emerged in Dnieper Ukraine in the early twentieth century?
3. How did Ukrainian parties solve the national problem?
4. When did the first bourgeois-democratic revolution in Ukraine take place?
5. Describe the revolutionary events in Ukraine.
5. When was “The Manifesto on the Improvement of the State Order” published? What did Nicholas II promise the people in the Manifesto?
7. What were the achievements of the Ukrainian national liberation movement during the revolution of 1905-1907?
8. When was the Stolypin agrarian reform carried out?
9. Explain the reasons for the agrarian reform.
10. Describe the measures of the agrarian reform.
11. What were the consequences of Stolypin’s agrarian reform?
12. What was negative and what was positive in the person of Peter Stolypin?
13. What indicated the intensification of the revolutionary liberation struggle?
14. What parties emerged in the Dnieper Ukraine in the early twentieth century?

15. Outline the essence of the national revival of Ukraine.
16. Describe the reasons that contributed to the rise of the national liberation movement.
17. Outline the weak points of the Stolypin agrarian reform mechanism. Did it cause changes in the socio-economic life of Ukraine?
18. What were the achievements of the Ukrainian national liberation movement during the revolution of 1905-1907?

TESTS

1. On the eve of the First World War, Ukrainian lands were under power of:
 - a) Russia and Romania;
 - b) Poland and Austria-Hungary;
 - c) Romania and Poland;
 - d) Austria-Hungary and Russia.
2. Which countries claimed Ukrainian lands before and during the First World War?
 - a) France;
 - b) United States;
 - c) Russia;
 - d) Turkey;
 - e) Austria-Hungary.
3. Indicate the Ukrainian lands that belonged to Austria-Hungary before the First World War:
 - a) Bukovina;
 - b) Volyn;
 - c) Transcarpathia;
 - d) Galicia;
 - e) Podillya.
4. What lands did Russia claim at the beginning of the First World War?
 - a) Eastern Galicia;
 - b) Northern Bukovina;
 - c) Volyn;
 - d) Transcarpathia.
5. At the beginning of the First World War K. Levitskyi was elected chairman of:
 - a) Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee;
 - b) Society of Ukrainian Progressives;

- c) Main Ukrainian Council;
- d) Union for the Liberation of Ukraine.

6. During the First World War, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives called the Ukrainians for:

- a) opposing the Entente and the Triple Alliance in order to win "... a single, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus";
- b) supporting the Entente and honestly, "... without succumbing to provocations, fulfilling its duty to the citizens of Russia to the end";
- c) being neutral, because none of the warring parties "... could evoke sympathy for either the goals or the means of struggle";
- d) supporting the Triple Alliance, "... because by going to war, Russia threatened to destroy the Ukrainian life, which had found protection in the Austrian state".

7. In August 1914, the Main Ukrainian Council called the Ukrainians of Galicia for:

- a) being neutral, because none of the warring parties "... could evoke sympathy for either goals or methods of struggle";
- b) supporting Russia and honestly, "... without succumbing to provocations, fulfilling its duty to the citizens of Russia to the end";
- c) supporting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, "because by going to war, Russia threatened to destroy the Ukrainian life, which had found protection in the Austrian state";
- d) opposing Russia and Austria-Hungary in order to win "... a single, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus".

8. Read an excerpt from a historical source and answer the questions. "The real baptism of Ukrainian Sich riflemen took place in April - early May 1915 in the battles for the mountain near Slavsk. Several times this important point passed from hand to hand. Only at the cost of heavy losses did the Russian soldiers manage to gain a foothold on the mountain, but at that time the general retreat of the Russians from Galicia began". Where did the described events take place?

- a) Mn. Pogar;
- b) Mn. Hoverla;
- c) Lysonya;
- d) Makivka.

LECTURE 7. EVOLUTION OF UKRAINIAN STATE FORMATION IN 1917-1920.

- 1. Historical circumstances of the Ukrainian statehood revival.**
- 2. Search for optimal models of state building.**
- 3. The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920: achievements and failures in state-building competitions**

1. Historical circumstances of the revival of Ukrainian statehood.

At the end of February 1917 in Petrograd, as a result of an armed uprising of workers and soldiers, tsarism was overthrown. However, the struggle for power was not over. In parallel, there were two political structures that represented the interests of different social strata: the Provisional Government, formed mainly of liberal-bourgeois deputies of the IV State Duma, and the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.

In Ukraine, the situation turned out to be even more complicated. Along with the bodies of the Provisional Government and the Workers 'and Soldiers' Councils (there were already more than 170 of them in March 1917 alone), another body – the Central Rada – emerged and united the Ukrainian national democratic forces,. This public association was first established on March 7, 1917 in Kyiv on the initiative of a number of political, public and scientific organizations. Prominent historian and public figure M. S. Hrushevsky was elected the Chairman of the Council. Among the parties, the leading role in the Central Rada was played by the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists (UPSF), the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP), and the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party (USRP). Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries predominated in most Soviets of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.



In the picture: Ukrainian demonstration in Kyiv.

Periodization of the Central Rada (Council):

1. Formation of the UCR, formation of its composition, struggle for democratization and Ukrainization, cooperation with the Provisional Government, the crystallizing the idea of autonomy of Ukraine within Russia (March - early June 1917 p.).

2. Deepening the process of state building in Ukraine on the basis of the autonomous-federal principle, legitimization of autonomy in terms of reaching a temporary compromise with the Provisional Government (late June - early October 1917 p.).

3. Struggle for power with the central Bolshevik government (October 1917 - January 1918).

4. Existence of a formally independent Ukrainian People's Republic under the protectorate of Germany and Austria-Hungary (March - April 28, 1918).

On March 19, 1917, a grand demonstration (more than 100,000 participants) took place in Kyiv, during which demands were made to grant Ukraine's autonomy. On April 7-8, 1917, the Ukrainian National Congress was held in Kyiv. It was attended by delegates from the provinces of Ukraine, Ukrainian public organizations of Petrograd, Moscow, Crimea, Kuban, ТВ. Kholm. At that time, the Central Rada consisted of 822 seats, about a quarter of which belonged to Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other non-Ukrainian parties. The Central Rada was constituted at the congress, and it became the representative body of the Ukrainian people. This was the first step in the revival of the nation on the path to statehood. The leadership of the Central Committee began working on the creation of subordinate local authorities - Ukrainian councils (provincial, city, parish). Thus, a triangle of political forces was created in Ukraine. An important decision of the Congress was the proposal that the borders between the autonomous republics in New Russia be determined on the basis of the ethnographic principle.



In the picture: Kyiv City Teacher's House, where the Ukrainian Central Rada was located during 1917-1918

The Central Rada demanded the autonomy of Ukraine, supported measures to create the Ukrainian press, the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools, and the abolition of any restrictions on the development of Ukrainian culture and socio-political life. The general democratic demands and the line of the Central Rada received the support of all Ukrainian congresses convened in Kyiv in May 1917: military, peasant, and workers'.

On June 10, 1917, the Central Rada issued its First Universal, i.e. a state document in the form of an appeal to the population. It proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine and emphasized that Ukraine was not separated from Russia. The order and structure of society in Ukraine were to be established by "the National Ukrainian Assembly (Seim) elected by popular, equal, direct and secret ballot." This was the first step towards the implementation of national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine.

The Universal emphasized that the composition of the Central Rada would be supplemented by representatives of other peoples living in Ukraine, and this would permit it to become the only supreme body of the revolutionary democracy of the region. The recruitment of certain military units only by Ukrainians will be carried out under the control of the Minister of War and the General Staff. The problem of land reform also had to be solved by the Constituent Assembly.

On July 3, 1917, the Central Rada issued the Second Universal, declaring that it did not agree with the separation of Ukraine from Russia and postponed the decision on the exercise of Ukraine's autonomy was postponed until the All-Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

Universal II was a concession to the Russian Provisional Government, a compromise, to some extent a step back from Universal I. It manifested itself in the fact that the territory to which the power of the Central Rada extended was not defined, and the powers of the General Secretariat were not specified, especially in relations with the local bodies of the Provisional Government. The proclamation of Ukraine's independence in those conditions was unrealistic.

Soon the Central Rada created its executive body - the General Secretariat, headed by the famous Ukrainian writer V.K. Vynnychenko. The secretariat consisted of 8 ministries, headed mainly by representatives of the Social Democratic Party. The actions of the Central Rada caused dissatisfaction on the part of the Provisional Government, and only another failure of a new offensive by Russian troops in Galicia forced it to enter into negotiations with the Central Committee. O. Kerensky, I. Tsereteli from the Provisional Government, M. Hrushevsky and V. Vynnychenko from the Central Rada took part in the talks. The Provisional Government was forced to recognize the General Secretariat as its regional governing body of five (out of nine) Ukrainian provinces (Kyiv, Poltava, Podil, Volyn and Chernihiv). This meant an increase in the authority and influence and power of the Central Rada.

However, the Central Rada was deprived of its legislative rights. This new compromise with the Russian government was enshrined in the "Interim

Instructions for the General Secretariat.” Military, judicial, and food cases, as well as the post office and telegraph, were removed from the Secretariat’s jurisdiction.

The General Secretariat was accountable to the Small Council (of 40 members), a body that dealt with current and urgent issues. The Central Rada agreed to cooperate with “non-Ukrainian groups of the population” if the latter would recognize it as the “highest competent body”. It should be noted that the differences between the Central Rada and the Provisional Government concerned only the national problem and the prospects of Ukraine’s system. As for the issues of state system, economic, land, social, and military policy, the differences were insignificant or absent.

The Central Rada made a number of mistakes in its activities. In fact, it did not deal with socio-economic problems (among which the main one was land), but focused only on national aspects. In addition, the members of the Central Rada lacked experience in solving purely practical problems, such as maintaining law and order, providing cities with food, and organizing the work of the railways. Debates and ideological conflicts took up a lot of time, especially between the Social Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Communication with the masses was limited to speeches at rallies in cities, and the impact on the countryside, where the majority of Ukraine’s population lived, diminished. The CR’s mistake regarding military formations was significant. In the summer of 1917, about 300,000 Ukrainian soldiers spontaneously reorganized into Ukrainian formations, swearing allegiance to the Central Rada. In addition, General Pavlo Skoropadsky gave the Central Rada a Ukrainianized corps of 40,000 soldiers, more disciplined and better equipped than the disorganized Russian troops. But his proposal was rejected because the leaders of the Central Rada believed that the army in a post-revolutionary democratic society would be unnecessary and, moreover, could not trust the rich landowner Skoropadsky.

The attitude of the Central Rada to officials was also utopian. Prime Minister Vynnychenko called them “the worst and most harmful people”, believing that they were a remnant of a despotic state. But it quickly became clear that it was impossible to do without the army and officials.

Thus, the UCR at that time took an autonomist-federalist position, tried to promote the national liberation movement of other peoples, not limited to solving the topical Ukrainian issues.

2. Search for optimal models of state building.

The political and economic crises that engulfed the entire country, the powerlessness of the Provisional Government permitted the Bolsheviks to carry out a revolution and seize power in Petrograd in late October 1917. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets decided to transfer all power to the Soviets, and formed its own government, the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Radnarcom),

headed by Lenin. From Ukraine, the congress was attended by 140 delegates from 75 Soviets, who voted mainly for the Bolshevik resolution.

The Central Rada condemned the armed uprising in Petrograd and declared the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies inadmissible. Thus, this meant that the Central Rada broke off with the Workers' Soviets and entered into a confrontation with the Russian People's Commissars. Under such conditions, the Bolsheviks of Kiev decided to raise an armed uprising. Fierce fighting lasted three days in Kiev. Thousands of well-armed officers, cadets, and Cossacks managed to drive the troops out of Kyiv, but the power was still out of their hands.

The Central Rada, relying on detachments of "Sich Riflemen" and "free Cossacks" loyal to it, seized power in Kyiv.

On November 7, 1917, the Central Rada adopted its Third Universal, where Ukraine was proclaimed a people's republic (UPR) as part of a federation of equal and free peoples. The Universal declared a promise to resolve the land issue, introduce an 8-hour working day, establish state control over production, and settle the problems of war and peace. Universal III proclaimed abolition of private property, nationalization of landlordly, monastic, state and church property. But the implementation of these slogans was postponed until the Constituent Assembly. Political freedoms were proclaimed: speech, press, religion, assembly, association, strikes, as well as the inviolability of the person and the home. The death penalty was abolished, an amnesty was announced.

Four more provinces of Ukraine came under the rule of the Central Rada: Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Tavriya, and Kherson. However, in fact in Donbass power belonged to the workers' Soviets. The historical significance of the Third Universal is that Ukrainian statehood was proclaimed in the form of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the urgent socio-economic measures of the Ukrainian government for the future were outlined. However, these measures met different segments of the population in different ways. Leaving the idea of a federal connection with Russia, where power passed to the Bolsheviks, was a mistake, lagging behind the realities of the historical moment.

The Central Rada ignored the decrees and laws of the People's Commissars and appealed to the anti-Bolshevik governments that emerged in a number of regions (Don, Kuban, Crimea) with a proposal to begin negotiations on a new federal government of Russia - as opposed to the People's Commissars.

In November 1917, about 50% of the Black Sea Fleet ships, which raised yellow and blue flags, joined the Central Rada. Subsequently, the Ukrainian Ministry of the Sea was formed, and the "Provisional Law on the UPR Fleet" was adopted. But the Central Rada again made a mistake, declaring service in the Navy voluntary.

The struggle for power intensified even more during the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Ukrainian parties received 70% of the vote in Ukraine, while the Bolsheviks received only 10%. Among the individual

parties, the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries received the majority. This was due to the fact that they reflected the opinion of the Ukrainian countryside on the land socialization on the principle of no less than the consumer, but no more than the labor norm. The leaders of the UCR, among whom Romantic politicians predominated, did not see the destructiveness brought about by the revolution and the radical parties. Until mid-December 1917, the conflict between the Soviet People's Commissar and the UCR was perceived as a clash of non-antagonistic political forces within one state.

With the expansion of the confrontation, it was interpreted as a struggle of radical and moderate socialists.

In the autumn of 1917, Ukraine became virtually independent, but neither the people nor the Ukrainian socialists accepted it. Until the end of December 1917, the leaders of the UCR did not consider Ukraine a subject of international law, and only on December 26 the General Secretariat for Foreign Affairs was created and headed by A. Shulgin. The Central Rada closed the border with Soviet Russia, stopped the export of bread, and did not allow units of the Red Guard to cross the territory of Ukraine to suppress the attack of Ataman Kaledin. In December 1917, the Bolshevik government banned Ukrainization on the fronts and in the rear garrisons.

To strengthen their position, the Bolsheviks decided to hold the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which provided for the proclamation of Soviet power. On December 3-4, 1917, 124 out of 49 Soviets (out of 300) arrived in Kyiv. The Central Rada outwitted the Bolsheviks by taking not entirely lawful measures. It sent 2,000 of her supporters to the congress, who dramatically changed the balance of power. The Bolsheviks were forced to leave the congress and move to Kharkiv, where they were joined by delegates to the Third Regional Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Basin. This is how the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was organized. About 200 delegates from 82 Soviets of almost all provincial centers and the largest cities took part in its work. The Bolsheviks had the majority.

This congress was held on December 11-12, 1917, and proclaimed Soviet power throughout Ukraine, advocated a federal form of relations between Ukraine and Russia, and elected a Central Executive Committee (41 members, including 35 Bolsheviks, the chairman of the CEC was Yuriy Medvedev). The CEC was instructed to immediately distribute on the territory of Ukraine all decrees and orders of the People's Commissars on land, workers' control over production, democratization of the army, to declare invalid all orders of the Central Rada, which it "issued and will issue". Thus, the basic laws of Soviet Russia applied to Ukraine, and the legislation of the Central Rada was ignored.

On January 11, 1918, the Central Rada issued its Fourth Universal, which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine. The Central Rada did not secede from Russia until the beginning of the civil war, when a break with the Bolsheviks became inevitable.



In the picture: Proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Central Rada on Sophia Square in Kyiv

The government was instructed to make peace with the Fourth Alliance; declared the transfer of land without ransom to all peasants; forests, waters, and subsoil were to be subordinated to the UPR government; it was proclaimed that the government took control of the most important branches of trade, banks, and monopolized a number of leading industries. Universal IV became an important milestone of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, marked the revival of the Ukrainian nation-state.

The Universal noted the peaceful relations of the Ukrainian People's Republic with neighboring countries (Russia, Poland, Austria, Romania, and Turkey). The government was instructed to conclude peace talks with Germany and its allies and sign peace with them. It was planned to demobilize the army and create a militia, to distribute land to peasants without ransom in the spring, to take banks under strict control, to introduce a monopoly on the production and trade of iron and tobacco. The General Secretariat was renamed the Council of People's Ministers. The historical significance of Universal IV is that Ukraine was proclaimed an independent sovereign state, and its leaders in general must abandon the autonomist-federalist position and move to independence in the process of Ukrainian statehood, although they left the final decision on federal relations with the former Russian state to Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

Having been defeated in the struggle against the Bolsheviks, the Central Rada decided to use an external factor. Initially, it sought the support of the Entente, especially France, but having failed to receive it, entered into

negotiations with the Quadruple Alliance. This was also done to prevent the Bolsheviks from representing Ukraine.

On February 9, 1918, representatives of the Central Committee signed an agreement with the Quadruple Alliance in Brest-Litovsk. Its essence was that the Union recognized the independence of Ukraine, witnessed the cessation of the war, did not provide for annexations and contributions, the borders between the UPR and Austria-Hungary coincided with pre-war Russia, and within the future Poland they were determined by a special commission on the basis of "ethnographic relations and taking into account the wishes of the population". It provided for the establishment of diplomatic relations, exchange of prisoners of war. The exchange rate of the Ukrainian currency against the German mark was set (1000 marks = 462 gold rubles of the Ukrainian People's Republic). In addition, a secret agreement was signed between Austria-Hungary and the Ukrainian People's Republic, which provided for the division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian and the unification of Eastern Galicia with Bukovina into one continuous crown land. The UCR promised support in supplying the central countries with bread and raw materials. In April 1918, the UCR signed an agreement to supply the central countries with 60 million poods of bread, 400 million poods of eggs, 2.75 million poods of meat, 3 million poods of sugar, and so on.

On April 29, 1918, the Central Rada adopted the Constitution of Ukraine, entitled "Statute on the State System, Rights and Freedoms of the Ukrainian People's Republic." It consisted of 8 sections and 85 articles. Ukraine was proclaimed a sovereign, independent, separate state. The separation of powers was envisaged. The supreme body of power was to be the National Assembly, which forms organs of the executive and judiciary power. The highest executive power belongs to the Council of People's Ministers, and the highest judicial body is the General Court of the Ukrainian People's Republic; local self-government is represented by elected councils and administrations of communities, parishes and lands. One of the central places was occupied by human rights and freedom of speech, press, conscience, equality of all citizens regardless of origin, religion, nationality, property status.

Despite the fact that the Central Rada managed to return to power, it did not have the support of the general population for various reasons:

- large industrialists and landowners, as well as the Kaiser of Germany were frightened by the socialist orientation and socialist composition of the Central Committee (nationalization of land, 8-hour working day);
- the Russified part of the population was not satisfied with the national character of the government;
- national-democratic circles and pro-Bolshevik elements (here their positions coincided) - support of the German occupation by the Central Committee and plunder of Ukraine;

As a result of all these forces, the Central Rada was unable to stay in power. Opposition forces decided to create a strong authoritarian government,

giving it, by historical analogy, the form of a hetmanate. The German command also agreed to this.

On April 29, 1918, at the Congress of Farmers (6,500 delegates), Pavlo Skoropadsky, a descendant of the Hetman of Ukraine under Peter I Ivan Skoropadsky, was elected Hetman of Ukraine. He was 45 years old at that time, in the past he was an aide-de-camp to Tsar Nicholas II. Hetman announced the establishment of the “Ukrainian State” (as opposed to the “Ukrainian People’s Republic” by the Central Rada).



In the picture: Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky

The Hetman’s government made significant progress in recognizing Ukraine as a separate state in the international arena. Diplomatic relations were established with 12 countries, including (except Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which had been achieved by the Central Rada) with the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Norway and others, as well as with political innovations in the former Russian Empire. (Georgia, Lithuania, Crimea, Kuban). For a long time, negotiations were held in Kyiv with Soviet Russia on concluding a peace agreement and defining borders. On June 12, 1918, the parties signed an armistice agreement, but the peace agreement was never signed, as the delegation of the Soviet People’s Commissars refused further negotiation.



In the picture: Currency of the Ukrainian State headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky

The Hetman's government achieved significant success in the field of culture. At the primary school level, several million copies of Ukrainian-language textbooks have been issued, and the Ukrainian language has been introduced in most schools. During this period, 150 Ukrainian gymnasiums, Ukrainian universities in Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilskyi were opened; The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the State Ukrainian Archive, the National Gallery of Arts, the Ukrainian Historical Museum, and the Ukrainian National Library with a collection of 1 million volumes were established.

The return of land to the landlords, the forcible requisition of bread, and mass repression caused acute dissatisfaction among various sections of the population. An insurgent-guerrilla movement against the German occupiers and the hetman's regime arose and grew rapidly. The restoration of many pre-revolutionary orders meant the accumulation of the explosive material in society that had already led to the upheavals of 1917 and inevitably had to revive them again. The hetman was compromised by his dependence on the Germans, who ruthlessly plundered Ukraine, the Russian environment, which sought to restore a "united and indivisible" Russia.

The defeat of the Four Alliance and the revolution in Germany accelerated the fall of the Hetman's regime. Skoropadsky lost external military resistance, and intra-social was very weak.

On November 14, 1918, at an underground meeting of the Ukrainian National Union, the Directory was established, headed by V. Vynnychenko, which assumed the function of open struggle against the Hetman's regime. It soon signed an agreement with the Germans, where it undertook to help them

evacuate along with their property in exchange for neutrality in the fight against the hetman.

Skoropadsky also went all-in, reorganized the government and stressed that his “ultimate goal would be the restoration of Greater Russia.” Ukraine was declared a “theater of war.” Thus, the hetman finally moved to the camp of all-Russian reactionary forces, which, however, only weakened him. The hetman’s troops moved to the side of the Directory, and insurgent peasants joined them.

On December 14, 1918, Skoropadsky abdicated and left for Berlin with German troops. The Directory triumphantly entered Kyiv. On December 26, 1918, it published its program document, the Declaration, in which it proclaimed the liquidation of the Hetman regime and the restoration of the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. One of the main provisions of the Declaration was the promise to expropriate state, church and large private land holdings for redistribution among the peasants. The directorate also promised to restore the 8-hour working day, to establish “labor power”, to hold elections to the Labor Congress, which will have the highest legislative power. However, most of these promises have remained on paper. Within the Directory, there was a constant struggle for power between Vynnychenko and Petliura, between different factions that differed in their views on the state system of Ukraine. All this hindered the practical work of the new government.

The Directory restored the republican system and democratic rule in Ukraine. The Act of Unification of the Ukrainian People’s Republic with the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) testified to the will of the Ukrainian people for Unity. The Labor Congress convened by the Directory provided a broad representative base for the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian delegation took part in the Paris Peace Conference, where the fate of the participants of the First World War was decided.



In the picture: Heads of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic

Throughout this period, the UPR fought hard for independence and territorial integrity. Together with the Galician Army, the UPR Army showed heroism and did not capitulate even when several small parishes remained under the Ukrainian flag. The counterattacks of March 1919, the Offensive on Kyiv-Odessa, and the First Winter Campaign testified to the will of the Ukrainians to fight. The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact laid the foundation for a long-lasting Ukrainian-Polish alliance and provided an illusory chance of victory in the spring of 1920. However, even the Ukrainian soldiers abandoned by the ally did not stop trying to gain a foothold in their native lands. Until November 1921, a mass insurgent movement continued.

Western Ukrainian People's Republic (November 1918 – July 1919)

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, nicknamed the “patchwork empire”, paved the way for the independence of its peoples. Galicia - the eastern part of the Austrian crown land - from the beginning became an arena of rivalry between the Ukrainian and Polish national liberation movements. The rights to it were claimed simultaneously by the Ukrainian National Council and the Polish Liquidation Commission. The Ukrainians of Transcarpathia and Northern Bukovina gravitated towards their Galician brethren, but their lands were also the object of encroachment by neighboring peoples and states.

The competition for the headship in Lviv was won by the Ukrainians, who quickly and decisively established control over the region. These events went down in history as the November Act. The temporary basic law on the state independence of the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy introduced the name of the new state - the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. However, the Galicians could not consolidate their success. After a month of fierce fighting, Ukrainians were forced to leave their capital. A long Ukrainian-Polish front was formed. Initially, the battles were positional in nature. This enabled the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to settle state affairs: to carry out reforms, to form an effective government, administration, and army.

The help of Kyiv, which the statesmen of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were counting on, by signing the Act of Unification on January 22, 1919, did not help win the war with Poland. Strengthened Polish troops with the support of the victorious Entente occupied almost all of Eastern Galicia. A desperate counterattack - the Chortkiv Offensive - only briefly rectified the situation. Eventually, the government and the army of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were forced to cross the Zbruch and unite with the forces of the Directory in Podillya.

In 1921, after several wars between Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian People's Republic, almost the entire territory of Ukraine came under the control of the occupier. The Riga Peace Treaty, signed in March of the same year between the Soviet governments of Russia, Ukraine and Poland, effectively

buried the independence plans of the UPR and WUPR governments. Earlier, in 1918, Romania occupied Bukovina, and in 1919, Transcarpathia was ceded to Czechoslovakia. The fate of Eastern Galicia was decided in 1923 at the Paris Conference - it was annexed to Poland.

Despite the fact that by the mid-1920s all the lands of modern Ukraine were under the rule of four states, the question of the unity of the Ukrainian nation has never been questioned. It was during the Ukrainian Revolution that Ukraine's independence was proclaimed, and the possibility of a civilized democratic gathering of territories into a single sovereign state was demonstrated. It was a significant and in many respects tragic experience of state and legal development of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian political elite failed to fully implement the idea of reviving statehood. This is due not only to external geopolitical factors, the reluctance of the victorious states in World War II to see Ukraine as independent, but also to internal problems. We are talking about insufficient consolidation of social strata, sharp ideological contradictions of the political elite, underestimation of the importance of the armed forces in defending state sovereignty, the weakness of the mobilization efforts of governments, miscalculations in the choice of strategic allies.

3. The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1920: achievements and failures in state-building competitions

The Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 returned our homeland to the world map. After centuries of statelessness, Ukrainians created an independent nation-state, which had a territory, borders, symbols, its own parliament, government, army, academy of sciences, currency, language, and international recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic. For the first time after centuries of statelessness, the eastern and western Ukrainian lands were united in one joint state. The current symbols of Ukraine - the blue-yellow flag, the trident, the anthem "Ukraine is not dead yet" were chosen as state ones back then.

The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921 was a social and political phenomenon of modern Ukrainian history, which was the logical conclusion in the development of Ukrainian national liberation movement of the 19th century and at the same time determined the nature of the Ukrainian history of the 20th century, in particular the development of Ukrainian nationalism, national self-consciousness, nation- and state-building, accelerated the process of forming the Ukrainian nation, led to the restoration of Ukrainian state.

Establishment of this term – "Ukrainian Revolution" - in modern historic literature is not a novelty. The events of 1917-1920 / 1921-1923 were considered the Ukrainian revolution by its creators and the first historiographers M. Hrushevsky, V. Vynnychenko, P. Khrystyuk, D. Doroshenko and others. It should be noted that this term was used in the 1920s in the UkrSSR historiography (V. Zatonyskyi, A. Richytskyi, M. Skrypnyk, M.I. Yavorskyi)

exclusively in the context of the October Revolution. With the strengthening of the class approach in the methodology of Soviet history science, this term was replaced by another one – “revolution in Ukraine”, which was designed to disavow the reference to the national content of the revolutionary events.

The concept of “Ukrainian national liberation struggles”, introduced from the diaspora literature, is also widely used in modern historiography. In terms of content, it is close to the term “Ukrainian Revolution” and is often used as a synonymous substitute. Although, in our opinion, the definition of “Ukrainian revolution” has a more reasonable criteria and typology.

Established in the new domestic historiography, the term “Ukrainian Revolution” meets with certain objections, especially from the Russian researchers who claim that there was no separate or special “Ukrainian revolution”, but there was a process of disintegration and reorganization of the socio-economic and ethnic structures of the former Russian and Austro-Hungary empires. Modern Ukrainian historiography does not deny the consideration of the Ukrainian revolution events in the context of all-Russian revolution process, especially in its beginnings. M. Hrushevsky, summing up its national democratic stage, wrote: “Unfortunately, our Ukrainian revolution did not develop independently, it always had to march with convulsive movements and thrashes of the Russian revolution which dragged us through blood, through ruins, through fire”. He believed that it was the “cleansing by fire” of Bolshevik expansion that freed Ukraine from its “dog’s duty” to Moscow.

Systematic research of the domestic scientists convincingly prove that generated by the collapse of the Russian imperial organism UNR in the process of development acquired expressive self-sufficient forms, becoming a phenomenal phenomenon of the 20th century, which left a deep mark in the Ukrainian past. people and served as a source of state claims of several generations of Ukrainians.


The Ukrainian revolution was caused by a number of factors, primarily the collective desire of the people to get rid of deep social deformations, which Ukrainian society suffered due to the territorial division of Ukrainian lands between Russia and Austro-Hungary empires in the 18th century, and xenophobic anti-Ukrainian policy of Russian autocracy, aimed for the assimilation of Ukrainians in the 2nd half of 19th century. The revolution belonged to the type of national-democratic with a strong social component. Its most characteristic features were national liberation struggle, creation of an independent nation statehood, formation of a modern nation, as well as the agrarian revolution. The catalyst for the revolution was the First World War, which took place under the slogan “the right of nations to self-determination” and led to the collapse of not only Russia but also Austria-Hungary and Osman empires.

At the beginning of the 20th century the Ukrainians remained an oppressed, structurally incomplete people who lost (at the end of the 18th century) their own elite, so for a long time they were in a low-income national

position. In Russia Ukrainians did not even have the status of foreigners, but were considered one of the branches of a single Russian people.

The severity and originality of the agrarian problem (rural land and the presence of a large number of Russians in Ukraine, Polish landowners and Jewish tenants) united the national movement with the social one. The close intertwining of national and social issues provided Ukrainian revolution a certain paradigmatic primacy, which was later reproduced in various forms in many revolutions of the 20th century.

The ideology of the revolution was formed on the basis of general European democratic values and recognition of the nation's right to self-determination. The bearers of this ideology were Ukrainian intellectuals (Ukrainian intelligentsia).



In the picture: Ukrainian Sich Riflemen

The peculiarity of the revolution, which was superimposed on its course and negatively affected the final result, was primarily Ukrainian-Russian opposition. Ukrainians had to fight for rights in the competition with the Russians political forces of different social orientation, which, however, unanimously thought in terms of “united and indivisible” Russia. During the revolution there were several Russian-Ukrainian wars with both “red” and “white” Russia. It should be noted that there were other unfavorable foreign political circumstances that accompanied Ukrainian revolution. The geopolitical factor must be taken into account, first of all the conditionality of the Ukrainian revolution fate and statehood by the results of the world war I. Without receiving support from the Entente (especially France) in the fight against Bolshevik aggression at the beginning of 1918, the authorities of the Ukrainian

People's Republic were forced to sign the Brest Peace Treaty with the two Quadruple Alliances in February 1918. This circumstance later became an insurmountable barrier in the UPR's relations with the Entente. As a result, in the plans of the victors for the postwar reconstruction of Europe, Ukraine was not considered an independent state formation. At the beginning of the 1920s, the territory of Ukraine was divided between Bolshevik Russia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

Along with adverse externalities internal factors also existed. At the beginning of the 20th century, Ukraine was predominantly peasant, Ukrainian peasants made up the vast majority of its population. The peasants were mostly illiterate and insufficiently penetrated by the national consciousness, they perceived national idea not because of the desire of a sovereign state life, but as one of the ways of self-sufficiency in land, through the radical division of landowners' property.

Secondly, the bearers of modern national identity, young Ukrainian elite - the intellectuals, were in the process of their own formation, were small in number and remained closely attached to the peasantry, as most of them came from the village (children of peasants, village priests, teachers, etc.). Their national consciousness grew out of Ukrainian village elements, and the solution of social problems of the village was an important part of their political worldview, moreover, quite strongly determined by the Russian revolution movement. The absolute majority of Ukrainian intellectuals had the populist and socialist ideology, in light of which the national state was not the ultimate goal, but rather the necessary means of solving social problems. In Ukrainian social political thought of the end of the 19th - the beginning of the 20th century socialist and federal-autonomous views dominated. The idea of statehood, independence, although it had already been formulated, had not acquired any theoretical completeness, nor mass distribution in contrast to radical social slogans. Origin and illegal activity of Ukrainian political parties became an important prerequisite for revolution.

Considering the peculiarities of Ukrainian revolution, it is important to mention the key role of cities in the life of modern society. At the beginning of the 20th century russification policy and the de facto ban on the free development of Ukrainian culture made the cities of Ukraine russified, therefore Ukrainian life in cities had latent or marginal forms.

During the years of the Ukrainian revolution the government failed to consolidate for a long time in any of the large or medium-sized industrial centers of Ukraine: The Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic was repeatedly forced to leave Kyiv, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav (see Dnipropetrovsk), Odessa, Poltava, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr. Thus, the cities turned out to be neutral or biased towards Ukrainian movement, this forced it to become more attached to the village, and at the same time to look for foreign political and military support in the fight against "red" and "white" Russia (Austro-German troops control over

the territory of Ukraine in 1918, the Entente's military presence in southern Ukraine 1918-1919, the Warsaw Pact in 1920).

Ukrainian revolution, like any phenomenon, has its own historical and temporal space, beginning and end, i.e. certain chronological framework. Their definition has been debated for a long time. If the lower limit is considered by most researchers to be the first days of March 1917, the upper limit has a range from 1919 to 1923. The most common thought in modern Ukrainian historiography is the opinion that it was 1921. Its proponents believe that despite the loss of statehood in the late 1920s revolutionary potential of Ukrainian people was not exhausted. This was manifested in the mass anti-soviet insurgent movement, armed actions of military formations and diplomatic efforts of the former UPR. It is obvious that the upper limit of Ukrainian revolution as a fading process, had no clear time reference, especially for processes related to revolutionary changes in the mass consciousness. In the middle of the 1920s, the State Political Directorate of the UkrSSR recorded numerous outbreaks of pro-Petliurist sentiments and expectations among the population. In the 2nd half of the 1920s, a large-scale discussion took place in Ukraine about the further direction of Ukrainian culture development. The content of the discussion was clearly expressed by the slogan "Away from Moscow!", formulated by M. Khvylovyi. The discussion was a direct consequence of the revolutionary events.

The definition of the chronological boundaries of the Ukrainian revolution era is closely connected with the problem of its periodization. It has macro- and micro-levels that correspond to certain stages and periods. The criterion for distinguishing the former are the cardinal crashes during the revolution, which significantly changed its nature, decisively influenced the model of the state formations. During the Ukrainian revolution 3 stages are distinguished. The 1st stage is associated with the functioning of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the UPR (March 1917 - April 1918). The 2nd one lasted from the state coup d'état on April 29 until the fall of the hetman rule on December 14, 1918. The 3rd stage started with the coming to power of the UPR Directory in mid-December 1918 and existed through a series of transformations of the state power until the end of 1920 and then to individual manifestations in 1921.

Ukrainian revolution took place in the development of certain periods, the boundaries of which were marked by significant changes and reflected certain advances in its progress. Marker milestones of the 3rd stage, on the contrary, were characterized by the degradation of the revolutionary process, deepening its internal contradictions, their adequate reflection on the national state formation.

The catalyst and the determining condition for the outbreak of the revolution was the First World War, which not only depleted material resources, greatly exacerbated the socio-economic situation, but at the same time accelerated the growth of national self-awareness. It was that circumstance that ensured the beginning and rapid development of the Ukrainian revolution. Its

main task was to eliminate the shameful state in which Ukrainians were in Russian empire, as well as to create favorable conditions for the national and social modernization of Ukrainian society. It is a mistake to believe that this task was fulfilled by the Russian Revolution of 1917-1918, which in February 1917 abolished the autocracy regime.

At the first stage of the revolution, a dominant role was played by national liberation processes. On April 7, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) was created, which announced a course for national-territorial autonomy, i.e. the restoration of Ukrainian statehood forms in a federal relationship with the Democratic Russia. The difficult path to autonomy was marked by struggles and compromises with the Provisional Government.

It was most pronounced through the proclamation of the I, II and III Universals of the UCR. The III Universal (November 7, 1917) declared the creation of Ukrainian Peoples Republic. During the Ukrainian revolution, the Ukrainian elite, realizing the relevance and certainty of the nation-state ideas, rejected the slogans of autonomy and federation, and replaced them with the slogan of sovereign Ukrainian state. On January 11, 1918, the IV Universal of the UCR proclaimed the full independence of the UPR.

State-building aspirations were a characteristic feature of Ukrainian revolution. In its course, several models of national statehood were tested: democratic (UPR), conservative (Ukrainian State of Hetman P. Skoropadsky), left-democratic (UPR of the Directory era), liberal-democratic (Western Ukrainian People's Republic), but none of those models could be fully implemented.

Emphasizing the National Democratic, peoples' nature of the revolution, it should be noted that Ukrainian hetman state hardly fits into this definition. Having emerged as an alternative to the parliamentary in form and democratic in its ideological direction UPR, the hetmanate functioned as an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime with the head of state close to dictatorial powers and significant restrictions on democratic freedoms. In relation to the previous National Democratic stage it was the antithesis or attempt to deny it. Given the conservative-liberal nature of P. Skoropadsky's reforms, some researchers qualify this era as a conservative revolution. There are also assessments of the uprising against the rule of P. Skoropadsky as an anti-hetman revolution. Despite the inorganic nature of the hetman stage and the restoration nature in the socio-economic aspect, however, there are no sufficient grounds to exclude it from the context of Ukrainian revolution.

Renewal of the National Democratic content of Ukrainian revolution in the autumn of 1918 was associated with a new trend - the November National Democratic Revolution in Galicia in 1918. It was the result of the collapse of Austria-Hungary empire after the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance. This circumstance brought Ukrainian revolution beyond the territorial boundaries of the former Russian empire and discourse of Russia revolution of 1917-18.


In Soviet, modern Russian, and partly foreign literature, the concepts of “revolution” and “civil war” are considered in close connection. Obviously, in relation to the Russian historical background such an approach is justified. The latest domestic historiography has in fact abandoned the use of the term “civil war” in the context of the Ukrainian revolution’s events. This is motivated by the fact that in Ukraine there was no large-scale domestic war on ideological grounds. The UPR had to conduct defensive or offensive hostilities in its own territory against the armed expansion of armies of non-Ukrainian origin. Participation of ethnic Ukrainian elements on their side does not provide grounds for the qualification of these wars as civil. Only certain manifestations of civil war can be observed in the village: armed protests against the hetman regime. However, here, too, in addition to domestic, foreign occupation forces opposed these demonstrations. Given the massiveness and contradictions of the Makhnovist movement, we can speak of the peasant anti-government war.

Defeat of the national state formation during the revolution has several explanations of the external and internal nature. The chief one among them is the insufficient readiness of the then nation for a full-blooded state life. Ukrainian elite, represented mainly by the intellectuals, turned out to be numerically insignificant, and the masses - unconsolidated, with a low level of national consciousness. This circumstance contributed to the movement of the revolutionary priorities with national tasks to social.

First, when the fall of the autocracy created favorable conditions for legally active communities life, and the state authorities still retained control over the situation on the ground, the social component was muted and only strengthened the Ukrainian national movement. However, as the moral authority and power in Russia and Ukraine began to decline, political moods and behavior of the masses became radicalized, and the importance of the national became increasingly inferior to the social.

Under the regime of Hetman P. Skoropadsky, who tried to build the Ukrainian state on the basis of conservatism, restoring the right of landlords to land, and at the same time the partial functioning of the pre-revolution legislation, social radicalism of the peasantry came into conflict with the state-national needs. The peasants refused to support the state that took away their land and bread. Ukrainian idea turned out to be strongly discredited in the eyes of the village, which in the autumn of 1918 launched a mass insurgent movement against the hetman state and destroyed it. Directory that came to power in the wake of the struggle against the hetman regime (*Anti-Hetman Uprising of 1918*) and proclaimed the restoration of the UPR, and failed to find convincing arguments in the eyes of the peasantry for the actualization of the national ideas. For a long time, the Directory could not articulate the ideological political platform of its activities. It did so only at the end of December 1918, when there was no concerted action between the members of the Directory, its chairman V. Vynnychenko was on the move, changing his views for several

weeks. The authorities, based on discussion and hesitation, could neither provoke mass support inside the country nor receive external recognition.



In the picture: Act of Unification of 1919

This circumstance caused an acute and protracted crisis of the national revolution. It could not be overcome by the proclaimed conciliarity of the Ukrainian lands on January 22, 1919 (*Act of Unification of 1919*). The unification of the eastern and western parts of Ukraine remained essentially only a solemn but declarative act, which expired in late 1919, but has survived in historical memory of the nation as one of the symbols of its consolidation.

Neither organizationally nor ideologically, the UPR governments failed to use the social factors of Ukrainian movement, especially the uprising, which mainly manifested itself in local, spontaneous or poorly organized forms. Attempts to rely on the exterior forces in the state construction were also unsuccessful.

The longest of them was German and Austro-Hungarian troops' presence in Ukraine in 1918. For some time, these troops managed to stabilize the situation, and it is possible that in this way one could hope for a certain Ukrainian state-building perspective. However, the war lost by the Four Alliance, the revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary undermined the project too quickly. The Polish-Ukrainian attempt was defeated even faster. Union in 1920, and achieve the support of the Entente Ukrainian politicians failed.

Adverse foreign political situation practically made Ukrainian state camp powerless in the face of left-wing radicalism, personified by Bolshevism, which acted not only militarily but also ideologically, actively using the slogans of the social and world revolution.

The acute manifestation of social antagonisms brought additional tension to the Ukrainian political environment, led to the division of the political parties, the left of which intercepted the Bolshevik slogans of "Soviet power", created the ground for national communism, which, along with military aggression, ultimately ensured the ultimate success of Bolshevism: in 1920 Ukraine was finally occupied and transformed into Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.

During 1919-21, the Ukrainian peasantry during 1919-21 put up a unanimous armed resistance to the Communist practice of the Bolsheviks. The village insurgent movement became part of the Ukrainian revolution and its defining feature, in this sense, it, according to the western historiography (A. Gracioso), has a certain paradigmatic value. The course of the revolution, closely connected with the Ukrainian-Bolshevik war, also provides some paradigmatic clues to revealing the nature of the Bolshevik regime, which, under the guise of communism and forcibly imposed them ("military communism", "red terror"), actually occupied Ukraine. The final period of the 1920-21 revolution before the introduction of a new economy in Ukrainian politics (autumn 1921) was marked by the incitement of class struggle, the creation of committees of poor peasants, "red terror", the use of the army to suppress anti-Bolshevik resistance, purges in the CP (B) U and the first wave of famine that engulfed Ukraine in 1921-22.



In the picture: Commemorative coin “100th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution”

The final assessment of the Ukrainian revolution cannot be unambiguous. If Ukrainian statehood failed to assert itself during the revolution, it still does not give grounds to talk about a complete defeat, let alone a catastrophe. The revolution had a powerful mobilizing effect on Ukrainian national forces, contributed to the consolidation of the nation, the growth of its ethnic and political identity. It finally eliminated the shameful status of Ukrainians in tsarist Russia, and forced the Bolsheviks to make significant concessions to Ukrainians, providing them with certain privileges in cultural and national development and the proclamation of the USSR and later the union state.

However, those concessions, as well as the abandonment of “military communism” in favor of the NEP, meant only a ten-year pause, which was the prelude to a gigantic totalitarian experiment with millions of human victims, distorted worldview, morality and legal consciousness, collectivization and the Holodomor of 1932-33 involved Ukrainian people. The close cause and effect of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in the USSR, the mass extermination of Ukrainian intellectuals with the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-21 gives grounds to consider these phenomena in a general context as a whole.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. What events marked the collapse of the autocracy in Russia?
2. Describe the powers of the Provisional Government and Soviets after the February Revolution.
3. What Ukrainian national parties operated in 1917?

4. What all-Russian parties operated in Ukraine?
5. Explain the purpose for formation of the Ukrainian Central Rada.
6. Describe the composition of the Central Rada.
7. What was the main goal of the Central Rada?
8. When was the First Universal adopted? What was the main idea of the Universal?
9. When was the Second Universal adopted?
10. When was the General Secretariat established?
11. Explain the main provisions of the Third Universal.
12. When was the Ukrainian Soviet Republic proclaimed? What was the name of the Soviet government?
13. What was the significance of the Fourth Universal?
14. Describe the terms of the UPR peace treaty with the states of the German-Austrian bloc in Brest-Litovsk.
15. Analyze the reasons for the fall of the Central Rada.
16. What were the reasons for the establishment of P. Skoropadsky's Hetmanate?
17. What were the positive and negative aspects of Skoropadsky's government?
18. What political forces opposed the hetman's regime?
19. What purpose was the Directory established for? What was its composition?
20. What circumstances contributed to the seizure of power by the Directory in Ukraine?
21. Describe the political course of the Directory. Which parties determined it?
22. What is the essence of the Directory's agricultural policy? How was it perceived by the population?
23. What influence did the Allied forces have on the development of events in Ukraine?
24. Explain the reasons for the resignation of V. Vynnychenko.
25. Why did the Directory fail to agree with the Entente on the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic?
26. Which forces' struggle determined the military-political situation in Ukraine in the summer of 1919?
27. When and under what circumstances did the forces of the Directory and the Ukrainian Galician Army unite?
28. In what condition were the Ukrainian troops after the retreat from Kyiv?
29. What was the significance of the "winter campaign" of the UPR army? How was it carried out?

TESTS

1. The most successful offensive operation of the Ukrainian Galician Army, carried out at the final stage of the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918-1919, was recorded in history as

- a) "Brusilovsky breakthrough";
- b) "Kyiv Catastrophe";
- c) "Chortkiv Offensive";
- d) "Winter hike".

2. When was the solemn proclamation of the unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) into a single independent state by the Directory of the Universal?

- a) On November 7, 1917;
- b) On January 9, 1918;
- c) On November 13, 1918;
- d) On January 22, 1919.

3. When was the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) proclaimed?

- a) On January 22, 1918;
- b) On January 22, 1919;
- c) On December 13, 1918;
- d) On November 13, 1918.

4. Regular troops of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic were called:

- a) UGA;
- b) USR;
- c) UNRA;
- d) UPA.

5. The President of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic was:

- a) Ye. Petrushevyh;
- b) S. Petliura;
- c) O. Barvinsky;
- d) K. Levytsky.

6. What were the names of the highest legislative and executive bodies of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic?

- a) Directory and Council of Ministers;
- b) Central Rada and General Secretariat;
- c) Ukrainian National Council and State Secretariat;
- d) People's Council and Council of Ministers.

7. Who led the Chortkiv offensive?

- a) D. Vitovskyi;
- b) Ye. Petrushevych;
- c) V. Oskilko;
- d) O. Grekiv.

8. Which country occupied Bukovina in November 1918?

- a) Russia;
- b) Poland;
- c) Romania;
- d) Czechoslovakia

9. Read the lines of the biography of a politician and indicate him.

“Years of life - 1863-1940. Born in Busk, he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Lviv University. He was ambassador to the Austrian parliament. He was elected President of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. He emigrated and died in Berlin”.

- a) Dmytro Vitovskyi;
- b) Vsevolod Golubovych;
- c) Kostya Levytskyi;
- d) Yevhen Petrushevych.

10. The main reason for the defeat of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in the Polish-Ukrainian war was:

- a) lack of a capable army and the support of the people;
- b) lack of command staff and incompetence of the military leadership;
- c) intra-party struggle within the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, contradictions in government leadership;
- d) international isolation, non-recognition of the independence of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic by the Entente and its full support for Poland’s claims to the Galician lands, a larger Polish army.

11. The head of the government of Western Ukraine was?

- a) Kostya Levitskyi;
- b) Yevhen Petrushevych;
- c) Dmytro Vitovskyi;
- d) Dmytro Dontsov.

12. Who became the commander of the Ukrainian Galician Army after its reconstruction?

- a) Yevhen Petrushevych;
- b) Dmytro Vitovskyi;
- c) Mikhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko;
- d) Yevhen Myshkovskyi.

LECTURE 8. THE SOVIET FORM OF STATEHOOD IN UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1921–1939)

1. Historical conditions for establishment of the Soviet form of statehood in Ukraine (1917-1920).

2. Soviet Ukraine in the federal system.

3. Contradictory nature of political and economic development of Dnieper Ukraine in the 20-30s of the twentieth century.

1. Historical conditions for establishment of the Soviet form of statehood in Ukraine (1917-1920).

After the February 1917 revolution and the overthrow of the monarchy, by the Provisional Committee of the Russian State Duma issued a resolution according to which the Provisional Government was formed. The Provisional Government Declaration on its composition and tasks (March 3, 1917) proclaimed a course for democratic transformation and the immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly. Later, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly faced a sad fate: they were dismissed by the Soviet authorities.

At the local level, including the Ukrainian territories, the Provisional Government established local state bodies and local public bodies performing state functions. As already mentioned, the Central Council established in Kyiv in the first weeks was considered a body of purely national representation and only later took over the legislature functions.

At the same time, as in the whole territory of the former Russian Empire, in Ukraine, in the wake of bourgeois-democratic transformations, Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies emerged everywhere as the governing bodies of the revolutionary movement in the regions and cities. In early March 1917, in Kharkov, Kyiv, Odessa, Katerynoslav, Kremenchuk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Luhansk, Vinnytsia, Simferopol, and Zhytomyr, Soviets of Workers' Deputies were established. The Petrograd Council of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies assumed the function of the All-Russian Coordinator of Local Soviets. At the end of March 1917, the All-Russian Meeting of Soviet Delegates took place in Petrograd. It directed the activities of the Soviets to the creation of an all-Russian state system.

In total, in March-April 1917, more than 250 local councils were established in Ukraine. They demanded democratic transformations and an end to the war. Most of them were Soviets of Workers' Deputies, but many councils also appeared in military units (Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies). In some places in

the countryside there were Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. During April - May 1917, regional congresses of Soviets held in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa elected the governing bodies – executive committees. In the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih basin and some other regions of southern Ukraine, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies acted as authority bodies. They established an 8-hour working day, fixed prices for basic necessities, created food commissions, and so on.

Following the Russian example, armed formations – detachments of the Red Guard – were created at Bolshevik party committees and Bolshevik-controlled enterprises in the industrial centers of Ukraine.

It was under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” put forward by Lenin that the Bolsheviks came to power in Petrograd in October 1917. By means of their peace and land decrees and the Declaration of Nations' Rights, they attracted the working masses including most of the peasantry and the army. It should not be assumed that the attitude of the social “lower classes” to the Bolshevik government in Ukraine was fundamentally different. “Almost all the workers of each city followed them; in the countryside, the rural beggars were obviously pro-Bolshevik ...” – wrote V. Vynnychenko.

At the end of 1917, in the proletarian regions of Ukraine, where the Bolsheviks dominated in the Soviets, armed pressure began on the Ukrainian Tsentralna Rada local authorities. In early December, the confrontation between the Russian Bolshevik government (Council of People's Commissars) and the Central Rada intensified. On December 3, the Council of People's Commissars addressed the Ukrainian people with a manifesto, signed by V. Lenin and L. Trotsky, containing ultimatum-like claims to the Central Rada. The latter was accused of: “ambiguous bourgeois policy”, i.e. “non-recognition of the Soviets and Soviet power in Ukraine”; disorganization of the front, relocation and withdrawal of Ukrainian units from the front by unilateral orders; disarmament of Soviet troops stationed in Ukraine; support for the counter-revolution, which was manifested by allowing the troops to pass through its territory to Kaledin (who led the Cossack uprising against the Bolsheviks in the Don region), and by refusing to allow the troops against Kaledin.

Accusing the Central Rada of “unheard-of betrayal of the revolution”, the Council of People's Commissars stated that if the actions were not stopped within 48 hours, it would “consider the Central Rada to be in a state of open war against the Soviet power in Russia and Ukraine.”

In a response dated December 4, the Secretariat-General outraged the ultimatum, accusing the Council of People's Commissars of imposing “its forms of political system on the self-determined state”. The standpoint on the protection of Ukraine from Bolshevik experiments was clearly defined. “As long as anarchy evolves and economic, political and economic ruin develops in Russia, as long as total arbitrariness and trampling over all the freedoms won by the revolution reign, the Secretariat-General does not find it necessary to repeat this experiment on the Ukrainian people's territory. Ukrainian democracy

represented by the Ukrainian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, organized in the legislature, the Central Rada, and in its government, the General Secretariat, is quite satisfied with both the composition of these bodies and the implementation of their declarations of will". It was noted that Ukrainian soldiers, workers and peasants, defending their rights and their country, would give a proper response to the people's commissars, who raised the Russian soldiers' hand to "their Ukrainian brothers." The export of bread to Russia was banned, the railway service with it was suspended, and the issuance of Ukrainian banknotes was organized.

The Bolshevik attempt to legitimately eliminate the Central Rada failed. The Bolsheviks scheduled a congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies for December 3, 1917. They intended to use that event for "re-electing" the Central Rada. In addition to the number of mostly workers' deputies determined by the Bolshevik organizing committee, the Central Rada summoned delegates from peasant unions to that congress held in Kyiv. As a result, about 2,000 delegates representing peasants and Ukrainianized military units gathered in Kyiv and fully supported the Central Rada.

Then, at the the Bolsheviks' initiative, 124 deputies representing 49 Soviets moved to Kharkiv, where the Congress of the Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih Basins' Soviets was taking place. As a result of their unification, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was proclaimed. Undoubtedly, representing only 89 of the then existing about 300 councils, it was not legitimate.

The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (December 11-12, 1917) accused the Central Rada of "disrupting the work of the Congress of Soviets in Kyiv", hailed the "October Proletarian-Peasant Revolution" and "the establishment of a de facto dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poorest peasantry". In the congress resolutions "On the Self-Determination of Ukraine" and "On the Organization of Power in Ukraine", Ukraine was proclaimed the "Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" as a federal part of the Russian Republic. The Congress elected the Provisional Central Executive Committee (CEC) consisting of 41 members, including 35 Bolsheviks. The CEC was instructed to "immediately disseminate throughout the territory of the Ukrainian Republic all decrees and orders of the federal workers' and peasants' government, which are of general importance for the whole federation - on land, on workers' control over production, on full democratization of the army". All orders of the Central Rada and the Secretariat-General that were "directed against the interests of the workers and the poorest peasants of Ukraine" were declared invalid. However, the official name of the state remained unchanged: "Ukrainian People's Republic".

On December 17, 1917, the CEC of Soviets of Ukraine addressed a Manifesto to Ukraine's workers, peasants, and soldiers, urging them to help the new Soviet government. It announced that the Central Rada had been deprived of its rights by the Congress a resolution; at the same time, the Secretariat-General had lost its powers». The CEC resolution of December 17, 1917 formed

the first Soviet government, the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, of which more than 80% were Bolsheviks. The competence of the Soviet government was not defined by law. It exercised its powers both through local councils and through commissioners appointed by it.

The confrontation between the two Ukrainian centers of power quickly turned into an armed struggle. Russian troops operating on the territory of Ukraine, led by V. Antonov-Ovsienko, at that time were subordinated to the People's Secretariat of Ukraine. Having united with detachments of Ukrainian Red Guards and Red Cossacks led by Yu. Kotsyubynskyi and V. Prymakov, they quickly moved from the north, Kharkiv and Katerinoslav regions, and on January 26 arrived in Kyiv.

The Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (March 17-19, 1918) introduced certain changes in the state and legal status of Soviet Ukraine. Given the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty, Ukraine was proclaimed a self-sustained republic, independent of the RSFSR.

However, the process of the Soviet system formation in Ukraine was suspended. Under the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty, under pressure from the German-Austrian occupiers, the Council of People's Commissars of Russia was forced to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in March 1918. The CEC and the People's Secretariat found themselves on the RSFSR territory and ceased their activities. The insurgent struggle behind the occupiers' lines was led by extraordinary government authorities: from April to July – by the Insurgent Bureau, and from July 1918 – by the Central Military Revolutionary Committee (CMRC) and local revolutionary committees.

After the annulment of the Brest Peace Treaty, the next stage of the spread of Soviet power in Ukraine began. On November 28, 1918, the first meeting of the Provisional Workers 'and Peasants' Government of Ukraine took place in Sudzha, Kursk Province. In a manifesto to the workers and peasants of Ukraine, the workers 'and peasants' government announced the removal of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi from power and the transfer of all power to the Soviets. On November 30, the Military Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Army was formed.

As a result of the Red Army's offensive blow in May 1919, Soviet power was extended to almost the entire Ukraine's territory within the former Russian Empire. The resumption of central and local authorities' activities began. By the decree of January 6, 1919, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government abolished the name of the state "Ukrainian People's Republic" (UPR) established by the Central Rada and approved another, similar to the RSFSR, official name – "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" (UkrSSR). In accordance with the decree of January 29, 1919, the Ukrainian government began to be called like the Russian one – "Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR".

The UkrSSR as a Soviet form of statehood took shape with the adoption of the first Constitution of the UkrSSR at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (March 6-10, 1919) The Congress elected the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, which functioned between congresses and was endowed

with legislative and control functions. The congress approved the government staff – the Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR. A permanent Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, headed by H. Petrovskyi, was established to carry out current work and draft bills. But soon its powers grew. In particular, in the period between sessions, it approved the resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR, appointed people's commissars, heads of state committees, considered pleas of mercy and more.

In April-May 1919, in accordance with the Constitution, local (provincial, county and district) councils were elected and their executive bodies – executive committees – were formed. Elections were not held in the frontline areas where revolutionary committees remained authorities.

An essential feature of the Soviet authorities formation was that both in the center and on the ground, they were increasingly controlled by the Bolsheviks.

Due to the advance of Denikin's troops from the south and combined forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Directory) and the Ukrainian Galician Army from the west, Soviet state building was temporarily suspended. The government and administration bodies were restructured in accordance with the military conditions. On April 30, 1919, the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense of the UkrSSR was established. It included the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Bolshevik Party of Ukraine, two representatives of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, People's Commissars for Military Affairs, Food Supply, Railroads, Social Inspection, the Ukrainian Front Commander-in-Chief, Revolutionary Military Council member, Head of the Red Army Munitioning Extraordinary Committee. The Defense Council carried out the operational management of the country, issued decrees and resolutions, set up various committees, and appointed "special commissioners", conferring them extraordinary rights. Defense committees were also set up in provincial centers.

In the conditions of the spread of peasant uprisings, the decree of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee "On the Rural Poor Committee" of May 14, 1919 temporarily dismissed the village councils and made the Poor Committees the only and extraordinary bodies of power in the countryside. Violent and repressive measures were used to provide food for troops, workers and the rural poor. Thus, the resolution of the Defense Council of July 17, 1919 recommended applying the following methods in the fight against the rebellious peasantry: circular bail, hostage-taking, imposing contributions, eviction of insurgent leaders' families, etc.

Emergency measures did not help the Bolsheviks retain power. On September 30, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet government was evacuated to the RSFSR.

The restoration of Soviet power and administration took place in November 1919 – February 1920 in the form of emergency bodies –

Revolutionary Committees. On December 11, 1919, at a joint meeting of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee Presidium and the UkrSSR Council of People's Commissars, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee headed by H. Petrovsky was established. It represented the highest legislative and executive power. The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, in coordination with the provincial committees of the CP(B)Ukr and the Red Army command, created provincial revolutionary committees. Similarly, province revolutionary committees, with the assistance of the active army political departments, created county revolutionary committees.

At the end of February 1920, the highest bodies of state power and administration of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the UkrSSR Council of People's Commissars resumed performing their duties. Elections to local councils soon followed, and lasted until April 1920. Provincial and other local congresses of Soviets formed their own executive committees, which replaced the Revolutionary Committees. On May 16-23, 1920, the IV All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was held in difficult conditions. Polish-Petliurist troops and Wrangel's army launched a campaign against the Soviet authorities. This was reflected in the Congress' decisions to strengthen the workers' and peasants' power, and to militarize Soviet institutions. Among the newly formed staff of the highest authorities – the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, and the UkrSSR Council of People's Commissars, the overwhelming majority were Bolsheviks. Thus, among 82 members of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, they accounted for 74; four members belonged to the party's top leadership, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP(b)Ukr.

In October-December 1920, re-elections of local councils were held on the basis of convening workers' conferences, general meetings, and rallies. The vast majority of their members were Bolsheviks: in the county executive committees they accounted for more than 70%, in the provincial ones – about 85%. This made it possible to make local Soviets bodies of the proletariat dictatorship, to ensure their control over the committees of the CP(b)Ukr. A significant role in exercising power on the ground was played by the Revolutionary Committees, military committees formed by the party Bolsheviks' committees, and appointed commissars, groups of three, four, seven members. All of them were conferred extraordinary rights.

Village and county committees of poor peasants (Komnezams) established in accordance with the Law of May 9, 1920 contributed to strengthening the social base of Soviet power in the countryside. In contrast to the existing Kombids, they included not only the poor but also the middle-income peasants. While Kombids were formed in the absence of village councils and instead of them, Komnezams were formed by local councils and acted under their leadership. Their tasks included: promoting the implementation of the law on the allocation of land and equipment to landless peasants; the implementation

of the law on grain distribution and provision of the rural poor with the share of procurement provided by law; assistance to the Soviet government in the countryside.



In the picture: Soviet propaganda poster

The Bolshevik authorities, having destroyed the remnants of previous judicial and law enforcement agencies, paid great attention to the creation of bodies to protect their own regime.

The Government Resolution “On the Introduction of the People’s Court” of January 4, 1918 established district, county, and city people’s courts, the verdicts and decisions of which were final and not subject to appeal or cassation. In accordance with the government decree of January 20, 1918, disputes in land, civil, and labor cases were referred to extrajudicial and public bodies: peasant land committees, conciliation chambers, housing chambers, labor departments of local councils, etc.

In accordance with the Provisional Regulation on People’s Courts and Revolutionary Tribunals of the UkrSSR of February 20, 1919, the system of people’s courts was reorganized. A single people’s court was created on the basis of district courts, and county and city courts were abolished. Councils (congresses) of people’s judges of the county (judicial district) were convened as a cassation instance.

The Regulations of the Council of People's Commissars on the People's Court of October 26, 1920 introduced permanent provincial councils of people's judges consisting of the chairman, his deputy, 2-5 members, elected by the Congress of People's Judges.

Criminal cases were heard by the people's court collectively. The court consisted of a people's judge and two or six people's assessors, who were elected by relevant councils or executive committees. Candidates for the position of People's Judge required experience in political activity. Boards of human rights defenders (lawyers) were established in the people's courts; their personnel were elected by the relevant Councils and executive committees.

The function of suppressing resistance to the proletariat's dictatorship was entrusted to revolutionary tribunals, which were set up one per province. Cases of counter-revolutionary crimes, espionage, official crimes, speculation, and from 1920 cases of banditry, robbery, theft, etc., were referred to tribunals. According to the Regulations on Revolutionary Tribunals of January 23, 1918, they operated under a simplified procedure. However, the preliminary investigation was to be carried out by special people's investigators, the functions of prosecution by prosecutors, and protection by defense attorneys. The quantitative and personal composition of the members of the tribunal was determined by the provincial executive committee, but it could not be less than 15 people. Cases were pursued by 3, and from March 1920 – 5 members of the tribunal. In April 1919, the Supreme Court of Cassation was established to hear appeals from tribunal verdicts, and in late May 1919, the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal was established to act as a court of first instance in cases of special importance.

To combat counter-revolutionary, military and other crimes, military tribunals were established in the Red Army, the procedure for which was determined by the Regulations on Special Military Tribunals of December 11, 1918.

A special role in the struggle against Bolsheviks' political opponents was played by the All-Ukrainian Emergency Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Sabotage and Official Crimes created by the example of the RSFSR by the decree of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine on December 3, 1918. Although formally the Emergency Commission was created as a department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and in 1920 it was subordinated to the Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR, actually the process of its transformation into a kind of repressive and punitive structure of the Bolshevik Party took place. The activities of the All-Ukrainian Emergency Commission were largely directed by the All-Russian Emergency Commission, which was directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the RCP(b).



*Поспішай панові доброго прочухана дати!
Барона також не забудь!!!*

In the picture: Soviet propaganda poster

In 1917, the Soviets of Workers' Deputies began to create detachments of workers' militia. At that time its main purpose was to prevent counter-revolutionary coup attempts. However, in their practical activity, police units guarded factories, maintained public order in cities, combated crime, and executed search warrants at homes of persons engaged in speculation, and so on. The reorganization of these units into militia departments at the military-revolutionary committees began in late 1918. In accordance with the decree of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine of February 5, 1919, transferring to the republican Soviet militia in the republican scale was carried out. Its structure gradually included criminal investigation, general, forensic, industrial, railway, river, and maritime services. Militia units were responsible for maintaining order in cities and villages, conducting urgent investigative actions and taking measures to detain criminals in cases of crimes, and assisting judicial institutions in enforcing sentences. On March 30, 1920, the Main Directorate of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Militia was established under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR.

Numerous control commissions and departments also supervised the implementation of the authorities' legislative acts. A prominent place among the

bodies of supervision and control belonged to the People's Commissariat of Justice and its provincial, county and city departments.

2. Soviet Ukraine in the federal system.

After the First World War, new states in Central and South-Eastern Europe appeared on the political map of the world. 13 states emerged on the ruins of the former Russian Empire. Five of them – Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland – were truly independent. In all others, in particular in Ukraine, the Soviet form of statehood was formed.

According to the Constitution, the UkrSSR had all the characteristics of an independent state. However, in fact it remained part of the former empire, revived by the Bolsheviks in a strange form of a conglomeration of independent states. The history of Ukraine (for almost 70 years) was inextricably linked with the history of the multinational Soviet state – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

After the end of the civil war, Ukraine was in a difficult socio-economic and political situation.

The First World War, foreign intervention and the Civil War caused great damage to Ukraine's economy. The losses were estimated at almost 10 billion gold rubles. There was a rift in the industry. The iron ore industry did not work. The area under crops decreased, it amounted to 15% of the pre-war level. The food problem was exacerbated by the crop failure of 1920 when the republic was hit by drought. At the end of 1921, 1.2 million people were starving in Ukraine, and in May 1922 that figure amounted to 3.8 million. However, by 1922, almost all food was exported to the RSFSR.

Bread export stopped only in the summer of 1922, and aid to the starving increased. Only the 1922 harvest and the deployment of the American Relief Administration's food outlets, a non-governmental organization set up in the United States to help European countries affected by World War II and other aid organizations, stopped the mass mortality.

The economic crisis was complemented by the political one. An insurgent movement developed in a large part of the republic. The resistance movement caused great trouble to the new government. The scale of Makhno's army activity was of particular concern. The reason for the army's elimination was the termination of Makhno's agreement with the government, disobedience to the order to reform his army. The forces were unequal, and in August 1921 N. Makhno was forced to flee with a small group of like-minded people to Romania. By the way, in the autumn of 1921, large detachments led by Atamans Zabolotnyi, Orlyk, Blokha, and Mordylevych were also destroyed. After the Ukrainian government announced an amnesty, which was monitored by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (the People's Commissar was M. Skrypnyk), more than 10,000 members of the insurgent movement appeared to be found guilty.

In November 1921, several detachments of Petliura's army general Yu. Tiutiunnyk, which had broken through from Poland, were defeated, and in December its main forces were liquidated. After the end of the civil war and intervention, conditions were created for the transition to post-war reconstruction. The problem of paramount importance was the diplomatic recognition of the UkrSSR by the great powers. It was necessary to settle relations with border-states.

During 1921-1922 the following agreements were signed:

- February 14, 1921 – the first peace treaty of Soviet Ukraine with Lithuania,
- March 18, 1921 – Riga Peace Treaty with Poland,
- January 2, 1922 – Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood with Turkey.
- In late 1922 – early 1923, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia as a single delegation took part in the Lausanne Conference, which discussed the Black Sea Straits issues. The conference was attended by representatives of England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Turkey and other countries.

The transition to rebuilding the national economy in new, peaceful conditions was carried out in an extremely difficult situation, as the badly ruined country found itself in the grip of a deep political and economic crisis. The militarization of all spheres of life caused by “military communism”, the elimination of legal trade, the curtailment of commodity-money relations, the implementation of food surplus requisitioning in rural areas (forced withdrawal of additional, and often much-needed product from producers in favor of the state), rigid control over the measure of labor and consumption became a brake on the revival of the national economy in the new, peaceful conditions.

Peasants showed quite justified dissatisfaction with the food surplus requisitioning, which did not allow them to freely dispose of the products of their labor, and therefore did not encourage the development of productive agriculture. The extreme degree of impoverishment gave rise to the same sentiments in the working environment. Escaping from starvation, many workers abandoned factories, mines, railway workshops and began to engage in handicrafts, went to the countryside, and declassed.

As a result, the social base of the proletariat dictatorship weakened, and the danger of the restoration of the capitalist system increased.

A comprehensive analysis of the growing crisis convinced Lenin of the unsuitability of the “military-communist” approaches for the new conditions and, consequently, of the need for a sharp turn in the party's policy. This turn called the new economic policy (NEP) was proclaimed on the initiative of V. Lenin by the Xth Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1921. The NEP period began with the abolition of food surplus requisitioning. Based on the decisions of the Xth Congress of the RCP(b), the extraordinary session of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee passed a law on replacing the food surplus requisitioning with a food tax, and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR issued a decree on tax norms and amount.

The cereal food tax was 117 million poods instead of 160 million poods of the food surplus requisitioning from the 1921 harvest. Those peasants who fulfilled the food surplus requisitioning plan in 1921, were free to sell the surplus of their products. The abolition of the requisition principle in grain procurement and trade permits were of significant importance. For the first time, the prospects of truly economic development of the received land opened before the peasants.

The recognition of commodity-money relations, private trade, and the strengthening of finances by the government brought entrepreneurial activity out of the underground. The so-called new bourgeoisie appeared. That society stratum comprised tenants, brokers, commission agents, wholesalers, and industrialists who were called nepmen – people of the NEP. Nepmen's activity contributed to the rapid overcoming of economic chaos and devastation.

In the industrial sector, in order to implement the NEP principles, it was planned to concentrate the management of large enterprises in the hands of the state and to lease small ones. In Ukraine, 5,200 enterprises were leased to organizations (groups, cooperatives) and individuals, including former owners.

During the Civil War, nationalized enterprises did not have independence, they did not sell, but delivered their products to state bodies on the basis of orders; they did not buy, but received raw materials and supplies through work-permits. With the transition to the NEP, companies merged into self-supporting trusts. As a method of management, self-financing was based on the self-sufficiency of enterprises, which provided not only break-even, but also profit.

In 1922-1924, in order to ensure the effective functioning of the country's economic system monetary reform was introduced, which resulted in financial stabilization in both domestic and foreign markets. The state fully supported the development of various forms of cooperation, created conditions for further strengthening of ties between urban and rural areas.

According to the Constitution of 1919, the UkrSSR was considered a legally independent state. On December 28, 1920, the representatives of Russia – V. Lenin and G. Chicherin, – as the first party, and the representative of Ukraine Kh. Rakovskiy, as the second party, signed a treaty on a military and economic alliance between the two states. Under the treaty, the governments of Russia and Ukraine announced that they would unite seven People's Commissariats – military and naval affairs, foreign trade, finance, labor, roads, post and telegraph – and the Supreme Councils of National Economy.

According to the treaty, the joint People's Commissariats were part of the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR and had their representatives in the People's Commissariat of the UkrSSR. Despite Ukrainian Left Socialist Revolutionaries' protests against the treaty it was ratified at the Vth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (March 1921). Similar treaties were concluded between the Russian Federation and other republics: Azerbaijan (September 1920), Belarus (January 1921), Georgia (May 1921). Thus the federation of Soviet states was created.

The transformation of public administration bodies of the Russian Federation into general federal ones meant “autonomization” of independent republics, i.e. their actual inclusion in Russia’s borders as autonomies.

This caused dissatisfaction on the part of the population, and the national republics’ leaders, who defended the idea of sovereignty. KH. Rakovskyi, who headed the Ukrainian Soviet government in 1919-1923, became a mouthpiece of these ideas.

In March 1922, he addressed the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with a proposal to specify the relations between the RSFSR and the UkrSSR within the treaty federation. To prepare a project for improving federal relations, there was set up a commission which included representatives of the national republics; the chairman of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee H. Petrovskyi represented Ukraine in it. The commission included the following members of the Central Committee of the RCP(b): G. Ordzhonikidze, Kh. Rakovsky, G. Sokolnikov and J. Stalin.

The chairman of the commission was V. Kuibyshev. All members of the commission, with the exception of Kh. Rakovskyi, were supporters of the republics’ autonomization. Developed by J. Stalin draft resolution “On the relations of the RSFSR with independent republics” provided for the latter to enter the Russian Federation as autonomous entities.



In the picture: Soviet propaganda poster

Thus, Kh. Rakovskyi’s initiative gave the opposite result. V. Lenin did not participate in the commission meeting due to illness. After reviewing the

materials provided by the commission, he made a proposal to form the Soviet Union, i.e. a new federation comprising the Russian and Transcaucasian federations, Ukraine and Belarus.

The form of formation of a single state, proposed by Lenin, was approved by the October (1922) plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). However, the tendency to national republics' autonomization was revealed during the constitutional commission meeting attended by J. Stalin, M. Kalinin, G. Piatakov, Kh. Rakovskyi and G. Chicherin. This commission developed the constitutional principles of a single state. People's Commissariats of three types were created - merged, united and autonomous.

Five merged People's Commissariats with "undivided power" were to operate throughout the Soviet Union. Five united Commissariats differed from the merged ones only in that the republican units subordinated to the Moscow Collegium were called People's Commissariats (narcomats). Six People's Commissariats retained the status of independent in their republics: justice, internal affairs, agriculture, education, health care and social security.

On December 10, 1922, delegates of the VIIth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets approved the Declaration on the Establishment of the USSR and the draft Union Treaty. On December 30, 1922, the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR took place. At the suggestion of the head of the UkrSSR delegation M. Frunze, the Congress mainly approved the Declaration on the Establishment of the USSR and the Union Treaty. Thus, a new state appeared on the world political arena – the USSR, which included Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and the Transcaucasian republics – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

To govern such a large state, allied governing bodies were formed – the Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the Central Executive Committee (CEC), the Council of People's Commissars (government), and the ruling Bolshevik Party RCP(b) was renamed in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) with its center in Moscow (1925).

Later, the USSR included:

- Turkmenistan (1925) after the establishment of the Turkmen SSR in 1924;
- Uzbekistan (1925) after the establishment of the Uzbek SSR in 1924;
- Tajikistan (1929) after the creation of the Tajik SSR in 1929.

In 1936, the USSR united 11 union republics.

However, taking into account the comments and proposals of the union republics, the final texts of the documents were to be approved by the following Congress of Soviets. At the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the CEC of the USSR was elected. It comprised 371 members and 138 candidates, as well as four chairmen of the CEC (H. Petrovskyi from Ukraine).

In January 1923, the CEC of the USSR approved the Constitutional Commission headed by M. Kalinin. Together with the CEC of the Union Republics, the commission began developing the basic principles of government system. This commission, which worked openly, had only to repeat those things,

which, in principle, had already been decided by an unknown intra-party constitutional commission, the decisions of which had been based on Stalin's autonomy project.

On January 26, 1924, the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR opened. It approved the first Constitution of the USSR. In May 1925, the IXth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets approved a new text of the Constitution of the UkrSSR. It enshrined in law the entry of Soviet Ukraine into the USSR, as well as the right to leave the Union freely, defined the competence and functions of republican bodies of state power and public administration, as well as relations between the highest bodies of state power and public administration of the UkrSSR and USSR.

Thus, naval and foreign affairs, foreign trade, and rail transport were entirely within the competence of the union government. The financial system, labor, food, and industry were subordinated to the Union-Republican People's Commissars. Some other people's commissariats - justice, home affairs, agriculture, education, health care and social security - retained the status of independent. But they also ideologically and materially depended on the central apparatus.

Thus, the process of formation of a multinational union, and in fact a unitary state, was completed. Ukraine, like other national republics, while retaining signs of state sovereignty, had for many decades been held hostage to the policies of the center, Moscow's ruling party and economic structures. The Constitution also recorded changes resulting from the formation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924 and the new administrative-territorial division of the republic.

In 1923, instead of poviets and volosts, counties and districts were formed, and in 1925, the provinces were liquidated and a three-tier system of government management was established: center-county-district.

At that time, the Ukrainian Republic was the second largest in the USSR. Its area was 450 thousand square kilometers, and the population reached almost 26 million people.

3. Contradictory nature of political and economic development of Dnieper Ukraine in the 20-30s of the twentieth century.

The rejection of the new economic policy meant a serious turn, first of all, in the Bolsheviks' domestic policy. They chose the course of "accelerated socialist construction", and it was the policy of "socialist industrialization" that was to bring success to Stalin's course of the "great turning point". The aim was to ensure the predominant and priority development of Group A industries (fuel, energy, chemical, machine-building, etc.). This would make it possible to turn the USSR into a powerful industrial state with great military-industrial potential.

Very high rates of development of heavy industry were planned for Ukraine. In particular, the target for coal production was increased from 27 to 80

million tons (actually 45 million tons were produced), and the plan for pig iron smelting - from 2400 to 6600 thousand tons (actually – 4330 thousand tons).

At the same time, the “proletarian” state shamelessly exploited the working class, primarily through coercion and intimidation. Workers’ sincere enthusiasm, their trust in the government, and their faith in a “bright future” were also exploited. Material incentives, which clearly demonstrated their advantages during the NEP period, were replaced by moral, political and ideological ones.

On the night of August 30-31, 1935, O. Stakhanov, a miner at the “Central Irmine” mine, got 102 tons of coal (while the task was 7 tons), with the help of two assistant shaft timbermen, whose names remained unknown to history. The state used this fact to revise production rates in the direction of increasing them by 35-45%. Millions of repressed “enemies of the people” also became participants in Stalin’s program of socialist industrialization. The villagers were also ruthlessly exploited.

As for industrial policy, it consisted in the creation of monopoly enterprises, whose products were intended for the needs of large regions, including Central Russia. Zaporizhstal, Azov-Stal, Dniiproges, Kramatorsk Machine-Building Plant, Kharkiv Tractor Plants, etc. were built. At the end of the first five-year plan in Ukraine, the enterprises of the Soviet Union subordination produced 69.8% of the total output, the republican ones – 20.3%, the local ones – 9.9%. Since the mid-1930s, the course for the militarization of the national economy and the creation of a powerful military-industrial complex became increasingly clear. The relationship between industry and agriculture in the general structure of the economy changed. All types of private enterprise have sharply decreased. Foreign concessions were liquidated. A planned administrative-command system was established. In a few decades it would exhaust itself and collapse.

This is how forced socialist industrialization – an integral part of Stalin’s policy of “the onset of socialism on the whole front” – took place. Today the whole world knows how this offensive ended. As for Ukraine, its inhabitants, who voluntarily or forcibly bore the burden of industrialization, simply did not feel its results. And not surprisingly, as almost three-quarters of industrial output produced by Ukrainian enterprises were sent to the All-Union Fund.

Another component of Stalin’s course was the so-called socialist collectivization of agriculture. This direction was determined in 1927 at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In early 1928, Stalin and his entourage made adjustments to the Congress’s decision, the essence of which was to further limit the market elements left over from the NEP, to forcibly liquidate all forms of agricultural cooperation, and the “kulaks as a class”. Collective farms and state farms were to become the only form of production organization in the countryside. All this was to be fulfilled in three or four years. Those who opposed the “party line” were declared “enemies of the people” and repressed (M. Bukharin, M. Rykov, O. Tomsnyi, etc.). For the same

reasons, the reprisal against prominent agricultural scientists O. Chayanov, K. Kondratiev, and others took place.

In 1929, the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held. There, it was stated that Ukraine should introduce collectivization as soon as possible, setting an example for other republics of the USSR. And it began to set such an example. If in October 1929 there were 10 completely collectivized districts in Ukraine, in December of the same year they amounted to 46. The establishment of the collective and state farm system was accompanied by the forced expropriation of land, livestock, and agricultural tools. Everything was done to kill peasants' eternal desire to have their own land and learn to work productively on it. Peasants were deprived of almost everything and forcibly driven to the collective farms. Dissenters were repressed. In fact, it was about the resettlement of Ukrainian farmers. Some of them, primarily young people, went to the cities to get engaged in industry. Many people from the countryside who became students or were enlisted into the Red Army did not return home. The consequences of mass deportations were also severe for Ukraine. In the late 1920s, 850,000 Ukrainian peasants were forcibly relocated to the inhabited areas of the Polish Peninsula and Siberia. The policy of "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" was also aimed at resettlement of farmers, because many middle-sized farms also suffered at that time.

To ensure a high rate of collectivization, the Bolsheviks sent 62,000 workers to the Ukrainian countryside. The so-called twenty-five thousanders – usually Russian workers who were to pursue the party's agrarian policy – also arrived there. As of June 1, 1930, 90,000 farms were forcibly collectivized in the republic, and in the years of collectivization in total 200,000. Together with all members of the kulak families, this amounted to 1.2 – 1.4 million people. More than half of them were deported to the North and to Siberia. In 1932, by introducing a passport system in the cities, the authorities actually attached the peasants to the collective farm land, making them state serfs.

Thus, as a result of "socialist collectivization", the Soviet government achieved many goals. Wealthy and capable of productive labor peasantry (kulaks, much of the middle class) was exterminated. The rest of the peasants, especially the poorest, were driven to the collective farms, as a result of which Ukrainian farmers suffered. Due to mass repressions, the gene pool of the Ukrainian people in general and the Ukrainian peasantry in particular was significantly undermined. The Soviet government failed to achieve only what "socialist collectivization" was officially introduced for – the creation of highly productive agriculture, raising the living standards of the population.

In 1932-1933, the Ukrainian people, especially the peasantry, experienced perhaps one of the most tragic outcomes of collectivization: the Holodomor. Its origins, as already noted, should be sought in the agrarian policy of the Soviet government. The grain procurement plans, in particular, were never economically sound, they essentially meant a food dictatorship. Almost two-

thirds of the gross grain harvest, the vast majority of livestock products, was confiscated from Ukrainian farmers. In addition, the collective farms maintained machine-tractor stations on their own therefore they did not have products for sufficient wages for farmers.

In 1931, almost a third of the harvest was lost. Grain procurement plans, however, remained unchanged. In 1932, the area under crops in Ukraine decreased by one-fifth. The grain procurement plan was raised by 44%. In 1932, a resolution “On the Protection of Socialist Property” was adopted. According to it peasants were punished by execution or concentration camp for «appropriating» even a handful of grain from a collective farm field. At that time, even the seed stock was confiscated to the state granary, without giving any grain to the collective farmers.



In the picture: Holodomor Memorial Complex in Ukraine

The famine began in the republic. In March 1933, it covered 103 out of 400 districts. However, even under those conditions, a significant amount of grain was exported. The central government managed to allocate only 3 million poods of bread to Ukraine. Even today the its portion given to the hungry remains unknown. Another thing is known: the losses of Ukraine amounted to 5-7 million people. This famine was undoubtedly artificial and is classified as a Soviet-Bolshevik genocide against the Ukrainian people.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. When did the Bolsheviks first come to power?
2. Describe the conditions under which the Bolsheviks lost power.

3. When did the Bolsheviks come to power for the second time?
4. What Ukraine's territories came under the control of the Bolsheviks in winter - spring 1919?
5. Describe the features of the formation of the central Soviet government apparatus in Ukraine in the late 1918 - early 1919.
6. When was the policy of "military communism" adopted?
7. Explain the reasons for adopting the policy of "military communism" and outline its essence.
8. Outline the Bolshevik policy towards the peasantry.
9. Give a general description of the attitude of various population segments and political organizations towards the Bolshevik policy in Ukraine.
10. For what purpose was the All-Ukrainian Committee created?
11. Describe the government land policy in 1920. What factors influenced its implementation?
12. Describe the essence of the food surplus requisitioning. What methods of its introduction were used by the Bolsheviks?
13. Describe the reasons for adopting the new economic policy. When was it adopted?
14. Discover the essence of the NEP.
15. What are the limitations of the NEP?
16. What are the implications of the NEP for economic development?
17. Analyze the causes and consequences of the famine of 1921-1923.
18. What is the purpose of industrialization?
19. Describe the difficulties of industrialization.
20. What economic outcomes were planned in the first five-year plan and by what methods?
21. What factors influenced the transition to forced industrialization? What was the manifestation of that transition?
22. What were the first five-year plan outcomes? What tasks could not be solved?
23. Describe the consequences of industrialization.
24. Identify the reasons for the establishment of Stalin's totalitarian regime.
25. Outline the ideology and policy of socialism?
26. What were the consequences of Stalin's repression in the 1930s?
27. The new Constitution of the USSR declared citizens' rights and freedoms. Was their practical implementation been ensured? Justify the answer.

TESTS

1. L. Trotsky was supported by the following CP(B)U members:
 - a) I. Dashkovsky, N. Gordon;
 - b) D. Manutulsky, G. Petrovsky;
 - c) M. Skripnik, V. Chubar.

2. The first five-year plan was drafted for:

- a) 1926 - 1931;
- b) 1928 - 1932;
- c) 1927 - 1931;
- d) 1932 – 1937.

3. The first five-year plan was approved by the XI All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in:

- a) 1927;
- b) 1928;
- c) 1929;
- d) 1930.

4. According to the five-year plan, 64 billion rubles were allocated for capital construction in the USSR, of which Ukraine accounted for:

- a) 13 billion rubles;
- b) 15 billion rubles;
- c) 16 billion rubles;
- d) 17 billion rubles.

5. The grain crisis arose in:

- a) 1926 - 1927;
- b) 1928 - 1929;
- c) 1929 - 1930;
- d) 1931 – 1932.

6. The transition to forced industrialization began in:

- a) 1927;
- b) 1928;
- c) 1929;
- d) 1930.

7. Dnipropetrovsk hydroelectric power plant in Zaporizhia started producing electric power in:

- a) 1932;
- b) 1933;
- c) 1934.

8. The Constitution of the USSR was approved by the XIV All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in:

- a) January 1936;
- b) January 1937;
- c) January 1938;

d) January 1939.

9. The State Political Directorate “exposed” the underground organization «Union for the Liberation of Ukraine» in:

- a) in the autumn of 1929;
- b) in the summer of 1930;
- c) in the spring of 1931;
- d) in the spring of 1932.

10. The second five-year plan was developed for:

- a) 1932 - 1936;
- b) 1933 - 1937;
- c) 1934 – 1938.

11. The “Mine case” trial of coal industry specialists (Donbass) was fabricated in:

- a) 1927;
- b) 1928;
- c) 1929;
- d) 1930.

12. In “The Year of the Great Revolution” article, J. Stalin proposed an increase in heavy industry output in 1929/30 by:

- a) 31%;
- b) 32%;
- c) 40%;
- d) 42%.

13. How many enterprises were created during the first five-year plan implementation in Ukraine?

- a) 300;
- b) 400;
- c) 500 .

14. The first tractor was manufactured by Kharkiv Tractor Plant on:

- a) October 1, 1930;
- b) October 1, 1931;
- c) October 1, 1932

15. During the second five-year plan period (1933-1937) the following industrial facilities were constructed:

- a) Kharkiv Tractor Plant and Dniproges;

- b) Zaporizhstal and Kryvorizhstal;
- c) Azovstal;
- d) Novokramatorsk plant of heavy engineering.

LECTURE 9: UKRAINE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A NEW PARADIGM

- 1. The Ukrainian question in international relations on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War.**
- 2. The contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over Nazism.**
- 3. Historical and legal consequences of the Second World War for Ukrainian statehood.**

1. The Ukrainian question in international relations on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War.

The disunity of the Ukrainian lands, their belonging to different states were not only a painful problem of a large European nation, but also one of the difficult moments of the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the prewar period. Ukraine constantly attracted attention of many European countries, but they were only interested in seizing Ukrainian lands and turning them into their colony.

On the eve of World War II, the population of Western Ukraine was about 7 million people. All these lands were dominated by a foreign administration, which pursued a policy of colonization. This infuriated Ukrainians and led to their opposing the official authorities.

In 1925, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union headed by K. Levytskyi was formed. In 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was established in Vienna under the leadership of Ye. Konovalets. Its aim was to gain Ukraine's independence.

A brief history of the statehood of Carpathian Ukraine is not only a bright page in the liberation struggle of Ukrainians, who for many generations, since the Hetmanate, dreamed of their independence and the establishment of Ukraine as an equal among equals in the world. Carpathian Ukraine is also a manifestation of fierce and stubborn competition of peoples for the assertion of their will and place in the world. Moreover, it demonstrated how between several fires, not only Polish and Soviet, but also Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak, Ukrainians fought for their political and national establishment on their own land, in particular, in Transcarpathia.

When Greater Ukraine was formally proclaimed one of several similarly formal national republics of the USSR and enslaved within the framework of the Soviet totalitarian system, the Ukrainian question was acute in Central Europe, primarily in Czechoslovakia. It was presented to the Czechoslovak Republic at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-20, when the West demanded that Tomas

Masaryk's government grant autonomy to Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, namely in Transcarpathia, with further settlement of the issue after Ukraine's statehood as a whole was resolved.

That is, in Paris, in particular, under the Treaty of Saint-Germain of 1919 and the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, they saw no other way for Transcarpathian Ukrainians than their entry into the future independent Ukraine.

Prague delayed the proclamation of Transcarpathian autonomy for a long time, until Czechoslovakia was threatened with dismemberment following the September 1938 Munich Agreement.

Although the need to declare the autonomy of Transcarpathia was enshrined in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia, neither President Tomas Masaryk nor President Edvard Benes was in a hurry to do so. It was not until September 1938, when the Munich Conference of the Great Powers was held, that the question of Subcarpathian Rus was raised in connection with the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.



In the picture: Poster of Carpathian Ukraine

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop invited the Uzhhorod delegation to Munich. It was headed by Eduard Bachynskyi and was

accompanied by several Greek Catholic fathers. Referring to them, Bachynskiy persuaded the Germans of the need for Transcarpathia's independence from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Later, while in Yugoslavia in late March 1939, the President of Carpathian Ukraine Augustyn Voloshyn described how he had informed Berlin in early March 1939 of Hungary's proposal to Khust (the capital of Carpathian Ukraine) to include Carpathian Ukraine in the Hungarian state on the basis of autonomy following the model of Croatia and Slovenia as part of Austria-Hungary.

According to Voloshyn, the Germans forbade him to give a positive answer to Budapest's proposal, because it allegedly contradicted the Vienna Arbitration of November 2, 1938.

In an interview with a Yugoslav newspaper, Augustyn Voloshyn also claimed that Germany had been strongly opposed to a common Hungarian-Polish border in the Carpathians, therefore he, as president of Carpathian Ukraine, had been forced to declare its independence on March 15, 1939.

On October 8, 1938, the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia General Jan Sirovy (President Edward Benes had already emigrated from the country on October 5) was forced to proclaim the autonomy of Subcarpathian Rus under pressure from both Berlin and Uzhhorod.

The first autonomous government of Subcarpathian Rus, headed by Russophile leader and Hungarian intelligence agent Andriy Brodiy, was joined by the Augustyn Voloshyn (Ukrainophile). On October 26, Brodiy was removed from office as a Hungarian agent, and Augustyn Voloshyn was elected Prime Minister of Carpathian Ukraine.

Hungary did not agree with the division of former Czechoslovakia's borders, and at its request, Germany held an arbitration in Vienna on November 2. According to it, the territories of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Sevlush (Vynohradiv) counties with the cities of Uzhhorod, Mukacheve and Berehove were taken from Carpathian Ukraine and transferred to Hungary.

On November 3, the name "Carpathian Ukraine" appeared in the official documents of the Augustyn Voloshyn government.

On that day, the Prime Minister of Subcarpathian Russia Augustyn Voloshyn addressed the people of "Carpathian Ukraine with a call to stand up for self-sufficiency and the development of an independent state". He emphasized that "great-states, which had established the final boundaries on the 2nd of November, 1938, in Vienna, had called Subcarpathian Rus naturally – Carpathian Ukraine".

In the same appeal, the rejection of Carpathian Ukraine's territories by Hungary was called a "heavy wave" and a "wound" for "Ukrainian state independence". It was also reported that the government of autonomous Carpathian Ukraine then as part of the Czechoslovak Republic was forced to move to Khust, where in 1919 "the first wish of our independence had been proclaimed on January 21". The government's move from Uzhhorod to Khust

took place on November 10, 1938. The political situation in early 1939 was extremely tense. Peaceful life in Transcarpathia was disturbed by constant terrorist provocations by Hungarian and Polish agents. At the turn of 1938-39, almost every night, shootings took place on the border between Hungary and Carpathian Ukraine, between Uzhhorod and Perechyn.

Relations between the autonomous government of Carpathian Ukraine and the Czech authorities were tense. Prague wanted to directly control all of Khust's actions and, contrary to its autonomous rights, appointed its general Lev Prhal a minister to the government of Carpathian Ukraine. On January 20, 1939, at the request of the Czech government, all political parties in Carpathian Ukraine were dissolved. However, Augustyn Voloshyn immediately created the Ukrainian National Union, which violated previous decisions of the Prague authorities.

The Sejm of Carpathian Ukraine convened, with the consent of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic Emil Gaha, on the night of October 14-15 in Khust. It proclaimed the full independence of Carpathian Ukraine. Not only the fact of independence of Carpathian Ukraine was proclaimed at the Sejm, but also the main documents on independence, on the state system, name, anthem, state language, and flag. This can be seen and heard in the film document of the cameraman Peter Lesyuk (or Lysyuk), who died on March 15, 1939 on the Red Field, on the banks of the Tisza, between Khust and Korolev during the battle of the Carpathian Sich with Hungarian troops:

It happened at an extremely difficult time. On the night of 13 to 14, the Hungarian army was already on the border of Carpathian Ukraine in the area of Korolev, a few kilometers from Khust. That same night there was a bloody clash between the Czech troops and the Carpathian Sich. The Czechs did not want to arm the Sich. On March 15, Hitler introduced his troops into the Czech Republic and Moravia. Czechoslovakia disintegrated.

The declaration of independence of Carpathian Ukraine, as can be seen from the film, was a triumph, a moment for the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia. And already on March 15, 1939, the bloody historical reality turned the events in Carpathian Ukraine into a tragic direction.

A new attack on the western Ukrainian lands was inflicted on August 23, 1939, when V. Molotov and J. Ribbentrop signed the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. The secret protocol provided for the delimitation of the spheres of interests of the two states, and Western Ukraine, along with other territories, was to become part of the USSR. Lemkivshchyna and Kholmshchyna fell into the German zone.

On September 1, 1939, World War II began with a German attack on Poland. On September 17, Red Army troops crossed the Polish border. This was described by official Soviet propaganda as a "liberation campaign" in Western Ukraine. On September 22, a preliminary demarcation line was established between the aggressor's troops, and on September 28, the USSR and Germany signed a treaty of friendship. On February 11, 1940, an economic agreement was

signed in Moscow, according to which on May 15, 1941, Germany received from the USSR 632 thousand tons of bread, 232 thousand tons of gasoline, 23.5 thousand tons of cotton, 50 thousand tons of manganese, 900 kg of platinum, etc. Joint military parades took place in Brest, Pinsk, and Kovel, which was to symbolize the friendship between the USSR and Germany.



In the picture: Columns of Soviet infantry cross the border with Poland on September 17, 1939.

The mentioned secret protocol also referred to the interests of the USSR in relation to South-Eastern Europe, in particular Bessarabia. At the end of June 1940, the USSR, taking advantage of German non-intervention and its pressure on the Romanian government, occupied Bessarabia, the Ukrainian-inhabited territories of Bukovina, and the Romanian district Hertza.

Thus, almost all Ukrainian lands previously belonging to other states were collected together within the USSR. On the one hand, this fact had an undisputable positive significance: the reunification of the western Ukrainian lands objectively corresponded to the eternal desire of our people for unity. But it is impossible not to take into account such things as who, why and by what methods did it. Stalin, conducting a political bargain with Hitler, first of all cared about the further expansion of his empire, and the creation of a “security zone” on the western borders. In addition, Stalin sought to put an end to the liberation movement of the population of Western Ukraine as soon as possible. Not only repression was used for this. For tactical reasons, a number of steps were taken to limit Polish influence in those lands. In particular, the Ukrainian language became the language of instruction at Lviv Ivan Franko University.

However, the situation of the new territorial possessions of the USSR was dominated by something else. There was a tough process of forced Sovietization. All Ukrainian parties, cultural and educational organizations, unions, clubs, the Greek Catholic Church, Prosvita (Enlightenment) institutions, and more than 80 different publications were banned. The Soviet leadership was mortally frightened by the very possibility of the influence of nationally-minded Galicia on Soviet Ukraine. That is why the authorities with such persistence imposed the totalitarian-communist system (worked out in the USSR) in Western Ukraine. Repression against the population became increasingly brutal and massive. Since the autumn of 1939, 10% of the population of Western Ukraine had been repressed for political reasons, usually without trial or investigation. The long-awaited reunification of Ukrainian lands turned out to be bloody.

2. The contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over Nazism.

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR. Ukraine occupied a special place in the fascists' plans. According to the Ost plan, Germany intended to deport tens of millions of people from Ukraine, relocating German colonists there. Part of its lands was supposed to be transferred to the satellites of Hitler's Germany.

The first days of the war showed the weakness of the USSR. Despite the massive heroism of the fighters, the Red Army, whose command staff had fallen victim to Stalinist repression in the prewar years, quickly retreated. By mid-August 1941, German troops had captured Galicia, Western Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Bessarabia. On September 19, the Nazis took over Kyiv, and in October – Odessa and Kharkiv. By the end of 1941, almost the whole Ukraine was occupied. Human toll and material losses were enormous.

The hopes of Western Ukrainians that with the Germans' the arrival and the Bolsheviks' retreat they would get improvement did not come true. Although the OUN military units fought against the Red Army together with the Germans at the beginning of the war, Hitler had no idea that Ukraine could become an independent state. This became especially clear when the Ukrainian state proclaimed in Lviv on June 30, 1941, was quickly liquidated, and the initiators of the Act of Independence of Ukraine – S. Bandera and Ya. Stetsko – were deported to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

An occupation regime, which brutally persecuted all those who opposed it, was established throughout Ukraine. On August 20, 1941, the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine, headed by the fascist executioner E. Koch, was established on a large part of the republic occupied by the Germans. However, all this could not suppress the population's resistance. In particular, the Soviet guerrilla formations launched an active struggle against the occupiers. The Ukrainian National Council, a political and public center under the auspices of the OUN, was established in occupied Kyiv. There were underground Bolshevik

and nationalist organizations, Polish partisan detachments, and other resistance units. While the Soviet partisans' activity was concentrated mainly on the Left Bank, the OUN armed formations, primarily the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, operated in Western Ukraine. In July 1944, the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council was established. However, the Bolsheviks regarded the OUN-UPA as allies of Germany, their enemies. For this reason, the anti-Nazi movement in Ukraine weakened, and its forces were often spent on fratricidal struggle among its units.



In the picture: OUN-UPA leaflet

Events on the fronts, especially after Germany's defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk, began to develop in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. The strategic initiative was finally transferred to the Red Army. The liberation of the Left Bank of Ukraine began. The Red Army had a threefold advantage over the Germans in the number of troops and almost a fivefold one in equipment, much of which was supplied by the Allies, primarily the United States and Great

Britain. Replenished with enormous human resources, the Red Army launched a vigorous offensive. During the summer and autumn of 1943, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Poltava were liberated, in September – Donbass, and on November 6 – Kyiv. The victorious forcing of the Dnieper completed a radical change in the war.

The final stage of the Second World War occupies a very important place both in the world history and in the history of Ukraine. It urged the formation of new views on the postwar development of the world, and on the entire system of international relations. And as the victory over the common enemy drew nearer, these issues attracted the increasing attention of the political leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.



In the picture: Soviet poster on the Second World War

As for the course of World War II in 1944-1945, it became increasingly clear that the anti-Hitler coalition was confidently on its way to victory over Nazi Germany. In particular, 1944 was the year of the final liberation of Ukrainian lands from Nazi invaders. In February 1944, a large group of German troops was liquidated near Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi. On March 26, Soviet troops reached the state border with Romania. After the liberation of Crimea in the first half of May 1944, the main efforts were concentrated in the western direction. Eight German divisions were defeated near Brody, including the SS Halychyna division. Lviv, Stanislaviv, and Uzhhorod were liberated.

At the beginning of October 1944, the territory of Ukraine was completely cleared of occupiers, and at the end of that month, Transcarpathia was liberated. On June 29, 1945, the USSR and Czechoslovakia concluded an agreement on the reunification of Transcarpathia with the Ukrainian SSR.

The Soviet partisan formations headed by M. Naumov and O. Fedorov made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Nazis. S. Kovpak's unit also achieved certain success during its Carpathian raid. The actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were an integral part of the all-Ukrainian movement against the Nazis. In the autumn of 1944, it carried out 800 raids. After Soviet troops marched across Western Ukraine, the UPA organized a series of actions to prevent the mobilization and deportation of the Ukrainian population. At the same time, for tactical reasons, the Germans released S. Bandera, J. Stetsko, and A. Melnyk from the concentration camp. However, they did not achieve their goal: the OUN-UPA did not abandon the struggle on two fronts – both against the Bolsheviks and against the Nazis.

Thus, the events on the fronts showed that the defeat of Germany was imminent. The victory of the united nations over the Nazis and their allies, as already noted, not only summed up the Second World War, but also put no less important issues – the postwar world order – on the agenda.

Ukraine made a huge contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany and Japan. At least 5.3 million people, or one in six Ukrainians, died in World War II. 2.3 million Ukrainians were deported to Germany for forced labor. Ukraine's losses account for 40-44% of the USSR's total losses. Deportees from the Ukrainian SSR make up 78.6% of all deportees from the USSR. Material losses in Ukraine were estimated at 286 billion rubles (total losses of the USSR amounted to 679 billion, of which Russia accounts for 225 billion, Belarus – 75 billion, Latvia – 20 billion, Lithuania – 17 billion, Estonia – 16 billion).

3. Historical and legal consequences of the Second World War for Ukrainian statehood.

World War II significantly affected the international legal status of Soviet Ukraine, and in the long run – the corresponding status of the modern Ukrainian state. In this regard, the events in the USSR and, in particular, in the UkrSSR in 1944 were of great importance. Thus, on January 27, 1944, the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), convened for the first time since the war, approved proposals to expand the rights of the union republics in the field of defense and foreign relations. On February 1, 1944, the tenth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR heard a report delivered by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov "On the Transformation of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from All-Union to Union-Republican People's Commissariats". On the same day, the relevant law was adopted and the USSR Constitution was amended. According to the law, each republic had the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them and to exchange diplomatic and consular missions. On March 4, 1944, the sixth session of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR passed the law "On the Establishment of the Union-Republican People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR". O. Korniychuk was appointed head of the

Commissariat, and he returned from Moscow, where he had worked as one of V. Molotov's deputies.

The fact mentioned above was not the only instance evidencing Moscow's loyalty towards Ukraine. There was a row of other ones, namely: one of the sections of the Soviet-German front was renamed the Ukrainian Front; Volodymyr Sosiura's poem "Love Ukraine", full of pronounced national motives, was awarded the Stalin Prize by Moscow authorities; new military awards were introduced, including the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

What were the real motives for these decisions taken by Moscow? Whose interests did they meet? In fact, that was acknowledged, in a somewhat veiled form, in V. Molotov's report of February 1, 1944, where he stated, in particular, that the proposed changes would meet not only the interests of the union republics but also the USSR as a whole. Stalin tried to prove that there were no national problems in the USSR, even the slightest reason to be dissatisfied with Soviet national policy; that the union republics, including Ukraine, had become subjects of international law and could be members of postwar international organizations. At the Dumbarton Oaks (the USA) conference, held in August-October 1944, the Soviet leadership raised the question of admitting all the republics of the USSR to the future international organization. The claim was rejected as legally unfounded. Later, an agreement was reached according to which the two Soviet republics – Ukraine and Belarus – would become co-founding members of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union thus received two additional votes in this organization, which violated the general principle: one state – one vote. These republics' membership in the United Nations, and later in other international organizations greatly facilitated pursuing Soviet foreign policy in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where totalitarian-communist regimes were established after World War II.

After that, the Stalinist leadership rejected the flirtation with the Ukrainians. In July 1944, O. Korniychuk was dismissed from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs by a directive from Moscow. He was succeeded by D. Manuisky, who in the 1920s had supported Stalin's project of "autonomy" and whom Stalin had called a "fake Ukrainian". V. Sosiura soon became unnecessary. His poem "Love Ukraine", once awarded the Stalin Prize, was later subjected to severe political ostracism.

While Stalin "worried" about Ukrainians for tactical reasons, on February 11, 1944, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to deprive a number of the USSR peoples of the remnants of their statehood. In March of the same year, L. Beria reported on the "work done": 12 nations and nationalities were deported – just over 3 million people. In 1956, at the XX Congress of the Communist Party, N. Khrushchev said: "Ukrainians escaped this fate because there were too many of them and nowhere to evict them. Otherwise Stalin would have evicted them". Tens of millions of Ukrainians, unlike Tatars or Chechens,

were indeed difficult to deport from their homelands. In addition, the geopolitical location of Ukraine did not contribute to such an action.

All these events, as already noted, took place when Allied troops were advancing on Berlin, the assault on which began in April 1945. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers took part in the battle for Berlin. On May 2, the German capital was taken. On September 2, 1945, Japan also capitulated. World War II was over.

The Ukrainian people, who became one of the victors in that bloody massacre, hoped that after the war everything would be different, that totalitarianism and genocide were things of the past. However, those hopes were in vain. For many decades, Moscow denied the Ukrainian people, as well as other peoples of the USSR, the right to free, independent development, to their own independent state.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. Describe the geopolitical situation on the eve of World War II war and the role of Ukraine in it.
2. What plans did Nazi Germany have for Ukraine?
3. What role did the secret agreement of 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union «play» in the action of annexing the western Ukrainian lands to the USSR?
4. What was the contradiction of the processes that took place in all spheres of life in the western Ukrainian region?
5. Explain the essence of the non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany.
6. Why has the Treaty of Friendship and Border between Germany and the Soviet Union been a top secret in the USSR for 50 years?
7. Why were the first months of the war so tragic for the Red Army?
8. Name the main military operations that led to the occupation of almost the entire territory of Ukraine by Nazi troops.
9. How adequate were the hopes of OUN leaders for the revival of Ukrainian statehood with the help of Germany?
10. What were the consequences of the “Sovietization” of Western Ukraine?
11. What was the policy of the German occupation regime in Ukraine and what was its attitude to the activities of the OUN-UPA?
12. Outline similar and different features of Soviet troops’ and OUN-UPA armed groups’ methods of fighting against German occupiers.
13. What forms of people’s struggle in the enemy’s rear in all regions of occupied Ukraine do you know?
14. What do you know about the so-called rail war?
15. What prominent Ukrainian military leaders of the Second World War do you know?

16. Describe the main political and socio-economic consequences of World War II.
17. Why wasn't the Secret Protocol supplementing The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact publicly announced in the USSR for 50 years?
18. The situation before the war and at the initial stage of the war in relations between the OUN and the leadership of the Third Reich is aptly described by O. Subtelnyi: "... each side sought to use the other one for its own, often opposite purposes." What did the historian mean?
19. How did the views of S. Bandera's and A. Melnyk's supporters on Ukraine's ways of gaining independence differ?

TESTS:

1. The occupation zone, which included the territories of Lviv, Drohobych, Stanislav and Ternopil regions, was called
 - a) Transnistria;
 - b) Reich Commissariat "Ukraine";
 - d) Galicia District;
 - c) front zone;
2. What was an integral part of the Nazi new order?
 - a) liquidation of collective and state farms;
 - b) opening universities;
 - d) ban on the use of forced labor of the local population;
 - c) discrimination against the population and total terror.
3. What is the Holocaust?
 - a) total physical extermination of the Jewish population by the Nazis;
 - b) restriction of the rights of the Jewish population on religious grounds;
 - d) the hostile attitude of the Nazis towards the Jews in the occupied territories;
 - c) moral and psychological pressure of the occupation administration on the Jews.
4. Which lands belonged to the Reich Commissariat Ukraine?
 - a) Lviv, Drohobych, Stanislav and Ternopil regions;
 - b) Right Bank, most of the Left Bank and the southern areas adjacent to the Crimea;
 - c) Eastern regions of Ukraine up to the coast of the Sea of Azov and the Crimean Peninsula;
 - d) Odessa region, southern districts of Vinnytsia and western districts of Mykolayiv regions.

5.What are the names of people who voluntarily cooperate with the occupation authorities?

- a) prisoners of war;
- b) collaborationists;
- c) ostarbeiters;
- d) Volksdeutsche.

6.Specify the name of the occupation regime established by the Nazis in the occupied territories:

- a) “Scorched earth”;
- b) ‘Hardening in the East”;
- c) “New order”;
- d) “Final solution”.

7. Indicate the name of the settlement that was first liberated from German troops in Ukraine.

- a) Sverdlovsk, Luhansk region;
- b) Pivnivka, Luhansk region;
- c) Kharkiv;
- d) Uzhhorod.

8. What concepts and terms should be used to describe the events of World War II in Ukraine? (3 options)

- a) “de-Stalinization”;
- b) “deportation”;
- c) “military communism”;
- d) The Holocaust;
- e) “Ost Plan”.

9. Identify forms of struggle against fascist invaders in the occupied territories (2 answers):

- a) sabotage of enemy communications, destruction of communication lines, roads, and bridges, intelligence gathering, raids on the enemy’s rear;
- b) distribution of leaflets and newspapers calling for the struggle against the occupiers;
- c) deportation of people to forced labor in Germany;
- d) export of bread, food, equipment of factories from Ukraine;
- e) use of forced labor of the local population.

10.”... We were evicted on May 18, 1944. The eviction was brutal. At three o’clock in the morning the children were still asleep, the soldiers came in, ordered us to gather in five minutes and leave the house. We were not allowed to take any things or products ...”, from the memoirs of G. Ibragimova.

What event is mentioned in the memoirs?

- a) deportation of Jews;
- b) deportation of Crimean Tatars;
- c) deportation of Roma;
- d) deportation of Poles.

11. The liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine from the German occupiers and their allies took place on

- a) November 6, 1943;
- b) February 17, 1944;
- c) October 28, 1944;
- d) May 9, 1945.

12. Indicate the main outcomes of the Second World War (1939-1945) for Ukraine.

- a) liberalization and democratization of socio-political life in the Ukrainian SSR;
- b) growth of autonomous sentiments in the party-Soviet leadership of the Ukrainian SSR;
- c) unification of the main mass of Ukrainian ethnic lands within one state;
- d) cessation of hostilities of UPA detachments and OUN underground activities;
- e) entry of the republic into the international arena, accession to the United Nations;
- f) numerous human losses and material losses of the national economy of the Ukrainian SSR;
- g) granting the Ukrainian SSR the status of a union republic within the Soviet Union.

13. Identify the characteristics of the Nazi occupation regime in Ukraine during World War II.

- a) total terror, mass extermination of local civilians, prisoners of war;
- b) brutal exploitation of the population and economic robbery (export of raw materials, food, property);
- c) complete liquidation of the collective and state farm system, equal distribution of land between peasants according to labor standards;
- d) forced deportation of local able-bodied people to Germany;
- e) restoration and legalization of Ukrainian non-socialist political parties;
- f) creation of the Ukrainian National Army – Germany's ally in the war – by total mobilization.

LECTURE 10: CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF UKRAINE (second half of the 40s - the 80s of the XX century)

1. Features of the postwar period: objective conditions and subjective factors.

2. Attempt to liberalize the political regime (1953-1964)

3. The growth of crisis phenomena in the political life of Ukraine in the 60-80s of the twentieth century.

1. Features of the postwar period: objective conditions and subjective factors.

After the end of World War II, the Soviet Union faced the problem of rebuilding a largely devastated economy. Ukraine was particularly affected: 714 cities and towns and more than 28,000 villages had been destroyed, 250 villages had been burned to the ground. Demographic losses accounted for almost a quarter of the total population. About 10 million people had been left homeless. The damage caused by the war amounted to an astronomical figure of 286 billion rubles.

In August 1946, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR passed the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the National Economy. The task for 1950 was to bring the gross domestic product to 113% compared with 1940. The agrarian sector experienced particularly significant difficulties. Only about 7% of capital expenditures were allotted to this area. The peasantry was oppressed by excessive taxes.

The situation worsened in 1946-1947 due to crop failures and famines. Livestock had decreased significantly. Despite that, mandatory supplies of agricultural products to the state had hardly decreased. However, the USSR provided extensive support to the countries of Eastern Europe, which under Moscow's pressure had embarked on the path of "socialist construction". In 1946, the USSR exported 1.7 million tons of grain. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of peasants in Ukraine and other republics were dying of starvation. The international community offered its assistance aimed at overcoming the effects of World War II and the famine of 1946-1947, but Moscow refused it, as well as the assistance offered by the United States (the Marshall Plan). Thus, the Soviet people were abandoned to the whims of fate by own authorities.

These were the conditions for rebuilding the destroyed national economy: command and administrative methods, state, socialist property, the dominance of the collective farm system in agriculture, almost complete lack of worker's economic interest in the development of production, total ideological control. At

the cost of enormous strain the wounds of war had been largely healed by 1950. The volume of gross industrial output exceeded the level of 1940 by 15%. The Donbass mines and heavy industry enterprises were put into operation. The amount of iron ore, mechanical engineering, electricity, and cement production exceeded that of pre-war period. Gross output of agricultural production in 1950 was 91% of the prewar level. Positive changes were observed in the fields of education, science and culture.

Along with that, there were many problems in the postwar development of Ukraine. In particular, one-sidedness, imbalance of the economy, which was mainly directed to the needs of the military-industrial complex, became more and more obvious. Collectivization in the villages of Western Ukraine became a serious problem for the authorities as it provoked mass opposition from the local population. In that region, collectivization was completed only in the early 50s. Its main methods were coercion, “dekulakization”, and deportation. In particular, more than 203,000 so-called accomplices and assistants of OUN-UPA groups were deported to the eastern regions of the USSR;

The so-called Operation Vistula became a tragic event in the lives of Western Ukrainians. Its origins are probably to be found in 1944. It was then, on September 8, that an agreement on the mutual repatriation of the Polish and Ukrainian populations was signed between the Polish National Liberation Committee and the government of the Ukrainian SSR. In this way, the Polish pro-communist government tried to solve the problem of national minorities in its country. This meant, in particular, the “voluntary” resettlement of Ukrainians from the Zakerzonia region (the name comes from the ‘Curzon line’, beyond which there were the lands of Lemkivschyna, Nadsyannia, Kholmshchyna and Pidliashshia) to Soviet Ukraine. As of January 1, 1945, only up to 40,000 people left. These were mostly members of the Communist Party of Transcarpathian Ukraine, “Muscophiles”, as well as those who were forced to live in war-torn villages. As for the majority of Ukrainians of the Zakerzonia region, they did not intend to do so. Then the Polish government, supported by Moscow, began to “persuade” Ukrainians to leave Poland. Everything was used – from propaganda and threats to arson, looting and murder.

At the beginning of August 1946, when the end of “voluntary repatriation” was officially announced, more than 480,000 people were relocated to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) units took an active part in resisting the forcible deportation. Fighting in the Polish Carpathians did not subside in the postwar years.

On March 29, 1947, the Polish communist authorities decided to evict all Ukrainians living in south-eastern Poland (Lublin, Rzeszów and Kraków voivodeships). On April 28, 1947, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the notorious Operation Vistula began. It was carried out by 6 Polish divisions, united into a task force, and state security troops. As a result of their actions, 140,575 Ukrainians were deported, 655 were killed, and 1,466 OUN-UPA soldiers were taken prisoners. 2274 Ukrainians were arrested, 3873 people were imprisoned in

a concentration camp. In 1947, 372 Ukrainians were sentenced to death (a total of 573 in 1944-1956). As for the Ukrainians forcibly deported to Poland in April-August 1947, they were specially scattered in the northern and western Polish lands.



In the picture: Monument to Vistula operation victims in ЗщдфТВ

This action not only destroyed the OUN-UPA base in Zakerzonja, it had an extremely severe impact on the socio-economic and political-legal situation of those Ukrainians who remained in Poland. The international consequences of the operation were also negative. During the long postwar decades, it significantly hindered the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations. The Polish communist authorities refused to condemn this act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Only the new Polish government decided to do so.

On March 5, 1953, an event took place that was able to have a significant impact not only on domestic political life in the USSR, but also on the international situation in general: J. Stalin died. The conditions for change for the better seemed to have been created. However, it began, as always, with the struggle for the “throne”. A group of party leaders led by N. Khrushchev removed L. Beria and came to power in July 1953. The society, which had been in Stalin’s clutches for almost 30 years, was waiting for change. Ukraine, where Khrushchev had worked for a long time, hoped to consolidate its position. These hopes were especially strengthened after the XXth Congress of the Communist Party, where Khrushchev partially exposed Stalin’s atrocities.

For the first time, some concrete steps had been taken to improve the society. Rehabilitation of innocent convicts by the Stalinist regime began. Thousands of repressed people, including those from Ukraine, were released

from concentration camps. There were carried out reforms that to some extent contributed to the development of the economy, education, and science. New phenomena took place in the field of culture. To some extent, the rights of national republics expanded. In 1956, the government of the Ukrainian SSR took over more than 10,000 industrial enterprises. Ukraine's share in the all-Union economic complex increased. During 10 years (1955-1965) the production of tractors in the republic doubled, there were produced 11 times mainline locomotives and 17 times more excavators. Unfortunately, all this was done largely according to old recipes, mostly extensively. Another serious drawback was that the products of the national economy were still in demand mainly in the domestic market, partly in the countries of the "socialist camp" and in some underdeveloped countries of the world. Its quality did not meet world standards. The main part of Soviet exports was not finished goods, but raw materials, especially oil and gas. As a result, the barbaric attitude to natural resources and the environment grew.

At that time, Ukraine was one of the main producers of agricultural products. However, by the mid-1950s, the countryside was still half-destroyed, and the collective farmers were without rights. All this required urgent changes in agriculture. However, this practically did not happen. Attention was focused not on increasing labor productivity and yield, but on increasing quantitative factors, expanding areas for grain crops. In the UkrSSR, the sown area for corn doubled. Problems in the development of animal husbandry worsened. In the second half of the 50s, the agrarians still managed to achieve a certain increase in agricultural production. This inspired the party leadership, and unreasonable, unrealistic growth rates were planned for seven years (1959-1965). Naturally, they were derailed: extensive methods of farming increasingly showed their failure and futility.

Ambiguous events took place in socio-political life. In 1954, a major propaganda campaign was conducted on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the "reunification" of Ukraine with Russia, which essentially erased the entire history of Ukraine, making it part of the history of Russia. On February 19, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in agreement with the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of Russia and Ukraine, decided to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR. The following factors were taken into account. Firstly, the fact that the RSFSR did not have a common border with the Crimean region; secondly, the strong economic ties between the UkrSSR and the Crimea; thirdly, the urgent need for irrigation of agricultural land in this area implied a single management of the peninsula's economy. After 1954, new industrial enterprises were built on the territory of the Crimea, a large number of communications were laid, and the peninsula was fully supplied with water, gas, and electricity. It was after those economic changes that Crimea became the main all-Union health resort. As a result, the population of Crimea grew rapidly, especially the Russian-speaking part.

The decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1954) on this issue fully complied with both the legal norms in force at the time and the historical, geographical and cultural factors that had united Ukraine and Crimea for a long time. The contemporary government of independent Ukraine states that there are no legal, political, ethnic or any other reasons to revise this decision. Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine. This standpoint fully complies with the requirements of international law and the documents governing the territorial integrity and borders of European countries.

2. Attempt to liberalize the political regime (1953-1964)

The period that entered the official history of the USSR as the “great decade” was by no means a time of de-Stalinization and renewal of Soviet society: and such tasks, by and large, were not set by the then party leadership.



In the picture: Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR”.

This, therefore, can only be a part of this period, when Khrushchev made attempts to carry out partial reforms that did not affect the fundamental principles of the system created under Stalin. At the same time, ill-considered and inconsistent reorganizations in the economic sphere, the dominance of willful decisions, and serious failures in foreign policy nullified Khrushchev’s “thaw” and put an end to all hopes for the better. The standard of living was falling. There were serious problems with bread. Dissatisfaction was growing in the country. The situation in the party leadership also worsened. The style and methods of Khrushchev’s leadership irritated a large part of the party governing

establishment, that during the years of the Stalinist regime had become accustomed to the guarantee of its dominant position and did not want to lose it.

Thus, in October 1964, Khrushchev was dismissed from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. L. Brezhnev became the new party leader. Thus the “great decade” ended. Expectations associated with the recovery of society, economic growth, improving the living standards of the people, the development of national cultures, were in vain. And this is quite natural: both Khrushchev and those who succeeded him were members of the same party, defenders of the communist system.

Towards the end of the “Khrushchev thaw” the intensification of ideological pressure, the refusal to seriously analyze the shortcomings of the system, and the attempt to reduce everything to a partial critique of only one person, Stalin, became more and more noticeable. There were mass violations of human rights, persecution for views that differed from the official ones. The political and ideological offensive became total. But the idea of fighting the regime did not disappear in society.

One of the manifestations of the latter is the formation of the Ukrainian human rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In May 1961, a trial was held against the Ukrainian Workers ‘and Peasants’ Union. It was organized in 1959 by L. Lukyanenko, who graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University, and then was sent to party work in Western Ukraine. The union aimed to achieve the withdrawal of the UkrSSR from the USSR by implementing the relevant article of the USSR Constitution. Thus, it was a legal, legitimate change in the status of one of the republics of the USSR. For this, the dissident lawyer was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to 15 years in prison and 10 years in exile. Together with L. Lukyanenko, V. Lutskevych, I. Kandyba, and others were convicted. In 1961, General P. Hryhorenko publicly criticized the new CPSU Program. Many pages of the development of the Ukrainian human rights movement were connected with Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv. In particular, in February 1963, a conference was held here, the participants of which protested against the prohibitions and restrictions on the development of the Ukrainian language.

L. Brezhnev’s coming to power was marked by an even greater attack on the Ukrainian culture. I. Dziuba’s work “Internationalism or Russification?” Was a kind of protest against the arrest of Ukrainian dissidents in 1965. Authorities responded by stepping up repression. In the second half of 1965, political arrests took place in Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv, Ternopil, Lutsk, and other cities. In September 1965, on the day of the premiere of “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors” at the Ukraine Cinema, representatives of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia protested strongly against the actions of the authorities. Among them were I. Dziuba, V. Stus, V. Chornovil, Yu. Badzio and others. In April 1966, ten members of the Union of Artists of Ukraine appealed to the Supreme Court to review the case of P. Zalyvakha, a member of the Union. Film director

S. Paradzhanov, composer G. Maiboroda, poets L. Kostenko, I. Drach, and aircraft designer O. Antonov appealed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to publicly explain the reasons for the mass arrests. A. Malyshko and M. Stelmakh also defended the convicts. M. Vingranovskyi, Ye. Sverstiuk, M. Kotsiubynska, V. Stus, A. Matvienko, M. Shapoval and many other cultural figures suffered from persecution.



In the picture: Ivan Dziuba

The human rights movement in Ukraine did not become widespread for several reasons, but the main one was that the totalitarian regime had a dense network of its local units, which were more brutal in their actions than, similar services in Moscow. Almost completely isolated from the Western media, Ukrainian dissidents did not have the “umbrella of publicity” that helped their Moscow counterparts to some extent. In addition, the problem of national rights of Ukrainians did not arouse any significant interest in the West. The narrowness of the social base of the dissident movement was explained by the fact that it did not formulate a clear socio-political program, understandable not only to the intelligentsia but also to the masses. At the same time, the Ukrainian human rights movement of this period played a significant role in awakening the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people.

3. The growth of crisis phenomena in the political life of Ukraine in the 60-80s of the twentieth century.

With the removal of Khrushchev from power in 1964 and the end of the so-called “great decade” the almost 20-year “era” of L. Brezhnev came. It began with a familiar scenario: accusations of predecessors, the new leadership’s statements of their deep devotion to the people and determination to immediately rectify the situation, overcome the crisis, raise living standards and, of course, ensure dynamic progress through communist construction.

What was observed in practice? Khrushchev’s reforms were curtailed. In September 1965, the decentralized management system (soviet economy) was replaced by a tried-and-tested centralized one. Earlier, in March, a decision was

made on the agrarian sector. A new procedure for harvesting and stocking up agricultural products was approved. Firm plans for its purchase were determined. Surcharges for unscheduled products were introduced. Purchase prices were formed taking into account climatic conditions and the specifics of production in some agricultural areas. As we can see, no radical changes were drafted. The industry envisaged strengthening economic incentives for production, expanding the scope of self-supporting relations, creating an effective system of incentives, reducing the number of indicators dictated from above.

Further developments seemed to confirm the path chosen by the new leadership. The outcomes of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1965-1970) were quite encouraging. They were the best in the last 35 years. Two thirds of industrial production was obtained by increasing labor productivity. Ukraine mastered the production of 440 samples of new equipment and materials. 250 large enterprises were built. Changes for the better were observed in agriculture. In Ukraine, its gross output grew by 16.6% in the eighth Five-Year Plan period.


However, it was a temporary success. The emphasis was increasingly on the reckless exploitation of raw materials, including oil and gas, in order to achieve the least success by any means. The country continued to follow the traditional path of extensive development. The number of workers grew rapidly, but the growth of industrial production was constantly falling. While in 1966-1970 it amounted to 50% in Ukraine, in 1981-1985 it was only 19%. Inefficiency in land use led to the fact that from 1965 to 1985 the sown area in Ukraine decreased by more than a million hectares. The richest lands were often transferred for capital construction or became the bottom of artificial seas. Working and living conditions in the countryside were steadily deteriorating, as a result of which the number of rural population of Ukraine decreased by 4.6 million people during 1966-1985. Serious complaints were raised about the living standards of the people, which were also maintained mainly through the ruthless exploitation and sale of national natural resources, the amount of which was catastrophically declining. This directly affected Ukraine as well. The residual principle of funding led to impoverishment in the fields of education, science, culture, and medicine. Along with this, as before, huge resources were directed to the development of the military-industrial complex.

The imbalance of economic development, ignoring objective economic laws, L. Brezhnev's barrenness of intellect and physical inability of to properly lead the country - all this exacerbated the crisis and processes in the USSR, aggravated the general situation in the Soviet empire, which was on the verge of disaster. Dissatisfaction grew not only among the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, but also among a certain part of the party insiders of various levels.

The protest against the bankrupt policy of the ruling party was manifested by strengthening the human rights movement. The authorities widely used repressive methods to its participants. In January-May 1972, new mass arrests

took place in Ukraine, where P. Shelest was replaced by V. Shcherbytsky as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The victims were V. Chornovil, Ye. Sverstyuk, I. Svitlychnyi, I. Dziuba, M. Osadchyi, V. Stus, I. Kalynets, N. Svitlychna, Yu. Shukhevych, and others. A new step in the development of the Ukrainian human rights movement was the establishment of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (1976), which included M. Rudenko, O. Berdnyk, P. Hryhorenko, I. Kandyba, L. Lukyanenko, O. Tykhyi, N. Strokata, M. Matusevych and others. In 1977-1978, the leading members of the group were tried.

Repressions were combined with increasing ideological pressure on society. In the sphere of interethnic relations, the focus was on the merging of nations and the artificial formation of a “new historical community - the Soviet people”. Russification policy intensified. Deep economic crisis, low living standards of the people, political and ideological pressure in the spiritual sphere, growing problems in foreign policy were the characteristics of the USSR in the late 70s - early 80s.



Levko Lukyanenko

In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU. At the April plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he announced a course for democratic reforms in the USSR. The need to reform Soviet society was obvious, especially its economic system. The reform began under the slogan of perestroika, the renewal of socialism. But apart from traditional demagoguery, the reformers failed to propose a focused, science-based

reform program. At the first stage, the perestroika took a course to “accelerate the pace of socio-economic development”, which was carried out by means of the old administrative-command methods. Realizing the futility of such a path, in 1987 Gorbachev resorted to a certain democratization of economic relations. Pro-profit model and cooperatives were introduced, individual labor activity was allowed. The relations between the USSR and the West were warming. Seeing Gorbachev as their ally, western countries supported him in every way and encouraged his radical reforms. There were demands for the democratization of society in the middle of the country. Informal groups, political associations and movements were emerging.

In 1988, the XIX Party Conference outlined a program of broader democratic transformations: the expansion state bodies’ competency through transferring them the power of party bodies, the introduction of democratic elections, and the expansion of the republics’ sovereignty. The idea of market relations and multiparty system introduction is imposed, which is incompatible with the principles of socialism. In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev finally lost control of the situation - the Baltic republics proclaimed their sovereignty, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) ceased to exist, and democratic revolutions took place in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Socialist society proved to be subject to democratization. Reforms from above grew into revolutions from below.

In 1990, a year earlier than planned, the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU took place. The congress made desperate attempts to retain the Communist Party and prevent the collapse of the USSR. But the process had already become irreversible. In the summer of 1990 there was a parade of sovereignty of the republics. Gorbachev tried to sign a new union treaty establishing the Union of Republics. But the attempted coup d’etat in August 1991 broke that plan of the “architect of perestroika”. The USSR ceases to exist, and another attempt to build a just society became a utopia.

On October 27, 1989, the 10th session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR of the 11th convocation, passed three important laws: “On Amendments to the Constitution of the UkrSSR of 1978”, “On Elections of People’s Deputies in the UkrSSR” and “Language Law”. Article 73 of the new version of the Constitution formalized the Ukrainian language as the state one. The new version of Chapter 10 – “Electoral System” and “Election Law” provided for a democratic system of elections, the possibility of nominating candidates by political associations and social movements, public control over the election process, campaigning, alternative elections. Significant changes affected Chapter 12 – “The Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR”. The amended Constitution assigned the Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR much broader powers than the corresponding article of the Constitution of the UkrSSR of 1978. Thus, the Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR was given the authority to determine directions of domestic and foreign policy of the UkrSSR; make decisions on holding a nationwide referendum in the UkrSSR; ratify and denunciate

international treaties; suspend acts of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the territory of the UkrSSR, if they contradicted the Constitution and the law of the UkrSSR, and other (33 points). According to Article 98 the Verkhovna Rada consisted of 450 deputies. Articles 107 and 108 the amended Constitution established the powers of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman as the highest official representing the UkrSSR within the USSR and in the international arena. These norms indicate the legal expansion of state sovereignty of the UkrSSR within the USSR.

In March 1990, the first democratic elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR took place. From the CPU, which still had real power in its hands, 378 deputies were elected, 72 deputies represented the national democratic forces. On May 15, 1990, the Verkhovna Rada of the 12th convocation began its sessions. Using the majority, the Communists formed the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada and elected the First Secretary of the Communist Party, V. Ivashko, as the Verkhovna Rada Chairman. But a month later, Ivashko resigned, agreeing to Gorbachev's proposal to take the post of Deputy Secretary General of the CPSU. During the new elections, L. Kravchuk, Ideology Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was elected Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.

On July 16, 1990, on the initiative of a democratic minority in the Verkhovna Rada and under pressure from the masses, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The Declaration proclaimed the state sovereignty of Ukraine as the supremacy, independence and indivisibility of the power of the Republic within its territory and independence and equality in foreign relations. The declaration consisted of 10 chapters, which enshrined the right of the Ukrainian nation to self-determination, proclaimed the Ukrainian people as the sole source of power, established the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the UkrSSR on its territory, inviolability of the territory of the USSR, economic independence with the right to introduce its own currency, the right to own the Armed Forces. The Ukrainian SSR declared its intention to become a neutral non-nuclear state in the future, and the Ukrainian SSR was defined as a subject of international law. Thus, the Declaration changed the state and legal status of the USSR as a union republic, significantly expanding its internal and external sovereignty. The declaration did not proclaim the withdrawal of the UkrSSR from the USSR, the establishment of the state border of the UkrSSR, the unified citizenship of the UkrSSR, did not provide for the dissolution of the CPU - the main political force uniting the republics within the USSR, thus it did not establish full state sovereignty.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. How did “de-Stalinization” begin and what were its consequences in 1953-1955?
2. What is the historical significance of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU?
3. Prove half-heartedness of the Twentieth Congress’ decisions regarding Stalin.
4. What is the essence of the de-Stalinization process? What were the positive and negative consequences of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences”?
5. Why was the rehabilitation of the innocent repressed, which took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, called inconsistent and incomplete? What were the reasons for that inconsistency and incompleteness?
6. What forces inhibited de-Stalinization? Did they have support in society?
7. Explain the meaning of de-Stalinization in the field of culture. Why was the process of national revival restrained and Russification intensified under those conditions?
8. Why did the process of “de-Stalinization” not lead to radical changes in society, to a change in the political system in the USSR in general and in the UkrSSR in particular?
9. For what purpose were the rights of the union republics expanded during the “Khrushchev’s thaw”? What were the consequences of this process in Ukraine?
10. Describe the positive and negative changes in the socio-political life of “Khrushchev’s thaw”. Which of them prevailed?
11. Is it possible to move from totalitarianism to democracy at once by democratizing society?
12. How did the implementation of the three ‘super-programs’ – the development of virgin lands, large-scale expansion of corn and peas, forced development of livestock – affect the economic development of the republic? Did they have a chance of success?
13. What were the general results of Khrushchev’s reforms in the economy? Which economic course - Stalin’s or Khrushchev’s - was more tangible and long-lasting for Ukraine’s economy?
14. How are the socio-political life of the republic and the state of its economy related? Has active political intervention accelerated or slowed down economic development?
15. Why was the pace of industrial development in 1966-1970 relatively high, despite the limitations of economic reform in 1965?

TESTS

1. A new system of economic management through the councils of the national economy (soviet economies) was introduced in:

- a) 1956;
- b) 1957;
- c) 1958.

2. How many councils of national economy were formed in Ukraine in the late 50s – early 60s?

- a) 11;
- b) 15;
- c) 18;
- d) 21.

3. The seven-year plan covered:

- a) 1957-1963;
- b) 1958-1964;
- c) 1959-1965.

4. During the seven years the country built and reconstructed:

- a) 250 enterprises of light and food industry;
- b) 560 enterprises of light and food industry;
- c) 700 enterprises of light and food industry.

5. The decision to reorganize the machine-tractor stations (MTS) into repair and technical stations (RTS) and the mandatory purchase of machinery by collective farms was made in:

- a) 1956;
- b) 1958;
- c) 1960.

6. Monetary reform was carried out:

- a) 1958;
- b) 1960;
- c) 1961.

7. How many enterprises were transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1953 – 1956?:

- a) 10 thousand;
- b) 12 thousand;
- c) 14 thousand.

8. The first group of Ukrainian youth left for the virgin lands:

- a) in February 1954;
- b) in March 1955;
- c) in April 1956;
- d) in May 1957.

9. The economic debate of the early 60s began with a letter to Khrushchev, authored by:

- a) O. Latsis;
- b) B. Paton;
- c) O. Lieberman;
- d) Ye. Dolynyuk.

10. October (1964) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

- a) removed P. Shelest from office;
- b) removed N. Khrushchev from office;
- c) appointed V. Shcherbytsky First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

11. On April 20, 1978:

- a) the new Constitution of the UkrSSR was approved;
- b) the new Constitution of the UkrSSR was approved;
- c) Soviet troops were introduced in Afghanistan.

12. P. Shelest held the position of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine:

- a) from 1956 to 1964;
- b) from 1963 to 1972;
- c) from 1968 to 1974

13. P. Shelest was criticized for his book;

- a) "Our Soviet Ukraine";
- b) "Soviet Ukraine is beautiful";
- c) "Soviet Ukraine is our rare land".

15. V. Shcherbytsky was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine:

- a) from 1964 to 1972;
- b) from 1968 to 1974;
- c) from 1972 to 1989

16. How many members did the Communist Party of Ukraine include in the late 70s?

- a) 2.7 million;
- b) 1.5 million,

c) 3.4 million,

17. State farms were liquidated:

- a) in 1963;
- b) in 1964;
- c) in 1965,
- d) in 1966.

18. Characteristic features of the development of the political sphere in 1965 - 1985 were:

- a) the establishment of the cult of personality (L. Brezhnev);
- b) the expansion of the rights of the union republics;
- c) the replacement of true democracy by formal representation of workers

29. Characteristic features of the the Council system in 1965 - 1985 were:

- a) growth of the bureaucracy;
- b) weakening of ideological dictate;
- c) nullifying the independence of public organizations;
- d) easing censorship;

LECTURE 11: HISTORICAL FEATURES OF STATE-BUILDING PROCESSES IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE (since 1991)

- 1. Independent Ukrainian state: ways to legitimize**
- 2. The historical dimension of the constitutional process and its role in the political reform of Ukraine**
- 3. Ukrainian vectors of international politics**

1. Independent Ukrainian state: ways to legitimize

L. Brezhnev's death in 1982 put an end to his "era", but did not change the general situation in the country. Brezhnev's successor was seriously ill Yu. Andropov. In 1984 he died. Yu. Andropov was replaced by seriously ill K. Chernenko, who joined his predecessors in March 1985.

The time came for young and energetic Mikhail Gorbachev. With his coming to power again, as had happened many times before, there was hope for the best. The new leader and his supporters were the first generation of Soviet leaders to be formed after Stalin's death. Despite fierce resistance from the conservative part of the party governing establishment, Mikhail Gorbachev began a campaign to restructure the Soviet system and, above all, its stagnant economy. To achieve his goal, he proclaims a new style of leadership, making the impression of greater closeness to the people, calling for publicity in governing the state and for pluralism of opinion within the framework of socialist choice. Regarding the foreign policy of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev called for the introduction of new political thinking in the system of international relations.

Before Gorbachev's reforms reached Ukraine, a catastrophe of global significance occurred: on April 26, 1986, the reactor of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded. A huge radioactive cloud, immeasurably larger than that of Hiroshima, covered many regions of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, and later spread to Poland and Scandinavia. In their own way, the Soviet authorities tried to hide first the fact itself, and then the scale of the catastrophe.

As for the course of "perestroika" in Ukraine, we can say that the then party leadership, led by V. Shcherbytsky, did its best to keep everything the same. In September 1989, late V. Shcherbytsky was replaced by V. Ivashko, who, however, soon moved to Moscow, where he became Deputy Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee. The Communist Party of Ukraine was headed by S. Hurenko. Opposition to Gorbachev's course of the majority of the party governing establishment, including the Ukrainian one, weakened its initiator's stance and negatively affected the entire development of the socio-economic situation.



In the picture: the city of Prip'yat after the Chernobyl disaster

Almost the only area where the “perestroika” brought positive results was the socio-political one: some steps related to the democratization of society, a certain expansion of awareness, publicity. Under the pressure of circumstances, the leadership of the republics was forced to meet the demands of time and society. In particular, in October 1989, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the law “Languages in the Ukrainian SSR”. The State Program for the Development of the Ukrainian Language until 2000 was elaborated. The most characteristic feature of that period was the formation of a multiparty system in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Green Party, etc .; a total of 16 political parties were established in 1990. Democratic, national-state parties advocated the building of an independent Ukrainian state. The Communist Party of Ukraine took a diametrically opposite standpoint. An important event in 1990 was the relatively democratic elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the UkrSSR. Narodnyi Rukh (People’s Movement) of Ukraine became the most popular democratic organization. Young people played an important role in the struggle for the renewal of public life. In 1990, the Ukrainian Students’ Union and the Democratic Students’ Union emerged.

The new political leadership in Moscow decides to remove the article on “the governing and guiding role of the CPSU” from the Constitution of the USSR. This was a fundamentally important victory for the democratic forces. Of the 150 legislative acts adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR in 1990, the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine approved on July 16

became particularly significant, despite the fact that it did not address the independence of Ukraine as a state.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the sphere of international relations and foreign policy was almost the only part of the Soviet society life, where “new political thinking”, “publicity” and “perestroika” did not remain declarations, but brought significant results.

Gorbachev understood that without overcoming the international isolation in which the Soviet totalitarian-communist regime had been, there could be virtually no hope of reforming it. Real steps on the part of Moscow were needed to achieve this. And the USSR was forced to take a number of such steps towards an understanding with the world community.

For the first time, it was stated that the priority should be given to universal values and not on any other ones. The USSR refused to consider peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle. New tactical and strategic attitudes emerged in the USSR’s views on global security and disarmament. In relations with the socialist countries, the emphasis was placed on unconditional independence, full equality, and non-interference in internal affairs.

During that period, serious geopolitical processes unfolded in Europe, which clearly demonstrated the nature and direction of changes in the system of international relations. The communist regimes in the countries of the so-called socialist camp found themselves in a state of deep crisis. Poland became the first country where communists lost democratic elections and power. The Warsaw Pact fell apart. It was officially announced in February 1991. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ceased to exist.

Under such conditions, the Soviet leadership could no longer practice the means and methods of foreign policy that had been used throughout most of the empire’s existence.

Certain positive changes also took place in the exercise of the foreign policy powers of the USSR republics. It became possible to make separate decisions on interstate relations independently, without looking up to Moscow. Significant changes, primarily related to the defense of Ukrainian national interests, were observed in the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

On April 25, 1990, the board of the Ministry considered the issue “On the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR in the development of the concept of the Ukrainian SSR’s activity in the international arena”. The decision stressed that the concept should be based on a new division of responsibilities between the all-Union and republican foreign ministries, so that the republic had more opportunities to build bilateral relations, especially with Central and Eastern Europe. It should be added that at that time 96 people worked in the representative bodies of the UkrSSR in international organizations, embassies, consulates, and secretariats of international organizations.

New opportunities for more extensive fulfillment of national interests in the field of international relations appeared after July 16, 1990, when the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. Chapter X of this important document, “International Relations”, emphasized that Ukraine’s foreign policy was democratic and peaceful. The declaration defined the main directions and priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Based on this document, the republic intensified its foreign policy presence. This particularly affected the development of bilateral diplomatic relations and the expansion of the participation of Ukrainian diplomats in international organizations. At the end of 1990, the UkrSSR was a party to 172 international agreements and 15 international organizations and more than 60 of their bodies. In addition, the republic acceded to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, became a party to the agreement between the governments of the USSR, BSSR, UkrSSR and IAEA on conducting international studies of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.



In the picture: rally in front of the Verkhovna Rada during the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine

In 1990, bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland became significant events. Those were the first bilateral agreements concluded by Ukraine after 1945. The practice of the Ukrainian Government’s preparation and approval of its directives to the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR for participation in international organizations began. The practice of the Ukrainian Government’s preparing statements on

international issues was also new (Iraq's aggression against Kuwait; unification of Germany; Paris summit, etc.). For the first time in the history of the UkrSSR at the UN, the delegation of the republic used its presence at the 45th session of the General Assembly to establish bilateral relations.

Thus, the period under consideration became the second period of increased foreign policy activity of Ukraine as a component of the Soviet Union after 1944-1949. The Ukrainian SSR took a number of important steps towards expanding its foreign policy powers and strengthening its international prestige. At the same time, the republic still did not have its own foreign policy and was not a full-fledged subject of international relations. Democratic, nationally conscious forces of Ukrainian society, political parties and movements became increasingly aware of this and took steps to bring the time of Ukrainian statehood closer.

Democratically-minded forces in Ukraine increasingly opposed the republic's membership in the USSR, supporting the idea of Ukrainian state independence. This development did not suit not only the conservative establishment, but also the initiator of the "perestroika" - Mikhail Gorbachev – as President of the USSR. Trying to prevent the "sovereignty" of the union republics from escalating into a process that would lead to the creation of independent states, Mikhail Gorbachev began to maneuver. In particular, he proposed a draft of the so-called new Union Treaty and insisted that the union republics sign it.

The question of the USSR's fate and the union republics' status in this regard significantly increased socio-political tensions in society, including in the CPSU leadership. Its most conservative part opposed any concessions on this issue to the union republics and stood for the preservation of the USSR as a single state. On the night of August 19, 1991, the eve of signing the Union Treaty, these reactionary forces isolated Mikhail Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha and removed him from power. Boris Yeltsin strongly and uncompromisingly opposed the rebels, describing their actions as a right-wing anti-constitutional coup. The Ukrainian leadership, in particular the Verkhovna Rada, took a wait-and-see attitude. As for the top of the Communist Party of Ukraine, then headed by S. Hurenko, and most local authorities and party committees, they supported the actions of the Moscow rebels. The demand of the democratic part of the parliamentary corps on the need to convene an extraordinary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was ignored.

Only when the Moscow uprising was actually suppressed did the Ukrainian leadership take action. On August 26, 1991, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, taking into account the fact that the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine supported the actions of the Moscow rebels, adopted a decree «On the temporary suspension of the Communist Party of Ukraine.» On August 30 of the same year, a resolution "On banning the activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine" was adopted.



In the picture: Act of Independence of Ukraine

At the same time, pro-communist forces in the Verkhovna Rada and beyond it launched a campaign to defend the Communist Party, citing the fact that, first, the August 30 resolution concerned the Communist Party of Ukraine as a republican organization and did not mean that its members were without a court decision may be accused of involvement in the August uprising. Secondly,

in accordance with the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of May 14, 1993, citizens of Ukraine who shared communist ideas could form their own party organizations. The Communists, by the way, promptly took advantage of this: in June of the same year, the Communist Party was formed. However, even after that, attempts to repeal the resolution of August 30 did not stop. Of course, the newly formed Communist Party, led by P. Symonenko, was particularly active.

Another part of the members of the former Communist Party of Ukraine chose a slightly different path: on October 26, 1991, they announced the creation of the Socialist Party of Ukraine. It was headed by O. Moroz. The OUN also resumed its activities under the leadership of the former President of the Ukrainian People's Republic in exile M. Plavyuk. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, headed by J. Stetsko, had about 15,000 members.

The August events in Moscow further strengthened the aspirations of the peoples of the USSR for self-sustained development and independence. On August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, based on the situation resulting from the liquidation of the August uprising, adopted the Act of Independence of Ukraine. It was a document of great historical importance, confirmed by a national referendum on December 1, 1991. It was attended by 84.2% of voters, of whom 90.3% voted for the independence of Ukraine. On the same day, L. Kravchuk was elected President of Ukraine.



In the picture: Leonid Kravchuk and Mikhail Gorbachev

On December 7, 1991, the leaders of Belarus (S. Shushkevich), Russia (B. Yeltsin) and Ukraine (L. Kravchuk) gathered in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and held talks (without the involvement of Mikhail Gorbachev, who returned to the presidency of the USSR). The following day they signed an agreement to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) instead of the USSR. On December 21 of the same year, a meeting of the leaders of the independent states of the former USSR took place in Alma-Ata (with the exception of Georgia and the Baltic States). The adopted declaration stated that with the formation of the CIS, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. That was the last page in the history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The liquidation of the world's largest totalitarian empire, which lasted almost 70 years, became a fact of global significance

2. The historical dimension of the constitutional process and its role in the political reform of Ukraine

The proclamation of state independence of Ukraine on August 24, 1991 raised the issue of state, economic and political development of Ukraine in a fundamentally new way. It was a new and, as further developments testified, an extremely complex page in its centuries-old history. The proclamation of Ukraine's independence and the task of creating an independent Ukrainian state naturally raised the problem of the development of state-building processes. The people of Ukraine stated that they would build a sovereign and self-governing, independent and open, democratic and legal state. Solving this problem encountered a number of very difficult questions.

The process of state formation in Ukraine, in contrast to other countries that faced similar problems in the late 80s - early 90s, took place in specific conditions and was determined by its own characteristics. Realizing this fact is extremely important because, firstly, the reasons for the current problems of our development become clear, and secondly, the paths, political decisions and economic levers that can really ensure the Ukrainian state's way out of the economic crisis and political instability in which it has been from the moment of its formation are clearer.

Our present is a period of transition from a totalitarian-communist regime to a democratic, independent, legal state. As the experience of many Central and Eastern European countries shows, it is desirable to do everything possible to make this period as short as possible, to free society from the vestiges of the communist system as soon as possible and to move to modern market rails. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not yet managed to do that. And this is where we should look for the root cause of almost all today's problems.

Why did this happen? There were many factors for this. The processes of the late 80s - early 90s seemed to have taken our society by surprise. Ukraine's rapid breakthrough to national sovereignty and state independence gave rise to a sense of overconfidence among many of the political elite of the time. Society found itself in a state of almost mass political and economic euphoria. But the

«honeymoon» of Ukraine's independence clearly dragged on. It became increasingly clear that practical problems related to the creation of the Ukrainian state should be addressed. As subsequent events showed, the leadership of the state was not ready for that. And not only through their own fault: the breakthrough to sovereignty and independence, begun under President L. Kravchuk, was largely carried out against the background of psychological, professional and conceptual unpreparedness of all government agencies to work in conditions different from the Soviet era practices. Personnel, brought up by the previous system with their experience of "socialist management", faced a dilemma: either to study and work at the same time to create a modern state with a modern political and economic system, or to work in much the same way as in the old days. Judging by the current state of Ukrainian society, in particular its economy, the authorities have not been able to find an optimal solution to the problem of personnel whose effective activity is a key to success of any business. The consequences of this continue to have a negative impact on almost all areas of our lives.

A serious obstacle to the development of state-building processes remains the fact that society, political parties and movements still do not agree on what kind of society we are building. The Ukrainian national idea as a unifier is not universally recognized. The severity of the problems faced by our state in the first years of its existence was exacerbated by the economic crisis, the catastrophic decline in industrial and agricultural production. At the same time, the efforts of the political leadership were largely spent not on overcoming those phenomena immediately, but on controversy and inter-party quarrels. In particular, attempts were made to prove that the economic crisis and its consequences were the result of the transition to a market system, the abandonment of the Soviet economic experience, and finally the collapse of the USSR and the severance of economic ties between its former republics.

This explanation does not stand up to serious criticism. First of all, Ukraine has not made the transition to a market economy, unfortunately, we are still far from that. We are moving very slowly in this direction - and this is one of the reasons for the current social and economic crisis. As for the Soviet "experience", where the left-wing communist forces want to take us back, it is well known all over the world. It was it that created the economy of the empire, which ceased to exist not as a result of wars or other external threats, but as a result of internal self-destruction. The USSR disappeared from the map of the world, but for many decades the regime did everything possible to ensure that the problems it created remained and were overcome by others, including Ukraine, with its huge but inefficient economic potential. Independent Ukraine inherited an economy where total domination of state and collective farm property, prohibition and persecution of market relations, and militarization of the economy were common (almost 80% of the national economy of the USSR was associated with the military-industrial complex). It is an indisputable fact that it was the Soviet government, and not any other government, that pursued a

policy that did not take into account the national interests of Ukraine or the requirements of environmental security of its population, which has repeatedly fallen victim to real genocide.

As for the reference to the rupture of economic ties between the former Soviet republics, this rupture only exacerbated the crisis created by the administrative-command system in Soviet times. It should be added that independent Ukraine has received no less disastrous legacy. We are talking about the practical lack of modern experience in the field of building institutions of state power, democratic traditions, parliamentarism, and so on.

The preparation and adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine was a long constitutional process, which consisted of several stages.

On October 24, 1990, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution «On the Committee Developing a New Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR,» which instructed this committee to establish working groups for elaborating certain sections of the draft Constitution, involving leading scholars and experts in relevant fields. The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada was given a task to submit the Concept of the New Constitution to the session of the Verkhovna Rada in December 1990. On November 1, 1990, the first meeting of the Commission for Drafting the New Constitution, chaired by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada L. Kravchuk, emphasized that the new Basic Law at the constitutional level would enshrine the main provisions of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, would become a reliable foundation for the development of a sovereign state governed by the rule of law.

The meeting approved a working group to promptly resolve issues related to the development of the new Constitution and the preparation of its general Concept. It included people's deputies and leading scientists of the country. The task of the working group was to reflect in the Concept of the new Constitution the key issues concerning the future state system of the republic, its name, political, economic and electoral systems, citizenship, legal status, state and national symbols, administrative-territorial system etc. There was also approved the action plan of the Constitutional Committee, which defined the terms of elaborating the Concept of the new Constitution, its consideration in the Committee, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada and at the session of the Verkhovna Rada.

On December 4, 1990, a regular sitting of the Constitutional Committee of the Verkhovna Rada was held, at which the draft Concept of the new Constitution of Ukraine, developed by the working group of the Constitutional Committee, was considered.

According to the Concept, the Constitution was to be based on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, to develop and specify its provisions. Ukraine, in particular, was defined as a sovereign state, the essence of which was the formation of the power of the people. The sovereignty of the people was to be exercised on the basis of the Constitution both directly and

through deputies elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as well as through the Councils of Local Self-Government.

The main object of constitutional regulation and protection of the Constitution was defined the human being, his rights and freedoms as the highest social value. Thus, proclamation of citizens' rights which not enshrined in the previous Constitution was envisaged: the right to privacy, the right to freedom of opinion and belief, the right to receive and disseminate information, the right to compensation for material and moral damage caused to citizens by illegal actions of the state, state bodies and officials, the right to financial compensation in case of illegal detention, arrest, conviction, placement in a psychiatric institution, the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence, the right to leave the country and return to it, etc. It was also planned to establish an institute of a parliamentary ombudsman for the protection of human rights at the Verkhovna Rada. All these novelties were reflected in the new Constitution of Ukraine.

According to the Concept, the Constitution was designed to confirm the will and determination of the people of Ukraine to provide decent living conditions, to establish a just, democratic society, free, sovereign, peaceful state governed by the rule of law, open to international cooperation. In general, the Concept envisaged the creation of a strong state with strong legislative, executive and judicial powers aimed at ensuring and protecting human and civil rights.

The following meeting of the Constitutional Committee took place in February 1991, where the draft Concept of the new Constitution was discussed, taking into account the remarks and suggestions made by deputies, legal scholars and other experts. The Committee chairman L. Kravchuk noted in his speech that the time was extremely difficult, and the political situation in the USSR and the republic was aggravated and constantly changing. A law on the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had been recently adopted, a Union Treaty was being elaborated, and new parties were appearing in the political arena. All those factors to some extent hindered the adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine.

It was also emphasized that the new Constitution should clearly reflect Ukraine's commitment to universal values and norms of international law. The red thread through the Basic Law was to be the ideals of a humane, democratic, legal state and civil society based on the trinity of legislative, executive and judicial branches.

During the discussion of the Concept, different approaches to its individual provisions were revealed. In particular, there were actively debated the issues of the name of our state (Ukraine, the Republic of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic), the form of government (presidential or parliamentary), the structure of the Verkhovna Rada (one- or two-chamber), the place and role of the prosecutor's office and Councils of People's Deputies in

the system of public authorities, the need to abandon the imperative seats and the transition to free ones and others.

In order to widely and comprehensively test the draft Concept of the new Constitution, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a resolution of March 18, 1991 “On holding a republican conference on the Concept and Principles of the New Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR”. The conference which was held on April 18 – 20, 1991, developed a number of interesting and specific recommendations.

On May 22, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada considered the Concept of the New Constitution of Ukraine and instructed the Committee to finalize a New Constitution taking into account the discussion and submit it for approval to the Verkhovna Rada on June 19, 1991.

The content of the Concept of the new Constitution of Ukraine was reduced to the definition of general methodological principles of the Concept itself, as well as the structure of the Constitution. As for the general methodological principles, six of them were formulated: the new Constitution should be based on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, consolidate, develop and specify its provisions; The Constitution should determine the priorities of universal values, enshrine the principles of social justice, affirm the democratic and humanistic choice of the people of Ukraine, and clearly show Ukraine’s commitment to universally recognized rules of international law; the regulations of the new Constitution must be norms of direct action; the new Constitution must be stable; to ensure the stability and effectiveness of the Constitution, the institution of constitutional laws should be introduced, the references to which would be contained in the text of the Constitution itself.

Characterizing the structure of the draft Constitution of Ukraine, it should be noted that it consisted of a preamble and nine chapters under the following titles: “Principles of the constitutional order”, “Human and civil rights”, “Civil Society and State”, “Territorial system”, “State system”, “Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”, “National security”, “Protection of the Constitution”, “The order of amendments to the Constitution and constitutional laws”.

In accordance with the Concept approved on July 1, 1992, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine considered the draft of the new Constitution of our state. It was decided to put it up for public discussion. A few months later, the committee received almost fifty thousand comments and suggestions

On October 8, 1993, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution according to which the draft of the new Constitution was to be finalized as a result of public discussion and reviewing by the Verkhovna Rada. The final version of the draft of the new Constitution of Ukraine, finalized by the Constitutional Committee, was dated October 26, 1993. Thus, it was on that day that the first stage of the constitutional process in Ukraine was practically completed.

After that, the constitutional process slowed down, if not stopped for a while. The political situation in our country at that time became complicated. Relations between the legislative and the executive powers deteriorated.

Preparations for the early parliamentary elections and the presidential election began. Elections to the Verkhovna Rada took place in March, and presidential elections - in June 1994. There were other reasons to stop the constitutional process.

The constitutional process in Ukraine resumed, or rather entered its second stage only on September 20, 1994, when the Verkhovna Rada by its resolution determined the number (40 people) of the Committee for working on the draft Constitution of Ukraine. The Committee was chaired by O. Moroz, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and L. Kuchma, President of Ukraine. Both the Verkhovna Rada and the President delegated 15 members to the Committee, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea – 1 member; judicial institutions and the Prosecutor General's Office – 7 members. It should be noted that the members of the Constitutional Committee from the Verkhovna Rada were determined by deputy groups (factions) on a proportional basis. Thus, the composition of the Constitutional Committee reflected various branches of government. On November 10, 1994, the Verkhovna Rada approved the full composition of the Constitutional Committee, which prepared the draft of the new Constitution of Ukraine.

It was clear that the delay in drafting and adopting the new Constitution of Ukraine had a negative impact on society and the state, hampered economic, political and state-legal reforms.

These and other factors led to the development and conclusion of the Constitutional Treaty between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine «On Basic Principles of Organization and Functioning of State Power and Local Self-Government for the Period Before the Adoption of the New Constitution of Ukraine», which was signed on June 8, 1995. Its introductory part clearly stated the reasons for concluding the treaty, namely: the absence of a new democratic Constitution of Ukraine, which was a brake on the implementation of economic, political, state and legal reforms; rejection of the Law of Ukraine “On Application of the Law of Ukraine” On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine and amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of Ukraine in connection with its adoption” aimed at implementing the provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine”, which made it impossible for the entire state mechanism to function properly both in the center and on the ground, hindered the implementation of economic reforms, led to further impoverishment of the vast majority of the population, exacerbation of social conflicts etc.

Various political forces and statesmen expressed different assessments regarding the content of the Constitutional Treaty and the very fact of its adoption. Not all its norms were perfect and adjusted accordingly, and in some cases even contradicted each other. However, the treaty contributed to a certain stabilization in the state and society and intensified the course of the constitutional process.

At the same time, it was necessary to continue working on the draft Constitution. Ukraine remained the only state of the former USSR in which the Constitution as the main legal attribute had not been adopted.

On June 19, 1995, in order to speed up the process of finalizing the available materials, studying and summarizing the prepared alternative drafts of the new Constitution (there were up to ten of them) the Co-Chairs of the Constitutional Commission – the President of Ukraine and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – ordered to create a working group of the Constitutional Committee. As a result of processing the materials submitted to this group, a draft Constitution of Ukraine was prepared. On March 11, 1996, it was approved by the Constitutional Committee, and on March 20, it was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. There was practically a public act of transferring the developed and approved draft of the new Constitution to the Verkhovna Rada together with remarks and additions of the members of the Constitutional Commission for further work on it. After reviewing these materials and in order to further finalize the draft Constitution, the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of May 5, 1996 established a Temporary Special Committee.



In the picture: Publication on the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine.
/ “Voice of Ukraine” / June 29, 1996, p.1.

In the end, the draft Constitution was once again finalized and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. On June 28, 1996, the new Constitution of Ukraine was adopted by 315 votes. The adoption of the Basic Law of our state was a significant event in its history. A long and extremely complex constitutional process came to an end, and a qualitatively new stage in the development of society and the state began.

3. Ukrainian vectors of international politics

The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine states that Ukraine, as a subject of international law, has direct relations with other states, concludes agreements with them, and participates in the activities of international organizations to the extent necessary to effectively ensure the national interests of the republic in political affairs, economic, information and other areas.

Ukraine is an equal participant in international communication, it actively contributes to the strengthening of general peace and international security, directly participates in the European process and European structures.

Ukraine recognizes the superiority of universal values over class ones, the priority of universally recognized norms of international law over the norms of state law.

Ukraine solemnly declares its intention to become a permanently neutral state in the future, which does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to use, produce or purchase nuclear weapons.

The main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy were supplemented in the Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World". It states: "Ukraine is building a democratic state governed by the rule of law, the primary goal of which is to ensure human rights and freedoms. To this end, Ukraine will adhere to international law, guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights ratified by Ukraine, and other documents (Pravda Ukrainy. 7 December, 1991.).

Geopolitical accents of Ukraine's foreign policy are as follows:

- Ukraine is a European state, so it must strengthen and expand comprehensive ties and relations with European states.
- Ukraine as the former republic of the former USSR was closely connected with all its former republics, which requires the preservation and further development of mutually beneficial relations with them.
- Ukraine is a maritime state, which necessitates the development of mutually beneficial relations with the countries of the Black Sea and Mediterranean basins.
- Ukraine cannot provide itself with its own raw materials (oil, coal, gold, diamonds, etc.). This forces it to buy them abroad - in Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and other countries.

The national interests of Ukraine are as follows:

- guaranteeing the sovereignty of the state;
- maintaining the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders;

- achieving security in all its dimensions: military-political, economic, etc.;
- overcoming the economic crisis;
- creation of a democratic state governed by the rule of law;
- ensuring national consent;
- political and social stability, guarantees of human rights;
- establishing good neighborly relations with near- and far-abroad countries.

The focus is on fruitful work at the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The second direction is foreign policy diplomatic activity. Ukraine establishes diplomatic relations on the basis of equality, sovereign equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, recognition of territorial integrity and permanence of existing borders.

The third direction of modern Ukraine's foreign policy is the establishment, support and development of economic, cultural, scientific and technical relations with all countries of the world community, except for countries that have been declared economic warfare by the UN Security Council.

The fourth direction is participation in solving global problems of the modern world.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. When did the perestroika begin and who initiated it?
2. What were the reasons for the perestroika?
3. How do you assess the significance of the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee? What did the acceleration course mean? What was its goal?
4. Identify the main directions of Gorbachev's reforms.
5. What was the purpose of the policy of "acceleration" in industry? Why did it not give the expected results?
6. In what direction was the deepening of economic reform? What has been done for this? Why did these actions not give the desired result in 1987-1989?
7. After numerous attempts to increase the pace of economic development in 1990 there was a reduction in material production. Why?
8. What significance did the decisions of the XIX Party Conference play in the development of the political system?
9. Describe the reform of the political system in the USSR.

10. What caused the aggravation of the national issue in the USSR in the second half of the 80s? What events did it lead to?
11. Prove that in Ukraine in 1985-1990 the national liberation movement grew.
12. Explain the significance of the miners' strike struggle. What impact did it have on the further development of political events in Ukraine?
13. What was the process of forming Narodnyi Rukh (People's Movement) of Ukraine? What is the historical significance of this public organization?
14. Classify newly created political organizations in Ukraine. What criteria underlie the classification?
15. When and under what circumstances was the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted? What was its historical significance?
16. What changed in the activities of the Verkhovna Rada of the republic?
17. How did the attempted coup d'état on August 19, 1991 in Moscow affect the process of state formation in Ukraine? Evaluate the actions of the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Emergency Situations Ministry.
18. Analyze the circumstances of the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR of the Act of Independence of Ukraine
19. When was the Act of Independence of Ukraine adopted?
20. Describe the process of state formation and its components.
21. Explain the process of forming local authorities.
22. Why does democratic development require a division into 3 branches of government?
23. Tell us about the activities of the Verkhovna Rada of the 12th convocation.
24. Describe the main features of the formation and operation of the executive branch.
25. Identify the main stages of the Ukrainian army formation. Explain the tasks facing the Armed Forces of the Ukrainian state.
26. What distinguished the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1998 from the party elections?
27. Who won the 1998 presidential election in Ukraine? Why?
28. What electoral systems do you know?
29. What is a parliamentary majority in parliament? What is its significance for the work of the legislature?
30. What groups were the political parties in Ukraine divided into in 1991-1994?
31. Justify the relevance of the development and adoption of the Constitution for the Ukrainian state.
32. Describe the main stages of the constitutional process in Ukraine in 1991 - 1995.

33. What forms of adoption of the Constitution do you know? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the new Ukrainian Constitution being adopted by the Verkhovna Rada?

34. Describe the main challenges facing Ukraine's economy since independence? What is the essence of the radical economic reforms of 1994?

35. What were the causes of the economic downturn in the first half of the 90s? What was done to stabilize the economy?

36. Describe the results of economic development of Ukraine before 1999.

TESTS

1. When was the first President of Ukraine elected and who was elected?

- a) 1990; L. Kuchma;
- b) 1991; L. Kravchuk;
- c) 1992; O. Moroz.

2. The name Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was replaced by the name – “Ukraine” in:

- a) September 1990;
- b) September 1991;
- c) September 1992

3. The Law “On the State Border of Ukraine” was adopted:

- a) in October 1991;
- b) in November 1991;
- c) in September 1992.

4. The Law “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” was adopted on:

- a) December 6, 1990;
- b) December 6, 1991;
- c) December 6, 1993;

5. The Verkhovna Rada approved the State Symbols of Ukraine in:

- a) January - February 1991;
- b) January - February 1992;
- c) January - February 1993.

6. Elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the 13th convocation took place in:

- a) March 1994;
- b) March 1995;

c) March 1996.

7. Kuchma was elected President of Ukraine during the elections of:

- a) June - July 1993;
- b) June - July 1994;
- c) June - July 1995.

8. The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the 13th convocation was:

- a) O. Moroz;
- b) O. Tkachenko;
- c) N. Vitrenko.

9. The Verkhovna Rada of the 14th convocation, headed by O. Tkachenko and chaired by I. Pliushch operated:

- a) in 1994 - 1998;
- b) in 1998 - 2002;
- c) in 2002 – 2006.

10. For the second term, Kuchma was elected President of Ukraine in:

- a) 1998;
- b) 1999;
- c) 2000.

11. The Constitution of Ukraine was adopted on:

- a) June 28 1995;
- b) June 28, 1996;
- c) June 28, 1997.

LECTURE 12: MAIN STAGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. UKRAINE'S EXPERIENCE.

1. The role and place of education, science and technology in the development of society

2. Education in Ukraine: history and modernity

1. The role and place of education, science and technology in the development of society

The level of education of people is one of the main criteria for the potential development of any society. These opportunities are most fully realized by requiring the organic interconnection of education, science, and industry. The creation of material and spiritual wealth of society depends on the general level of science, on the progress of technology, and on the application of science in production. An indicator of the development and democracy of society is the availability of the benefits of science, education and culture for all segments of the population.

Science, technology, and education must be objectively considered in an organic unity that follows from their functions and content. Science can be regarded as an institution, as a method, as the accumulation of traditions and knowledge, as an important factor in maintaining and developing production, and as one of the strongest factors shaping beliefs and attitudes toward the world and humanity. In turn, technology is a set of artificially created means of human activity. The field of education is a supplier of specialists for various sectors of the economy, science and culture. Research work of theoretical and applied character is conducted here, retraining and advanced training of teachers and experts is carried out. Therefore, the purpose and functions of these areas are interdependent and interrelated.

It is important to remember scientists' great mission and responsibility for the consequences of their work, for the fate of mankind. After all, the achievements of scientific thought, including those in the field of nuclear energy, have repeatedly been used not for creation but for destruction. The real threat to humanity is environmental problems caused by ill-considered actions in the field of scientific and technological progress.

In the context of the development of independent Ukraine, M. Hrushevsky said that the needs of the native school were the most important, because the people who did not have their own school could only be the stepson of foreign peoples, because they would never choose an independent path of existence. He believed that Ukrainians would have their own higher educational establishments, where all subjects would be taught in Ukrainian and by Ukrainian professors, so that the various needs of Ukrainian citizens would be

met by Ukrainian science, so that Ukrainians would live their own and full-fledged lives. He called for “giving Ukrainians full freedom and the opportunity to develop their writing, science and art, their public life”.

An independent state of Ukraine must have a national system of education and science, because each nation, large or small, has its own qualitative features, its own specifics, which belong only to it and which are manifested in the national culture. However, it is important to remember that science, technology, and education have no national borders, they are created by all peoples.

Each nation, depending on the specific historical conditions, contributes to the development of world science and technology. For example, how can we talk about the development of heat engineering, without dwelling on the contribution made to it by the Russian inventor Ivan Polzunov, the English inventor James Watt, the French scientist Sadi Carnot? The history of aviation would be incomplete if such names as Lilienthal, Mozhaisky, the Wright brothers, and Sikorsky were forgotten.

Can humanity forget the contribution of Soviet and American scientists and designers in space exploration, and the Japanese ones - in the development of computers and robotics? By the way, Ukrainian scientists have left a noticeable mark both in the first and in the second spheres.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider the development of science, technology and education in the context of both world history and domestic one.

2. Education in Ukraine: history and modernity

The formation of the education system is most directly related to the emergence and development of writing. The creation of the Slavic alphabet is associated with the names of Cyril and Methodius (IX century). At the turn of the IX and X centuries on the territory of the First Bulgarian Kingdom on the basis of the synthesis of the Greek alphabet and Glagolitic script a more perfect alphabet called the Cyrillic alphabet appeared. With the adoption of Christianity, the development of written culture accelerated. Church Slavonic, which came to Russia from Bulgaria, became the literary language.

The chronicle first mentioned Volodymyr Sviatoslavovych's introduction of schooling in Rus. During his reign in Novgorod, Yaroslav the Wise ordered to establish schools and to teach literacy to three hundred children.

At the Kyiv-Pechersk Monastery there was a school of the highest type, where, along with theology such disciplines as philosophy, rhetoric, and grammar were studied. Famous figures of ancient Rus culture graduated from the school.

Not only boys but also girls studied literacy. The chronicle tells about a school opened by Yaroslav the Wise's granddaughter Anna (Hanka) Vsevolodivna at the St. Andrew's Monastery in Kyiv. At school, in addition to literacy, the girls learned singing, sewing, and other needlework, which was a

novelty for medieval Europe. Princess Euphrosyne knew “book writing” and wrote books herself.

By the end of the XVI century Byzantine traditions remained decisive in school affairs: the school functioned at the church (or monastery); sacristan (“didaskal”, “master”, “bachelor”) was a school teacher; liturgical books were used as textbooks; church singing and writing were curriculum components, Church Slavonic served the language of instruction.

Jesuit colleges (at the end of the 16th century there were more than 20 of them in Ukraine) provided education of the highest European standard. Ukrainians who did not have equal Orthodox schools sent their children to these colleges, where they almost completely lost all signs of national identity.

As early as 1569, the Jesuits opened their college in Vilno, which in 1579 was classified as an academy. In response, in 1580, with the active assistance of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi, the Ostroh Slavic-Greek-Latin Collegium was opened on his family estate in Ostroh on the basis of the former school, which was also conceived as a future Orthodox academy.



In the picture: The Ostroh Academy

The Ostroh Academy (1580-1608) opposed the Polish expansion to the national system of spiritual values. The academy, which was called the “trilingual lyceum”, “temple of muses”, “Ostroh Athens”, was a new type of educational institution - the Slavic-Greek-Latin academy, modeled on the opening of Orthodox training centers in Kyiv (1632), Iasi (1640).), Moscow (1687). Unlike the best cathedral schools, where education was limited to

grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics (trivium, Latin trivium of the crossing of three roads), it taught the “seven free sciences” (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music - quadrivium, Latin). Elements of philosophy, created by prominent theologians, philologists and philosophers – Gerasim and Meletius Smotrytsky, Vasyl Ostrozky, Christopher Filalet (Martin Bronsky) – were also taught.

The Zamoyski Academy, opened in the western Ukrainian city of Zamość in 1595, contributed to the expansion of higher education, in particular, philosophical education in Ukraine. Well-known cultural and scientific figures – Sakovych, Kozlovsky, and Kosov – graduated from this academy. Later they became teachers at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Brotherhoods – national and religious public organizations of the Orthodox bourgeoisie – played an important role in the organization of cultural and educational institutions. In particular, in 1585 the Assumption Brotherhood of Lviv organized its school. Subjects were taught in the Ukrainian language of that time. They taught Slavic and Greek, as well as “liberal arts”. In 1586, the “School Order” was drawn up here, which in particular set out the pedagogical requirements for teachers. A teacher was to be “pious, humble, not angry, not a slanderer, not a sorcerer, not a laugher, not a fabler, not a heretic, but a help of piety, an image of goodness in all things”. At the beginning of the XVII century there were about 30 fraternal schools in Ukraine.

The Cossacks played a significant role in the development of education in Ukraine. Zaporizhzhia schools were divided into Sich, monastery and parish. According to D. Yavornytsky, the majority of the Sich army was so high in literacy that in this respect prevailed the middle and, perhaps, the highest class of people of their time. In 1616 the unregistered part of the Zaporozhian Host became a collective members of the Kyiv Brotherhood. The Kyiv Fraternal School was established in 1615. In 1619, another school appeared in Kyiv - the Lavra School, founded by the Archimandrite of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Petro Mohyla.

In 1632, the schools were merged into the Kyiv Collegium, later the Kyiv Mazepa-Mohyla Academy, and then the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Slavic, Greek, Latin, Polish, and Ukrainian languages, rhetoric, philosophy, mathematics (arithmetic and geometry), astronomy, music, theology were studied here. By the way, most of the above disciplines were taught at glorious Cambridge University. Later, in the late XVIII - early XIX centuries, history and geography began to be taught at the academy.

For the first time the status of the Academy was fixed by the Treaty of Hadiach in 1658. In 1701, thanks to Mazepa's insistence, Peter I confirmed the level of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as the highest educational institution. There were 8 classes there. The duration of study was 12 years. The academy had a democratic system of electing teachers and rectors. It was governed by the rector, prefect, and superintendent.



In the picture: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy satisfied Ukraine's educational, scientific and social needs for almost 200 years. Its students were H.S. Skovoroda, A. Denysov, M.V. Lomonosov. Colleges in Chernihiv (1700), Kharkiv (1721), and Pereyaslav (1738) were founded on the model of the Kyiv Academy. In particular, the Kharkiv Collegium became the center of education in Slobidska Ukraine. In 1765, engineering, artillery, geodesy and geography began to be taught here.



In the picture: Kharkiv Collegium

Thus, at the end of the XVII century Ukraine had a developed education system, which included primary, secondary and higher education. However, at the end of the XVIII century the situation was different. Due to peasants' enslavement and impoverishment, most rural schools in the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine ceased to exist. Later, small two-year public schools and basic five-year public schools emerged in county towns and provincial centers respectively.

In 1802 the Ministry of Education of the Russian Empire began its activity. In 1803 it carried out the systematization of educational institutions. Four types of schools were approved: parish, county, provincial (gymnasiums), and universities. Intermediate positions between gymnasiums and universities were occupied by lyceums which in Ukraine were represented by the three institutions: Richelieu in Odessa (founded in 1817), Kremyanets (founded in 1819), and Nizhyn (founded in 1820). Training was carried out in Russian.

Primary (trivial) and incomplete secondary (main) schools were organized in the western Ukrainian lands, where, as a rule, German was taught. In rural schools, children attending church schools were also taught in Polish or German, only in isolated cases they were taught in Ukrainian.

In the late XVIII - early XIX centuries the first universities appeared on the territory of Ukraine. The oldest university in the western Ukrainian lands, Lviv University, which dates back to 1661, resumed its work in 1784.

After February 1917, the creation of an effective education system in Ukraine became one of the main issues in the Central Rada's activity.

In the summer of 1917, the first Ukrainian People's University was established in Kyiv, because there were no Ukrainian philologists at the existing university. The same universities were opened in Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

Most of what was drawn up by the Central Rada was carried out under Hetman P. Skoropadsky. In particular, 150 Ukrainian gymnasiums were opened; 350 scholarships for students were established; in 1918 the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, headed by one of its organizers and its first president V.I. Vernadsky, began functioning; the National Library of Ukraine, archive, art gallery, historical museum, national theater, etc. were founded.

After the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine, progress was made in the elimination of illiteracy, the development of higher education, science and technology.

In January-April 1919, the basic principles of the Soviet system of education and upbringing were proclaimed: comprehensible, accessible for all, free and compulsory schooling. The Soviet People's Commissar of Ukraine issued decrees on school education, according to which the church was separated from the state and the school – from the church, tuition fees were abolished in all educational institutions without exception, all private schools were transferred to the state, and mixed classes were introduced. A ten-year

two-level school was created, and a vocational school was built on the basis of seven classes. Two types of higher education institutions were established: technical schools, which trained domain specialists, and institutes, which graduated engineers and other specialists in various fields. In 1921, workers' faculties were organized, which prepared workers and peasants for admission to universities.



In the picture: Volodymyr Vernadsky

Carrying out the reform of higher education, the People's Commissariat of Ukraine in 1920 abandoned such types of higher education institutions as universities. All higher education institutions, and especially universities, were transformed into institutes of public education (IPE).

In the 1920s, the "Ukrainization" of the education system was effectively carried out in Ukraine, which was part of the USSR. Thus, in 1927, 78% of schools, 40% of technical schools, 33% of universities used Ukrainian as a language of instruction.

The restoration of university education in Ukraine in 1933 was extremely important for the development of science and culture. Universities began to operate in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk. At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1937), a stable network of higher education institutions was formed in the republic, which comprised 123 universities, including 35 industrial and technical, 20 agricultural, 36 pedagogical, 14 medical, etc.

In the postwar period the educational sphere was restored in a short time, the university sector of science was significantly strengthened. Thus, in the system of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Higher Education of the UkrSSR in 1966 there were 4 research institutes, 37 problem and 68 branch laboratories, the volume of scientific research in all universities of Ukraine had increased by 12 times since 1956 (for 10 years).

During that period, Soviet science played a priority role in nuclear energy and rocketry, space exploration, the creation of lasers, the development of biochemistry, etc. The USSR surpassed the United States, thanks in large part to the high level of education of the population.

Unfortunately, in the 1970s and 1980s, the shortcomings inherent in the administrative-command system had a negative impact on education and science. While the developed capitalist countries increased their spending on science and education several times, made a breakthrough to new technologies through the powerful development of microelectronics, computer science, biotechnology, the Soviet Union trampled on the ground, losing priorities in the development of science and public education.

Many correct decisions in the field of education and science were made in 1985-1990. However, they remained only on paper. Ukraine's gaining state independence and the collapse of the USSR radically changed the further process of reforming higher education, as well as the entire sphere of education.

During the years of Ukraine's independence, significant steps have been taken in building the national education system:

- a new legal framework for the education sector has been developed;
- domestic textbooks and pedagogical press have been created;
- the content of education has been updated, first of all, in the social and humanitarian sphere;
- the scale of Ukrainian-language education has been expanded;
- significant steps have been taken to include Ukrainian education in the European and world educational space. In particular, educational and qualification degrees have been brought in line with international requirements, state education standards have been developed, cooperation agreements with more than fifty countries have been concluded, and in 2005 Ukraine joined the Bologna Process.

The level of education of the population in Ukraine is one of the highest among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the gross enrollment rate in 2003 in Ukraine was 79.6% (for comparison: the world average - 65%, in developing countries - 61%, in highly developed countries - 94%, in Eastern Europe - 77%). The number of university students per 10,000 people increased from 316 in 1990 to 512 in 2003.

On the other hand, the quality of education in Ukraine is negatively affected by:

- long-standing underfunding (analysts believe that educational institutions do not receive from 40 to 60% of the funds needed for their normal functioning);
- clearly increased number of students of higher education institutions paying a tuition fee. Their share in the 2003-2004 academic years was 60%;
- low level educators' salaries, reduction of prestige of scientific and pedagogical work that complicates a personnel problem in the field of education;
- insufficient provision of textbooks, academic and methodological literature and information materials;
- low level of material and technical (especially computer) base of the academic process, lack of energy resources.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. What is science?
2. What is the main purpose of science?
3. Explain the concept of "knowledge".
4. Define the essence of the concept of "scientific activity" and enlist its types.
5. What is the importance of science for the development of modern civilization?
6. What is the order of scientific and technological revolution?
7. When was the scientific foundations of mathematics, astronomy, mechanics and medicine created?
8. When and by what means were dialectical ideas of general development and connection in nature approved?
9. What led to the creation of a quantum mechanical system of worldview?
10. What is the scientific and technological revolution?
11. Which of the prominent Ukrainian scientists achieved significant success in the development of world-class intellectual information tools?
12. What is the essence of the intellectualization of science and what does it give?
13. List the priority areas of development of Ukrainian science and technology for the period up to 2022.

TESTS

1. What is science?
- a) system

- b) process
- c) activity;
- d) function.

2. Sergei Korolev was an outstanding scientist as a...?

- a) economist;
- b) biologist;
- c) chemist;
- d) designer.

. In which spheres of creative activity did Ivan Franko achieved significant success?

- a) philosophy;
- b) literature;
- c) economy;
- d) biology.

4. When was the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU) founded?:

- a) in 1919;
- b) in 1921;
- c) in 1936;
- d) in 1939

5. Who was the first President of the NASU?

- a) Paton;
- b) Alexandrov;
- c) Vernadsky;
- d) Zabolotny

6. Who is an outstanding Ukrainian scientist in the field of mathematics, cybernetics, computer engineering and control systems?

- a) Hlushkov;
- b) Paton;
- c) Alexandrov;
- d) Ostrogradsky.

7. Who was the first Ukrainian to fly into space?

- a) Yuri Gagarin;
- b) Pavlo Popovych;
- c) Leonid Kadenyuk;
- d) Igor Sikorsky.

8. Well-known Ukrainian folklorist, ethnographer and public literary figure, academician of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, a native of the village Velesniv of Monastyrsky district of Ternopil region (1871-1926), friend and colleague of I.Ya. Franko:

- a) Pavlo Dumka;
- b) Ivan Hnatyuk;
- c) Volodymyr Bilytsky;
- d) Volodymyr Hnatiuk.

. Scientist ophthalmologist, surgeon who created a national scientific school of ophthalmologists:

- a) Mykola Amosov;
- b) Volodymyr Filatov;
- c) Olexandr Bogomolets;
- d) Mykola Strazhesko.

10. The head of the team performing automatic high-speed welding of metal structures:

- a) Yevhen Paton;
- b) Victor Kirpichov;
- c) Mykola Bogolyubov;
- d) Boris Paton.

11. Archaeologist, ethnographer, folklorist, writer, researcher of the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks

- a) Volodymyr Hnatiuk;
- b) Fedir Vovk;
- c) Ivan Hnatyuk;
- d) Dmytro Yavornytsky.

12. Founder of military field surgery and an outstanding anatomist who spent the last 20 years in the village of Vyshnya in Vinnytsia region:

- a) Mykola Amosov;
- b) Dmytro Mendeleev;
- c) Olexandr Bogomolets;
- d) Mykola Pyrohov.

13. Scientist in the field of mechanics and control processes, designer of rocket and space systems, who provided the world's first manned space flight:

- a) Yuri Kondratyuk;
- b) Yuri Gagarin;
- c) Leonid Kadenyuk;
- d) Serhiy Korolev.

14. Outstanding Ukrainian aircraft designer and entrepreneur who played a leading role in the world aircraft and helicopter engineering:

- a) Kostiantyn Antonov;
- b) Ihor Sikorsky;
- c) Yuriy Kondratyuk;
- d) Mykhailo Yangel.

15. Biologist, founder of theories of embryonic leaves (1871) and the origin of multicellular organisms (1886):

- a) Danylo Zabolotny;
- b) Ilya Mechnikov;
- c) Mykola Kholodny;
- d) Volodymyr Filatov.

16. The main function of science is:

- a) knowledge of the objective world from living contemplation to abstract thinking and practice;
- b) participation in the development of scientific and technological progress;
- c) participation in ensuring the effectiveness of management;
- d) participation in the accumulation of facts and the disclosure of the laws of the world;

LECTURE 13. UKRAINE AND THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

- 1. Sovereign Ukraine in the modern geopolitical space.**
- 2. Ukraine and the European integration process**
- 3. International relations and foreign economic activity of agricultural universities**
- 4. Eastern and Western Ukrainian diaspora in interstate relations.**

1. Sovereign Ukraine in the modern geopolitical space.

Although Ukraine is still considered a young state, it has long taken its rightful place in the geopolitical space.

Studying the history of our country, we can confidently consider it a heroic one. After all, it has experienced a lot during its existence, a huge force of invaders occupied its lands, everyone wanted to grab at least some piece. But our people did not give up, they believed in a better future.

On August 24, 1991, Ukraine finally gained its long-awaited freedom. And now, we live in free Ukraine, which has had over three decades of independence.

With the adoption of independence, our state is a full-fledged subject of international relations. This event gave impetus to the development of further plans of the international community.

Ukraine has been recognized by 150 countries, 100 countries have established diplomatic relations with it. Our country is a member of the United Nations, it has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is a member of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF, the World Bank and other world and European organizations.

Geopolitics implies the decisive role of geographical factors in the policy of the state. With global political changes that have sharply emerged at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, it acquires a new meaning and content. This is primarily due to the inconsistency with the realities of traditional models of implementing state and political aspirations.

The location and size of Ukraine, its population, natural resources in combination with potential in scientific, economic and other spheres of public life give it the right to have the status of a large European state with appropriate geopolitical behavior and geostrategic orientation.

Ukraine's current policy is based on peaceful principles. Its nuclear-free status helps to improve relations with European states, on the other hand, it can pose a certain danger if the actions of neighbors acquire aggressive features.

Now Ukraine, which has long been part of various states, including the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, should formally gain full independence from our eastern neighbor, but this is not yet the case. And this is quite understandable for a number of well-known reasons.

Ukraine has also begun to convert on chance to directly join the international community as its full-fledged entity. Our country has active bilateral relations with many countries. In particular, it develops relations in the East, the West, with the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America. Ukraine has close ties with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

For our state, which throughout its history has been at the center of the geopolitical interests of many superpowers, foreign policy choices have not only domestic but also international significance.

Ukraine's foreign policy is also aimed at:

- protection of state sovereignty;
- ensuring the country's security;
- preserving the integrity of the state territory;
- providing favorable external conditions for economic cooperation, trade, cultural ties with other countries to overcome the deep economic crisis and raise its prestige in the world community;
- strengthening the influence on international events, neutralizing the actions of individual countries unfavorable to Ukraine.

The foreign policy course is enshrined in Article 18 of the Constitution of Ukraine: "Ukraine's foreign policy is aimed at ensuring its national interests and security by maintaining peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with members of international community in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law".

Modern features of geopolitical processes and the role of Ukraine in their development are based on the following aspects:

1. The global transformations that began at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries have not yet been completed. Taking into account near and far (both desirable and undesirable) potentially possible changes in the region and beyond is extremely important for Ukraine and other European countries. Therefore, it is in the interests of our state and continent to strengthen trust, expand political dialogue and cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis within the pan-European process, to take measures to overcome the economic crisis, and adhere to universal fundamental values.

2. The adaptation of foreign policy principles, adjustment of strategic priorities with account of new realia, formation of clear criteria of geopolitical and geoeconomic situation, taking into account difficult conditions of the European continent's transition period appear constructive in the activity of young democracies.

3. Overcoming difficulties, Ukraine continues the process of expanding its diplomatic presence in the world, gradually becoming an influential European country, turning into a real and active subject of international relations, which has its own national interests and resolves them among European nations.

If Ukraine really continues to pursue a pro-European policy, develops and cares about both internal and external situation, focuses on its own interests and not on those of its neighbors, in the future it will achieve a very high and decent level in the geopolitical space.

2. Ukraine and the European integration process

Ukraine's intention to build relations with the European Union was first announced in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of July 2, 1993 "On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy".

Relations between Ukraine and the European Union were launched in December 1991, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, as the representative of the EU Presidency, officially recognized Ukraine's independence in a letter on behalf of the European Union. Subsequently, Ukraine's strategic course towards European integration was reaffirmed and developed in the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU, approved on June 11, 1998, and in the Program of Ukraine's Integration into the EU, approved on September 14, 2000. It proclaimed a long-term strategic goal - Ukraine's European integration.

According to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy», one of the fundamental principles of Ukraine's foreign policy is to ensure Ukraine's integration into the European political, economic and legal space in order to gain EU membership.

On March 5, 2007, Ukraine and the EU began negotiations on a new agreement between Ukraine and the EU.

On September 9, 2008, at the Paris Summit, Ukraine and the EU reached a political agreement on concluding a future treaty in the format of an Association Agreement, which would be based on the principles of political association and economic integration.

In accordance with the agreements reached during the Paris EU-Ukraine Summit, in 2009 the parties developed and approved an Association Agenda, which replaced the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and aimed to serve as a guide for reforms in Ukraine in the process of preparing the implementation of the future Association Agreement.

At the 15th EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv on December 19, 2011, negotiations on the future Association Agreement were completed, and on March 30, 2012, the text of the future Agreement was initialed by the heads of the negotiating teams of Ukraine and the EU.

The political part of the Association Agreement was signed on March 21, 2014, the economic part - on June 27, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament simultaneously ratified the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Since November 1, 2014, its temporary application was carried out.



In the picture: signing of the political part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union



In the picture: signing of the economic part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union

The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU entered into force on September 1, 2017. It is an international legal document that enshrines

at the legal level the transition of relations between Ukraine and the EU from partnership and cooperation to political association and economic integration.

3. International relations and foreign economic activity of agricultural universities

The National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine strengthens its leadership position in the field of international activities from year to year. The university takes an active part in the implementation of international programs in the field of higher education, assists foreign countries in training their national personnel in the agricultural sector.

The purpose of the university's international activity is gaining world's leading universities' recognition of the university's system of education, science, and research by its adaptation to the requirements of international education quality standards.

The main directions of international activity of National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine are the following:

- deepening and expanding existing contacts with foreign partner universities and other institutions of Europe, Asia; USA and others;
- improvement and expansion of bases of industrial practices, students' internships abroad;
- providing information on curricular in foreign higher education institutions, search for possible partners and resources for such curricular;
- development of grant proposals and coordination of work within international programs and projects;
- providing support to foreign applicants and supervision of foreign Bachelor, Master, and PhD students;
- cooperation with ministries, departments, embassies of foreign countries in Ukraine and other institutions and organizations on international activities.

Education process at the National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine is carried out on the basis of: international agreements of Ukraine, national programs and agreements concluded with legal entities and individuals.

Today, citizens of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, the United States, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic study at NULES of Ukraine. They are guaranteed all the rights and freedoms provided by the current legislation of Ukraine.

4. Eastern and Western Ukrainian diaspora in interstate relations.

Today, it is almost impossible to calculate what part of the world community Ukrainians make up. Many have accepted the citizenship of the country they now live in, and there are those who do not even know their Ukrainian origin, because they were born in another state, where their ancestors once emigrated.

The commonly used ethno-political term “diaspora” comes from the Greek «diaspora» and means: «scattering in different countries of the people expelled by the conquerors outside the homeland.»

Among the central executive bodies responsible for resolving the problems of the Ukrainian diaspora is the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Migration. The President’s Decree No. 486 of April 27, 2004 “On ensuring the with Ukrainians living outside Ukraine” obliged the Committee to provide the cooperation with Ukrainians living outside Ukraine and coordination of activities in this area. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine directs its activities to establishing relations with Ukrainians living outside Ukraine. The Ministry of Culture and tourism of Ukraine focuses on one of the important areas of its work which is the implementation of state policy to support the culture of Ukrainians living outside the country.

The main document developed to implement Article 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine to meet the national, cultural and linguistic needs of foreign Ukrainians was the National Program “Ukrainian People Abroad” for the period up to 2010.

In 2017 the “Concept of the State Program of Cooperation with Foreign Ukrainians” was adopted. Given the need to regulate the status of Ukrainians living outside the country, to facilitate their contacts with the ethnic homeland, the Law of Ukraine “On Foreign Ukrainians” was adopted. According to the Law, “a foreign Ukrainian is a person who is a citizen of another state or a stateless person, and also has Ukrainian ethnic origin – belonging of a person or his / her ancestors to the Ukrainian nation and his / her recognition of Ukraine as homeland”. The Law reads: “The Ukrainian state promotes the development of the national consciousness of Ukrainians living outside Ukraine, strengthens ties with the homeland and returns them to Ukraine. According to Article 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the state cares about meeting the national, cultural and linguistic needs of Ukrainians living abroad”.

In order to meet the national, cultural and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad, Ukraine in concluding international agreements provides for the rights of Ukrainian minorities abroad, creating optimal conditions and opportunities to meet their social, cultural, educational, informational and other needs; promotes the conclusion of international agreements on cooperation in the fields of culture, education, social protection, information support, taking into account the interests of organizations of foreign Ukrainians; provides organizational, methodological, technical and other assistance to Ukrainian cultural and

information centers in places of compact residence of Ukrainians abroad; creates conditions for radio broadcasting and television broadcasting of programs from Ukraine to the territory of compact residence of Ukrainians abroad, in particular through satellite communications and other means of communication.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. What are the priority areas of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine enshrined in law?
2. Characterize the main provisions of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.
3. Do Ukraine's foreign policy interests coincide with priority areas of Euro-Atlantic integration?
4. What determines the orientation of public administration on implementing the established priority areas of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine?
5. What are general characteristics of EU legal system?
6. What are general characteristics of the main EU institutions?
7. Tell about the implementation of the principle of power separation in the institutional structure of the EU.
8. How does the role the European Parliament strengthen in the rule-making process?
9. Outline the role and importance of the economic and social committee and the region committee in the EU policy-making.
10. Outline Copenhagen criteria as criteria for EU accession.
11. Tell about current state and prospects of relations between Ukraine and the EU.
12. Name the basic documents of sovereign Ukraine's foreign policy.
13. Outline the principles, goals and main features of Ukraine's foreign policy.
14. Describe the development of Ukraine's relations with the CIS countries.
15. Identify the national interests of Ukraine in the foreign policy arena.
16. What is Ukraine's foreign policy strategy?
17. What are the prospects for Ukraine's cooperation with NATO?
18. Why is the ecology of Ukraine an international problem?
19. Identify the main stages in the evolution of Ukraine's relations with the United States.
20. Describe the current state of Ukrainian-American relations.

TESTS

1. What is world politics?

- a) The system of relations between states;
- b) Practical implementation of national interests of the state;
- c) System of interstate relations;
- d) Interaction of various political players in the international arena.

2. What union did Ukraine become a member of in December 1991?

- a) Commonwealth of Independent States;
- b) Council of Europe;
- c) United Nations;
- d) Organizations for security and cooperation in Europe.

3. What is the evidence of independent Ukraine's cooperation with the United Nations?

- a) Participation of Ukrainian units in peacekeeping operations;
- b) Joining the Partnership for Peace;
- c) Proclamation of the nuclear-free status of the state;
- d) Deployment of foreign military bases on its territory.

4. What caused the appearance of the 1994 memorandum signed in Budapest, an excerpt from which is given below?

"The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States reaffirm to Ukraine their commitment in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act to respect Ukraine's independence and sovereignty and existing borders ...";

- a) Ukraine's renunciation of the status of a nuclear state;
- b) Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe (CoE);
- c) Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO);
- d) Holding an All-Ukrainian referendum to confirm the Act of Independence of Ukraine.

5. The NATO program in which Ukraine participated:

- a) "Call for temporary change";
- b) "Invincible Freedom";
- c) "Partnership for Peace";
- d) "Fair retribution".

6. Solving the problem of nuclear weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine:

- a) Ukraine's renunciation of strategic nuclear weapons, ratification of the START-1 agreement, and the preservation of other types of nuclear weapons;

b) Maintaining Ukraine's nuclear status until it joins the NATO bloc, after which it will hand over warheads to the bloc;

c) Ukraine has completely renounced nuclear weapons, ratified the START-1 treaty, and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

d) Ukraine has partially renounced nuclear weapons, retaining tactical nuclear weapons, and ratified the START-2 agreement.

7. Component of the process of Ukraine's integration into the European space:

a) enshrining its non-nuclear status in the Constitution of Ukraine;

b) introduction of a proportional electoral system;

c) signing the Helsinki Final Act in Ukraine;

d) introduction of the national currency - hryvnia.

8. The essence of the agreements between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet (1997):

a) transfer of naval bases for an indefinite lease to Russia;

b) transfer of property of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine, permitting Russia to use the bases as redemption;

c) complete transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine;

d) dividing the property of the fleet between Ukraine and Russia, which also received the right to lease part of the bases for a period of 20 years.

9. The organization with which Ukraine signed an association agreement in 2014:

a) European Union;

b) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

c) Council of Europe;

d) Commonwealth of Independent States.

10. The reaction of the world community to Russia's armed aggression:

a) boycott of Russian goods;

b) Russia's exclusion from the UN;

c) imposing sanctions against Russia;

d) announcement of a trade blockade of Russia.

11. The essence of the Address to the UN, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE, national parliaments of the world, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from on January 27, 2015:

a) recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state;

b) enshrining its non-nuclear status in the Constitution of Ukraine;

- c) announcement of Ukraine's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- d) abolition of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on friendship and cooperation.

12. The essence of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Ukraine of December 2016:

- a) recognition of Russia as an occupying power and Donbass as an occupied territory;
- b) recognition of Russia as an occupying power, and Donbass and Crimea as occupied territories;
- c) recognition of Russia as an occupying power and Crimea as an occupied territory;
- d) a statement of neutral stance in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

13. Indicate the name of the President under whose leadership the Charter on a Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO was signed.

- a) L. Kravchuk;
- b) L. Kuchma;
- c) V. Yanukovich;
- d) P. Poroshenko.

14. Which of these types of international relations corresponds to Ukraine:

- a) transitional relations;
- b) relations of cooperation and mutual assistance;
- c) relations of domination and subjugation;
- d) other relationships.

15. General course of the state in international affairs:

- a) domestic policy;
- b) diplomacy;
- c) political cooperation;
- d) foreign policy.

16. Which of the following is not a form of international politics?

- a) diplomacy;
- b) war;
- c) revolution;
- d) foreign policy propaganda.

17. Which provision is not a principle of modern international politics:

- a) the principle of sovereign equality;
- b) the principle of non-alignment and neutrality;
- c) the principle of territorial integrity;

d) the principle of respect for human rights.

18. Which of these state bodies is responsible for the foreign policy of the state:

- a) Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- b) Council of Justice;
- c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- d) Verkhovna Rada.

19. Geopolitics in the broadest, most common sense is:

- a) depending of the policy on the geographical location of the country;
- b) policy of influencing international relations due to its geological reserves;
- c) strategic concept of the state on the development of natural resources;
- d) policy on demarcation of state borders.

20. Ukraine did not participate in the establishment of this organization:

- a) UN;
- b) CIS;
- c) IAEA;
- d) Entente.

21. When did Ukraine sign the Association Agreement with the EU?

- a) in 1996;
- b) in 1999;
- c) in 2014;
- d) in 2017.

LECTURE 14 PROSPECTS OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE IN THE XXI CENTURY.

1. The concept of sustainable development and strategic prospects of Ukraine

2. Political system of Ukraine: ways of democratic transformations

3. Socio-economic factors of national development in the XXI century

1. The concept of sustainable development and strategic prospects of Ukraine

The history of strategic planning in independent Ukraine began in 1994 with the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma's address to the Verkhovna Rada. The vagueness of the role and place of the address in the system of strategic public administration forced Kuchma to issue a Decree "On Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine", which entered into force on April 9, 1997. It determined the most important areas of economic, political and social development, provided measures for the strict protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, improvement of regulatory mechanisms for regulating social relations.

These were only the first steps on the long path of development of strategic planning in Ukraine. It soon became clear that such annual presidential addresses were not enough to guide the movement of the whole country - it was necessary to create more detailed documents and involve all key players in the planning process - the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet. However, this was not enough.

A striking example of the case when the best strategic documents were not implemented due to the lack of a system of strategic planning and public involvement was the Strategy of Economic and Social Development of Ukraine for 2004-2015 "Through European Integration". This document declared wonderful things - identified the main strategic priorities, including: creating the conditions for Ukraine's membership in the European Union, ensuring sustainable economic development, establishing an innovative model of development, social reorientation of the economy. However, the strategy did not work - the authorities continued to address state issues «in the old fashioned way», regardless of the long-term perspective and, in fact, only under the guise of the goals of the Strategy. The lack of a clear vision of the country's development and ways to achieve it, the belief in the possibility of changing the vector of movement (from West to East) actually led to the collapse of power in 2013. After all, the very decision to suspend the process of preparation for

signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union led to the Revolution of Dignity, which grew into an open confrontation.

After the Revolution of Dignity, the government drew some conclusions from the failures of its predecessors, and wishing to be more consistent, made a clear bet on the European Union, consolidating its decision by signing the Association Agreement and declaring a new strategic document - Sustainable Development Strategy "Ukraine 2020". The document was created focusing on European models, in particular on the strategy 'Europe – 2020'. In fact it became the most important strategic document of the country.

"Ukraine 2020" was to become a program of national reforms (a total of 62 reforms were mentioned in the document), a guide for local authorities, which would justify their regional strategic plans based on the national strategy. And for civil society it would serve as a benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of government.

What does the Ukraine 2020 Strategy consist of? The strategy very briefly indicates the main vectors of Ukraine's development, lists all reforms and programs, the implementation of which should be completed by 2020. The Strategy also lists 25 indicators that assess the progress of reforms, such as the level of corruption, the level of trust in the police, the amount of foreign investment or even the number of medals won by our athletes at the Olympic Games.

Unfortunately, a significant number of indicators "blur" the Strategy. Instead of concentrating on the most important areas, the government has returned to the old model "everywhere a little bit" (because thanks to some miracle, all indicators should improve - less corruption, more medals). This approach actually denies the very essence of the reforms and, unfortunately, Ukraine has not been able to get out of this quagmire since independence. For example, in the pan-European strategy "Europe 2020" there are only 5 such indicators and they clearly guide Europeans to one goal planned for a decade, namely - the development of man, human capital.

However, «blurring» is not the only problem of "Ukraine 2020", because in fact all 25 indicators listed in the Strategy are significantly overestimated and achieving them by 2020, even under the most favorable conditions, is impossible.

In 2014, the new government was very active in promoting Ukraine 2020 as a panacea for all social ills, but many experts rightly criticized the Strategy for lack of justification and populism. As a result, it was decided to place the strategy "under the rug", and a year later they preferred not to mention it. The question arises - does it make sense in such a strategy?

Despite the fact that instead of a well-thought-out and well-written concept of socio-economic development, we received a list of formal and moderately fantastic goals, but for the first time at the level of official documents it was said what the young Ukrainian state lacked, namely answers to the question: "what tasks do the authorities and society face?"

“Ukraine – 2020”, despite its frank shortcomings, was a bold attempt to address the difficult topic of national values and ideas.

Extensive decentralization of power

While the Ukraine-2020 Strategy became a reference point for the country’s development priorities, the State Strategy for Regional Development for the period up to 2020 (“SSRR-2020”) became a specific document for the implementation of these priorities. This document also appeared after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity on August 6, 2014, when the new government in a short time needed to change the development vector to the European one and formulate new tasks for Ukrainian society, rethink the development of regions in the context of decentralization reform and take into account a number of new issues, which arose as a result of the conflict in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea.

In 2014, Ukraine was formally very centralized, with weak local self-government and increasing interregional disparities. The rigid executive branch, represented by local state administrations, was a political vertical, and heads of administrations represented the interests of regional elites rather than ordinary citizens and the state. However, it was in 2014 that the government took steps that in the conditions of war might seem illogical and dangerous for the existence of the state itself - it announced a broad decentralization of power and the formation of a new state regional policy based on European traditions and partnership in regional development among the state, regions and communities. These changes in society were expressed by means of the SSRD-2020 - a fundamental document that still has not occupied a key place in the hierarchy of strategic documents of Ukraine and is rarely mentioned when planning new reforms and is made formal references to when elaborating local strategies. It was this document that highlighted the European idea - development and unity focused on a man. In addition it was focused on raising the living standards of the population regardless of place of residence, based on the development of regions, and social and economic unity of the state.

At the same time, the State Fund for Regional Development (SFRD), which was closely connected with the SSRD-2020, received a new breath. The key idea of this document was to allocate funds purely for regional development and achieve the goals set out in the SSRD-2020. The State Fund for Regional Development was introduced as a mechanism to combat lobbying and corruption in the allocation of funds from the state budget to regional development, as a way to finance regional development projects that met regional development strategies and achieve the operational and strategic goals. However, if under Yanukovich funds were distributed opaquely and unfairly (for example, in 2012, the two privileged regions received from the SFRD more than the other regions of Ukraine combined, and some regions did not receive anything at all), in 2015 after a number of amendments to the legislation funds began to be distributed among the regions on an estimated basis (taking into account the population and GDP of the region).

Unfortunately, it should be noted that despite recent improvements, the process of distribution of money of the State Fund for Regional Development continues to be insufficiently transparent - only now the “carve-up” takes place in the regional center, not in Kyiv.


Another problem of the State Fund for Regional Development was the fact that the regions were not ready to submit strategic projects.

The modernization of strategic sectoral planning should be mentioned separately. It is worth noting that the number of sectoral strategies has been growing steadily in recent years - the central executive bodies are trying to improve the situation. Such strategies should focus on national strategies and detail the prospects for the development of some important areas of state activity - health care, defense industry, agriculture, etc. However, there are complications, because despite some success (some industries have developed and begun to use new and high-quality strategies), most industries are in no hurry and continue to live “their lives”.

In any case, over the last five years, we have seen positive changes in the approach to strategic planning: the authorities are paying more and more attention to the content of the strategy and are more responsible for its implementation. An example is the draft strategy “Ukraine – 2030”, which has become a significant step in improving its predecessor. The vector of Ukraine’s development has remained the same - integration into the European Union. “Ukraine – 2030” looks much more elaborate and realistic - instead of a list of reforms there are now clear strategic goals and descriptors on how the strategy will be implemented and monitored, indicators are based on the real situation and are realistic to implement. The draft Ukraine-2030 strategy also takes into account the updated EU Sustainable Development Strategy Europe 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals 2030.

2. The political system of Ukraine: ways of democratic transformation

The political system of Ukraine is a set of political relations, legal and political rules, institutions and ideas related to the formation and exercise of power and management of society. Ukraine has chosen a democratic type of political system. Today our country is experiencing an active process of formation of a new type of political system, which is reflected in the formation of local government, the introduction of the institution of presidential power, separation of political power and the existence of a mechanism of checks and balances.



The building of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

In terms of features of system-wide qualities, the political system of Ukraine is characterized as:

- a relatively stable (on the surface) system that can be easily transformed into an unstable one due to the deepening of conflicts between the main political blocs, including those within the state mechanism;
- a system with a relatively low pace of social processes and insufficiently receptive to social innovations;
- a young independent system, which in fact does not have enough effective modern traditions and experience of independent functioning;
- centralized, with some elements of regionalization and decentralization;
- a system that does not perform the full range of functions that are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of civilized society;
- a system which is in the process of transition from closed to open;
- a system that operates in an emergency situation, not in a normal one.

Given the peculiarities of the political nature of the existing system of political institutions in Ukraine, the political system of the country is characterized as:

- transitional from non-legal to legal type;
- legitimate for the majority of the population;
- transitional to the implementation of a consensus model for resolving social conflicts (while maintaining the possibility of implementing a purely confrontational model in practice);

- peaceful, non-aggressive;
- deprived of its own global system of ensuring national interests;
- a system that is not yet able to increase the level and quality of welfare of all major segments of the population, but retains elements of the ‘welfare state’;
- secular (as opposed to religious or atheistic);
- nationalized;
- a system with an insufficiently high intellectual level of policy;
- a system with the political dominance of certain social strata of the «reformed traditional nomenclature», the new “nomenclature” etc.

The main directions of formation and development of the new political system of Ukraine are:

- building a democratic, social, legal state;
- approval of civil society;
- further development and improvement of political relations, political principles and norms;
- growth of political consciousness and political culture of society and the individual;
- improving the media activities.



The building of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

The problem of determining the prospects of Ukraine’s development, trends in its state and political system is a relevant scientific and applied area of modern research for many scientists and politicians in our country, and especially in Europe. The urgency of this topic is due to the need to address many practical issues of state formation, develop a foreign policy strategy of the

state, identify ways and priorities to build a full-fledged, functionally effective rule of law and civil society structures in Ukraine. One way or another, this problem primarily concerns forms of cooperation with powerful geopolitical states.



The building of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine

Political forces, which are gradually replacing each other on the state-political Olympus of Ukraine, often shift the goalposts, interfere in the legal field, the activities of state institutions, suggesting administrative, political and even constitutional reforms. In addition to the understanding of the importance of reforming the institutional sphere of our country's political system and improving the legal framework, it is important to have a scientific understanding of the existing promising areas for Ukraine and the possible consequences and positives in this choice. Ukraine has its own traditions and value-based social guidelines for state building as well as improving, deploying and functioning of the state and political system as a whole. As a European country, we objectively share with other European countries the general trends in the development of the state and society. Undoubtedly, from the point of view of Eurocentric orientations of the Ukrainian state's modern policy, the experience of the countries of this region is invaluable for us. Changes in their political structures are an important scientific and practical material that can be useful for analyzing and elaborating prospects for the development of Ukraine's state and political system.

3. Socio-economic factors of national development in the XXI century.

After Ukraine gained independence, developmental and transformational socio-economic processes began to take place in its economic space with varying intensity. In the context of creating Ukraine's own economic system, its main attributes were formed, namely: financial, monetary, budgetary, banking, customs, tax and other subsystems. In addition, as of the beginning of 2015, the country mainly used the potential of a market economy, which to some extent intensified the economic activity of economic entities. However, the market itself was not and could not be the goal of socio-economic transformation. The market is a rather rigid institution of economic activity and requires the state to take action to carefully study the degree of economic activity's saturation with social aspects, to delineate the the economy's parameters appropriate for changing ownership of fixed assets, to examine the specifics of the national movement to civilizational standards. Such a scientific orientation in Western countries contributed to the formation of different models of social market economy, which still differ in the degree of state participation in ensuring sociality.

The indisputable facts are the special dynamism and incomparable with the Soviet period complexity of modern socio-economic processes. They give rise to the urgent need for innovative principles of social and technical-technological organization of society. As a result of this statement, there is a need to rethink the notions of "socio-economic development" and even revise the categorical foundations of this concept. The term "socio-economic development" is a complex phrase that contains three different words, namely "social", "economic" and "development". But their core is the term 'development', and the other two characterize the trends of its focus.

In the context of the processes that outline the category of "development", we can highlight its two permanent directions of movement to a qualitatively new state, namely social and economic. These aspects of social development are closely intertwined. Before distributing the created goods and satisfying the various needs, it is necessary to produce, and this is an axiom. However, this in no way denies the paramount importance of social development. The synthesis of social and economic development follows from their complementarity and the dual role of man in social production (as a factor of production and the purpose of production). In theoretical terms, economic development can be interpreted as a means, and social development - as a goal of development. In this expression, the social and economic aspects of development can be considered only from the standpoint of achieving the goal. Focusing on certain features of the social and economical development makes it possible to formulate its essence as economic relations between economic entities on the development of economic foundations to ensure a constant transition to better quality of life through the benefits of new milestones that promote synergistic

interaction of socialization and economization. In the context of globalization, it is possible to win the competition at all levels of economic activity only through the introduction of the results of innovation. Taking into consideration the importance of using innovation and investment potential to ensure sustainable socio-economic growth, it can be argued that the innovation and investment component of social progress is a targeted institution of state holistic management of continuous economic change and quality social transformations and thus ensures their dynamic structuring, socialization aspects of economic transformation on the basis of using existing but unused innovation and investment potential. Each country has its own socio-economic growth strategy, which can combine elements and characteristics of different approaches to accepted models. It is logical to qualify the management of socio-economic development as a process of forming sound management decisions based on changes in a certain range of factors and the implementation of effective management influences on their basis in order to achieve progressive social dynamics. For the formation of management decisions and ensuring effective management influences we need not just data on socio-economic development of the region in a wide range of issues, but only the part of the information, that is selected from its general array on certain criteria of suitability and content saturation, so that to be able to further develop its complex information load.

The general trends and signs of instability of the Ukrainian economy are well known. After all, the mere fact that the country's real GDP decreased by 40% between 1991 and 2016 indicates the accumulation of serious problems in national production. The latter are due to not only its slow growth, but also to the regular economic crises that have devastated national finances three times in the last 20 years. In 1996–2017, their losses were accompanied by a 15-fold depreciation of the national currency against the US dollar and an almost 13-fold increase in prices for consumer goods and services. Against this background, the lack of decent vacancies in the labor market causes a steady outflow of the most educated professionals outside the country. According to estimates of the Ministry of Social Protection of Ukraine, given in February 2017, the number of the Ukrainians employed abroad reached 5 million people, or about 27% of the total labor force of Ukraine. Finally, the country's steady dependence on loans from international financial institutions indicates deep problems not only in its financial sphere, but also in its approaches to determining its economic development. The annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the war in the east of the country, and human and financial losses have been, of course, the main challenges for Ukrainian society over the past three years. However, its dramatic consequences cannot explain the specifics of the national economy in previous decades. Moreover, its structural analysis shows that the crisis of 2014–2016 would have taken place without the military intervention of 2014. Another thing is that the latter has repeatedly deepened the decline in production and gone far beyond it, becoming a real tragedy nationwide.

Attempts to reform the domestic economy took place during the former Soviet Union period, when the depth of its social problems and associated financial imbalances became apparent. However, Ukraine began building its own economic complex from the moment of declaring independence in August 1991, after which the country plunged into a rapid flow of “radical structural reforms” for decades. To call them systemic would be an outright exaggeration, not to give such a label – nonsense. After all, on the one hand, the changes that have taken place in the national economy over the past 30 years have rather resembled a chaotic set of internally contradictory measures, which eventually provoked two Maidans. On the other hand, these changes were so profound that today almost nothing resembles the way and standards of living of the former Ukraine. Thus, it is now safe to speak of systemic changes that have radically transformed the national economy. However, the question whether they reach the level of reforms aimed at improving the welfare of society and the lives of citizens remains open. Because the fact that in 2016 Ukraine’s real GDP was 40% lower than in 1990 gives many reasons to think about what exactly happened in the country and what is happening in it now. After all, such statistics in all respects exceed the horrors of the Great Depression in the United States, which was recorded in the world textbooks as an example of the extraordinary crisis of our time. However, what is not controversial is the fact that during all this time the country has been moving towards building market relations. And Ukraine, frankly, has succeeded. But how well the obtained market economy meets the dream goal is another matter. There is currently no consensus on the causes of the actual differences between our reality and the former market ghosts. At the same time, almost everyone agrees that something was wrong. In this regard, some criticize the neoliberal slogans of national transformation. Others note that the slogans themselves were completely true, but they did not become principles of reform in Ukraine. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that over the past 30 years, changes have taken place in the ideology of the neoliberal reforms themselves. Therefore, today they are much broader than the 10 initial principles of the Washington Consensus, or their content, which J. Soros called “market fundamentalism”. This allows us to draw at least a few conclusions. First, the oversimplification of neoliberal “first-generation reforms” is now recognized not only by their critics but also by their developers. (Another thing is that it is hardly commented on publicly.) Accordingly, the correctness of the neoliberal advice of the 1990s, which was not only provided but sometimes imposed on transition economies from the outside, is no longer in question. As a result, arguments about the desecration of neoliberal principles in Ukraine are losing their former weight. Finally, the implementation of “second generation reforms” leaves open a window of discussion on their effectiveness. Moreover, the experience of Ukraine gives grounds to believe that they have inherited certain defects of their predecessor.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS:

1. How are states classified by administrative-territorial organization?
2. What administrative-territorial structure does modern Ukraine need?
3. What is a “welfare state”? Is Ukraine a welfare state?
4. What are the signs of the rule of law? Is Ukraine a state governed by the rule of law?
5. What is a “political regime”?
6. What types of political regimes are there in the modern world?
7. What type of political regime does Ukraine have?
8. What are the basic principles of democracy?
9. What concepts of democracies do you know?
10. What are the prospects for the development of democracy in Ukraine?
11. Define the concept of “political system of Ukraine”. What is its structure?
12. Identify the periods of formation and development of the political system of Ukraine.
13. Analyze the essence of democracy.
14. How can we classify the model of democracy that Ukraine is trying to introduce?
15. Describe the political structure of Ukrainian society.
16. Identify the problems of parliamentarism in modern Ukraine.
17. Describe the structure and powers of the Parliament of Ukraine.
18. Trace the genesis of the presidency institution in Ukraine.
19. Describe the procedure for the formation and resignation of the government in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine.
20. Describe the mechanism of checks and balances in the system of power of Ukraine.

TESTS

1. What was the name of President Yushchenko’s program, which provided for the implementation of the promises made on the Maidan?
 - a) “Ten steps towards people”;
 - b) “Stability and prosperity”;
 - c) The Five Year Plan;
 - d) “Government and people”.

2. What was the main reason for the split in the “orange” team?
a) Resignation of Yulia Tymoshenko;
b) Rising mass discontent;
c) Conflict between O. Zinchenko, P. Poroshenko, O. Tretyakov and M. Martynenko;
d) Rising inflation.

3. When was the Decree “On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and calling early elections for May 27, 2007” issued?

- a) on June 4, 2006;
- b) on April 5, 2007;
- c) on June 3, 2007;
- d) on April 2, 2007.

4. When did Ukraine become a member of the WTO?

- a) in 2007;
- b) in 2006;
- c) in 2009;
- d) in 2008.

5. What was the impetus for the beginning of Euromaidan?

- a) construction of the hotel on the Independence Square;
- b) Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe and the WTO;
- c) refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU;
- d) Kharkiv agreements with Russia on the Black Sea Fleet.

6. From February 22 to June 6, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada appointed the Acting President:

- a) Arseniy Yatseniuk;
- b) Arsen Avakov;
- c) Andriy Parubiy;
- d) Olexandr Turchynov.

7. The anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine was launched:

- a) on March 16, 2014;
- b) on April 14, 2014;
- c) on May 25, 2014;
- d) on June 7, 2014.

8. The term “Cyborgs” is associated with the following event of the Russian-Ukrainian war in eastern Ukraine:

- a) Shooting down a Malaysian passenger plane over the Donetsk region;

- b) Ilovaysk onslaught;
- c) Defense of Donetsk International Airport;
- d) Fights near Debaltsevo.

9. How has the Russian-Ukrainian war been called since 2018?

- a) Operation of the Ministry of Defense;
- b) Joint Forces Operation;
- c) special police operation;
- d) special Security Service operation.

10. What events are associated with the terms «anti-terrorist operation», and “temporarily occupied territories”?

- a) Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014;
- b) “gas” and “trade wars” with Russia;
- c) signing of the Kharkiv agreements on Sevastopol;
- d) Russia’s attempt to capture the island of Tuzla.

11. One of the tasks of education reform in accordance with the law of 2017 is:

- a) renewal of tuition fees for high school students (specialized education);
- b) transition to 10-year secondary education;
- c) introduction of 10-year secondary education in 2030;
- d) abolition of compulsory secondary education.

12. The President of Ukraine, under whose rule the Association Agreement with the EU was signed, was

- a) V. Zelensky;
- b) P. Poroshenko;
- c) V. Yushchenko;
- d) V. Yanukovich.

13. Which leadership of the largest Orthodox Church in Ukraine refused to take part in the unifying council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on December 15, 2018?

- a) Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church;
- b) Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate);
- c) Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

14. Read a passage from a historical source and complete the task.

“It was a protest not only against the demonstrative attempt to humiliate and subdue Ukrainian society - demonstratively not to sign the Association

Agreement with the EU. It was an explosion of protest against the savage cynicism and immorality of the then authorities in Ukraine”.

The passage is about:

- a) “Revolution of Dignity”;
- b) “Granite Revolution”;
- c) “Cultural revolution”;
- d) “Orange Revolution”.

EXAM QUESTIONS

1. Subject, tasks, methods and sources of studying the history of Ukrainian statehood. Scientific periodization of the history of Ukrainian statehood.
2. Primitive society and the first state formations on the territory of Ukraine.
3. Problems of origin and development of the Ukrainian people.
4. Slavic tribes on the territory of Ukraine: theories of origin, settlement, occupation.
5. Prerequisites for the formation and concept of the origin of the state of Kyivan Rus, their assessment in modern historiography.
6. Periodization of the political history of Kyivan Rus.
7. Socio-political system of Kyivan Rus (late ninth - early fourteenth century).
8. Socio-economic development of Kyivan Rus (late ninth - early fourteenth century).
9. The historical significance of the adoption of Christianity in Kyivan Rus.
10. Causes and consequences of feudal fragmentation of Kyivan Rus. Its significance in the historical destiny of the Ukrainian and other Slavic peoples.
11. Formation of the Galicia-Volhynian state, its political and socio-economic development.
12. Ukrainian lands as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland (middle XIV - first half of the XVI century).
13. Ukrainian lands as part of the Commonwealth (second half of the sixteenth - first half of the seventeenth century). The Union of Lublin of 1569 and the Union of Brest of 1596
14. Ukrainian Cossacks: causes and theories of origin, evolution and socio-ethnic composition.
15. Zaporizhzhya Sich: origin, military-administrative system, economy. The historical significance of the Zaporizhzhya Sich in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for state independence.
16. The struggle of the Cossacks against the Tatar-Turkish aggression (the XVI - first half of the XVII century.). Hetman Petro Sahaidachny.
17. Cossack-peasant uprisings late XVI - early XVII century.
18. Ukrainian national revolution of the seventeenth century: causes, drivers, purpose, nature, periodization and historical significance.
19. Pereyaslav Council of 1654. March articles and their evaluation in the historical literature.

20. B. Khmelnytsky's program to build a Ukrainian state based on the idea of Ukrainian unity. The main features of the Ukrainian Cossack state.

21. The struggle for the preservation of the Cossack state led by the hetmans of the Left and Right Bank of Ukraine in the Ruin period (60-80s of the XVII century).

22. Political and economic development of the Right Bank of Ukraine in the second half of the XVII – XVIII centuries

23. Features of the territorial and political system and economic development of the Left Bank of Ukraine in the second half of the XVII-XVIII centuries.

24. Ukraine's participation in the Great Northern War. Hetmanship of I. Mazepa.

25. Hetman P. Orlyk and the Constitution of 1710.

26. Stages of Ukraine's autonomy liquidation (XVIII century).

27. Zaporizhzhya Sich in the second half of the XVII – XVIII centuries and its final liquidation. Further fate of the Ukrainian Cossacks.

28. Haydamak and Opryshk movements in Ukraine.

29. Administrative-territorial system, political life and socio-economic development of the Ukrainian lands as part of the Austrian Empire late XVIII-XIX centuries.

30. Socio-political movements in the western lands of the second half of the XIX century: Muscophiles, populists, radicals.

31. Cyril and Methodius Society, its program and practical activities.

32. The Decembrist movement in Ukraine.

33. Socio-economic consequences and features of the agrarian reform of 1861 in Ukraine. Imperial bourgeois reforms of the 60-70s of the XIX century and their consequences.

34. Social movements of the second half of the XIX century: populist, liberal, social-democratic, national.

35. The emergence of the first political parties in Ukraine (late nineteenth - early twentieth century.).

36. National and agrarian issues in the revolution of 1905-1907.

37. Ukrainian lands during the First World War.

38. Stolypin's agrarian reform and its implementation in Ukraine.

39. Ukrainian Central Rada: social base, structure and program tasks. Domestic and foreign policy.

40. Problems of state formation in the Central Rada's Universals.

41. Ukrainian state of Hetman P. Skoropadsky: internal and external politics, the causes of the fall.

42. Directory of the UPR: composition, social base, domestic and foreign policy, the causes of the fall.

43. State-building processes in Western Ukraine. Act of unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic on January 22, 1919

44. Historical significance, causes of defeat and lessons of the national-democratic revolution in Ukraine (1917–1921).
45. The process of formation and establishment of Soviet power in the Dnieper Ukraine (1917-1921).
46. The policy of “military communism” and its implementation in the UkrSSR (March 1919 - January 1921). The famine of 1921–1923
47. Development of the national economy of Ukraine on the basis of the NEP. (NEP, its essence and implementation in Ukraine).
48. Ukraine and the creation of the USSR (Union Treaty of December 30, 1922).
49. Features of industrialization in Ukraine, its socio-economic consequences.
50. Economic essence and purpose of continuous collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine.
51. Socio-economic and political consequences of forced collectivization in Ukraine. The Holodomor of 1932–1933
52. The policy of Ukrainization (20-30s of the twentieth century), its consequences.
53. Stalin’s repressions in Ukraine and their disastrous consequences for Ukraine.
54. The situation of western Ukrainian lands in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (20-30s of the twentieth century).
55. Accession of Western Ukrainian lands to the UkrSSR: positive and negative consequences.
56. The Ukrainian question in international politics on the eve and at the beginning of World War II.
57. Carpathian Ukraine (1938–1939).
58. Fascist occupation regime in Ukraine. Forms of resistance movement.
59. The contribution of the Ukrainian people to the struggle against Hitler’s troops in 1941-1945 and the consequences of World War II for Ukraine.
60. Features of the Ukraine’s economy reconstruction of in the postwar period. “Sovietization” of the western Ukrainian regions.
61. Reforms of the 50-60s of the twentieth century and their implementation in Ukraine.
62. The growth of crisis phenomena in the socio-economic and political life of Ukraine in the 70-80s of the twentieth century.
63. Dissident movement in Ukraine (60-80s of the twentieth century).
64. Complexity and contradictions of perestroika processes in Ukraine (1985–1991).
65. Proclamation of sovereignty and state independence of Ukraine: preconditions, legislative base.
66. Constitutional process and adoption of the Basic Law of Ukraine of 1996.

67. Reforming the political system and building civil society in independent Ukraine.

68. Socio-economic transformations in independent Ukraine.

69. The essence and stages of the agrarian reform in modern Ukraine.

70. History of national and state symbols of independent Ukraine.

71. Directions and priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.

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