



НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ БІОРЕСУРСІВ І ПРИРОДОКОРИСТУВАННЯ УКРАЇНИ

С. Б. Христюк

МЕТОДИЧНІ РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ ДЛЯ ДОМАШНЬОГО ЧИТАННЯ “READ AND SPEAK” (PART II)

з дисципліни «Іноземна мова (англійська)»

для студентів ОС «Бакалавр»

спеціальності 291

«Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії»



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Кафедра англійської філології

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**Методичні рекомендації для домашнього читання
з дисципліни «Іноземна мова (англійська)»
для студентів ОС «Бакалавр»
спеціальності 291
«Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії»**

Методичні рекомендації призначені для покращення навиків читання, розуміння текстів соціально-політичного спрямування, монологічного та діалогічного мовлення на запропоновані теми студентів спеціальності «Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії» 2 року навчання.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	5
Lesson 1. The impact of globalization and the interconnectedness with the comprehensive economic and trade agreement between Canada and the European Union.....	7
Lesson 2. The fourth industrial revolution: shaping a new era.....	19
Lesson 3. The India-China confrontation: a view from seawards.....	29
Lesson 4. US electorate shows distrust of the realities of foreign policy	47
Lesson 5. Why the COVID-19 response needs International Relations.....	58
Lesson 6. Children ‘born of war’: a role for fathers?.....	75
Lesson 7. The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump.....	86
Lesson 8. Transforming practices of diplomacy: the European external action service and digital disinformation.....	99
Lesson 9. Political leadership and gendered multilevel games in foreign policy.....	111
Lesson 10. Why protests matter: the battle between authoritarianism and democracy, a war we must win	122
Lesson 11. The shifting sands of global order.....	135
Lesson 12. The failed divorce of Serbia’s government and organized crime...	148

PREFACE

English communication skills are important in both social and political areas. Lack of communication skills creates various problems leaving a bad impression on superiors and colleagues. From the above standpoint, curricular recommendations for home reading have a significant educational and methodological value and grant you an excellent chance to review and practice vocabulary, develop the key diplomatic and political terminology, improve your communication skills in both spoken and written contexts and consider social and political fundamentals in a new way.

Curricular recommendations offer a range of materials that include components specifically designed to meet the needs of students who need to either learn their specialty through English, or take an exam in English in order to start their career. The information data can be used individually or in a variety of combinations.

These curricular recommendations are intended for students majoring in “International Relations, Public Communications and Regional Studios” of Bachelor’s degree for reading and conversational skills development. Professional orientation in vocabulary and the problems presented for discussion and oral comprehensive communication correlate with modern sentence-structure.

The curricular recommendations’ structure and content stimulate the creative and initiative development from both – the foreign learner of English and the teacher of English. Structurally the content of each unit is supplemented and developed by the content of the exercises. Technologically, exercises are aimed at creating the meaning perception through the notional field; the recommendations given to exercises do not limit the teacher’s initiatives in methods while working with information data.

We hope the learners of English will find these recommendations beneficial and truly up-to-date. Everybody studying it will become more fluent and confident in language practices and increase career prospects.

LESSON 1. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Globalization has plenty of significant effects and implications in the society and business practice, but the positive effect of globalization can't be allowed to keep under wraps the negative repercussions in the process of trade liberalization, including the open issue of the criteria based on which the analyzes are mad that exclude the side effects in the whole process. The wide number of involved countries as contracting parties in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada provides an opportunity for contrastive consequences due to the different national legal systems and the establishment of new challenges in the international trade policy.

CETA as an agreement that is promoting the stimulation of the economic activity and social development, helping the release of customs taxes, and supporting the sustainable development in the countries is one of the most exceptional trade agreements that is ever concluded, having every intention of CETA's scope. There is no doubt that CETA's intention to provide regulation including a variety of fields is comprehensive, but as a primarily economic agreement – the scope is a stimulus to reverse the real impact on the quality of employment provided in CETA towards trade liberalization and labor mobility. Considering the previous mention, arrangement the trade negotiations in the same agreement as the employment and labor standards exemplifies a tricky approach. Trade liberalization has made successful the free movement of people, capital, and goods, but that does not change the possibility that free trade creates unemployment.

Also, when analyzing CETA, the contracting parties didn't inform the civil society about the negotiation process and didn't consult with the business societies, which in this case made the absence of public debates due to the

protections of the labor rights and labor standards very questionable are de facto the workers under CETA provisions have economic and social benefits versus the corporations in free-market conditions. Moreover, the previous mention also made the implementation process ambiguous given the positive role of CETA in reducing global unemployment and the strength of workers' rights protection and the upholding of high labor standards.

The unhappiness of many working people with their deteriorating economic situations, and the feeling that they have been harmed rather than benefitted from globalization, is the driving force. All are aware that globalization has created – winners and losers.

Despite the appreciable amount of benefits, that globalization delivered in the business society, in particular within the sustainable development of the countries while engaging the smooth access to different goods and services, the implications in the practice have shown that the process of globalization invoked some inevitable challenges. For instance, diversity in labor standards and politics is one of the numerous more.

The question that this raises is, given the challenge of globalization of the world markets and the liberalization of domestic markets, can the same degree of social protection still be provided as before? On the other hand, must labor regulation be changed to stimulate competitiveness and create jobs? These questions raise the issue of the economic/social divide. The work of the WTO and that of the ILO seem to converge at the crossroads of economic development and social equity. The significance of international labor law institutions on the economic/social divide will no doubt be given attention anytime the issue of core labor standards is raised at the international level.

Globalization changed the world and had an influence on the labor law and labor standards along with the way of their incorporation in the trade agreements, which also composed the flexibility for a discussion dealing with the subject of the labor chapter, labor issue, and labor standards in a

comprehensive economic trade agreement as CETA. It is indisputable that the process of globalization produced the expansion of new technology and develops the interconnection between the countries among themselves, the access to new cultures and all the distinctive things that culture brings with itself like the specific food or distinctive music could not be imagined differently. Successively, with the acknowledgment of globalization, we have a high-level competition, in particular, that is agreeable to the ordinary citizens which are giving them indefinitely large choices that they didn't have previously, accompanying the new choices which subsequently lay the foundations of new customers on a global level.

It's oversimplified the perception for indicating the importance of globalization's weaknesses, but who encompassed globalization on the negotiation stage and who arranged the intermixture of the trade issues and labor issues on that negotiation stage? Globalization is a process that has a great number of beneficial sides in the business practice, additionally is understandable that there are widespread challenges that globalization is persuading. Globalization brought into existence a world that is in such a manner connected evermore while at the same time some processes are more distant than ever since many of the distinctive fragments in the global culture began to have the appearance of failing to keep sight of their diversity. Apart from everything else, what is the link between globalization, trade, and labor?

There are, however, some common findings: globalization can lead to considerable job turnover and result in workers losing their jobs and changing sectors, especially in the short term. Those who lose their jobs require support to recover. There also seems to be the consensus that globalization affects certain groups – such as low-skilled workers – more than others.

According to the previous mention, the effects in consideration of trade liberalization are implicated on the low-skilled workers who are struggling on the labor market while being exploited from one point of view and losing their

position on the labor market from another perspective. That is an absolute manifestation, which indicates that globalization and trade liberalization i.e. free trade straightforward does not mean by default improved, sustainable but the most crucial of all – fair trade!

Core labor standards are also human rights and to that, extent would be covered by the exceptions on public morals. In other circumstances, other labor standards are unlikely to be covered. However, once again, the fact that CETA includes obligations concerning labor standards that go beyond core labor standards is significant. As mentioned, CETA requires the parties to promote the objectives in the ILO Decent Work Agenda and the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and that could be taken as an indication that the parties agree that these values are part of their respective public morals. Beyond this however, the extent to which labor standards are seen as a matter of common values, and how much a matter of each party's comparative advantage, remains to be determined.

Understanding the comprehensive approach from the CETA's contracting parties towards several different fields triggering Chapter 23: Trade and Labour from the Agreement, it's not enough the only incorporation and providing of the labor standards to be only in that way in a trade agreement which has a focus on the economy. The assurance that the labor standards will be respected, remains high and their excellent implementation in the business practice will be provided needs to be more specific. CETA is the most ambitious treaty signed by the EU to date, encompassing as it does a broad spectrum of measures relating to entry barriers to product markets, investment and public sector procurement and purchases usually not open to foreign companies, along with provisions on other aspects relating to intellectual property rights, labor mobility, etc. More specifically, concerning lifting customs duties, the CETA eliminates 99% of tariffs on trade in industrial products between the EU and Canada as from the treaty's entry into force.

The international trade agreements also have their function in managing the challenges that globalization produces on the negotiation platform for exemplification the certain ones making allowances for the connection with the labor, labor standards and the workers. Those challenges refer to handling the workers' immigration, the mechanism of recruiting the foreign workers, the process of purchasing the job across the border while having all the benefits and privileges of being a worker with respected labor standards on a high level, forbidding the exploitation of the workers with strengthening the tax regulation and also the impact of the transition of the workers across the borders on the domestic job loss.

Transparency in international negotiations is also important for broader political reasons: "Already at an early stage, transparency is important to address public reluctance, suspicion and engage with any opposition expressed regarding a particular trade deal".

CETA is a very important statement for the international community at present. It affirms a commitment to rules-based trade, to open economies, and importantly to multilateralism. CETA not only lowers actual barriers to market access, but also improves on both Canada's and the EU's previous binding commitments under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) rules, both in regards to tariffs and to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that control market access to services, investment, and government procurement. These binding commitments create greater certainty of market access for the parties to the agreement, in addition to the improved market access on an applied basis.

Due to the significance of globalization within every sphere, the approaches in the view of the business society are progressing towards, but in the accomplishment processes, some standards in the labor law are not unquestionably protected and are not undeniably on the appropriate trajectory as they should be. Nevertheless, with the synthesis between the trade and the labor, the de facto results in the business practice it is imperative to be in the favor of

the workers, not otherwise. The affiliation between globalization and CETA is established in the very beginning of Chapter 23 of CETA, named “Trade and Labour” where it is stated that the Parties recognize the value of international cooperation and agreements on labor affairs as a response to the international community to economic, employment and social challenges and opportunities resulting from globalization. They recognize the contribution that international trade could make to full and productive employment and decent work for all and commit to consulting and cooperating as appropriate on trade-related labor and employment issues of mutual interest. Taking into consideration that globalization has an essential impact on why a labor issue is a topic of discussion in a trade agreement like CETA, of the highest importance.

In the previously stated CETA Chapter, in the Multilateral labor standards and agreements it is stated that according to subparagraph 2(a), each Party shall ensure that its labor law and practices embody and provide protection for working conditions that respect the health and safety of workers, including by formulating policies that promote basic principles aimed at preventing accidents and injuries that arise out of or in the course of work, and that are aimed at developing a preventative safety and health culture where the principle of prevention is accorded the highest priority. When preparing and implementing measures aimed at health protection and safety at work, each Party shall take into account existing relevant scientific and technical information and related international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if the measures may affect trade or investment between the Parties. The Parties acknowledge that in case of existing or potential hazards or conditions that could reasonably be expected to cause injury or illness to a person, a Party shall not use the lack of full scientific certainty as a reason to postpone cost-effective protective measures.

In the legal language, there is a different interpretation to what certainly the word “shall” implies, but even if in case the interpretation of the word

“shall” refers to a legal obligation which implementation is mandatory, the prescribed repercussions must be provided, which will be activated at the moment when someone from the contracting parties is acting contradictorily in comparison with the provisions in CETA.

In this case, if the parties shall ensure the labor law and shall provide protection for working, what is the repercussion if the contracting parties are not acting upon that? On the other hand, what are the consequences if the parties are not using only relevant scientific and technical information and related international standards, guidelines, or recommendations, if the measures may affect trade or investment between the Parties when there is nothing provided on the contrary? Each Party reaffirms its commitment to effectively implement in its law and practices in its whole territory the fundamental ILO Conventions that Canada and the Member States of the European Union have ratified respectively. The Parties shall make continued and sustained efforts to ratify the fundamental ILO Conventions if they have not yet done so. The Parties shall exchange information on their respective situations and advances regarding the ratification of the fundamental as well as priority and other ILO Conventions that are classified as up to date by the ILO.

The scope of interest in this part is about the efforts that the parties will make to ratify the fundamental ILO Conventions if they have not yet done, also with no consequences and repercussions for acting neutral or on the contrary, creates the set of circumstances for launching the dilemma are the rights of the worker and the labor standards remaining uphold high and respected in a trade deal as CETA. In addition to its obligations under Article 27.1, each Party shall encourage public debate with and among non-state actors as regards the development and definition of policies that may lead to the adoption of labor law and standards by its public authorities.

Considering the point that CETA influences the public rights and public services, the public had the right to be involved in the process of negotiations,

but there was no public debate due those topics, even a slice of encouragement about the development of policies that may lead to the adoption of the highest labor law and standards.

The Parties shall consult to reach an agreement on the composition of the Panel of Experts within 10 working days of the receipt by the responding party of the request for the establishment of a Panel of Experts. Due attention shall be paid to ensuring that proposed panelists meet the requirements set out in paragraph 7 and have the expertise appropriate to the particular matter.

Even if the word “shall” in this case is interpreted as a mandatory “must”, how is secured that the proposed panelists will meet the requirements set out in paragraph 7 and have the expertise appropriate to the particular matter? What are the repercussions if there is an elected member who doesn’t have the appropriate expertise?

If the final report of the Panel of Experts determines that a Party has not conformed with its obligations under this Chapter, the Parties shall engage in discussions and shall endeavor, within three months of the delivery of the final report, to identify appropriate measures or, if appropriate, to decide upon a mutually satisfactory action plan. In these discussions, the Parties shall take into account the final report. The responding Party shall inform on time its labor or sustainable development advisory groups and the requesting Party of its decision on any actions or measures to be implemented. Furthermore, the requesting Party shall inform on time its labor or sustainable development advisory groups and the responding Party of any other action or measure it may decide to take, as a follow-up to the final report, to encourage the resolution of the matter in a manner consistent with this Agreement. The Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development shall monitor the follow-up to the final report and the recommendations of the Panel of Experts. The labor or sustainable development advisory groups of the Parties and the Civil Society Forum may submit

observations to the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development in this regard.

If some party from the agreement has not complied with its obligations under this Chapter, how is going to be convictable that will fulfill its obligation, what are the consequences of that party from the agreement in case it doesn't conform to the previously mention obligations?

Over the last two decades, the number of trade agreements with labor provisions has risen considerably. Typically, such provisions establish minimum standards of working conditions and labor rights and may also include a framework for cooperation, monitoring, and conflict resolution in differing forms. While there are clear similarities between the labor provisions used in different trade agreements, their content can vary considerably as a result of different approaches and country contexts. Their increasing use in combination with the spread of different approaches makes it important to explore the effectiveness of such labor provisions.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Globalization, provisions, decade, approach, to explore the effectiveness, a framework for cooperation, monitoring, and conflict resolution, to vary considerably, obligations, to be convictable, consequences, the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, the final report and the recommendations, advisory groups, to monitor the follow-up, consistent with, to submit observations, to identify appropriate measures, to meet the requirements, to encourage the resolution, the establishment of a Panel of Experts, to endeavor, mandatory, repercussions, the appropriate expertise, the highest labor law and standards, to be involved in the process of negotiations, to encourage public debate with and among non-state actors, public authorities, related international standards, guidelines, or recommendations, to ratify the fundamental ILO

Conventions, the international community, a subparagraph, the previously stated CETA Chapter, aimed at developing a preventative safety and health culture, binding commitments, government procurement, transparency, widespread challenges, strengthening the tax regulation, encompassing, implementing measures aimed at, the contracting parties, acting contradictorily, the legal language, to promote basic principles aimed at, investment and public sector procurement, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the most ambitious treaty signed by the EU, inevitable challenges, the negotiation stage, the upholding of high labor standards, straightforward, to keep sight of their diversity, the transition of the workers across the borders, concerning lifting customs duties, to address public reluctance, suspicion and engage with any opposition, potential hazards, to recognize the contribution, undeniably on the appropriate trajectory, to postpone cost-effective protective measures, in regards to tariffs and to non-tariff barriers, an exemplification, the acknowledgment of globalization, engaging the smooth access to different goods and services, the process of trade liberalization, the ILO Decent Work Agenda, multilateralism, mutual interest, taking into consideration, the appreciable amount of benefits, to keep under wraps the negative repercussions, towards several different fields triggering Chapter 23, versus, the set of circumstances for launching the dilemma, to cause injury or illness to a person, binding commitments, rules-based trade, implicated on the low-skilled workers, deteriorating economic situations.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. The Parties shall exchange information on their _____ situations and advances _____ the ratification of the fundamental as well as _____ and other ILO Conventions that are _____ as up to date by the ILO.

2. Each Party reaffirms its _____ to effectively _____ in its law and practices in its whole territory the _____ ILO Conventions that Canada and the Member _____ of the European Union have _____ respectively.
3. When preparing and _____ measures aimed at health protection and safety at work, each Party shall take into _____ existing relevant scientific and technical information and related international standards, _____ or recommendations, if the measures may affect trade or _____ between the Parties.
4. These _____ commitments create greater _____ of market access for the parties to the agreement, in _____ to the improved market access on an _____ basis.
5. The international trade agreements also have their function in managing the _____ that globalization produces on the _____ platform for exemplification the certain ones making _____ for the connection with the labor, labor _____ and the workers.
6. As mentioned, CETA requires the parties to promote the objectives in the ILO Decent Work Agenda and the 2008 ILO _____ on Social Justice for a _____ Globalization, and that could be taken as an _____ that the parties agree that these values are part of their _____ public morals.
7. The Committee on Trade and _____ Development shall monitor the _____ to the final report and the recommendations of the _____ of Experts.
8. Taking into consideration that _____ has an _____ impact on why a labor issue is a topic of discussion in a _____ agreement like CETA, of the highest importance.
9. The wide number of involved countries as _____ parties in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada provides an opportunity for contrastive _____ due to the different national _____ systems and the _____ of new challenges in the international trade policy.

10. _____, with the synthesis between the trade and the labor, the _____ results in the business practice it is _____ to be in the favor of the workers, not _____.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

International, mutually, an opposition, to emphasize, repercussions, to postpone, guidelines, globalization, to decrease, sustainable.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. The Parties shall make continued and sustained efforts to ratify the fundamental ILO Conventions if they have not yet done so.
2. They recognize the contribution that international trade could make to full and productive employment and decent work for all and commit to consulting and cooperating as appropriate on trade-related labor and employment issues of mutual interest.
3. The affiliation between globalization and CETA is established in the very beginning of Chapter 23 of CETA, named “Trade and Labour” where it is stated that the Parties recognize the value of international cooperation and agreements on labor affairs as a response to the international community to economic, employment and social challenges and opportunities resulting from globalization.
4. CETA is the most ambitious treaty signed by the EU to date, encompassing as it does a broad spectrum of measures relating to entry barriers to product markets, investment and public sector procurement and purchases usually not open to foreign companies, along with provisions on other aspects relating to intellectual property rights, labor mobility, etc.

5. Globalization has plenty of significant effects and implications in the society and business practice, but the positive effect of globalization can't be allowed to keep under wraps the negative repercussions in the process of trade liberalization.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 2. THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: SHAPING A NEW ERA

In January 2016, World Economic Forum Founder and Executive Chairman, Klaus Schwab, published a book titled The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Since then, the term “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (4IR) has been used to frame and analyze the impact of emerging technologies on nearly the entire gamut of human development in the early 21st century, from evolving social norms and national political attitudes to economic development and international relations.

The concept of the Fourth Industrial Revolution affirms that technological change is a driver of transformation relevant to all industries and parts of society. Furthermore, it highlights the idea that, at certain stages in history, sets of technologies emerge and combine in ways that have impacts far beyond incremental increases in efficiency. Industrial revolutions are revolutions in the systems that surround us, step changes in the complex interplay between humans and technology, and transformations that result in new ways of perceiving, acting, and being.

The idea of 4IR is often taken to be a synonym of “Industry 4.0,” an initiative that emerged in Germany between 2011 and 2015, focusing on the application of digital technologies to manufacturing. These two terms are not unrelated, but they describe different things. Industry 4.0 is an important component within the larger framing of 4IR with its narrower, vital focus on the relationship between digitization, organizational transformation, and productivity enhancement in manufacturing and production systems.

Fundamentally, 4IR represents a series of significant shifts in the way that economic, political, and social value is being created, exchanged, and distributed. These shifts in values are intimately related to the emergence of new technologies that span the digital, physical, and biological worlds, and they are most powerful when they combine and reinforce one another. In the contemporary technological culture that is spreading across the globe, 4IR represents what Sheila Jasanoff would term a “sociotechnological imaginary.” The concept focuses attention on the present by invoking society’s experiences of the past and its visions of potential futures. By drawing on language linked to both economic history and political change, 4IR highlights the importance of ongoing and prospective changes in markets, information flows, employment trends, environmental outcomes, and shifts in the balance of global power.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution versus the Digital Revolution

The ordinal prefix “fourth” is important because this revolution is intended to drive strategic dialogue beyond the digital revolution, which has been described by others as a transition from an industrial to an information age, or more clearly identified as the Third Industrial Revolution predicated upon digital information technologies. The Fourth Industrial Revolution builds upon the rapid exchange of information made possible by the data-centric foundations of the Third Industrial Revolution’s digital technologies, which in turn relied on the electricity and telecommunication systems at the heart of the Second Industrial Revolution.

The layering of dependencies matters because it shows that 4IR is best suited to examining technologies and systems that take the digital world for granted. Today, the combination of powerful machine-learning algorithms, low-cost sensors, and advanced actuators are allowing technologies to be seamlessly embedded into our physical environment. Furthermore, when combined with advanced imaging, signal processing, and gene-editing approaches, they have the potential to influence our physiological condition and cognitive faculties. Digital technologies are part of the fabric of daily life and, as they give rise to a new layer of physical and biological technologies, it is paramount to consider the ways that newer technologies emerging atop them are extending capabilities beyond the immediate functionality of being able to transmit, store, and process exponentially greater amounts of data.

This is not to say that 4IR is an entirely “post-digital” revolution. Instead, it is perhaps better conceptualized as an “epi-digital” revolution where the technologies we see driving change are forming a fertile layer of innovation resting upon digital foundations. These technologies, robotics, advanced materials, genetic modifications, the Internet of Things, drones, neuroethologies, autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, and machine vision, are becoming more integrated into our physical, social, and political spaces, altering behaviors, relationships, and meaning. The outcomes of ongoing research, development, and commercialization – and the adoption of emerging technologies are relevant far beyond the products that make our lives easier – reflect a fundamental set of shifts in human identity and a restructuring of the ways in which we experience the world.

A Very Brief History of Industrial Revolutions

Industrial revolutions are more than simply eras wherein new technologies are developed and introduced. Rather, they are times of technological change that have a particular set of characteristics that are connected to, and contemporaneous with, broader social transformation. They lead to changes that

go beyond discreet technological capabilities and, instead, shift entire systems of power.

The First Industrial Revolution, which first emerged in the United Kingdom in the 18th century, brought with it both steam power and factory politics, as women were pushed out of manufacturing roles in favor of a male-dominated workplace culture. The combination of steam power and mechanized production created a step change in output. This dynamic increase in capacity and productivity led to urbanization, the growth of regional and global market economies, the relevance of democratic governments, and a rising middle class in the western hemisphere. It inspired scientific and technical pursuits and the revision of academic fields. It brought new forms of literature and, as state-funded science was not the norm, stimulated entrepreneurial endeavors to spur further breakthroughs and gain new insights into emerging disciplines.

The Second industrial Revolution, which Vaclav Smil has persuasively dated between 1867 and 1914, is a subsequent wave of systems change that coalesced around the modern belief that science and technology are the way forward to a better life and that progress is in many ways a destiny for humanity. Entrepreneurs applied science to the ends of production, and the era saw a boon of products that were themselves the direct products of science and engineering. The revolution brought a step change in standardization, technical complexity, and precision in manufacturing, as well as large-scale technological infrastructure such as electricity grids and new forms of public transportation based on the internal combustion engine. Alongside innovations such as the steamship, the telephone, the gas turbine, artificial fertilizer, and mass production, a much more mobile and cognizant international public was developing a desire for goods, travel, and perhaps most importantly for the next industrial revolution, information.

The Third Industrial Revolution, which began in earnest following the Second World War, brought a step change in information theory and the power

of data. It bloomed alongside the discovery of the double helix, the space race, and the development of nuclear power. It shaped a post-war world that needed new economic structures and that had shifting conceptions of the human place in the cosmos, the natural world, and the political order. It also connected the planet's societies through infrastructure and applications, creating new flows of information sharing that continue to shape values, knowledge, and culture. Governments and businesses recognized the power of computers for performing complex calculations and, eventually, for general-purpose use. Rapid progress toward increasing computational power led to a more interconnected and complex world in many ways and is still driving change across sectors and regions at the beginning of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, just as the continuing spread of electricity access is still bringing the benefits of the Second industrial Revolution to communities around the world.

Like the industrial revolutions before it, the Fourth Industrial Revolution brings incredible opportunities for individuals, industries, and nations. Artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and the potential of quantum computing promise the better optimization of systems. Distributed ledger technologies – for instance, blockchain – are demonstrating utility far beyond the emergence of cryptocurrencies, such as the provision of secure, digital identification, managing fraud and externalities in value chains, and creating greater transparency in government procurement. Neurotechnologies are advancing quickly and may soon augment human cognitive and physical capabilities in ways that were pure science fiction only a decade ago, while faster and more durable approaches to multidimensional printing will bring personalized, unique, and essential objects and structures into daily life.

Deploying the Fourth Industrial Revolution in International Relations

Both the term and the concept of 4IR are not especially academic in nature. Historians and cultural anthropologists will have the ultimate responsibility for establishing and supporting frameworks for how we regard

history and societal development. The phrase and concept do, however, co-opt the loose history presented above into a cohesive and practically employable mental model and umbrella concept that contextualizes and posits that the current set of transformations have similar attributes to past industrial revolutions.

The power of language to name phenomena is to make them comprehensible, and by doing so, to catalyze action. The concept of 4IR is meant to help individuals and organizations make sense of it at a time when advances in computing power, biotechnologies, artificial intelligence, renewable energies, additive manufacturing, and many other emerging technologies threaten to overwhelm us with complexity. From autonomous vehicles to biologically engineered humans, the new era will bring technical and ethical challenges to sectors, stakeholder groups, and social norms.

Therefore, the important work with regard to 4IR is not around defining it further, but rather understanding and shaping its impact. In so doing, four principles can be brought to bear on discussions that link emerging technologies to international relations:

The first is to focus on systems, rather than technologies. While artificial intelligence and blockchain remain the topics du jour, the important discussion is how to govern these technologies as part of broader systems, not as individual capabilities. This requires both a level of “minimum viable understanding” of complex, fast-moving topics as well as a willingness to examine the high-level social and political impacts of future systems.

The second is to focus on ensuring that emerging technologies truly empower, rather than direct, citizens. Business models built around the manipulation of behavior at scale are, as Jaron Lanier has pointed out, intrinsically at odds with individual values of liberty and concepts of national sovereignty.

The third is to act collectively by design, not by default. We are still at the beginning of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which means that the norms, standards, infrastructure, regulations, and business models that will define the future are still emerging. Such critical decisions about the future of our economies, political systems, and societies must be deliberated and shared by a wide range of responsible stakeholders, including governments, industries, and interest groups.

The fourth is to think of values and ethics as an important feature, not as a nuisance, of technological systems. Technologies are not, and never have been, mere tools. There is no such thing as a bias-free system, and technologies influence through the biases they encode, both implicitly and explicitly. They embody the values of their designers and both reflect and constrain the desires of their users. The ethics of technology must be considered at all stages of its development and implementation. Doing so should be seen as practical, accessible, and essential to creating the technological future we want.

These four principles are deliberately normative. The concept of 4IR is not – and should not be – just an attempt to describe the past, present, or future. It is a tool to think deeply about the dynamics, values, stakeholders, and technologies of a world that is changing rapidly, and drive collective action within and across nation states in a way that results in a more inclusive, fair, and prosperous future.

As the Fourth Industrial Revolution builds on top of the third, and new technologies emerge, taking advantage of the global digital infrastructure to scale, there will be myriad new ways to realize our visions of the future. The digital world is becoming an invisible fabric – taken for granted – and the disruptive attributes of a new world, dependent on cyber-physical systems, will require new ways of thinking about technologies, thinking about ourselves, and thinking about how we govern collaboratively, wisely, and with the flourishing of humankind in mind.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

World Economic Forum Founder and Executive Chairman, emerging technologies, taking advantage of the global digital infrastructure to scale, minimum viable understanding, individual capabilities, a wide range of responsible stakeholders, both implicitly and explicitly, deliberated and shared, to examine the high-level social and political impacts of future systems, to overwhelm us with complexity, performing complex calculations, similar attributes, to augment human cognitive and physical capabilities, durable approaches to multidimensional printing, the ultimate responsibility for establishing and supporting frameworks, the discovery of the double helix, the space race, and the development of nuclear power, to reflect a fundamental set of shifts in human identity, robotics, advanced materials, genetic modifications, the Internet of Things, drones, neuroethologies, autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, and machine vision, intimately related to, to span the digital, physical, and biological worlds, an entirely “post-digital” revolution, to be seamlessly embedded into our physical environment, furthermore, a boon of products, artificial intelligence and blockchain, advances in computing power, biotechnologies, artificial intelligence, renewable energies, additive manufacturing, to govern these technologies as part of broader systems, pure science fiction, creating greater transparency in government procurement, to bring personalized, unique, and essential objects and structures into daily life, a cohesive and practically employable mental model, electricity grids, new forms of public transportation based on the internal combustion engine, the steamship, the telephone, the gas turbine, artificial fertilizer, and mass production, invoking society’s experiences of the past and its visions of potential futures, a driver of transformation relevant to all industries, a destiny for humanity, entrepreneurs, applied science, cognizant international public, a bias-free system, a willingness

to examine, practical, accessible, and essential to creating the technological future, fast-moving, collaboratively, wisely, the manipulation of behavior, a nuisance, from autonomous vehicles to biologically engineered humans, especially academic in nature, state-funded science, a particular set of characteristics, forming a fertile layer of innovation resting upon digital foundations.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. It is a tool to think deeply about the dynamics, values, stakeholders, and technologies of a world that is changing rapidly, and _____ collective action within and across nation states in a way that results in a more _____, fair, and prosperous future.
2. While artificial intelligence and blockchain remain the topics _____, the important discussion is how to govern these technologies as part of _____ systems, not as individual capabilities.
3. The phrase and concept do, however, _____ the loose history presented above into a _____ and practically employable mental model and _____ concept that contextualizes and _____ that the current set of transformations have similar attributes _____ to past industrial revolutions.
4. Governments and businesses _____ the power of computers for performing complex calculations and, eventually, for _____ use.
5. The revolution brought a step change in _____, technical complexity, and _____ in manufacturing, as well as large-scale technological _____ such as electricity grids and new forms of public transportation based on the internal _____ engine.
6. It brought new forms of literature and, as state-funded science was not the norm, stimulated _____ endeavors to spur further _____ and gain new _____ into emerging disciplines.

7. This is not to say that 4IR is an entirely “post-digital” revolution. Instead, it is perhaps better conceptualized as an “_____” revolution where the technologies we see driving change are forming a fertile _____ of innovation resting upon _____ foundations.
8. Furthermore, it highlights the idea that, at certain stages in history, sets of technologies emerge and _____ in ways that have impacts far beyond _____ increases in _____.
9. The _____ of ongoing research, development, and _____ – and the adoption of emerging technologies are _____ far beyond the products that make our lives easier – reflect a fundamental set of _____ in human identity and a _____ of the ways in which we experience the world.
10. By drawing on language linked to both economic history and political change, 4IR _____ the importance of _____ and prospective changes in markets, information flows, employment _____, environmental outcomes, and shifts in the balance of _____ power.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To create, ongoing, advantage, artificial, outcome, capabilities, to emerge, flourishing, a formal, accessible, to govern, to constrain, intrinsically, national.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. By drawing on language linked to both economic history and political change, 4IR highlights the importance of ongoing and prospective changes in markets, information flows, employment trends, environmental outcomes, and shifts in the balance of global power.

2. Today, the combination of powerful machine-learning algorithms, low-cost sensors, and advanced actuators are allowing technologies to be seamlessly embedded into our physical environment.
3. Governments and businesses recognized the power of computers for performing complex calculations and, eventually, for general-purpose use.
4. Historians and cultural anthropologists will have the ultimate responsibility for establishing and supporting frameworks for how we regard history and societal development.
5. The ethics of technology must be considered at all stages of its development and implementation.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 3. THE INDIA-CHINA CONFRONTATION: A VIEW FROM SEAWARDS

The night of 15 June 2020 saw unusual military activity on the Aksai Chin plateau of India's Ladakh region that abuts both Tibet and Xinjiang. Troops of the Indian Army and China's Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) had been confronting each other, for over a month, along a notional 'line of actual control' (LAC), supposed to mark the farthest advance of the PLA during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The prolonged face-off, eventually, led to an ugly brawl between troops, resulting in 20 Indian dead, including a Colonel, and an unknown number of Chinese casualties. Although no firearms were used, this clash was the first instance, since 1975, of fatalities occurring on the Sino-Indian border. Both sides blamed the other and tensions are likely to persist.

A reference to this incident is necessary, at the outset, because it is likely to mark an inflexion point in India–China relations. It is now obvious that over the past three decades, India’s politico-diplomatic establishment has been lulled into the false belief that agreements, parleys and summit meetings could ensure peace and tranquility across the undefined LAC. India’s decision-makers are not fully cognizant of the fact that the existing Chinese military pressure in the north, coupled with a naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, could have ominous security implications for India. While the existing Sino-Indian agreements seem as good as dead, China’s forward creep along the LAC could be the precursor to more substantive incursions and to the establishment of a ‘new normal’ in the relationship.

Amidst the prevailing situation of politico-military flux, this essay is a modest attempt to cast some light on the rationale for China’s actions and its long-term strategic objectives, with a focus on its maritime ambitions.

Crystal Gazing

One of the biggest challenges of statecraft is the accurate prediction of a nation’s future intentions, and history is replete with instances where misperceptions of statesmen have led their countries to grief. In September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain loftily predicted on return from Munich after his talks with Hitler: ‘I believe it is peace for our time’. Less than a year later, he was proved not only to be a false prophet but utterly naïve because Hitler, skeptical about the willingness of Britain and France to go to war, was to remark: ‘Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich’.

Closer to home, it was the egregious misreading of China’s intent by India’s post-independence political leadership that led to India’s humiliating military defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India’s first Prime Minister was an idealist, whose pacifist beliefs, perhaps, blinded him to the reality that nations conduct themselves in keeping with tenets of political realism, which postulate that states are obsessed with security, territorial expansion and acquisition of

scarce resources. Realism also places national interest and security above ideology and morality, opposing power being the only restraining factor.

Opinion may be divided on the utility of history as an aid for future predictions, but if we accept that historical trends are likely to persist it would be prudent to take mental note of two theories about the conduct of nations. Political scientist George Modelski had posited, in his long cycle theory, that the international system seeks a hegemon, or a dominant single state, in order to maintain stability. Quoting historical precedents, Modelski had said that global hegemonic dominance is a cyclical phenomenon that lasts about a century, after which the title of ‘most powerful nation in the world’ changes hands. According to him, America’s era of dominance is nearing its end.

More recently, another political scientist, Graham Allison, having undertaken 16 historical case studies spanning the past 500 years in which the world was faced by a new rising power or hegemon, found that in 12 cases the situation had led to war. Coining a new term, the ‘Thucydides trap’, Allison concluded that a rising China, which feels that it was cheated out of its rightful place by stronger nations, now seeks to change the *status quo* and war remains a possibility.

On current trends, China’s rapidly growing economy promises to endow it with all the attributes of a great power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. This is the date by which President Xi Jinping has declared China’s intent to become a ‘fully developed nation’ and thus to attain strategic equivalence with the US. It is quite possible that in Beijing’s calculus, the attainment of this state of eminence implies a need to subjugate the neighborhood and suppress peer competitors or rivals such as India.

A resume of Sino-Indian relations

It seems that for Mao Ze Dong, the 1962 India-China War was a replay of the American experience in Korea. In Henry Kissinger’s words, ‘...an

underestimation of China by an adversary, flawed intelligence estimates, and grave errors in understanding how China reacts to perceived security threats'. Having assured himself through diplomatic channels that the United States would not interfere in his Himalayan venture, and that treaty partner USSR might even back him, Mao assembled his Central Military Commission colleagues in early October 1962 and announced sarcastically: 'Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on fighting us, for us not to fight would not be friendly enough. Courtesy demands reciprocity'. The rest is history.

In India, on the other hand, debate has persisted whether it was China's National Highway 219, joining Xinjiang and Tibet while cutting across the Aksai Chin, or Nehru's misguided 'forward policy' which constituted the actual *casus belli* for the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 20 November 1962, troops of the PLA withdrew 20 kms behind the LAC, which was described by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai as conforming to 'the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west'. China's adherence to its 1959 claim-line in Ladakh gave it physical control of 38,000 sq. km of the Aksai Chin plateau.

Six decades after the traumatic events of 1962, there continues to be a lack of clarity in India's political and diplomatic circles about framing of policies and shaping of strategies *vis-à-vis* the People's Republic of China (PRC). Much of this ambivalence is rooted in the paucity of Mandarin-speaking scholars in the country, as well as the lack of dedicated research into China's history, culture, economy, industry and strategic thought. Given this sparse data bank, Indian decision-makers have tended to grope in the dark about the nuances of Beijing's statements, actions and long-term intentions, and have often come to the wrong conclusions.

Note must be taken here of the remarkable indifference, bordering on disregard, shown by India's post-independence politicians, of all hues, towards

vital issues of national security. No Indian government, so far, has formulated a national security strategy or doctrine; nor has Parliament ever demanded a defence review or sought a white paper on defence. Consequently, India's defence planning has remained *ad-hoc* and underfunded, and most crises have caught the security establishment by surprise, leading to delayed responses. The current confrontation with China is a classic example.

Divergent outlooks

Any attempt to analyze the rivalry and conflict between India and China must be grounded on the clear premise that there is little in common between the history, civilizational values, social structure and political culture of the two nations. Essentially, while India has throughout its past been a multicultural and heterogeneous society which rarely managed to forge 'unity in diversity', China has been a more cohesive entity given its long history of imperial rule under the dominant Han ethnic group and rigid political systems like Confucianism and Communism. This background has played an important role in shaping the attitudes of these countries as twentieth-century nation-states.

Since the earliest days of the Sino-Indian relationship, there has been insufficient realization in New Delhi that the roots of distrust between the two states are linked to two issues; first, the importance accorded by China to its 'historical boundaries' and second, China's sensitivity about its standing in the world community.

Historically, protection of the Chinese heartland has demanded the pacification or control of its 'strategic periphery'. In the modern era, most of these regions were incorporated into China either by military force, as in Tibet and Xinjiang, or through Han migration and Sinicization, as in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. As seen in the more recent South China Sea (SCS) disputes, China pays scant attention to international law where control over what it sees as its 'strategic periphery' is concerned. Thus, in the early 1960s, while Indian

diplomats were busy building the legal case for India's border claims, PLA generals had been ordered to plan for re-capture of 'China's territories'.

An idealist Nehru was convinced that India and China, having risen together from foreign repression, should work together in fraternal partnership and to champion the cause of newly emancipated Afro-Asia; with India being the senior and more experienced partner. Mao, however, harbored his own aspirations to become a leader of the Third World and considered it presumptuous of India's 'bourgeois elite' to step on the stage of contemporary Asian history and act as leaders. This required India to be shown its place, which was done in 1962.

As far as national outlooks go, an apt analogy is provided by the Indian fondness for chess, and the Chinese devotion to its equivalent *wei-qui*. Whereas the former visualizes strategy in terms of striking blows, fighting battles and checkmating the opponent, the latter is all about maneuver and occupying empty spaces. Henry Kissinger provides a useful insight with this comment: 'If chess is about decisive battle, *wei-qui* is about a protracted campaign and "strategic encirclement"... if chess encourages single-mindedness, *wei-qui* generates guile and strategic flexibility'.

China's motivations

A look at China's past throws up two dominant factors, which provide us with a possible insight into the motivations that have underpinned China's steady rise to international eminence and the nation's present outlook and postures.

First, China has an imperial tradition going back many centuries, in which a well-defined heartland overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Hans exercised military dominance over the surrounding peripheral states. Thus, China has historically had a 'great-power' self-image, underpinned by the abundance of resources, economic self-sufficiency, and vastness of the imperial state and its population. According to China expert Michael Pillsbury, a part of the 'Chinese

dream of national rejuvenation' is the establishment of a 'unified global system' or Empire, termed *tianxia* in Mandarin, maintained under the aegis of a hegemon state whose superiority is acknowledged by all.

Second, in tandem with the cultivation of a 'great power' persona, the Chinese people have also nurtured a deep seated 'victim mentality' as a result of China's defeat, subjugation and humiliation by foreign powers. During the nineteenth century, China's inability to resist Western military pressures led to the Opium Wars and the signing of what they called the 'Unequal Treaties' with USA, Russia, UK and other European powers. In 1900, China suffered the humiliation of an invasion by a coalition of Western powers to put down the Boxer rebellion. In 1937, a Japanese invasion was followed by an eight-year war in which China suffered at least 20 million casualties and many atrocities. These historical events are used as justification for the creation of a powerful Chinese nation, strong enough to redress past wrongs.

In the current scenario, maintenance of internal order and domestic well-being are considered the foundation of China's national security, presenting many challenges to the Beijing regime. There is enormous pressure to sustain high levels of economic growth in order to cope with emerging economic disparities. Ethnic and political tensions simmer in non-Han majority areas like Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria. Reports have emerged of detention camps across Xinjiang in which about a million Muslim Uighurs are held for political indoctrination. Autonomous Hong Kong, already in the throes of a pro-democracy movement, has seen a sharp rise in protests over new extradition laws, inviting harsh police reprisals.

For most Asian nations, it was European dominance of the seas that enabled them to convert putative 'trading posts' and commercial enclaves into imperial colonies by force. The post-colonial era has, therefore, seen the rapid growth of many navies in Asia, partly as symbols of prestige but mainly as a precautionary measure against external intervention. In the case of a continental

nation like China, this ‘turn to the seas’ has been underpinned by additional factors, like territorial ambition, economic interests and a sense of historical grandeur.

China’s turn to the sea

The Chinese stake claim to an ancient maritime tradition going back to the first millennium BCE, which gave rise to important navigational and shipbuilding innovations and saw the opening of many trading routes to Asia and Africa. Early fifteenth-century narratives of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) describe Admiral Cheng Ho’s remarkable fleet of huge junks, carrying troops, treasure, merchandise and victuals, which made seven epic voyages to India, the Middle East and Africa.

This era of impressive Chinese naval power lasted a mere 30 years, as a combination of fiscal and political compulsions led the Ming Emperor to impose a ban on further voyages and order the destruction of Cheng’s ‘treasure fleet’. Over the next few centuries, protracted threats from the north and west ensured that China’s naval power remained at low ebb and, therefore, incapable of repelling European imperialists who came by sea in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

On its official founding in May 1950, the PLA Navy (PLAN) was equipped with warships and submarines supplied by the Soviets, who also helped establish training and maintenance infrastructure. China’s early maritime outlook was shaped by Soviet doctrine, which visualized the role of navies mainly for guarding the seaward flank of armies against amphibious assault by capitalist navies and for waging ‘guerrilla warfare’ at sea through submarines.

Early signs of China’s ‘maritime awakening’ started emerging when the 2004 Defence White Paper spelt out the PLAN’s responsibilities as, ‘safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its seas, along with maritime rights and interests’. Most China-watchers in the west were, however, skeptical about outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao’s lofty

declaration, at the 2012 Party Congress, that China aimed to become ‘a maritime great power’.

Less than a decade later, Western skepticism has given way to apprehension as it becomes clear that Hu’s announcement had been based on a well-considered and long-term strategy. The September 2020 edition of the US Department of Defence (DoD) report on China declares that the PLAN has become the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 major surface combatants; in the process relegating the US Navy (USN) numerically to second place.

At a 2013 Politburo meeting, Xi Jinping had pointed out that China’s broad maritime interests were dictated by four strategic objectives: a) defending China against an attack from seaward by the US, b) ensuring security of China’s seaborne trade, c) safeguarding China’s global economic interests and d) recovering sovereignty over claimed maritime territory – especially Taiwan. China’s leadership has been shrewd enough to realize that becoming a ‘maritime power’ requires the acquisition of a full range of capabilities, and China’s economic boom has enabled it to do so. As the 2020 US DoD Report points out, China happens to be the world’s top ship-producing nation, Chinese-flagged merchant ships outnumber all others on the high seas, and China boasts of the largest Coast Guard and fishing fleet in the world.

As far as the PLAN is concerned, its rise to eminence has been clearly propelled by considerations related to the four strategic objectives outlined above. In order to deter the USN from operating within the western Pacific Ocean, China has developed what is dubbed by western analysts as the ‘anti-access, area-denial’ or A2AD capability. It aims to pose a layered threat to approaching forces which may come in support of Taiwan or threaten the mainland; the prime targets of A2AD being US aircraft carriers.

In 2003, soon after the establishment of India's Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command in the Bay of Bengal, Premier Hu Jintao's had sounded a warning about the 'Malacca Dilemma' that China could face. This reference to the vulnerability of Chinese shipping led the PLAN to seek enhanced reach and endurance. The 2019 defence white paper (DWP) describes how, '...the PLAN is speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense of the near seas to protection missions on the far seas...' Apart from bolstering the PLAN's surface warfare capabilities China has secured a military base in Djibouti on the Red Sea and helped Indian Ocean Region (IOR) nations like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar to create ports which could become potential bases in times of need.

Safeguarding of Xi Jinping's prized Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as the companion, 'Maritime Silk Road' has been designated a strategic objective, and the 2019 DWP states that 'one of the missions of China's armed forces is to effectively protect the security and interests of overseas Chinese people, organizations and institutions'.

Finally, apart from the contentious maritime disputes thrown up by China's arbitrary and irredentist claims based on the 'nine-dash line', the most serious issue with a security implication is that of 'reunification' of the ROC or Taiwan with mainland China. Chauvinistic considerations apart, Taiwan's importance for Beijing is not only as a part of the 'first island chain' which forms a natural maritime barrier, but also as an island that can dominate China's seaborne trade and hence its economic development. While Beijing's stated goal *vis-à-vis* Taiwan is that of reunification by peaceful means, it is prepared to use force to deter external (read US) interference or internal resistance.

Before examining India's response to the maritime challenges posed by China, it is useful to examine the strategic equation that currently exists between the two neighboring giants.

The current India-China equation

In the midst of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, the world is still trying to fathom the rationale behind China simultaneously opening multiple fronts across the Indo-Pacific. Xi Jinping, in a move reminiscent of 1962, seems to have chosen this moment of distraction to stake aggressive claims on India's territory. Against this backdrop, one needs to retain clarity about a few issues that have a bearing on the future of Sino-Indian relations.

First, the competition between China and India in the economic and military spheres, no matter how asymmetric, makes it inevitable that the two will remain rivals in the Asian strategic space. India's efforts to underplay this competition are belied by China's reiteration of its revisionist territorial claims in Ladakh as well as in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and the determined stands it has been taking to oppose India's claims to membership of international fora like the UN Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. On India's part, its open opposition to the BRI and refusal to permit a Chinese company to set up fifth generation (5G) broadband cellular networks in India has deeply angered Beijing.

Second, burgeoning bilateral trade had made China India's largest trading partner (albeit with a huge deficit) and seemed to be the bright spot in the relationship. However, as India has been finding to its cost, trade, especially in the domain of digital services, could become a dangerous Trojan horse. In any case, historically, trade has never prevented nations from pursuing their national interest or even going to war.

Third, at US\$260 billion, China's 2019 defence budget was nearly four times that of India's and next only to that of the US. Possibly China spends an equal amount, secretly, on strategic forces and special projects. China's military expansion and modernization has been marked by total opacity of purpose, and it has never attempted to rationalize this expenditure or to reassure its neighbors. India must, therefore, assume the worst and expect hegemonic dominance.

Finally, China's cultivation of Pakistan as its South Asian proxy in order to neutralize rival India constitutes a sinister masterstroke. There is no precedent for the manner in which China has indulged in proliferation – nuclear as well as conventional – to arm its Pakistan's ally. China's steadfast political, economic and military support has engendered Pakistan's belligerence and encouraged its policy of initiating cross-border terrorism. All this has served to divert India's resources and distract it from the path of social development.

Against this backdrop, and mindful of the hazards of 'crystal gazing' pointed out earlier, a broad and generalized prognosis of the respective postures of India and China, as seen through Indian eyes, would be on the following lines.

China, having weathered the COVID-19 pandemic with relatively little economic impact, has already announced its revanchist vision via the 'nine-dash line' in the SCS and refusal to negotiate a mutually acceptable LAC on the Sino-Indian border. An economically strong, expansionist, and militaristic state, which seeks eventual parity with the USA, China will use the ambitious BRI and the Maritime Silk Route not only to expand its sphere of influence via 'debt diplomacy' but also to camouflage its grandiose maritime strategy that aims at dominance of the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian state, on the other hand, is compelled by circumstances to focus on five critical areas in the immediate future. First, to safeguard its territorial integrity in the face of irredentist claims by two nuclear-armed neighbors, China and Pakistan. Second, to restore its badly damaged economy to its earlier positive trajectory. Third, to continue its pursuit of socio-economic development for the uplift of its masses. Fourth, to build a sound technological base and consolidate its military power. Last, to ensure national cohesion by assimilation of alienated sections of Indian society into the mainstream. An Indian equivalent of Xi Jinping's grand 'China Dream' is unlikely to materialize until these conditions are fulfilled.

The fact that it has taken a border confrontation in the Himalayas to bring focus on India's maritime domain clearly indicates that the salience of maritime power is not yet understood by India's strategic elite. The stark reality is that given the huge economic, military and technological asymmetry between China and India, and the active China–Pakistan nexus, the best that India can hope for is a stalemate on its northern and western fronts. Attention has, therefore, been focused on the maritime domain where India may have some cards to play.

Indian diplomats used to derive considerable satisfaction from the 1993 Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, which they said had 'effectively delinked settlement of the boundary from the rest of the relationship'. However, given China's and India's longstanding territorial disputes and respective geo-strategic ambitions, it was naive of Indian politicians and diplomats to have hoped for the peaceful rise of both. The current Chinese border intrusions, which caught India by surprise, came at the worst possible moment with India struggling to cope with an incipient financial crisis followed by the COVID-19 pandemic of unprecedented virulence.

To the average Indian citizen, it appears that by failing to negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary for 58 years *post-bellum*, Indian diplomats have placed a ticking time-bomb in China's hands to be used for blackmail or coercion at will. In China's grand strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions. These pre-meditated 'land-grabs', blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political 'pressure-point' for New Delhi, especially since the Indian Parliament had passed a quixotic resolution in 1962 demanding that 'every inch of Indian territory' be recovered from China.

Given its growing asymmetry vis-à-vis China in the economic, military and technological domains and the possibility of Beijing invoking the Sino-Pakistan axis, India finds itself in a difficult situation. While the equation is certainly tilted in China's favor, it is incumbent upon India, as a nuclear weapon

state, a significant economic and military power and, above all, a democracy, to stand up to its hegemonic neighbor. Regardless of the asymmetry, India does have the military capability to inflict unacceptable pain in retaliation for Chinese adventurism.

There are other choices too. India can attempt power balancing by seeking alliances with like-minded powers or come to a *modus vivendi* with one or both adversaries through negotiations. All three nations need to be pragmatic enough to realize that neither conquest nor re-conquest of territory is possible in the twenty-first century, and they must now seek to establish stable, viable and peaceful national boundaries all around so that they can proceed with the vital tasks of nation-building and socio-economic development.

While actively exploring these possibilities, the best option in the long haul for India to counter the China–Pakistan axis is by learning to stand on its own feet. This would be a good juncture for India’s decision-makers to craft (even though belatedly) a grand strategy that encompasses comprehensive measures for ensuring rapid economic recovery, acquiring industrial self-reliance, building up military strength and enhancing national technological capability.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Axis, a good juncture, a *modus vivendi*, national boundaries, to counter, like-minded powers, adversaries, through negotiations, seeking alliances, comprehensive measures, to inflict unacceptable pain in retaliation, an incumbent, hegemonic neighbor, pressure-point, to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions, to cope with an incipient financial crisis, mutually acceptable boundary, to pass a quixotic resolution, the COVID-19 pandemic of unprecedented virulence, longstanding territorial disputes and respective geo-strategic ambitions, effectively delinked settlement of the

boundary, to derive considerable satisfaction from, a stalemate, the maritime domain, vis-à-vis, the active China–Pakistan nexus, the salience of maritime power, to ensure national cohesion, the mainstream, to build a sound technological base and consolidate its military power, to safeguard its territorial integrity in the face of irredentist claims, assimilation of alienated sections, to restore its badly damaged economy to its earlier positive trajectory, to camouflage its grandiose maritime strategy, refusal to negotiate a mutually acceptable LAC, the immediate future, to expand its sphere of influence via ‘debt diplomacy’, backdrop, and mindful of the hazards of ‘crystal gazing’, to rationalize this expenditure or to reassure its neighbors, eventual parity with, therefore, to assume the worst and expect hegemonic dominance, to arm its Pakistan’s ally, belligerence, to encourage its policy of initiating cross-border terrorism, the 1993 Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, to indulge in proliferation, to prevent nations from pursuing their national interest or even going to war, to become a dangerous Trojan horse, strategic forces and special projects, to announce its revanchist vision via the ‘nine-dash line’, to set up fifth generation (5G) broadband cellular networks, burgeoning bilateral trade, a broad and generalized prognosis of the respective postures, to retain clarity, efforts to underplay this competition, the UN Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, two nuclear-armed neighbors, to fathom the rationale behind China simultaneously opening multiple fronts, a sinister masterstroke, the midst of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, apart from the contentious maritime disputes thrown up by China’s arbitrary and irredentist claims, an attack from seaward, to pose a layered threat to approaching forces, reunification by peaceful means, an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines, to seek enhanced reach and endurance, to establish training and maintenance infrastructure, to redress past wrongs, a sharp rise in protests over new extradition laws, inviting harsh police reprisals, to demand the pacification or control of its ‘strategic periphery’, to harbor his own aspirations to become a

leader of the Third World, to examine the strategic equation, at low ebb, therefore, incapable of repelling European imperialists, remarkable fleet of huge junks, carrying troops, treasure, merchandise and victuals, for guarding the seaward flank of armies against amphibious assault by capitalist navies, underpinned by the abundance of resources, economic self-sufficiency, and vastness of the imperial state, to forge ‘unity in diversity’, for waging ‘guerrilla warfare’ at sea through submarines, to subjugate the neighborhood and suppress peer competitors or rivals, to mark an inflexion point in India–China relations.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. Second, in tandem with the cultivation of a ‘great power’ persona, the Chinese people have also _____ a deep seated ‘_____’ as a result of China’s defeat, _____ and _____ by foreign powers.
2. _____, while India has throughout its past been a multicultural and _____ society which rarely managed to forge ‘unity in diversity’, China has been a more cohesive _____ given its long history of imperial rule under the _____ Han ethnic group and rigid political systems like Confucianism and _____.
3. Having assured himself through diplomatic _____ that the United States would not _____ in his Himalayan venture, and that treaty partner USSR might even back him, Mao assembled his Central Military Commission _____ in early October 1962 and announced _____: ‘Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on fighting us, for us not to fight would not be friendly enough. _____ demands _____’.
4. While the _____ is certainly tilted in China’s favor, it is _____ upon India, as a nuclear weapon _____, a significant economic and military power and, above all, a _____, to stand up to its _____ neighbor.

5. An economically strong, _____, and militaristic state, which seeks eventual _____ with the USA, China will use the _____ BRI and the Maritime Silk Route not only to expand its sphere of _____ via ‘debt diplomacy’ but also to _____ its grandiose maritime strategy that aims at dominance of the _____.
6. It aims to pose a layered _____ to approaching forces which may come in support of Taiwan or _____ the mainland; the prime _____ of A2AD being US aircraft _____.
7. Over the next few centuries, _____ threats from the north and west ensured that China’s _____ power remained at low _____ and, therefore, _____ of repelling European imperialists who came by sea in the eighteenth and _____ centuries.
8. Six decades after the _____ events of 1962, there continues to be a lack of _____ in India’s political and diplomatic _____ about framing of policies and _____ of strategies *vis-à-vis* the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
9. On India’s part, its open _____ to the BRI and refusal to _____ a Chinese company to _____ fifth generation (5G) broadband cellular networks in India has deeply _____ Beijing.
10. In the midst of the _____ COVID-19 pandemic, the world is still trying to fathom the _____ behind China _____ opening multiple fronts across the Indo-Pacific. Xi Jinping, in a move _____ of 1962, seems to have chosen this moment of _____ to stake _____ claims on India’s territory.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To redress, equation, expenditure, to represent, to encourage, to embarrass, comprehensive, proliferation, guerrilla, belligerence.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. These pre-meditated ‘land-grabs’, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political ‘pressure-point’ for New Delhi, especially since the Indian Parliament had passed a quixotic resolution in 1962 demanding that ‘every inch of Indian territory’ be recovered from China.
2. Third, at US\$260 billion, China’s 2019 defence budget was nearly four times that of India’s and next only to that of the US.
3. In 2003, soon after the establishment of India’s Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command in the Bay of Bengal, Premier Hu Jintao’s had sounded a warning about the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ that China could face.
4. Safeguarding of Xi Jinping’s prized Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as the companion, ‘Maritime Silk Road’ has been designated a strategic objective, and the 2019 DWP states that ‘one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and interests of overseas Chinese people, organizations and institutions’.
5. On current trends, China’s rapidly growing economy promises to endow it with all the attributes of a great power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 4. US ELECTORATE SHOWS DISTRUST OF THE REALITIES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Whoever occupies the White House after the election, it is evident the emphasis will be on ‘America First’, and that only characteristics and approaches will differ. If Donald Trump is re-elected, his electoral base will support a continuation of isolationist, protectionist policies. If Joe Biden becomes president, he will enjoy some limited popular backing for international re-engagement, but his voters still clearly want him to prioritize domestic issues.

Implications for the foreign policy of the next US administration are evident. America may have a long history of isolationism, but that should not be confused with ignorance of the growing interconnectedness of today’s world. However, Americans are struggling to find a new equilibrium for their country’s role in the world.

Around seven-in-ten hold the view that the United States should take a leading or major role in international affairs, and the same number acknowledge that international events affect their daily life. However, Americans remain reticent about global engagement, and half of registered voters believe other countries take unfair advantage of the United States.

This clear contradiction is mirrored in what can be expected from the election victor, with a Joe Biden administration likely to speak for those who want America to lead, while a second Donald Trump administration is expected to continue complaining about US victimization by an ungrateful world.

A majority (57%) of Americans say foreign policy is ‘very important’ to them as they decide who to vote for in the 2020 election. This may seem like a high priority, but American polls often show many issues are ‘very important’ to voters. What matters is relative importance and foreign policy pales in comparison with the significance the public accords to the economy (79%) or healthcare (68%). Immigration (52%) and climate change (42%) are of even less relative importance to voters.

Publics in advanced and emerging economies alike generally agree that growing trade and business ties with other nations are good for their country, at least in theory. However, far fewer are convinced that increased trade results in more jobs, higher wages or lower prices at home – all benefits frequently touted by economists and proponents of international trade.

Americans and publics in advanced economies are especially skeptical of trade's role in boosting wages – only about three-in-ten in the United States and across the other advanced economies surveyed subscribe to this view. Slightly more Americans think trade lowers prices and generates new jobs (37% and 36%, respectively). Among the other advanced economies polled, a median of 47% link trade to job creation, while 28% say prices decrease thanks to trade.

People in emerging markets are even more dubious of trade's impact on prices – a median of just 18% in these countries say it drives prices lower. But publics across the nine emerging markets surveyed are enthusiastic about trade's other economic benefits: A median of 56% think trade leads to more jobs and 47% say it improves wages.

These are among the key findings from a New Research Center survey conducted among 30,133 respondents in 27 countries from May 14 to Aug. 12, 2018. The nations included in the survey account for roughly two-thirds of the global gross domestic product.

In many of the 22 nations polled in both 2014 and 2018, public views of trade's impact on jobs and wages have not changed substantially. However, there are exceptions. In the U.S., the share of adults who believe trade creates jobs has risen 16 percentage points over the past four years. In Poland, it has increased 10 points. Conversely, faith that trade generates employment has fallen 26 points in Argentina and 20 points in Tunisia.

Similarly, the belief that growing international trade and business ties boost wages is up 14 percentage points among Americans since 2014. Among Poles, it is up 14 points. Again, public opinion in Tunisia and Argentina has

moved in the opposite direction. The share of Tunisians who say trade increases wages is down 22 percentage points and the share of Argentines who hold that view is down 13 points.

In many of the 22 nations polled in both 2014 and 2018, public views of trade's impact on jobs and wages have not changed substantially. Nevertheless, there are exceptions. In the U.S., the share of adults who believe trade creates jobs has risen 16 percentage points over the past four years. In Poland, it has increased 10 points. Conversely, faith that trade generates employment has fallen 26 points in Argentina and 20 points in Tunisia.

Among the 27 nations surveyed in 2018, attitudes toward trade are closely associated with education and income levels. In 19 countries, those with higher levels of education are more likely than those with less education to think trade creates jobs. In 20 countries, those with an income higher than the national median are more likely than those with an income below that line to believe trade generates employment. More broadly, views on trade seem to reflect a public's general economic mood. Globally, among respondents who think their economy is doing well, a median of 53% across 24 countries say trade creates jobs and 39% believe it increases wages. Among those publics who say their economy is doing poorly, just 43% believe trade generates jobs and 29% say it boosts wages.

Notably, despite the deep partisanship in American politics today, there is no difference between Republican and Democrat voters on the low priority they accord foreign policy. And barely one-third (35%) of the public give top priority to working with allies and international institutions to confront global challenges such as climate change, poverty and disease – in fact only 31% say improving relations with allies should be a top foreign policy priority over the next five years.

However, despite this apparent lack of support for international relations, a rising majority of Americans believe international trade is good for

the economy – running contrary to many international assumptions that Americans are inherently protectionist. Nevertheless, this increased interest may not amount to much in reality. Americans also believe trade destroys jobs and lowers wages. Trump is clearly wedded to a protectionist worldview and may continue to try dismantling the World Trade Organization (WTO). Biden is unlikely to initiate any new trade liberalizing negotiations given what would be, at best, a slim Democratic majority in the Senate and anti-trade views held by many unions and blue-collar voters among his constituency. Any political capital he commits to trade is likely to focus on reforming the WTO, but privately his advisers admit they are not optimistic.

In addition, both Biden and Trump face strong public support for ratcheting up pressure on China, although their lines of attack may differ, with Trump likely to double down on tariffs while Biden would work closely with Europe on both trade and human rights issues. More broadly, almost three-quarters (73%) of Americans now express an unfavorable view of China, up 18 points since the last presidential election. One-quarter of Americans classify Beijing as an ‘enemy’ with almost half saying the US should get tougher with China on economic issues, although attitudes do divide along partisan lines, with Republicans generally more critical of Beijing, but Democrats are tougher on human rights.

On immigration, Trump’s policies are out of step with the public. Six-in-ten Americans oppose expanding the border wall with Mexico, 74% support legal status for immigrants illegally brought to the United States as children – including a majority of Republicans (54%) – and as many Americans favor increasing immigration as support decreasing it. However, Trump has already promised to double down on limiting immigration if he wins because it is what his Republican electoral base wants and, as with trade, this is one of his long-expressed personal beliefs. If he wins, expect more mass roundups of

undocumented people, completion of his border wall and stricter limitations on legal immigration.

Sixty percent of Americans oppose major new construction of walls along the U.S.-Mexico border – the goal behind President Donald Trump’s budget showdown with Democratic leaders that led to a record 35-day partial shutdown of the federal government. The shutdown, which ended Jan. 25, and the political battles that preceded it over the past several months have had little apparent effect on public opinion about a wall. Fifty-seven percent opposed major new construction of walls seven months ago, a statistically insignificant three-percentage-point difference from the current number.

Gallup trends offer several signs that immigration has risen in prominence as a national issue in the past year:

- Twenty-one percent now name it as the country’s most important problem. That is the second-highest total for immigration in the 80-year history of the question, behind last July’s 22%.

- Seventy-eight percent in November identified immigration as an extremely or very important issue to them in the midterm elections, ranking it among the top three issues in importance to the public.

- Perhaps as a result of the heightened political attention given to the issue of immigration, the percentage saying they feel strongly one way or another about expanding the walls has increased since last June’s poll -- from 58% to 65%. More of that increase has come in strong opposition (five points) than in strong support (two points).

The issue of a wall was proposed as a way to slow illegal immigration long before Trump made it his signature 2016 campaign pledge. Gallup has asked about it using various question wordings, but all polls have shown a majority opposed. Gallup first asked about it in 1993, when 71% said they opposed “erecting a wall along the border with Mexico.” Opposition eased slightly in

1995, when 62% were against erecting a wall. In 2006, opposition to “building a wall along the border with Mexico” was 56%.

Public opposition to a border wall had increased by 2016, when Trump was pushing construction of the wall. Sixty-six percent opposed “building a wall along the entire U.S.-Mexico border” in June of that year. The current poll was conducted Jan. 21-27; slightly more than two-thirds of the respondents (69%) were interviewed before Trump ended the shutdown. There is no significant difference in views of the wall between those interviewed during the shutdown and those interviewed after it.

Clear majorities of U.S. adults in the latest poll support two other actions related to immigration, while rejecting a third.

- The vast majority of Americans (81%) favor allowing immigrants living illegally in the U.S. “the chance to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements over a period of time.” In 2016, the year Trump was elected president, 84% were in favor of a path to citizenship for those in the country illegally.

- Though a majority of Americans reject major expansion of walls on the U.S.-Mexico border, three-fourths of the public favors another method of increasing border security – the hiring of “significantly more” border patrol agents.

- Sixty-one percent oppose deporting all illegal immigrants back to their home country. In 2016, 66% were in opposition. Since Trump’s election, the proportion of Americans wanting to increase immigration levels has grown – from 21% in June 2016 to a record-high 30% now.

The percentage of Americans who want immigration levels decreased has been higher than those wanting it increased in every one of the 33 polls Gallup has conducted on the issue since 1965. However, the current one-point gap ties with the June 2018 poll for the smallest ever. Before Trump does election, the

percentage preferring a decrease in immigration averaged 31 points higher than the percentage want an increase.

Republicans, including independents who lean toward the Republican Party, are slightly more likely to favor increasing immigration levels now (16%) than they were in 2016 (11%), but about half (51%) want levels decreased. During the same period, support for increased immigration has risen more among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, from 31% to 41%, with only 13% wanting to decrease levels.

As a House-Senate conference committee begins discussions on resolving the fight over immigration spending and Trump's border wall, there is little question of where public sentiment stands on such key issues as expanding border walls, treatment of immigrants already in the U.S. illegally and increasing the number of border patrol agents.

Most of the cards at this point seem to be in the hands of the Democratic negotiators, fresh off their victory over Trump on the government shutdown faceoff. The public is solidly against the expansion of the border walls and remains sympathetic toward immigrants in the country illegally. Both of these views seem to match previous Democratic proposals at a time when Republicans are unable to agree on how to handle immigration. Therefore, it is not hard to envision an outcome that will please far more Democrats than Republicans.

In contrast, Biden is likely to loosen constraints on immigration because he believes immigration has been good for the economy and the Democratic Party is increasingly dependent on Hispanic and Asian voters, the two fastest growing portions of the population. However, open borders are not a Biden option. The US foreign-born population is at near-record levels and, every time in American history the portion of foreign born has come close to being 14% of the total population – in the 1880s, the 1920s and now – there has been a populist backlash. Democrats cannot risk that again.

On climate change, there is strong evidence the American public is increasingly worried, and likely to support rejoining the Paris Agreement if Biden is elected and increases US commitments to cut carbon emissions. However, the public also appears unlikely to punish Trump if, as promised, he leaves that accord, and he is almost certain to continue denying climate science in the interest of the coal, oil, and gas industries.

The public's concern about global warming does not necessarily translate into support for taking substantive action. There is a huge partisan divide between the number of Democrats (68%) and Republicans (11%) who say climate change is a very important issue in the 2020 election. When pressed on what action they want on climate change, and whom they trust to do it, Americans are less likely than Europeans to accept paying higher prices. A carbon tax stands no chance of passing the Senate, thanks to moderate Democrats from fossil-fuel states, and America's love affair with large, CO₂-emitting vehicles shows no signs of ebbing.

The outcome of the 2020 US election will almost certainly not be determined by foreign concerns, although an international crisis – a terrorist incident, a military confrontation with China or North Korea – could affect voting in an unforeseen way. However, given the mood of the American electorate, if Trump is re-elected, there will be scant public pressure for a more activist, collaborative US foreign policy, beyond support for a tough line on China, while a win for Biden will give more room for some international initiatives.

However, public opinion data is clear. Voters want the next US president to focus first on domestic issues – overcoming the pandemic, digging the country out of a deep economic hole, calming racial tensions, and reversing inequality. The outcome of the election may end America's recently antagonistic foreign policy and halt the deterioration of its international role. However,

dramatic American re-engagement appears unlikely as the public's priorities lie elsewhere.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Implications for the foreign policy, antagonistic foreign policy, re-engagement, calming racial tensions, reversing inequality, overcoming the pandemic, digging the country out of a deep economic hole, public opinion data, foreign concerns, a tough line on China, in an unforeseen way, fossil-fuel states, the deterioration of its international role, support for taking substantive action, to accept paying higher prices, to continue denying climate science, to cut carbon emissions, at near-record levels, a populist backlash, increasingly dependent on Hispanic and Asian voters, the government shutdown, public sentiment, to envision an outcome, in contrast, to remain sympathetic toward immigrants in the country illegally, the percentage preferring a decrease in immigration, expanding border walls, treatment of immigrants, slightly more likely to favor increasing immigration levels, the hiring of “significantly more” border patrol agents, to meet certain requirements over a period of time, signature, the vast majority, to have little apparent effect on public opinion, a statistically insignificant three-percentage-point difference, to face strong public support for ratcheting up pressure on China, apparent lack of support for international relations, conversely, growing international trade and business ties boost wages, to support a continuation of isolationist, protectionist policies, the public give top priority to working with allies and international institutions, to confront global challenges, using various question wordings, contrary to many international assumptions, for roughly two-thirds of the global gross domestic product, Americans and publics in advanced economies, especially skeptical of trade's role in boosting wages, enthusiastic, to try dismantling the World Trade Organization, blue-collar voters among his constituency, to double down on

limiting immigration, to divide along partisan lines, to initiate any new trade liberalizing negotiations, to expect more mass roundups of undocumented people, electoral base wants, to remain reticent about global engagement, to enjoy some limited popular backing for international re-engagement, to prioritize domestic issues, evident, proponents.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. The US foreign-born population is at _____ levels and, every time in American history the portion of _____ born has come close to being 14% of the total population – in the 1880s, the 1920s and now – there has been a populist _____.
2. Biden is unlikely to _____ any new trade _____ negotiations given what would be, at best, a _____ Democratic majority in the Senate and anti-trade views held by many _____ and blue-collar voters among his _____.
3. However, far fewer are _____ that increased trade results in more jobs, higher wages or lower _____ at home – all benefits frequently _____ by economists and _____ of international trade.
4. Implications for the foreign _____ of the next US administration are evident. America may have a long history of _____, but that should not be _____ with ignorance of the growing _____ of today's world.
5. However, given the _____ of the American electorate, if Trump is re-elected, there will be scant public _____ for a more activist, _____ US foreign policy, beyond support for a _____ line on China, while a win for Biden will give more room for some international _____.
6. Any _____ capital he commits to trade is likely to _____ on reforming the WTO, but _____ his advisers admit they are not _____.

7. If Joe Biden becomes _____, he will enjoy some limited popular _____ for international _____, but his voters still _____ want him to _____ domestic issues.
8. When pressed on what _____ they want on _____ change, and whom they trust to do it, Americans are less _____ than Europeans to _____ paying higher prices.
9. The _____ of the 2020 US election will almost _____ not be determined by foreign _____, although an international crisis – a _____ incident, a military _____ with China or North Korea – could affect _____ in an _____ way.
10. On climate change, there is strong _____ the American public is increasingly _____, and likely to support _____ the Paris Agreement if Biden is elected and _____ US commitments to _____ carbon emissions.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To favor, significant, antagonistic, electorate, to handle, collaborative, rejoining, to negotiate, boosting, a shutdown.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. Public opposition to a border wall had increased by 2016, when Trump was pushing construction of the wall.
2. The issue of a wall was proposed as a way to slow illegal immigration long before Trump made it his signature 2016 campaign pledge.
3. During the same period, support for increased immigration has risen more among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, from 31% to 41%, with only 13% wanting to decrease levels.

4. The shutdown, which ended Jan. 25, and the political battles that preceded it over the past several months have had little apparent effect on public opinion about a wall.

5. Both of these views seem to match previous Democratic proposals at a time when Republicans are unable to agree on how to handle immigration.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 5. WHY THE COVID-19 RESPONSE NEEDS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The pandemic disease caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a political problem as much as it is a public health tragedy. Politics has been at the core of how governments have prepared for and responded to this crisis. Political decisions have beleaguered or improved outbreak management, sometimes irrespective of the strength of a health system, clearly demonstrating the political determinants of public health. However, more often than not, politics is presented as an ignoble irritant in contrast to the public health domain: ‘The IO [International Organization] professional staff of medical and public health advocates sought to do what was necessary to stem the epidemics of infectious disease, not to follow the political dictates of its principals [states].’ Yet, as is clear from the different government responses to the outbreak itself, technical decisions require political decisions about who should be consulted, who should provide advice, which models should be used, what policies should be implemented, how such policies should be enforced, and who should be

trusted in the international arena. Put simply: politics is deciding how COVID-19 is spreading and whether people are living or dying.

Political tensions are not limited to the domestic arena. International organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) are operating in an increasingly combative and divisive political realm, with proxy battles being waged within these institutions between member states, for example China and the United States. The WHO is considered to be either too political—‘in bed with China’⁴ – or not political enough. The politics of orchestrating the multiple demands and expectations of states within one international organization is vital to effective management of COVID-19.

From the very beginning, key tenets of international relations have dominated this outbreak, and cooperation between states and the WHO has dominated the narrative. In January 2020, Dr Tedros was at pains to stress that China was cooperating, and that the WHO did not support the restrictive trade and travel measures being adopted against China by other states and their corporations. No doubt, this emphasis was fueled by a desire to ensure that China continued to engage in a transparent reporting relationship with the WHO so that Beijing would supply much-needed data about the scale of the outbreak and successful prevention or treatment options. The politics of this diplomatic relationship remains contested even six months later: how does the WHO walk the tightrope of preserving a working relationship with China while not condoning delayed outbreak reports and lockdown procedures that may amount to human rights abuses? This question may be asked of many member states with which the WHO must maintain a technical and diplomatic relationship.

On 22 January, the IHR Emergency Committee convened its first meeting to consider the outbreak. The vote was split on whether it had at that point acquired the status of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Some Committee members who were nominated by western countries sided with China at this meeting in taking the view that the novel coronavirus

did not yet meet the conditions for a PHEIC. These meetings are strongly political; in the IHR legislation, the decision to declare a PHEIC remains with the director-general, upon the advice of the Emergency Committee. The Committee is comprised of technical experts (nominated by member states) and representatives from the state in which the health emergency is occurring. The affected member state's position is to be taken into account in the decision-making process. A week later, a PHEIC was declared, albeit still in markedly political terms, with Dr Tedros stating that the decision was not linked to the risks posed in China, but in view of the risks posed to low- and middle-income countries with weak health systems unprepared to manage the demands of a major epidemic.

By March the WHO was coming under increasingly strong criticism for 'appeasing' China's actions, which included Chinese police threatening medical staff with arrest for any online communication about the outbreak; forced quarantine and lockdown in cities (despite this later becoming the norm globally); and the failure to recognize and address the human and civil rights implications of such interventions. Others challenged the restrictive travel and trade measures adopted by countries such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, said: We recognize there are countries that make different decisions. The decisions we make are based on the best recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the tremendous health experts who work within Canada and around the world ... There is a lot of misinformation out there, there is a lot of knee-jerk reaction that isn't keeping people safe. That is having real, challenging impacts on communities, on community safety.

Yet to date the WHO director-general had not called out any individual state for failure to heed WHO advice – although it used sterner language in the face of the UK's approach to seeking 'herd immunity' and not rolling out community testing to manage the outbreak as recommended by the WHO. Even

when the United States sought to terminate its relationship with the WHO in June 2020, Dr Tedros sought continued collaboration with Washington.

The trust of states in the WHO, as the best delegated authority to steer the international community through COVID-19, is again being tested, as it was during the Ebola outbreak in 2014–15 and the Zika outbreak in 2016. For example, very few states adhered to the WHO's trade and travel advice, issued under the IHR. Nor are all states following the procedures recommended by the WHO to 'test, trace, isolate' to limit disease transmission. This lack of recognition of the WHO's authority to manage COVID-19 is most starkly demonstrated by President Trump's decision on 14 April 2020 to halt funding to the organization, on the grounds of its the apparent failure 'to adequately obtain, vet and share information [on COVID-19] in a timely and transparent fashion'. While this claim has been widely refuted, the very fact that it was made demonstrates that trust between actors in the global health arena is not easily established or maintained. Therefore, it was auspicious that the World Health Assembly agreed, in May 2020, that the WHO should initiate an independent evaluation of the 'lessons learned' from the international health response to COVID-19. In July 2020, the former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and former Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf were announced as the co-chairs of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPR). However, as Dr Tedros said on announcing the creation of the IPPR, whatever lessons are identified, the greatest threat remains the 'lack of leadership and solidarity at the global and national levels'. Six months on from the beginning of the outbreak, many domestic responses to COVID-19 are severely lacking, case numbers are soaring and governments are failing to protect their citizens, while the global political focus remains – erroneously, in the view of many – on China and the WHO's alleged failures in the early stages. Richard Horton, editor of the Lancet, described the current situation as a struggle for the soul of global health: Global health is typically agnostic about

the kind of political system a country chooses to adopt. Global health and its institutions see health systems as separate – technically, socially, economically – from the political ideologies of nations. This view is not sustainable. We cannot say that the terms of political engagement within a country are irrelevant to our hopes for health.

Politics cannot be wished away. Even the most democratic country can stumble over political ideologies and nationalism when facing the strength and pace of a virus outbreak. The contemporary debate about the wearing of face masks demonstrates this in abundance. Political forces will dramatically affect the fortunes of public health bodies, the efficacy of technical advice, and faith in the normative value of international health diplomacy.

How to ‘orchestrate’ the multiple competing approaches of states (and indeed non-state actors within the global health governance landscape) is the task now facing public health experts and, especially, the WHO. As IR scholars, we have some understanding of the structure, agency and preferences most likely to mobilize states and organizations to act cooperatively rather than as random individual agents in the way, that has plagued the COVID-19 response.

What is missing in current global health discussions about the coordinated global response to the current outbreak is an assessment of the international relations environment in which collective action is more likely to overcome domestic conditions of resistance: in brief, an assessment of how to play the two-level game of diplomacy and domestic politics. This is the game currently being played out between China and the United States through the medium of WHO adherence and interactions. Understanding the relationship between these two key states is vital if we are to understand how best to navigate these discussions and ensure that persistent Cold War-like tensions do not determine the potential success of global COVID-19 interventions.

There should be, at the core of the public health advice being issued at the international level, an IR-informed understanding of why states would delegate

to the WHO their agency to coordinate public health responses and public health action. As the COVID-19 outbreak progresses, domestic governments are proceeding alone, sometimes independent of the advice offered by the WHO. These actions put multilateral cooperation at risk, at a time when global supply chains, global trade routes and broader international diplomacy will be vital to secure populations and health systems until – If it is ever created – there is a vaccine. And even when (if) there is, coordination of the manufacture, distribution and supply of that vaccine will require more coordinated health diplomacy among very different political regimes and health systems.

There is an abundant literature on the WHO, global governance, and the management of states' collective and individual expectations within the pathologies of international organizations, non-governmental organizations and issue-specific networks. The core message across these studies is that while states always seek to maintain their sovereign independence, it is important to study when states choose to delegate authority to separate organizations to build institutional capacity, encourage moral persuasion or develop enforcement mechanisms. In other words, when do states – irrespective of their political complexion and powers – choose to respond to problems with collective action (shared among states) rather than 'going it alone'? Moreover, indeed, as states diverge from WHO advice during COVID-19, what can the WHO do to encourage a return to health diplomacy despite these differences? When is expertise required by a 'third' actor to 'orchestrate' cohesion over the differences between states and the limitations of their relationship? The degree to which states materially, normatively and strategically adhere to international laws, norms, rules and practices is at the core of what we study in IR.

Since the adoption in 2005 of the revised IHR, the primary international instrument and governance mechanism that guides collective behaviour in the event of a disease outbreak, many publications have flagged gaps in implementation. Attached to the IHR are eight-core capacity criteria that states

are expected to meet through legislation, finance, training, laboratory preparedness, etc. Since 2010, the WHO has received State Parties' Self-Assessment Annual Reports (SPAR), which review progress in building IHR core capacities and measure performance against 13 criteria and 24 indicators. In addition, since 2016 the WHO has coordinated nearly 100 (96) joint evaluation exercises (JEE) in which, upon state invitation, an external committee is sent in to evaluate how the state is meeting its IHR obligations. It is in these focused areas that issue-specific agents such as the WHO are attractive to state principals because 'they [WHO] offer consistent governance schemes that lower transaction costs involved in establishing collaborative ties'. The question is whether the WHO has been able to capitalize on the consent previously won from its state principals – advising on health emergencies – for a situation such as current COVID-19 crisis.

Attempts to manage differing contexts have been considered by the WHO, but the JEE process has primarily focused on structural questions such as size of country, federated systems and overseas territories, rather than considering a more holistic contemporary political picture, with analysis of governance capacity and human rights in relation to operationalizing the IHR. The vast majority of the knowledge gathered through the IHR SPAR website, the SPAR guidance documents and the JEE guidance documents concerns states' legislation, epidemiological training and technical proficiency. It is in these terms that the capacity to meet the IHR is assessed. Put another way, a state's capacity to meet the IHR has been separated from its political, economic, diplomatic and human rights positionality. As the COVID-19 outbreak clearly shows, the WHO's attempt to ascertain state capacity primarily through public health indicators neglects the range of historic, economic, political and social institutions that support state implementation of the IHR (and indeed any international legal instrument).

Obviously, in a highly charged environment such as a health emergency, understanding the political and socio-economic conditions within a country, as well as its economic and diplomatic interests in relation to neighboring states – what may constrain or enable cooperation and coordination – becomes essential. In an international crisis such as this, a ‘we feeling’ might create a dynamic process of mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalty, trust and responsiveness in decision-making, which could facilitate a global response to COVID-19; equally, individual state-centric concern for pandemic security also has the potential to become a barrier to such cooperation.

Historically, the WHO has faced few organizational competitors for its preeminent role as lead actor in international health governance orchestration, especially in health emergencies. The WHO is uniquely positioned – owing to its history as the conductor of international health for over 60 years – to disseminate advice that can serve to enable cooperation. Ultimately, health issues transcend borders, and the WHO has done a brilliant job in understanding the importance of claiming international technical authority; it has done less well, however, in appreciating and understanding the political or problem-solving skills required to understand contemporary sovereign behaviour. The WHO’s failure to grasp the political priorities of its member states, and realize that health is not a first, second or third diplomatic priority for many of its members, has left the organization struggling in recent years with how to manage and delegate its authority, as evidenced by the intense contestation about its actions in response to H1N1, MERS, Ebola, Zika and now COVID-19.

IR deals with the interrelationship between domestic and international politics. In any kind of emergency, including a health emergency, it is important first to have an understanding of the contemporary political environment – not to assume that such knowledge is ‘common sense’ or can easily be aligned with ‘past experiences’. Politics changes domestically and internationally on a daily basis as governments and non-governmental actors react to new events. Every

outbreak deserves recognition as unique. Every state has dynamic priorities, agendas and conditions that may affect its response to a new emergency, and the invitation to international cooperation may be received very differently from one year to the next. Keeping track of the diplomatic conditions that may enable, or constrain, states' cooperation during an emergency is of paramount importance to a successful health emergency response.

IR can offer 'entry points' for understanding cooperation and coordination between states, and where barriers may arise. One option may be to create a Politics in Health Emergencies provision, similar to the Social Science in Humanitarian Action service, established as a result of the Ebola outbreak in west Africa by anthropologists at the Institute of Development Studies, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and *Anthrologica*: a great example of how one social science – anthropology – facilitated communication within the WHO and beyond to understand what was missing from interactions between international organizations, states and academics. Already, during COVID-19, we are seeing the creation of advisory groups, such as the post-crisis recovery specialists' groups in Germany (including jurists and philosophers) and the Australian University's Group of 8 Roadmap to Recovery Task Force, which includes subgroups on international relations, human rights and vulnerable populations. Within the WHO, it is time to revisit the Secretariat's normative preference for health professionals and seriously engage with the contribution of political science expertise. For example, just as anthropologists are now routinely engaged by IHR committees, why not also permit decisions concerning a PHEIC declaration to be informed by human rights, diplomatic and political implications? An independent analysis of a country's diplomatic capacity to report and verify outbreak events appears to be especially vital when deciding if an outbreak could escalate. Clearly, the best surveillance system in the world is futile if governments are not willing to share their data internally or

globally, and if regions do not trust the reports; and the WHO can be placed in a politically precarious position of defending a ‘Potemkin village’.

Disease outbreaks reveal strains on collective governance. IR can provide public health officials with an understanding of the pre-existing transnational networks established before the crisis, and which are most likely to feel its impacts. For example, global governance analysis explains how the WHO works and how it interacts with sovereign member states and other actors in the global health regime. Previous research has considered the shifting power and agency of the organization both in ‘peace time’ and in times of health emergencies. The study of global governance conceptualizes the WHO within a larger international ecosystem, considering what has worked, what has been challenged by member states, what has brought states together and divided them, and how to embed any lessons learned to enhance authority when needed. In-depth analysis of the WHO and its position within the broader global health landscape is vital for building a typology of which political maneuvers work (and which don’t) during crises.

Global health security is predicated on norms of reciprocity, solidarity and sovereignty within the international community. These are embedded within competing global regulatory and legal frameworks, which govern global disease control; IR can explain departures from these frameworks. For example, prior to 2006, governments were normatively expected to share virus samples of new pathogens with the WHO, so that it could harness the power of the global health community to undertake research into vaccine or treatment options. In 2007, Indonesia challenged this normative understanding and status quo when it refused to share a viral sample of H5N1 with the WHO, citing the Convention on Biological Diversity and ownership of biological samples within a sovereign state, leading to considerable diplomatic tension. Their fear was of reciprocity of a different kind: they feared that vaccines developed from their virus samples would be unaffordable or unavailable to them, in view of prevalent geopolitical

economic structures and power relations. An understanding of politics between states, and of Indonesia's own world-view, would have allowed for nuanced negotiations from the start to mitigate such fears. The issue of equitable vaccine distribution is not resolved and is likely to rear its head again if a vaccine is ever developed for COVID-19, despite the hard work undertaken by a range of actors to secure equitable distribution of associated treatments and vaccines. The WHO, through the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), attempts to construct scientific and legal solutions, which ignore politics at their peril.

IR examines when states work alongside multilateral or regional institutions and when they do not – and, crucially, where the money goes within these commitments. Outside health emergencies, where the WHO's voice remains strong, the organization is being led rather than leading. The increased contribution to the WHO's voluntary budget over its core budget means there are powerful funding actors who increasingly decide on the focus and direction of the organization's programmes, and its total income is a fraction of the major bilateral assistance programmes run from the United States and China. The WHO does not necessarily get the first phone call or the first injection of funds. The precarious financing mechanisms within the WHO, with underfunded assessed contributions and voluntary programme funds linked to external actors' domestic or personal objectives, mean that the organization does not control 80 per cent of its own budget. The legislative power granted to the WHO (by article 43 of the 2005 IHR) to implement additional health measures is constrained by the lack of a sustained funding mechanism (suggested in article 44) through which countries can cooperatively support each other to build core competencies for disease surveillance and response. The WHO will never have the financial or political support it needs to implement all the activities it might wish to undertake to improve public health. States and the organization must know this. Moreover, with the recent cessation of funds from the Trump administration,

this precariousness is ever more apparent. However, the argument for change and more money is getting tired. No UN agency is getting more money. What can the WHO do about the inevitable reality?

Lack of trust in actors with supposed authority in health emergencies, differing sources of ‘legitimate’ information and ‘infodemics’ can all have substantial effects on health security. The health-care workers killed in Guinea during the Ebola outbreak in 2014 were perceived to be spreading the disease rather than trying to quell it. Similarly, there is a high likelihood of tensions and risk of communication failure when government public health campaigns are introduced in locations where governments do not have authority or trust among populations at risk, as was apparent in variable vaccination coverage for polio (another PHEIC) in Syria; arson attacks on Ebola treatment units and health-care facilities in eastern DRC; and vector-control strategies targeted at women in gang-controlled favelas in Brazil. Although the context varies, the importance of understanding informal political control of information and access to communities is vital for reaching the front line of outbreaks and those most marginalized within health crises.

The WHO has shown little recognition of the relationship between human rights, state capacity and outbreak response since the introduction of the IHR. In the technical spaces of infectious disease surveillance and response, we must be attentive to the civil and political rights space in which health-care workers, scientists, NGOs and the media work. Freedom to report, freedom to share information without fear of reprisals and freedom to seek health care without fear all affect collective capacity to conduct disease outbreak surveillance and reporting. We only have to consider the implications faced by the Chinese doctors who first alerted the world to COVID-19 in 2019, or similar whistle-blowers during MERS, to see the challenges that this freedom to report poses within political systems.

Why does attention to IR matter for the response to this and other disease outbreaks? The WHO is the international magnet that brings states together to discuss and collaborate on all matters of health science. The WHO has relied on science to persuade its member states to override their instinctual preferences. However, scientific argument is not always enough to sway political forces. Political knowledge, political methods and policy implementation expertise are also needed to inform the problem-solving skills required to understand contemporary sovereign behaviour. The WHO's failure to grasp the political priorities of its member states, and realize that ministries of health do not figure highly among them in many cases, has left the organization struggling to manage and delegate its authority in recent years – as is apparent if we look at the intense contestation about its actions in response to H1N1, MERS, Ebola, Zika and now COVID-19. Everyone needs to be in the room, not just the white coats.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

To delegate authority, the intense contestation, to inform the problem-solving skills required to understand contemporary sovereign behaviour, political methods and policy implementation expertise, to sway political forces, to override their instinctual preferences, to discuss and collaborate on all matters of health science, to grasp the political priorities, other disease outbreaks, to consider the implications faced by the Chinese doctors, without fear of reprisals, freedom to seek health care, vital for reaching the front line of outbreaks, the technical spaces of infectious disease surveillance and response, collective capacity to conduct disease outbreak surveillance and reporting, vector-control strategies targeted at women in gang-controlled favelas, apparent in variable vaccination coverage for polio, authority or trust, similar whistle-blowers, to introduce government public health campaigns, to have substantial effects on

health security, trying to quell it, with the recent cessation of funds, differing sources of ‘legitimate’ information and ‘infodemics’, with underfunded assessed contributions and voluntary programme funds, legislative power, to implement additional health measures, the lack of a sustained funding mechanism, the precarious financing mechanisms, the inevitable reality, little recognition of the relationship between human rights, state capacity and outbreak response, external actors’ domestic or personal objectives, a fraction of the major bilateral assistance programmes, arson attacks on Ebola treatment units and health-care facilities in eastern DRC, to undertake to improve public health, to secure equitable distribution of associated treatments and vaccines, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, to construct scientific and legal solutions, which ignore politics at their peril, total income, to share a viral sample, status quo, unaffordable or unavailable, the pre-existing transnational networks established before the crisis, the broader global health landscape, vital for building a typology, political maneuvers, strains on collective governance, willing to share their data internally or globally, embedded within competing global regulatory and legal frameworks, to enhance authority when needed, in-depth analysis, ownership of biological samples within a sovereign state, leading to considerable diplomatic tension, to undertake research into vaccine or treatment options, subgroups on international relations, human rights and vulnerable populations, the contemporary political environment, to understand contemporary sovereign behaviour, to disseminate advice that can serve to enable cooperation, ultimately, the Social Science in Humanitarian Action service, irrespective of the strength of a health system, clearly demonstrating the political determinants of public health, keeping track of the diplomatic conditions, as lead actor in international health governance orchestration, health emergency, a dynamic process of mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalty, trust and responsiveness in decision-making, to offer consistent governance schemes that lower transaction

costs, more holistic contemporary political picture, to deserve recognition as unique, to capitalize on the consent previously won from its state principals, to encourage a return to health diplomacy despite these differences, an abundant literature on the WHO, global governance, the management of states' collective and individual expectations within the pathologies of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, issue-specific networks, via, to overcome domestic conditions of resistance, an assessment of how to play the two-level game of diplomacy and domestic politics, to 'test, trace, isolate' to limit disease transmission, random individual agents in the way, that has plagued the COVID-19 response, a lot of knee-jerk reaction that isn't keeping people safe, key tenets, politics of orchestrating the multiple demands and expectations of states.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. Keeping _____ of the diplomatic conditions that may enable, or _____, states' cooperation during an _____ is of _____ importance to a successful health emergency _____.
2. One _____ may be to create a Politics in Health Emergencies _____, similar to the Social Science in Humanitarian _____ service, established as a result of the Ebola _____ in west Africa by _____ at the Institute of Development Studies, the London School of _____ and Tropical _____, and Anthrologica: a great example of how one social science – anthropology – _____ communication within the WHO and beyond to understand what was missing from _____ between international organizations, states and _____.
3. We only have to _____ the implications faced by the Chinese doctors who first _____ the world to COVID-19 in 2019, or similar _____ during

MERS, to see the _____ that this freedom to report _____ within political systems.

4. Their fear was of _____ of a different kind: they feared that _____ developed from their _____ samples would be _____ or unavailable to them, in view of _____ geopolitical economic structures and _____ relations.

5. In any kind of _____, including a health emergency, it is important first to have an understanding of the _____ political environment – not to _____ that such knowledge is ‘common sense’ or can easily be _____ with ‘past experiences’.

6. _____, in a highly _____ environment such as a health emergency, understanding the political and socio-economic conditions _____ a country, as well as its economic and diplomatic interests in relation to _____ states – what may constrain or _____ cooperation and coordination – becomes _____.

7. The question is whether the WHO has been able to _____ on the consent _____ won from its state principals – advising on _____ emergencies – for a situation such as _____ COVID-19 crisis.

8. Understanding the relationship between these two _____ states is _____ if we are to understand how best to _____ these discussions and ensure that _____ Cold War-like _____ do not determine the potential success of global COVID-19 _____.

9. By March the WHO was coming under _____ strong criticism for ‘_____’ China’s actions, which included Chinese police _____ medical staff with arrest for any online communication about the _____; forced _____ and _____ in cities (despite this later becoming the norm globally); and the failure to recognize and _____ the human and civil rights _____ of such interventions.

10. The politics of this diplomatic _____ remains contested even six months later: how does the WHO walk the _____ of preserving a working relationship with China while not _____ delayed outbreak reports and lockdown _____ that may amount to human rights _____?

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

Global, to undertake, consent, capacity, transmission, reprisal, subsequently, to implement, to grasp, to delegate.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

- 1.** From the very beginning, key tenets of international relations have dominated this outbreak, and cooperation between states and the WHO has dominated the narrative.
- 2.** An independent analysis of a country's diplomatic capacity to report and verify outbreak events appears to be especially vital when deciding if an outbreak could escalate.
- 3.** The WHO has shown little recognition of the relationship between human rights, state capacity and outbreak response since the introduction of the IHR.
- 4.** The precarious financing mechanisms within the WHO, with underfunded assessed contributions and voluntary programme funds linked to external actors' domestic or personal objectives, mean that the organization does not control 80 per cent of its own budget.
- 5.** Lack of trust in actors with supposed authority in health emergencies, differing sources of 'legitimate' information and 'infodemics' can all have substantial effects on health security.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 6. CHILDREN ‘BORN OF WAR’: A ROLE FOR FATHERS?

AR was 20 years old in 1997 when he was abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a common practice of forced recruitment by the rebel group during the war in northern Uganda. To strengthen his ties to the LRA and therefore lessen the likelihood of his planning to escape, he was assigned a 'wife' – Cynthia, also abducted – by senior commanders. In 2003, Cynthia escaped. Pregnant at the time, she gave birth at home in Pajule. When AR escaped a year later, he attempted to contact Cynthia, without success. She had returned to the husband she had had before being abducted and had taken AR's child, Kenneth, to live with them. AR continued his life normally, until he came back into contact with another woman he knew from LRA captivity, Milly. He had released her shortly before his own escape as she was pregnant and the father, an LRA commander, had died. After her daughter was born, Milly reached out to AR in the hope that he would introduce them to her child's paternal clan. Unfortunately, the clan rejected them, and refused to provide for the child, calling both her and her mother 'rebels'. AR, feeling ashamed for failing to reintegrate them into the paternal clan and worried for the child's well-being, proposed to the mother that they stay together. She accepted and AR took the child as his, began providing for her and paid for her to attend nursery school.

A year later, while walking home one day, AR received a phone call. It was Cynthia, who had travelled to his town and asked to be brought to his home. She told him about the mistreatment she and Kenneth suffered at the hands of

her current husband. AR was determined to get his child back, and contacted the police for help in the matter. They called Cynthia's husband and asked him to bring the child to the police station, but he refused. Years later, AR was still struggling to be reunited with his child, and decided to take the matter to court. His case was opened in 2013, and the court urged him to offer a payment to Cynthia's current husband to compensate him for the cost of providing for Kenneth in previous years. Upon receipt of this sum, the husband would have to return the child to AR. However, they could not agree on an amount, as AR was unable to pay what was requested by the uncompromising husband. At the time of writing, AR still had not been reunited with Kenneth, who is several years behind in school and continues to live with Cynthia and her husband. AR, who lives with Milly and their five children, reasserts his determination to persevere, stating: 'I cannot accept for my own child to suffer'.

Children 'born of war' are increasingly recognized as victims within relevant international policy frameworks, the coercive circumstances of their conception acknowledged, whether these be the result of 'sexual relations' between a foreign soldier and a civilian woman in militarized settings, strategic acts of sexual violence by armed actors perpetrated to humiliate and dehumanize an enemy or to commit genocide, or sexual slavery, 'forced marriage' and enforced impregnation of women and girls. In April 2019, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2467, recognizing for the first time children 'born of war' as a particular victim group. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (OSRSG-SVC), Pramila Patten, called for a stronger normative framework to protect children born of war, declaring 2018 the year of 'The Plight and Rights of Children Born of War'. In 2001, Colombia was the first country to recognize this particular victim group under the Victims' and Land Restitution Law.

Given the circumstances of their birth, these children's social status is often shaped by both the victimization of their mothers and the acts perpetrated

by their fathers. Many female survivors of conflict-related sexual violence report rejection by their families and their communities, based on the perception that they are ‘contaminated’ or complicit. By extension, their children too are rejected. On the other hand, the ‘sins of the father’ are often visited on his children, who carry his DNA and are thought to be genetically predisposed to violent behaviour. As a consequence of these associations and assumptions, children ‘born of war’ experience isolation, stigma and a negative self-identity, with long-term effects on their well-being. The case of AR, Milly and Cynthia is illustrative: the perpetrator status of AR, and the stigma Cynthia and Milly face as survivors, mark their children’s identity and, in turn, their place in social and economic life in the aftermath of conflict.

Historically, children ‘born of war’ were only recognized as a footnote in the literature on sexual and gender-based violence against women in wartime. The Women, Peace and Security agenda, rooted in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions, recognizes that acts of sexual violence may constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity and an act of genocide, opening new entry points for redress in international justice processes, including the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Despite the different contexts in which they live, children ‘born of war’ face similar challenges: they are at greater risk of developing a variety of mental health issues, including depression and anxiety, and are more likely to live in poverty and to lack educational opportunities. Many of those whose paternal identity is unknown lack national identity documents, preventing them from gaining access to citizenship and social services. They are sometimes cast as the outcome of ‘human wrongs’, born as the result of deliberate war strategies, or of asymmetrical relations between civilian populations and foreign occupying forces, including peacekeepers. As a result, they may be rejected, abandoned or abused. For instance, in Iraq and Syria, Yazidi women who gave birth to the children of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters were immediately

separated from their children, who were placed in orphanages, following their return home.

The women abducted by ISIS are ‘purified’ and accepted back into the religious community, but the children are not. For some mothers, their children represent a traumatic experience, leading to abandonment, neglect or abuse. As a 14-year-old raped by a peacekeeper in the Central African Republic (CAR) told reporters, ‘Sometimes when I’m alone with my baby, I think about killing him ... He reminds me of the man who raped me’.

The very existence of children ‘born of war’, moreover, presents a legal challenge: sexual and gender-based violence is a crime, but the birth of a child is not, and so there is no one to be held accountable for their well-being under international laws. As Tatiana Sanchez Parra observes in the case of Colombia, where, despite their recognition under the country’s Victims’ Law, ‘the existence of these children is defined by sexual violence ... their existence is irrefutable evidence of that harm’, and as such they become secondary victims of it. Disconcertingly, when the harms done to the mother and the children are elided, ‘a new category of human beings [is] ... produced, called “women-and-children,” with children just being an extension of women’s own body and soul’. This categorization is used to delineate acceptable support systems on which mothers and their children can rely, leading to the immediate dismissal of the possibility of scenarios that do not align with the established discourse. The children’s fathers are understood as only and always perpetrators. To bring them into the discussion, it is argued, could further violate the rights of the female survivors. Efforts to redress harm against the mother, then, are often assumed also to be in the best interests of the child. A disproportionate number of studies accordingly focus on the particular challenges of raising children ‘born of war’ from the mother’s perspective.

The current victim status of children ‘born of war’ has not helped create an ‘understanding the experience of war-affected children’; instead, these

children play ‘a role in reinforcing social representations of their mothers – as victimized subjects – and their biological fathers – as the incarnation of evil’. The desire of men to assume responsibility, or the agency of women or children in seeking fathers to take it, is rendered unintelligible. Yet there is some evidence that this allocation of responsibility does happen, in a range of historical and geographical settings. For instance, in 2018 a Haitian advocacy organization filed paternity suits against UN peacekeepers who fathered children while on mission in that country. In 1988, the United States passed the Amerasian Homecoming Act under which tens of thousands of children born to US soldiers and Vietnamese mothers migrated to the United States, where some of them were able to trace the identities of their fathers. In Peru, some survivors attempted to hold the fathers of their children accountable by approaching the commanders of armed forces and asking them ‘to order their subordinates to recognize and assume responsibility for the child born of rape’. In post-conflict Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, women who returned following years of abduction and ‘forced marriage’ to rebels have, in some cases, been reunited with their children’s fathers to raise them, or have sought to establish familial ties. In Korea, some ‘comfort women’ forced to have sex with Japanese soldiers before and during the Second World War described an intimate bond between themselves and the soldiers, some of whom fathered their children. Moreover, some children fathered by Allied Forces to German and Austrian women during the same conflict, on learning of their identity as adults, embarked on active searches for their father.

Originating in the Ugandan civil war, which culminated in a violent coup d’état in 1986, the armed conflict in northern Uganda lasted just over 20 years. Following a military campaign and then failed peace negotiations in 2008, the LRA shifted its operations to the CAR, Chad and the DRC, where it remains active at the time of writing. In northern Uganda, the LRA conducted mass abductions of children and youth to fight in the rebel group. It is estimated that

over the course of the conflict between 54,000 and 75,000 people were abducted, most of whom came from the Acholi subregion. Those numbers included 25,000–38,000 young people, 30 per cent of whom were girls. Under the leadership of General Joseph Kony, the LRA wished to create a new Acholi society through a strictly regulated process of ‘forced marriage’, forming familial units within the military organization that would literally give birth to the desired new nation. A quarter of female abductees report being forcibly ‘married’ to members of the LRA, leading to an estimated total of over 2,000 children ‘born of war’.

Only LRA commanders, and often Kony alone, could decide which combatants would be allowed to enter marriage, when and with whom, creating a coercive environment for both men and women. At times, some male combatants, most of whom had also been abducted at a young age, were reluctant to accept wives, but could not refuse for fear that their loyalty to the group would be questioned. AR, for instance, refused to accept a second wife, but when another woman abductee was brought to him, he saw ‘no option at that moment because if I had refused ... the commander would become suspicious and that would make them know my intention [of escaping]’. In other cases, men were punished for refusing to ‘marry’ as that was seen as showing disrespect for the commanders’ wishes. Some combatants preferred to endure such reprisals rather than to take a ‘wife’ and not be able to provide for her, as ‘consequences would be more terrible ... if [combatants] fail to take care of [their wives] well’.

Although according to Acholi cultural norms having children marks one’s transition into adulthood, and is therefore considered essential for fulfilling one’s role in society, children resulting from illegitimate unions, like ‘forced marriages’ in the LRA, are not held in the same regard. For a marital union to be considered legitimate, the man and woman should observe Acholi traditional customs. Acholi society is built on a patrilineal foundation of extended familial

networks or clans. One's clan affiliation regulates several aspects of one's life, including land inheritance, marriageability and social standing. A new marital union, for instance, becomes legitimate only after representatives of both clans come together to decide on the bride wealth, an amount paid to the woman's clan which formalizes her transition into her husband's clan.

When a child is born, the infant is considered to belong to the father's family, and thus it is within the paternal clan that the children are socialized, and where they learn cultural norms and values; one's sense of identity and belonging is inextricably linked to knowing and being a part of one's father's clan. Teaching a child about one's clan is part of the role of a father. One participant shared the belief that 'as a father, you should also make the child to know his culture and clan ... It helps in the future because life is unpredictable so you need to start teaching the child early'. Fathers also have the responsibility to provide, educate their children, and provide them with a stable home, so that their children can have a bright future. Reflecting upon his role as a father, AR stated that 'to be a good father, you should fully take care of all your children. You must pay them to school ... make sure that the children eat well, make sure there is soap for bathing, you should make sure that they have clothes and protect them'.

The conflict, however, placed a great strain on the cohesion of Acholi society, and well-established customs were violated by the LRA's strategy of abduction and forced 'marriage'. Children born in the LRA no longer belonged to a particular clan, but were considered the children of the movement. These children then inherited their fathers' identity as combatants alone, and hence were unable to benefit from land access and the sense of belonging that comes with being affiliated to the paternal clan. Home, in the Acholi context, is directly related to one's ancestral land, and challenges arise when children do not know where home is.

In cases where a mother returns to her own clan, the family may be reluctant to accept the child, believing they will have inherited cen, or evil spirits, from their father. Even when the child and mother are initially accepted by the maternal clan, over time the burden of caring for both may cause their relationship with the maternal family to deteriorate. In addition, economic and educational opportunities are severely limited, so that mothers are preoccupied with the economic burden of providing for their children. Some mothers will leave their children with grandparents and themselves move to a new village or city to make a fresh start; others may send the child away from the maternal home to work as a child servant. While some children report that their bonds with their mothers are closer because of what they experienced in captivity, others have faced devastating rejection and stigma from their mothers and maternal families.

Fathers are aware of the challenges their children face when they cannot be reconnected with their paternal clans. Male ex-combatants told us that the desire to know one's identity is one of the strongest incentives for a child to want to be reconnected with its father. There is an Acholi saying that 'when you go with your child to [the mother's] home, that child will cry until you return him to [his father's] home'. Some participants stated that they relied on the fact that even a child who lives with its mother will eventually begin asking questions about the paternal clan.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Challenges, the strongest incentives, the paternal clan, participants, to face devastating rejection and stigma, to make a fresh start, to experience in captivity, the burden of caring for both, to deteriorate, be reluctant to accept the child, directly related to one's ancestral land, to place a great strain on the cohesion of, well-established customs, to belong to a particular clan, sense of

identity and belonging is inextricably linked to, to violate, infant, to share responsibility, unpredictable, clan affiliation, land inheritance, marriageability, social standing, to literally give birth to the desired new nation, forced marriage, forming familial units within the military organization, a violent coup d'état, victimized subjects, advocacy organization, to file paternity suits against UN peacekeepers, unintelligible, gaining access to citizenship and social services, Allied Forces, to represent a traumatic experience, leading to abandonment, neglect or abuse, asymmetrical relations between civilian populations and foreign occupying forces, including peacekeepers, accountable by approaching the commanders of armed forces, to order their subordinates to recognize and assume responsibility for the child born of rape, an intimate bond, female survivors of conflict-related sexual violence report rejection by their families and their communities, requested by the uncompromising husband, irrefutable evidence of that harm, to delineate acceptable support systems, to redress harm against the mother, to lessen the likelihood of his planning to escape, abducted, a common practice of forced recruitment by the rebel group, to call for a stronger normative framework to protect children born of war, the outcome of 'human wrongs', born as the result of deliberate war strategies, The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, children resulting from illegitimate unions, the perpetrator status, mistreatment, to decide on the bride wealth.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. Although _____ to Acholi cultural norms having children marks one's transition into _____, and is _____ considered essential for fulfilling one's role in _____, children resulting from _____ unions, like 'forced marriages' in the LRA, are not held in the same _____.

2. _____, some children fathered by Allied _____ to German and Austrian women during the same conflict, on learning of their _____ as adults, _____ on active searches for their father.
3. In post-conflict Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, women who returned following years of _____ and 'forced marriage' to _____ have, in some cases, been _____ with their children's fathers to raise them, or have sought to _____ familial ties.
4. As a 14-year-old raped by a _____ in the Central African Republic (CAR) told _____, 'Sometimes when I'm alone with my baby, I think about killing him ... He _____ me of the man who _____ me'.
5. While some children report that their _____ with their mothers are closer because of what they _____ in captivity, others have faced _____ rejection and _____ from their mothers and _____ families.
6. As a consequence of these associations and _____, children 'born of war' experience _____, stigma and a negative _____, with long-term effects on their _____.
7. When a child is born, the _____ is considered to belong to the father's family, and _____ it is within the _____ clan that the children are _____, and where they learn cultural norms and values; one's sense of identity and _____ is _____ linked to knowing and being a part of one's father's clan.
8. This _____ is used to delineate _____ support systems on which mothers and their children can _____, leading to the _____ dismissal of the possibility of scenarios that do not _____ with the established discourse.
9. The very existence of children '_____', moreover, presents a legal _____: sexual and _____ violence is a crime, but the birth of a child is not, and so there is no one to be held _____ for their well-being under _____ laws.

10. A quarter of _____ abductees report being _____ ‘married’ to members of the LRA, leading to an _____ total of over 2,000 children ‘born of war’.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To deteriorate, outcome, to declare, mistreatment, crime, to accept, to provide, to raise, inheritance, peacekeeper.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. Originating in the Ugandan civil war, which culminated in a violent coup d'état in 1986, the armed conflict in northern Uganda lasted just over 20 years.
2. Efforts to redress harm against the mother, then, are often assumed also to be in the best interests of the child.
3. Some mothers will leave their children with grandparents and move to a new village or city to make a fresh start; others may send the child away from the maternal home to work as a child servant.
4. One's clan affiliation regulates several aspects of one's life, including land inheritance, marriageability and social standing.
5. In 1988, the United States passed the Amerasian Homecoming Act under which tens of thousands of children born to US soldiers and Vietnamese mothers migrated to the United States, where some of them were able to trace the identities of their fathers.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 7. THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY FROM WILSON TO TRUMP

Americans often describe their place in the world as ‘exceptional’. As Stanley Hoffmann once pointed out, every country likes to think of itself as unique, but two stand out in their claim that their values are universal: France and the United States. France, however, was limited by the balance of power in Europe. Only the United States ‘has tried to develop foreign policies that reflect such exceptionalism’, and has had the scope conferred by sufficient power to take an original path in the international jungle.

There are various sources of American exceptionalism. One strand is based on the liberal Enlightenment ideas of the founding fathers. As John F. Kennedy put it, “‘the magic power’ on our side is the desire of every person to be free, of every nation to be independent ... It is because I believe our system is more in keeping with the fundamentals of human nature that I believe we are ultimately going to be successful.’ Also important are the religious roots in scripture about being a chosen people and the Puritan guilt of those who fled Britain in order to worship God in a purer way in a new world. Such high aspirations led to anxieties about whether they were living up to these impossible standards. Even the founding fathers worried whether their new republic would decline in virtue like its ancient Roman predecessor.

Protected by two oceans, and bordered by weaker neighbors, the United States of the nineteenth century largely focused on westward expansion, and tried to avoid entanglement in the global balance of power centered in Europe. By the beginning of the twentieth century, America had become the world’s largest economy, and its intervention in the First World War tipped the balance of power. In the 1930s, however, the United States turned inward and became virulently isolationist. With the Second World War, leaders such as Franklin

Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and others drew the lesson that the United States could not afford to turn inwards again. The resulting system of security alliances, multilateral institutions and relatively open economic policies has been called the American international order or the ‘liberal international order’, and it defined America’s place in the world for 70 years. Today it is being called into question by the rise of new forces, such as China on the international scene and the rise of a new wave of populist politics within democracies.

During the nineteenth century, the relatively weak American republic could be imperialistic towards its small neighbors, but had to follow a cautiously realist policy towards the global balance of power in Europe. The Monroe Doctrine asserted the separation of the western hemisphere from the European balance, although the United States was able to maintain that assertion only because of British interest in excluding European rivals from the western hemisphere and the control of the seas by the Royal Navy.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, as American power grew, its global options increased. The dominant figures in the early twentieth-century expansion of American power were Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, alike in their patrician Ivy League backgrounds and progressive domestic politics, but very different in party, in temperament and in views of world politics. Both were moralists who believed in the special mission of the United States; but they exemplified two very different aspects of American exceptionalism and the moral traditions of, respectively, realism and liberalism.

Teddy Roosevelt believed in the civilizing mission of the Anglo-Saxons in general and the United States in particular. He was a balance of power realist who believed in the use of force, but he coupled that with a moral belief that America could serve humanity by combining power with high purpose. At the same time, he believed that ‘life is strife’, scorned those who dreaded war, and was irritated by what he saw as the unrealistic idealism of Woodrow Wilson.

Roosevelt is remembered for expanding American power by mediating the Russo-Japanese War (for which he earned a Nobel Prize); starting the Panama Canal; establishing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that asserted a US right to intervene; and expanding the American Navy into a Great White Fleet that sailed around the world. However, Roosevelt's ethical score card was far from perfect. Even allowing for the prevalent racism of his time, he fell short of some contemporary ethical standards, for example in the Philippines, where the American Army killed and tortured large numbers of prisoners to suppress an insurrection.

Like most American leaders early in the twentieth century, Wilson also considered himself an idealist. However, in his words, he sought inspiration from 'a long view of human nature derived more from literature' than from the rough and tumble of the frontier or the Spanish–American War that inspired Roosevelt. Wilson did not espouse universal human rights. He shared the racial prejudices and the prevailing Anglo-Saxon chauvinism of his times, and did not hesitate to intervene in Mexico and the Caribbean to promote democracy; but his vision of the international system was shaped by liberalism.

Wilson's view of self-determination focused on ethnic nations in Europe, not the colonial subjects of Europe or America, though his rhetoric nonetheless had a powerful if unintended impact on colonial peoples. Imperfect though it was in accepting colonies and imperialism, a liberal tradition had developed in Britain and the European continent rooted in the writings of Kant, Mill and others, and a league for peace was a European idea. Wilson was not an original thinker in foreign affairs. His 'essential contribution to this ferment was propagation and grand synthesis ... Nothing less than a new international political ideology.' Wilson did not initiate liberal views; but he synthesized them into what he considered a more moral American approach to foreign policy. He did not coin the term 'self-determination', but he adopted it without fully confronting all its implications.

Wilson understood the balance of power, but he said it was immoral because it cut up nations like cheeses for the convenience of others. Wilson believed that a League of Nations based on a collective security pact against aggressors would be more peaceful and just than the cynical alliances required to balance power. Both Wilson and Roosevelt eventually favored intervention in the First World War, but for different reasons: Roosevelt favored intervention on the side of Britain for balance of power reasons, while Wilson sought a peace without victory, mistrusted the use of force for material gain, and saw America's mission as one not of material aggrandizement but of leading all nations into a new international community organized to achieve right ends. America was an associate, not an ally. Wilson argued that this was the only kind of peace that would prove acceptable to the American people in the short run and to the moral opinion of the world in the long run.

Shortly after winning re-election on a peace platform in November 1916, Wilson was confronted by Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare (as well as the Zimmerman telegram trying to stir up trouble in Mexico). He looked carefully at three major options: continued neutrality; armed neutrality to try to protect ships at sea; and full entry into the war on the side of the Allies. Rather than pursuing the cautious middle option, Wilson chose the most audacious (as Roosevelt urged) – but he then did something Roosevelt would not have done. Rather than explaining the balance of power reasons for entry into the war that Roosevelt preferred, Wilson wrapped his choice in American moralism. In presenting his 14 points to Congress and the world, he outlined a new set of principles, including a league of nations, for a more moral order in world politics that would be consistent with his view of American values. Wilson had two transformational objectives: to change American foreign policy and to change the very nature of world politics; and he linked the two together.

Wilson's efforts to use American exceptionalism to win American public opinion over to a new approach to foreign policy also failed for the next two decades. Ironically, by the 1930s public reaction to Wilson's transformational achievement of bringing the United States into the First World War had led to a strong wave of isolationism that complicated the situation faced by Franklin Roosevelt when he tried to respond to the threat of Hitler's growing power after Munich. Wilson's overreaching idealism produced the interwar reaction of retrenchment. Excessively ambitious transformational objectives, combined with overconfidence in his own inspirational power, ultimately proved counterproductive to an effective or moral American foreign policy.

Where Wilson succeeded ethically was not as a foreign policy leader, but as a thought leader. In 1919 when he was idolized, and again decades later, he symbolized a new type of international relations. Nonetheless, Wilson had a profound effect on his successors, particularly Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, who launched the liberal international order that prevailed after 1945. Both men considered themselves Wilsonians, and the United Nations, which restricts the grounds on which nations can go to war, is a descendant of Wilson's League. As Henry Kissinger has noted, even the ultimate realist Richard Nixon was influenced by Wilson and hung his picture in the White House.

The hundredth anniversary of the end of the First World War is a particularly fraught time to assess the place of the United States in the world, and Wilson's liberal legacy, not only because of the rise of China but also because of domestic political polarization which is affecting American public opinion. The election in 2016 of a president who focused on nationalism and protectionism and rebuffed the country's allies represented a major change in policy after 70 years of broad continuity. For example, during the second week of June 2018, at the same time as Chinese President Xi Jinping was hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that called for 'a more open world economy', President Donald J. Trump rejected a G7 communiqué calling for a

‘rules-based international order’, imposed tariffs on American allies and insulted his Canadian host. This anniversary was an anti-Wilsonian moment.

The alliance policy downgraded by Trump dates back to the decisions of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman that took the United States into the Second World War and led to a permanent US military presence abroad. When the United Kingdom was too weak to support Greece and Turkey in 1947, the United States took its place. America invested heavily in the Marshall Plan in 1948, created NATO in 1949, and led a United Nations coalition that fought in Korea in 1950 under a strategy of containment of Soviet power.

From 1945 to 1991, the global balance of power was bipolar, although the United States was clearly stronger than the Soviet Union, with a disproportionate share of power resources and allies that are more important. Nevertheless, the two superpowers competed for advantage in the non-aligned world and engaged in a nuclear arms race. However, after the fall in 1989 of the Berlin Wall that had divided Europe and the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union (primarily for internal reasons), the United States became the world’s only superpower. Theorists called this a unipolar world because the United States was at this juncture the only state able to project military power on a global scale. The American military budget represented nearly half the global total, and it became impossible for other states to balance American military power. However, unipolarity proved deceptive in terms of controlling events in world politics. It contributed to a hubris that led not only to the overextension of American ambitions in the invasion of Iraq but also to political efforts by Russia and China to foil American diplomacy. As Kishore Mahbubani writes, some Americans erroneously came to believe that history was over and American style democracy was the only real option for the world.

George H. W. Bush was a pragmatic realist, but he used Wilsonian language of collective security and a ‘new world order’ to explain the first Gulf War. His successor, Bill Clinton, pursued what he called a policy of democratic

‘enlargement and engagement’, and his National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, referred to himself as a pragmatic Wilsonian. Initially, George W. Bush campaigned as a realist reacting against Clinton’s humanitarian interventions and nation-building in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo, but the Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 transformed public opinion and Bush’s policy and rhetoric.

There were many contributory causes of George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. The various motives of the different groups in the administration that launched the invasion included a realist fear that Saddam Hussein might develop and use nuclear weapons, a realist desire to increase American hegemony in the Middle East (‘the road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad’), neo-conservatives’ concerns over Saddam’s human rights violations and their belief that democratization could destroy the roots of terrorism. Most of the neo-conservatives were former liberals who adhered to Wilson’s American exceptionalism and belief in the spread of democracy, though not his multilateralism. As the war became bogged down and more unpopular among the US public as well as among America’s allies, Bush increasingly turned to Wilsonian-style moral claims for justification. His second inaugural address in January 2005 pronounced a ‘freedom agenda’ for American foreign policy; and, addressing a West Point graduation in May 2006, he affirmed that the United States would ‘not rest until the promise of liberty reaches every people in every nation’.

American foreign policy has always oscillated between overreaching maximalism and retrenchment. In the cycle of retrenchment that began well before the election of November 2016, Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017 expressed skepticism about the benefits of multilateral institutions and global commerce, refocusing attention instead on Great Power rivalry with China and Russia. In January 2018, Defense Secretary James Mattis proclaimed that ‘great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary

American focus'. In contrast, George Bush's 2006 NSS had promoted freedom and a growing community of democracies, leadership rather than isolationism, and open markets over protectionism. Obama's 2015 NSS rebuked Bush for overreach and called for America to act alone only when enduring national interests were at stake, and to lead by example at home. In the view of *The Economist*, 'Trump seems to reject both the Bush and Obama doctrines' and the strategy's 'transactional, zero-sum tone is dismaying'.

The 'liberal international order', the phrase commonly used to characterize the period of American primacy after the Second World War, is somewhat misleading, for the order was never global and not always very liberal. This American order was a combination of Wilsonian liberalism and balance of power realism, and it had four major strands. Chronologically, economics came first. The Bretton Woods liberal economic institutions were designed in 1944, while the war was still in progress and the memory of the Great Depression fresh in leaders' minds. The security strand came next, with the United Nations created as the war neared its end in Europe. It was clearly a successor to Wilson's League, but with FDR's important realist addition of four (later five) veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council. After the war, when other countries proved too poor or weak to fend for themselves, the Truman administration provided substantial aid, and in 1949 created the NATO alliance to contain Soviet power. A year later, Truman galvanized a UN force to apply Wilson's principle of collective security in response to aggression in Korea. This collective action was possible only because the Soviets mistakenly boycotted the Security Council in June 1950, and it was not repeated until 1990 when Gorbachev decided not to veto a Chapter VII resolution to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

A third strand of the American order emphasized human rights and liberal political values: this was incorporated in the UN Charter and codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Although – contrary to the

conventional wisdom – the leadership on this issue was not primarily American, the Americans led in the important postwar democratization of the defeated Great Powers, Germany and Japan. The fourth strand, protection of the global commons, was primarily a legacy of Britain's role in relation to freedom of the seas; even here, the United States was not always perfectly liberal, witness President Truman's extension of oil drilling on the continental shelf beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea limit. Eventually diplomatic efforts led to a UN Law of the Sea Treaty, which the US Senate declined to ratify but nonetheless treats as accepted international law. Other 'commons' agreements dealt with space, Antarctica and, eventually, climate change. In the security strand, important agreements were later negotiated with the Soviet Union and other nations to control arms and to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue, 'the distribution of capabilities among states is not shifting nearly as much or as quickly as is commonly believed'. However, they also point out that the scholarly conventional wisdom about what the US should do with its power has undergone a sea-change at home. The newfound popularity of a grand strategic approach that is alternatively called offshore balancing, retrenchment, disengagement or restraint tracked shifts in US public opinion after the Cold War. Even before to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

In 2017, there was a reaction against Wilsonian interventionism and some sceptics were questioning the post-1945 order. At the same time, a rising China and a declining Russia frighten their neighbors, and American security guarantees in Asia and Europe provide critical reassurance to buttress the stability that underlies prosperity. At the same time, military force is a blunt

instrument. Trying to enter and control the domestic politics of nationalistic populations in Middle Eastern revolutions is a recipe for failure that will prove counterproductive. Moreover, on many transnational issues, including climate change, financial stability or norms to govern the internet, military force is not the answer. Naval power does not produce cyber power. Maintaining networks, working with institutions, creating norms for new areas like cyberspace and climate change create the soft power needed to complement America's hard power resources. Yet this is the type of power challenged by Trump's unilateralist policies.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

America's hard power resources, unilateralist policies, counterproductive, a blunt instrument, to buttress the stability, offshore balancing, retrenchment, disengagement, restraint tracked shifts in US public opinion, the distribution of capabilities among states, to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, extension of oil drilling on the continental shelf beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea limit, codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, incorporated in the UN Charter, to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the important postwar democratization of the defeated Great Powers, primarily a legacy of Britain's role in relation to freedom of the seas, to reject both the Bush and Obama doctrines, mistakenly boycotted the Security Council in June 1950, veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, to provide substantial aid, to characterize the period of American primacy after the Second World War, misleading, at stake, a growing community of democracies, leadership rather than isolationism, liberal international order, to be oscillated between overreaching maximalism and retrenchment, to destroy the roots of terrorism, moral claims for justification, to increase American hegemony in the Middle East, to impose, rules-based international order, to compete for

advantage in the non-aligned world and engaged in a nuclear arms race, superpower, contributory causes, invasion, to lead to a permanent US military presence abroad, a realist reacting against Clinton's humanitarian interventions, Wilsonian language of collective security, a 'new world order' to explain the first Gulf War, hegemony, to foil American diplomacy, full entry into the war on the side of the Allies, a disproportionate share of power resources and allies, freedom agenda, transformational objectives, to change American foreign policy, to change the very nature of world politics, legacy, contrary to the conventional wisdom, material aggrandizement, essential contribution to this ferment, propagation and grand synthesis, the cynical alliances required to balance power, League of nations, accepting colonies and imperialism, a liberal tradition, high aspiration, exceptional, critical reassurance, a recipe, to express skepticism about the benefits of multilateral institutions and global commerce, refocusing attention instead on Great Power rivalry, a combination of Wilsonian liberalism and balance of power realism, major strands, chronologically, to become bogged down and more unpopular among the US public, open markets over protectionism, to symbolize a new type of international relations, nonetheless, to impose tariffs, anniversary, to prove unipolarity, deceptive in terms of controlling events in world politics, to focus on nationalism and protectionism, to rebuff the country's allies represented a major change in policy, broad continuity, to assert a US right to intervene, expanding the American Navy into a Great White Fleet, excessively ambitious transformational objectives, combined with overconfidence.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. At the same time, a _____ China and a declining Russia _____ their neighbors and American _____ guarantees in Asia and Europe provide critical _____ to buttress the stability that _____ prosperity.

2. The various _____ of the different groups in the administration that _____ the invasion included a realist _____ that Saddam Hussein might develop and use _____ weapons, a realist _____ to increase American _____ in the Middle East ('the road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad'), neo-conservatives' _____ over Saddam's human rights _____ and their belief that democratization could _____ the roots of terrorism.

3. The hundredth _____ of the end of the First World War is a _____ fraught time to _____ the place of the United States in the world, and Wilson's liberal _____, not only because of the rise of China but also because of _____ political polarization which is affecting American _____ opinion.

4. Excessively ambitious _____ objectives, combined with _____ in his own _____ power, _____ proved _____ to an effective or moral American _____ policy.

5. In presenting his 14 points to _____ and the world, he _____ a new _____ of principles, including a League of Nations, for a more moral _____ in world politics that would be _____ with his view of American _____.

6. The _____ policy downgraded by Trump dates back to the _____ of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman that took the United States into the Second World War and led to a _____ US military presence _____.

7. As the war became _____ down and more unpopular among the US public as well as among America's _____, Bush _____ turned to Wilsonian-style moral _____ for justification.

8. He was a _____ of power realist who believed in the use of _____, but he _____ that with a moral belief that America could serve _____ by combining _____ with _____ purpose.

9. Ironically, by the 1930s public _____ to Wilson's transformational _____ of bringing the United States into the First World _____ had led to a strong wave of _____ that complicated the situation _____ by Franklin Roosevelt when he tried to _____ to the threat of Hitler's growing power after _____.

10. The dominant _____ in the early twentieth-century _____ of American power were Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, _____ in their patrician Ivy League _____ and progressive _____ politics, but very different in party, in _____ and in views of world _____.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

Aggrandizement, to focus on, consistent, proliferation, substantial, contributory, ally, administration, to last, shifting.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. In 2017, there was a reaction against Wilsonian interventionism and some sceptics were questioning the post-1945 order.

2. The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics.

3. In the security strand, important agreements were later negotiated with the Soviet Union and other nations to control arms and to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

4. In the view of The Economist, 'Trump seems to reject both the Bush and Obama doctrines' and the strategy's 'transactional, zero-sum tone is dismaying'.

5. However, after the fall in 1989 of the Berlin Wall that had divided Europe and the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union (primarily for internal reasons), the United States become the world's only superpower.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 8. TRANSFORMING PRACTICES OF DIPLOMACY: THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE AND DIGITAL DISINFORMATION

The exposure of citizens to digital disinformation, including large-scale misleading or false information, is a major challenge for governments around the world. The involvement of Russian disinformation in the Brexit vote and the US election during 2016 has led to this issue becoming a key concern for the safeguarding of western democracy, sparking a global increase in attempts at countering digital disinformation using strategic communication and digital technologies.

In 2015, the EU tasked its diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service (EEAS), with responding to Russian disinformation. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the EU member states had gradually become aware of a new media environment in which myths and lies about EU politics could reach EU audiences to a greater extent than before, most notably through social media. The novelty of the situation led to the creation of a special unit, the East StratCom Task Force that has since been transforming practices of EU diplomacy using strategic communication. In less than four years, the task force developed from an unfinanced initiative into a prioritized unit. This group has

introduced changes in the practice of diplomatic communications that go beyond countering Russian disinformation. Now, not only has the EEAS added two more task forces that engage in similar activities, but the transformation of communication practices has spilled over beyond the activities of these specific groups into the wider practice of diplomatic communication. Since 2015, then, the EEAS has significantly enhanced its capacities for strategic communication. As new threats and countervailing tactics in international politics increasingly emerge from and through technological advances, similar ad hoc practices are bound to appear elsewhere as well, potentially bringing with them enduring institutional change.

It is interesting in itself that these new ways of countering disinformation emerged in the EEAS, a contested organization in EU foreign policy, and despite initial reluctance among the member states to engage in any attempts at counterpropaganda. The EEAS was conceived as an innovative mechanism in EU diplomacy, but has been hampered since its inception in 2010 by interinstitutional turf battles and conflicting member-state loyalties. Despite this tendency, the East StratCom Task Force has effectively managed to transform EU diplomacy, both by inspiring reflection on what can be done and through practical change.

The EEAS is best described as a hybrid EU foreign policy service that oversees the complex processes of coordinating EU foreign policy. As such, it is a unique organization populated by a combination of national diplomats from the member states and EU civil servants. Even setting aside the *sui generis* characterization of EU foreign policy, there is no equivalent organization anywhere else in the world. This unique institutional position is often assumed to carry with it a lack of autonomy. Studies informed by social theory have taken a keen interest in the opportunity offered by the unique ‘laboratory’ of the EEAS to observe how norms, roles and identities have shaped the practical enactment of EU foreign policy. It was anticipated that the early stages of the

EEAS as a diplomatic institution would offer the potential to fast-track innovation in EU diplomacy. It has also been suggested that the new and experimental character of the EEAS offered conditions for the development of bottom-up processes that could bring about change in EU diplomacy. It is in this context that the emergence of new practices of countering digital disinformation provide a highly interesting case through which to investigate institutional transformation.

Digitalization was initially envisioned as facilitating change and disruption in diplomatic practice, but studies now suggest that it is a more subtle process that involves gradual adoption of digital practices alongside traditional practices. To understand the digitalization of diplomacy, we must therefore seek to understand what happens when diplomatic practices are introduced and developed through and in relation to digital technology. Viewed from this perspective, the countering of digital disinformation entails the development of practices through conscious, gradual adaptation, involving the explorative use of, for example, and social media. Such countering tactics and activities have been mapped by both scholars and practitioners for the purpose of developing early warning systems as well as establishing best practices. Other studies have demonstrated how the new information environment and new technologies enable the spread of digital disinformation. Recently, critically orientated approaches have raised questions about the effects of measures undertaken to counter hybrid warfare, suggesting that some efforts to safeguard democracy may become counterproductive. While representing different theoretical stances, these approaches all focus on changes in security tactics and strategy.

Disinformation is broadly defined as ‘the distribution, assertion, dissemination of false, mistaken, or misleading information in an intentional, deliberate, or purposeful effort to mislead, deceive, or confuse’. This understanding of disinformation stems from the traditional concept of propaganda, from which it is distinguished by its fluid approach to ideology. In

the United States, scholars and analysts have identified digital disinformation as a key dimension of authoritarian ‘sharp power’ (associated with Russia and China), which by contrast to the soft power of attraction seeks to impair and distort political systems. Digital disinformation refers to the use of digital tools in the dissemination of disinformation. The links between disinformation, foreign policy and diplomacy have materialized in containment strategies pursued through both covert operations (clandestine diplomacy) and public outreach (public and digital diplomacy). In the context of liberal democracies, the connection to the latter lies in the use of public diplomacy to foster societal resilience. Societal resilience, according to this understanding, is the ability of societies to contain threats such as disinformation – an ability that depends on public resistance to false information. The role of public diplomacy then becomes one of effectively projecting narratives that resist or debunk disinformation claims, or convincingly deliver another interpretation of the political message. While to some extent this has always been a practice associated with foreign policy (exemplified by the propaganda games of the Cold War), the understanding of disinformation as a societal threat, and of public diplomacy as part of the solution, is today strongly linked to social media.

Managing misconceptions and projecting a positive image are key activities of diplomacy, as reputational aspirations are implicated in, for instance, justifications for war. This area of practice has, however, become broader and more complex in the new media environment. Social media have changed both strategies of public outreach and their intended audiences. The erosion of strictly national audiences has effectively made domestic and foreign publics equal targets in the pursuit and attainment of international reputation and status. Furthermore, audiences are now more informed about foreign policy-making, and in consequence have assumed a more empowered role. In a more competitive media environment, ministries of foreign affairs and embassies have

become aware of the need to be more active in promoting and safeguarding their images in the digital sphere.

‘Hybrid warfare’, including efforts at disinformation, became associated with Russia’s operations in Ukraine in 2014, and later also with China’s tactics and those of non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, it became widely known that Russia had been using disinformation to support and amplify the voices of political movements (ranging from far left to far right) to aggravate divisions in western politics. By then, disinformation was a fully integrated element of Russia’s military and defence arsenal, and one that was fundamental to the annexation of Crimea. In addition to the expansion of state-sponsored (and state-controlled) media both within and outside Russia, the Kremlin had invested in strategies to take advantage of social media and the uncertainty surrounding their influence in democratic societies. Phenomena such as ‘echo chambers’ and ‘epistemic bubbles’ on social media had already raised concerns about democracies’ ability to contain operations designed to exert influence from outside.

EU diplomatic practice is rarely used to illustrate advances in the digitalization of diplomacy, with the United States, United Kingdom and Israel being seen as more influential actors in the field. Misinformation and disinformation have, however, always been concerns in EU politics. Because of the complexity of EU policy-making and its relative distance from EU citizens, knowledge about the EU has been low in the member states. Politicians often misinform citizens about the EU because of their limited understanding of the system. Eurosceptic movements have exploited this weakness and intentionally spread lies about the EU to serve their own political agendas, the British ‘Leave’ campaign being one of the most recent examples. Still, until recently the EU member states treated disinformation primarily as a set of challenges to the safeguarding of domestic political discourse rather than as a security threat. It

was not until the Ukraine crisis in 2014 that member states raised concerns about Russian disinformation in the European neighborhood. Since then, Russian disinformation has increasingly been recognized as a threat to European integration. The aim of Russian disinformation in the EU has been identified as stirring up internal conflict and driving disintegration. The EU, in particular its neighborhood policy of fostering closer ties with former Soviet satellite states, is viewed by Moscow as an intrusion into Russia's geopolitical sphere of influence.

Practice approaches to international diplomacy have traditionally privileged the stability of diplomacy over transformation. Rather than delivering on the promise of capturing both continuity and change, practice approaches have represented the shift in attention from normative decision-making to everyday ways of doing politics. Such habitual practices are often assumed to reproduce continuity, undermining the role of change. Having said that, practices are not necessarily 'finished' habits and the process by which they become habitual ways of doing things leaves room for reflection. Furthermore, old habits can be transferred from one social setting into another, in the process introducing change via their transfer to new actors. Such transformations from within do not necessarily contradict repetitive and routinized patterns of action, but suggest subtle change and/or reflexive agency through the broadening of 'repertoires'. A repertoire of practice refers to the common resources, such as techniques, strategies, tactics, ways of working, expertise and know-how that a practitioner may use to address a particular purpose. A broadening of repertoires thus implies innovation in some form. Recent contributions to the field have signaled renewed interest in how the transformation of practices becomes manifest. Pouliot, for instance, has suggested that the UN Security Council transforms its practices 'on the fly' in an 'institutional grey area' where practices develop organically through moments of collective reflexivity.

Digitalization may set in motion unintended consequences of change that go beyond the mere transition to digital communication. For instance, when the French Foreign Service attempted to digitalize its internal communications, the information flow was systematically rearranged to allow diplomats to easily keep up to date on matters outside their specific posting but within their field of expertise. By organizing information distribution among groups, it would be possible for a diplomat to be kept ‘in the loop’ after leaving a posting in preparation for a future role in which such expertise would be needed. This change, aimed at improving internal communication, was made possible through digitalization but failed almost immediately: diplomats received too much information and were thereby prevented from focusing on the most important elements. In this case, the new practices were quickly abandoned; but it was digitalization that had laid the ground for transformation. While communication by Twitter is a new feature in diplomacy and the digitalization of diplomatic cables more of an adaptation, both may lead to transformation in practices. New expertise, new instructions to learn or new ways of doing things may all bring about transformation, either by broadening repertoires or by prompting the rejection of change in favor of sticking to what works.

First, transformation in practice emerges from changes in agency, when new or expanded groups of ‘practitioners’ of diplomacy are recognized as those who engage in the sayings and doings of diplomacy. New agents may introduce change by bringing in new practical knowledge, or by stimulating reflection within a group by challenging previous routines of action. New agents may also bring about change by contesting the shared understanding of who counts as a diplomat, and therefore who is capable of diplomatic agency. Such change may result from the formal acceptance of new actors, for instance, when new states are recognized in the UN or when envoys are sent to corporations, thereby acknowledging them as diplomatic actors. In the context of diplomatic services, it may result from an acceptance that officials without diplomatic training are

involved in the performance of diplomacy. Such transformation may also derive from change in the internal point of view within the diplomatic community, whereby diplomats accept new participants as ‘diplomats’ or new practices as ‘diplomatic conduct’.

Second, transformation can be seen in new material practices of diplomacy that come to be accepted in a group after processes of negotiation, learning, contestation or experimentation. These processes can be set in motion by creative influx (for instance, by the inclusion of new actors) or by improvisation in new or changing situations. These practices are often perceived to be ‘better’ than previous ways of doing similar things by virtue of saving time, being more secure, enabling inclusion or addressing problems that were previously unmanaged. This may or may not prove true; transforming practices are repeated but not necessarily everlasting. Transforming practices are by definition repeated to the extent that they bring change, but may be replaced by other practices (if the sense of improvement did not last). The increasing use of social media in diplomatic communication has given rise to new practices. For instance, drawing on the Ukraine crisis, Faizullaev and Cornut have introduced the concept of ‘narrative practices’ to examine how international practitioners (diplomats and others), perform narratives as part of their meaningful activities. While narrative practices are by no means new (managing narrative clashes is an essential part of diplomacy), the performance of narratives has gained greater salience in the current media environment, thereby introducing change to the daily routines and habits of diplomats.

Third, transformation in practices of diplomacy may reflect change in the identified partners or peoples on the receiving end. Day-to-day practical competence depends on diplomats’ enactment of the expectations of those in whose name they speak as well as those of their audiences.

Across the world, digitalization and increasing connectivity have both shifted traditional forms of state-centric diplomacy to include public diplomacy

aimed at foreign publics and, at the same time, eroded the boundaries between international audiences. In addition, social media challenge the mediating role traditionally played by the news media between state actors such as diplomats and the public. The resulting information dynamics are gradually changing the context in which international diplomacy is practised, and ministries of foreign affairs have adapted their institutions and practices to keep up with the development of ‘digital diplomacy’. This process has been reflected above all in changes in information gathering and the increasing presence of diplomatic organizations and their members on social media, most notably on Twitter. However, this adaptation has produced varying practices across diplomatic services and embassies, and among diplomats, depending on the specific time and context in which digitalization brought about change. For instance, the US Department of State created a task force on ‘Ediplomacy’ in 2002 as a response to the increasing need for understanding and management of the new information environment after the 9/11 attacks. Changing perceptions of the receivers of diplomatic communications may therefore also contribute in various ways to the transformation of diplomatic practices.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

To erode the boundaries between international audiences, the resulting information dynamics, ministries of foreign affairs, to keep up with the development of ‘digital diplomacy’, changes in information gathering and the increasing presence of diplomatic organizations, changing perceptions of the receivers of diplomatic communications, digitalization, increasing connectivity, day-to-day practical competence, diplomats’ enactment of the expectations, after processes of negotiation, learning, contestation or experimentation, the internal point of view within the diplomatic community, whereby, diplomatic conduct, creative influx, the inclusion of new actors, necessarily everlasting, by virtue of

saving time, being more secure, enabling inclusion or addressing problems, drawing on the Ukraine crisis, narrative practices, as part of their meaningful activities, to gain greater salience in the current media environment, thereby, introducing change to the daily routines and habits of diplomats, in the context of diplomatic services, to set in motion unintended consequences of change, digitalization, the mere transition to digital communication, to easily keep up to date on matters outside their specific posting, within their field of expertise, to be kept ‘in the loop’, by contesting the shared understanding, to be quickly abandoned, by broadening repertoires or by prompting the rejection of change in favor of sticking to what works, to develop organically through moments of collective reflexivity, delivering on the promise of capturing both continuity and change, practice approaches, to illustrate advances in the digitalization of diplomacy, identified as stirring up internal conflict and driving disintegration, the complexity of EU policy-making and its relative distance from EU citizens, reflexive agency through the broadening of ‘repertoires’, via, resist or debunk disinformation claims, or convincingly deliver another interpretation of the political message, to represent the shift in attention from normative decision-making to everyday ways of doing politics, EU to serve their own political agendas, the British ‘Leave’ campaign, phenomena such as ‘echo chambers’ and ‘epistemic bubbles’ on social media, to foster societal resilience, to impair and distort political systems, by stimulating reflection within a group by challenging previous routines of action, the common resources, such as techniques, strategies, tactics, ways of working, expertise and know-how, equal targets in the pursuit and attainment of international reputation and status, furthermore, managing misconceptions and projecting a positive image, (exemplified by the propaganda games of the Cold War, in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, materialized in containment strategies pursued through both covert operations, clandestine diplomacy, public outreach, public and digital diplomacy, reputational aspirations, to offer conditions for the development of bottom-up

processes, to investigate institutional transformation, including large-scale misleading or false information, a major challenge for governments, to stem from the traditional concept of propaganda, to anticipate, the European External Action Service, by interinstitutional turf battles and conflicting member-state loyalties, ad hoc, envoy, in particular, neighborhood policy of fostering ties, former satellite states, an intrusion into Russia's geopolitical sphere of influence.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. As new _____ and _____ tactics in international politics _____ emerge from and through technological _____, similar ad hoc _____ are bound to appear elsewhere as well, _____ bringing with them _____ institutional change.
2. Such change may _____ from the formal _____ of new actors, for instance, when new states are _____ in the UN or when _____ are sent to corporations, thereby _____ them as diplomatic actors.
3. The resulting information _____ are gradually changing the context in which _____ diplomacy is practised, and ministries of foreign _____ have adapted their institutions and practices to _____ up with the development of 'digital _____'.
4. The EU, in particular its _____ policy of fostering closer ties with former Soviet _____ states, is viewed by Moscow as an _____ into Russia's geopolitical _____ of influence.
5. '_____ warfare', including efforts at _____, became associated with Russia's operations in Ukraine in 2014, and later also with China's _____ and those of non-state _____ such as Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and the _____ State in Iraq and Syria.
6. Studies informed by social theory have taken a _____ interest in the opportunity offered by the _____ 'laboratory' of the EEAS to observe how

norms, roles and _____ have _____ the practical _____ of EU foreign policy.

7. The role of _____ diplomacy then becomes one of effectively _____ narratives that resist or _____ disinformation _____, or convincingly deliver another _____ of the political _____.

8. Disinformation is _____ defined as ‘the distribution, _____, dissemination of false, mistaken, or _____ information in an intentional, deliberate, or _____ effort to mislead, _____, or confuse’.

9. The _____ of Russian disinformation in the Brexit _____ and the US election during 2016 has led to this _____ becoming a key concern for the _____ of western democracy, _____ a global increase in attempts at countering digital disinformation using _____ communication and digital technologies.

10. Day-to-day practical _____ depends on diplomats’ enactment of the _____ of those in whose name they speak as _____ as those of their audiences.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To foster, to contest, transition, to examine, practitioner, measures, to safeguard, disinformation, aspiration, to enact.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. Recently, critically orientated approaches have raised questions about the effects of measures undertaken to counter hybrid warfare, suggesting that some efforts to safeguard democracy may become counterproductive.

2. Furthermore, audiences are now more informed about foreign policy-making, and in consequence have assumed a more empowered role.

3. For instance, the US Department of State created a task force on ‘Ediplomacy’ in 2002 as a response to the increasing need for understanding and management of the new information environment after the 9/11 attacks.
4. Furthermore, old habits can be transferred from one social setting into another, in the process introducing change via their transfer to new actors.
5. This process has been reflected above all in changes in information gathering and the increasing presence of diplomatic organizations and their members on social media, most notably on Twitter.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 9. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GENDERED MULTILEVEL GAMES IN FOREIGN POLICY

In these times of increasing polarization, gender is one of the major fault-lines in contemporary global politics. In recent decades, two major trends in global politics are apparent. On the one hand, there has been a noticeable promotion of pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy. Gender equality is now a salient issue in international relations, alongside human rights, multilateralism and liberal democracy. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has become an integral part of the normative international policy framework on peacebuilding; and gender equality is one of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, national and international security is increasingly linked to women’s security. Several studies have shown how the level of violence against women correlates with a state’s levels of

stability and peacefulness. This line of argument was stressed, for example, by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who advocated women's empowerment not only as the 'right thing to do' but also as a 'smart' policy and a vital component of US national security. Gender mainstreaming has been widely adopted by international institutions, organizations and states. Women's participation and representation in peace operations and negotiations have gained increasing visibility and importance in global affairs, with a number of international policy institutes and organizations tracking and mapping women's descriptive representation (women's numerical presence in representative positions). The WPS agenda has even become one of the core foreign policy pillars of some states, such as Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa and Sweden. For these states, the promotion of pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy is seen as a chance to exercise global and regional leadership and to undertake 'nation-branding', as well as 'smart' diplomacy and economics. As the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed it, 'gender equality is an opportunity, not a threat'.

On the other hand, we have also witnessed an opposite trend in contemporary global politics, with growing resistance to pro-gender equality norms and increasing difficulties in sustaining previously agreed multilateral commitments to women's human rights. This trend reflects a noticeable 'remasculinization' of international politics. A growing number of male populist political leaders are now forming governments in large and powerful as well as in smaller states. Most of these political leaders mobilize an antagonistic politics based on gendered dynamics, combining misogyny, anti-elitism and racism to challenge what they generally perceive as an 'unjust world order'. Discontent with neo-liberalism, combined with the economic inequalities and uncertainties generated by globalization and the concomitant financial, conflictual, migration and health crises, has fuelled support for both far-right and Islamic extremist movements that recruit members by promoting practices harmful to women.

Hence, gendered dynamics are strikingly present in the resurgence of populism and radical forms of nationalism, and of violent extremism, which threaten the liberal world order from within. Populist political leaders in a diverse set of countries, including Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey and the United States, share an ambition to reverse the feminist gains of recent decades, together with regimes in other states such as Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. The subordination of women fits these leaders' strongly held world-view that the 'natural' political order is based on male domination and gender segregation. The adoption of an 'alpha male foreign policy' by a number of countries is one reason why a dozen female world leaders recently warned that a 'war on women' is eroding women's rights globally.

Political leaders play a central role in navigating and shaping foreign policy change and continuity. Leaders leverage their own personal resources, such as their experience, ability to communicate well and rapport with followers. They deploy ideas and ideology and build coalitions and networks in order to promote policy change, maneuvering within and across existing domestic and international structures. Among the range of factors, influencing foreign policy leaders is the role of gender, with respect to both how leadership is pursued (process) and what policy change is sought (substance). Yet to date the study of foreign policy leadership has been for the most part gender-blind. As Karen Smith argues, 'the sex of the decision-maker and the gendered nature of the decision-making processes have generally been left out of the picture'.

One of the major debates in the field of FPA relates to agency and structure. However, there are few if any contributions to this debate in FPA that explicitly problematize gendered structures, hierarchies and political actors. Building on the analysis of why gender matters in foreign policy, we propose a novel concept of 'gendered multilevel games' for use in the critical assessment of foreign policy leadership. Inspired by Harding's seminal work on structuration and standpoint theory, the concept unpacks the gendered and

mutual constitution of agent and structure. As such, it is distinct from the ‘iterative games’ concept of neo-liberal institutionalists.

The metaphor of games suggests there is an element of play and performance in the diplomatic interaction. Feminist theorists have long understood the performative aspect of gender, the ‘stylized repetition of acts’ in any social interaction that reflect specific narratives, for example, highlighting that the archetypal diplomat or political leader has a male body. Yet gender is not just an attribute of individuals, but a system of signification and meaning; thus it affects actors’ self-understanding and perceived interests. Gendered norms establish biological differences ‘not only as a natural fact but as the ontological basis for political and social differences’. They do not just legitimate differences and inequalities; they produce them. In times of crisis and upheaval, which are frequent in foreign policy, gendered norms, which create the illusion of fixed and stable structures, reassert boundaries – defining identity, the home, public and private, and the nation-state.

Recognizing gender as performative and a productive form of power, we view foreign policy through the lens of gendered games – involving gendered behaviour, symbolism and interaction. Because diplomacy is social and dynamic, political leaders can be attentive to shifts in the intersubjective consensus among other leaders and states as well as to their domestic constituencies, and in response may reshape both foreign policy processes and outcomes. How political leaders, as situated actors, perceive and navigate these gendered dynamics, whether consciously or unconsciously, is central to the analysis of gendered multilevel games. Moreover, our approach challenges the domestic/international divide in foreign policy by recognizing that the state itself consists of multiple actors and bureaucratic processes. In addition, foreign policy leadership is increasingly about harnessing the power of global networks and publics to address common and often intractable challenges, as much as it is about managing interstate relations.

Political leaders are constantly mediating a complex international social world of gender symbolism and normative structures that affect how states, non-state actors and individuals present themselves and are perceived. In this world, gender generates power and authority from ‘systems of signification and meaning’ that are socially produced and affect political actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests. Consequently, the application of the concept of gendered multilevel games sensitizes our empirical analysis of situated political actors to the material lived experience of human beings where gender intersects with, and often reinforces, other social categories of inequality and identity, such as race/ethnicity, sexuality, class, nationality status and so forth. For instance, contemporary global incentive structures may provide an overarching rationale, such as economic growth or sustainable peace, to enable political leaders to use gender games to advance pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy. At the same time, it takes time to change deeply entrenched patriarchal structures in states and in global politics. If the present rule-based liberal order, which promotes international norms such as human rights and gender equality, is further eroded, the opportunities for navigating gendered multilevel games to promote outcomes conducive to gender equality in foreign policy are likely to be reduced. As such, existing patriarchal structures both constrain feminist and gender equality actions and enable resistance to them. For example, hyper-masculine performance of foreign policy, which is reflected in strong-arm tactics and displays of hard power, can be a game of political contestation embedded in antagonistic (racist, sexist, contested sovereignty) discourses that effectively mobilize anti-gender norms while also resisting pro-gender equality norms.

In sum, adept political leaders can maneuver these gendered dynamics vis-à-vis other leaders, institutions and structures to reconfigure diplomatic games, and to reshape and legitimize foreign policy outcomes. However, these gendered dynamics are also contextual and conditional, and vary from one

specific foreign policy domain to another. Thus, the power and authority of political leaders as situated actors to restructure foreign policy are contingent on their capacity to act and their understanding of the gendered dynamics of the situation.

Many populist leaders tend to favor a personal, direct, hyper-masculine leadership style, which offers them greater room for maneuver in both domestic and global politics. They also seek to bring back national ‘greatness’ through the pursuit of a revisionist foreign policy. Most analysts agree that the Trump administration lacked a clear sense of direction about substantive foreign policy goals and doctrines. However, political leadership is seen as vital in Trump’s campaign to restore and reclaim US ‘greatness’ in world politics. This campaign is marked by an extreme sensitivity to symbolism, where status, respect and recognition are seen as critical pillars upholding American foreign policy process and practice. Trump’s political mantra of ‘making America great again’, which has been consistently used in the administration’s political rhetoric, draws heavily on gendered leadership, symbolism and anti-gender norms in global politics. Thus, following his election in 2016, Trump marked the shift in US foreign policy by espousing a practice of strong-arm tactics and seeking out opportunities for visceral male bonding with foreign political leaders. One striking example of such a hyper-masculine gendered game was the North Korea–US summit in 2018. At this meeting, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un reinforced each other’s performance of gendered leadership by engaging in ‘masculinity contests’ over the size of the buttons they would press to release nuclear warheads, among myriad other examples.

President Trump’s leadership style enacted a gendered multilevel game through a power-oriented, macho-style, ‘winner-takes-all’ approach to foreign policy. On numerous occasions, Trump used gender-loaded symbolism – for example, during the election campaign of 2016, when he repeatedly discredited the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by describing her as an ‘evil

woman'. Likewise, he often referred to the former US president Barack Obama as a 'weak' accommodative globalist who, according to Trump, put American interests second to those of other states, resulting in a 'national humiliation' in which the rest of the world was 'laughing' at the United States. Trump's claim was that this approach weakened America, endangering its rightful claim to the top position in global politics, and consequently needed to be replaced by a more power-orientated diplomacy that draws authority from traditional gender norms in global politics. This triggered a dramatic shift towards bilateralism and militarism that reflects a disbelief in multilateral diplomacy.

President Erdoğan provides the other example in the way he negotiates domestic, international and transnational political authority and power. Erdoğan's political leadership seeks to throw off the gendered insecurity of Turkey in relation to western hegemonic powers. Like Trump, Erdoğan relies on his connection to social and religious conservatives for his domestic hold on political power. Erdoğan's control over the Turkish economy and society also extends to his networks with powerful businesspersons who are able to profiteer while the government cracks down on labour unions and workers' rights. The same authoritarianism also benefits male heads of household, whose dominance is assured by laws and policies restricting women's sexual and reproductive rights, their freedom of dress and their mobility.

President Erdoğan uses the gendered symbolism of women's bodies to assert his power both domestically and internationally. By singling out women who do not conform to conservative, religious norms, he signals both the reach of his state power and his rejection of the liberal international order, along with its core principles of human rights and women's rights. In several speeches, Erdoğan has claimed that abortion is stalling Turkey's economic growth, and has branded the procedure 'murder'. He has argued that women should be confined to the domestic sphere and dedicated to traditional roles, such as cooking and household chores.

In the context of the Syrian conflict, President Erdoğan struck a ‘patriarchal bargain’ with President Trump regarding the US withdrawal from Syria, allowing Turkey to reassert its power over the ‘feminized’ Kurds and their claim to territory. In that context, men apparently loyal to a Turkish-backed militia group, in a town taken from Kurdish fighters who had held it during the conflict with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, released a video on social media depicting their abuse of the body of a dead young female Kurdish fighter, Amara Renas, while yelling ‘Allahu Akhbar’. According to the Kurdish authorities, these were the very same methods used by Islamic State. This event, played out in the global media, revealed the antipathy of the Turkish regime to the Kurds through the violation of a female fighter’s body. The dead woman, who had taken on the traditionally male role of fighting against violent and misogynistic Islamic extremists, symbolized a challenge to the Turkish regime’s gender norms as well as to Turkey’s territorial boundaries. President Erdoğan’s administration deliberately targets women’s rights and restrains women’s bodily autonomy as an act of power and authority that employs gendered symbolism to shore up domestic and transnational conservative religious political constituencies, and to entrench Turkey’s regional hegemony in relation to international foreign policy alliances.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Patriarchal bargain, deliberately, to entrench Turkey’s regional hegemony in relation to international foreign policy alliances, territorial boundaries, to restrain women’s bodily autonomy, to reassert its power over the ‘feminized’ Kurds, apparently, to reveal the antipathy of the Turkish regime to the Kurds, to shore up domestic and transnational conservative religious political constituencies, to employ gendered symbolism, the traditionally male role of fighting against violent and misogynistic Islamic extremists, to assert his power

both domestically and internationally, rejection of the liberal international order, core principles of human rights and women's rights, depicting their abuse of the body of a dead young female Kurdish fighter, to throw off the gendered insecurity of Turkey in relation to western hegemonic powers, leadership style, consequently, to trigger, as a 'weak' accommodative globalist, national humiliation, to restructure foreign policy, engaging in 'masculinity contests' over the size of the buttons, to seek to bring back national 'greatness' through the pursuit of a revisionist foreign policy, greater room for maneuver in both domestic and global politics, to reconfigure diplomatic games, to reshape and legitimize foreign policy outcomes, to generate power and authority from 'systems of signification and meaning', performative and a productive form of power, constantly mediating a complex international social world of gender symbolism and normative structures, social categories of inequality and identity, such as race/ethnicity, sexuality, class, nationality status and so forth, for instance, the diplomatic interaction, to reshape both foreign policy processes and outcomes, to legitimate differences and inequalities, stylized repetition of acts, to affect political actors' self-understandings and perceived interests, to create the illusion of fixed and stable structures, reassert boundaries – defining identity, the home, public and private, and the nation-state, to provide an overarching rationale, such as economic growth or sustainable peace, to enable political leaders to use gender games, to advance pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy, to change deeply entrenched patriarchal structures in states and in global politics, Trump's political mantra of 'making America great again', distinct from the 'iterative games' concept of neo-liberal institutionalists, to explicitly problematize gendered structures, hierarchies and political actors, combined with the economic inequalities and uncertainties, generated by globalization and the concomitant financial, conflictual, migration and health crises, multilateralism, a noticeable promotion of pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy, to promote outcomes conducive to gender equality, to be attentive to

shifts in the intersubjective consensus among other leaders and states, marked by an extreme sensitivity to symbolism, status, respect and recognition, critical pillars upholding American foreign policy process and practice, hyper-masculine performance of foreign policy, endangering its rightful claim to the top position in global politics, power-oriented diplomacy, a dramatic shift towards bilateralism and militarism, to cracks down on labour unions, during the election campaign of 2016, to repeatedly discredit the former US Secretary of State, contemporary global incentive structures, whether consciously or unconsciously, to threaten liberal world order, the resurgence of populism and radical forms of nationalism, and of violent extremism, the normative international policy framework on peacebuilding; and gender equality.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. Trump's _____ was that this approach weakened America, _____ its rightful claim to the top _____ in global politics, and _____ needed to be replaced by a more power-orientated _____ that draws authority from traditional gender _____ in global politics.
2. At this meeting, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un _____ each other's performance of gendered _____ by engaging in '_____ contests' over the size of the buttons they would press to _____ nuclear _____, among myriad other examples.
3. For example, hyper-masculine _____ of foreign policy, which is reflected in _____ tactics and displays of hard power, can be a _____ of political contestation _____ in antagonistic (racist, sexist, contested _____) discourses that _____ mobilize anti-gender norms while also resisting pro-gender _____ norms.
4. In times of crisis and _____, which are _____ in foreign policy, gendered norms, which create the _____ of fixed and stable structures,

reassert boundaries – defining _____, the home, public and private, and the _____.

5. The adoption of an ‘alpha male foreign _____’ by a number of countries is one reason why a _____ female world leaders recently _____ that a ‘war on women’ is _____ women’s rights _____.

6. Women’s _____ and representation in peace operations and _____ have gained increasing _____ and importance in global affairs, with a number of international policy _____ and organizations tracking and _____ women’s descriptive representation (women’s numerical presence in _____ positions).

7. Discontent with _____, combined with the economic _____ and uncertainties generated by _____ and the concomitant financial, conflictual, _____ and health crises, has fuelled support for both _____ and Islamic extremist movements that _____ members by promoting practices _____ to women.

8. Gender _____ is now a _____ issue in international relations, alongside human rights, _____ and liberal democracy.

9. _____, the power and authority of political _____ as situated actors to _____ foreign policy are contingent on their _____ to act and their understanding of the gendered _____ of the situation.

10. Feminist _____ have long understood the performative aspect of gender, the ‘stylized _____ of acts’ in any social interaction that _____ specific narratives, for example, _____ that the archetypal diplomat or _____ leader has a male _____.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To participate, to display, gender, hegemony, context, domestically, ethnicity, to legitimize, to entrench, thus.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. The same authoritarianism also benefits male heads of household, whose dominance is assured by laws and policies restricting women's sexual and reproductive rights, their freedom of dress and their mobility.
2. He has argued that women should be confined to the domestic sphere and dedicated to traditional roles, such as cooking and household chores.
3. However, political leadership is seen as vital in Trump's campaign to restore and reclaim US 'greatness' in world politics.
4. For instance, contemporary global incentive structures may provide an overarching rationale, such as economic growth or sustainable peace, to enable political leaders to use gender games to advance pro-gender equality norms in foreign policy.
5. Populist political leaders in a diverse set of countries, including Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey and the United States, share an ambition to reverse the feminist gains of recent decades, together with regimes in other states such as Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 10. WHY PROTESTS MATTER: THE BATTLE BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY, A WAR WE MUST WIN

It has been more than a decade since the 2009 protests in Iran, in which the people rose up and voted to shake off the oppressive bonds of Islamic theocracy and demand their God-given rights. Instead of being a moment of

triumph for the universal longing for freedom, it was marked by widespread ballot fraud, ushering in the largest protests since the Islamic Revolution, dubbed the “Green Movement.” It also marked a stunning failure of U.S. foreign policy.

Though the Green Movement brought an opportunity to change the trajectory of Iran’s future, the U.S. administration at the time did not support the Iranian people nor rally the international community on behalf of the oppressed. It was only after protesters were beaten in the streets that then U.S. President Barack Obama spoke up. Not only did his administration fail to meet the moment, but also President Obama reportedly “overruled advisers who wanted to do what America had done at similar transitions from dictatorship to democracy, and signal America’s support.” Over the next decade, the Iranian regime brutally crushed additional protests, kidnapped Americans, continued to deprive Iranian women and minorities of their basic human rights, financed terrorist groups, and generally made the region and world unsafe.

Last year, protests erupted across the globe as authoritarian rulers fought to maintain their control over freedom-loving peoples from Caracas to Khartoum, Moscow to Hong Kong— a struggle whose outcome will define the 21st century. These protests transcended geographic boundaries and social classes, afflicting our allies, adversaries, and partners alike. It is painfully clear that the United States should never simply be an impartial observer. Silence and inaction send a deafening signal to corrupt, dictatorial regimes that they can strip away their citizens’ identities and freedoms with impunity. It is morally reprehensible and, as we have seen with Iran, also dangerous for our own nation.

In the aftermath of World War II, America worked to prove to the world that free, democratic governance was the most effective and ethical way to administer a nation-state. The U.S.S.R. worked to undermine these values worldwide, but its corruption and weak economy doomed it in the long run.

Today, we see a rise in authoritarian regimes that are both economically powerful and overtly hostile to civil society, with China being by far the most potent and malign example. Indeed, China uses sophisticated new tools through the internet and social media to carry out the repression of its citizens. Such behavior is not sustainable. The yearning for freedom is intrinsic to every human being, transcending culture, ethnicity, and socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, while a regime can repress it for a time, there are long-term costs and consequences for doing so.

For billions worldwide, there is no more powerful example of the irrepressibility of the human desire for freedom than the 1989 protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The students, who were eventually joined by Beijing residents and Chinese from the provinces, took to the Square against a lack of economic opportunity, inflation, and the corruption of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Soon, the protests escalated into calls for freedom and democracy. Many demonstrating did so courageously, in the face of near-certain death as Chinese People's Liberation Army tanks rolled in. While the CCP violently struck down thousands of protesters, their bravery has served as a powerful inspiration to those who bear it on themselves to defend democracy and advance the cause of freedom.

This inspiration is seen in the struggle of the people of Hong Kong, whose long-cherished freedoms have been eroded for years as Beijing has broken its promises and international commitments to Hong Kong's autonomy. For many in the city, an unjust bill introduced by the government that would allow extraditions from Hong Kong to mainland China – and expose people to the CCP's corrupt judicial system – was the straw that broke the camel's back. It brought over a million protesters from all backgrounds to the streets, likely making them the largest demonstrations in Hong Kong's history. The police responded with brutality, beating and arbitrarily detaining protesters and

slapping on spurious charges against them, as well as detaining and harassing medical workers who could otherwise attend to injured demonstrators.

The National Security Law that Beijing imposed in June was the latest blow to Hong Kong's freedoms. The destruction of Hong Kong's autonomy is not only a tragedy for its people but has major geopolitical implications, including severely weakening the city's status as an international economic hub. However, Hong Kongers are far from solitary in their recent fight for freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

A decade after 2009, Iranians' economic grievances and frustration over price increases of basic consumer goods boiled into the largest protests since the Green Movement. Instead of addressing unemployment and an economy declining in part due to sanctions over its malign regional activities, the regime in Tehran continued to spend money funding foreign adventurism and terrorism abroad. Protesters quickly shifted from anger over economic mismanagement and corruption to demands for political and social freedoms – including, notably, women's rights, as Iranians protested their nation's repressive compulsory hijab law.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, peaceful protesters began in 2014 calling for freedom from drug-trafficking dictator Nicolás Maduro. After suffering under years of blatant cronyism and human rights abuses, including jailing dissidents, Venezuelans took to the streets in historic numbers to call for Maduro's removal. The regime responded by violently suppressing the protests, weaponizing its food supply, and committing crimes against humanity such as killings, torture, and disappearances. Thankfully, the Trump administration has taken swift measures to support the Venezuelan people in their struggle to restore the rule of law and democratic order.

In Sudan, peaceful protests in 2019 fueled by anger over corruption, poor economic conditions, lack of governance, repression, and egregious human rights violations led to the ousting of corrupt dictator and indicted war criminal

Omar al-Bashir – who oversaw genocide and crimes against humanity and hosted al-Qaeda training camps during his decades in power. Sudanese from all walks of life demonstrated, demanding an end to Bashir's brutal reign, even when met with violence and repression.

Since the fall of Bashir's bloodthirsty regime, a joint military-civilian-led transitional government has worked hard to secure a path toward democracy and peace, despite many challenges. Should the Sudanese prove successful in their pursuit of stable, democratic governance; the results will have significant implications. The United States would be able to: advance discussions on removing Sudan from the State Sponsor of Terror list; review new security cooperation arrangements with the United States and our allies; open economic relations that would help Sudan rebuild while also providing the United States and others with a new market for exports; and potentially even pursue a Sudanese-Israeli peace agreement.

In Europe, the world has watched as the people of Belarus have risen up peacefully against dictator Alexander Lukashenko, who has ruled the country with an iron fist since 1994. For Belarusians, this is a critical opportunity to reject decades of Soviet-style control – marked by continued arbitrary detentions and interrogations at the hands of the KGB – and replace it with a transparent government and the ability to decide their own future. What follows in Belarus will send ripples across Europe, NATO, and our collective security. It is in our national interest to have a stable, responsible government that is accountable to its people and able to withstand pressures from Vladimir Putin or other malign actors.

While factors vary by country and region, beneath the surface of each of these protests there has been a pervasive theme: the global battle between authoritarianism and democracy. The United States has a tremendous stake in winning this fight, but policymakers must make the case to weary Americans,

exhausted by decades of war abroad and suffering from a pandemic-induced recession at home.

Proponents of a robust U.S. foreign policy should view populist skepticism of U.S. involvement abroad as an opportunity to sharpen their arguments by grounding the impetus for American leadership in the common good of the American people and world. First, there is the morality of rights that only the United States is positioned to champion. Unlike many other countries, Americans recognize that these rights derive not from any man, nor were they granted by the authority of any government. They are God-given. The principles enshrined in our founding documents, which have driven our own struggle for freedom, define who we are as Americans. Our foreign policy must reflect that basic conviction.

Authoritarian regimes especially do not recognize this fundamental truth. These are regimes that have no mooring in the natural rights of their people. The United States has a moral obligation, embodied in the laws that govern Americans and our institutions wherever in the world we operate, to protect and defend these rights from tyranny. However, beyond that moral obligation, because authoritarian regimes lack the secure foundation of natural rights, they inexorably move toward instability, which has a direct impact on Americans. This is in contrast to democratic nations with robust civil societies, which tend to protect individual freedoms, respect their people's rights, and rarely cause significant problems for regional stability. They are also more likely to be economically prosperous and become reliable trading partners. Compare democratic nations to regimes like that of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, whose bloody war has sent a massive tide of refugees into Europe, or Venezuela, where Maduro's domestic repression and narcotics trafficking have destabilized much of Latin America, caused a hemispheric migrant crisis, and sent a wave of drugs and crime to our allies and the United States. These

authoritarian states also offer opportunities for malign actors like Russia and China to exploit a crisis or conflict and subvert American interests.

Autocratic regimes tend to be outright hostile to other nations when it comes to conducting trade and economic relations. The most destructive example is China under the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP's evil and repressive policies against its own people – e.g. surveilling and jailing religious and ethnic minorities or denying the nation basic liberties such as the right to free expression – have long been well known. Yet international investors tried to convince themselves that such repression would not affect Beijing's dealings outside of China. For decades, workers in the United States have suffered because of China's predatory economic practices, and in recent years, U.S. investors have increasingly found themselves deprived of the market access they were promised.

It is no mystery why; as the Chinese playbook is clear at this point. After luring foreign firms with promises of cheap labor, the CCP then slowly seizes everything that makes those firms successful – their production techniques, trade secrets, and human resources – transferring these assets to CCP-controlled domestic competitors and foreclosing any possibility of fair competition.

Beijing also uses forced labor from Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities imprisoned in extrajudicial internment camps to make goods to export abroad. Most recently, reports surfaced that the Chinese government was using forced labor to make personal protective equipment amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides depriving the American people of stable, dignified work, Beijing's blatant intellectual property theft also comes with a hefty price tag to our economy: between \$225 billion and \$600 billion per year.

Under its Belt and Road Initiative, China uses debt-trap diplomacy to exert control over the political systems and economies of countries it seeks to influence and, in some cases, informally subjugate. Beijing backs huge, state-

directed firms like Huawei to thuggishly compete with private companies abroad and, after unfairly beating out competitors for international contracts such as for 5G implementation, gains access to critical technological infrastructure of foreign nations.

Now, China is working to try to sell its authoritarian tools abroad and undermine norms of good governance. To vulnerable nations, the CCP offers an effective toolkit for repression and graft for corrupt elite, allowing enriched dictators to paint a façade of economic success. This approach is evil because it devalues human life and harms future economic opportunity for millions worldwide. However, even from an amoral perspective, there are reasons to doubt its legitimacy. In China, the ruthless exploitation of the country's rural population for the benefit of an urban upper class no longer provides high economic growth, and nations abroad are starting to wake up to the dangers of partnering with Beijing or its state-run firms. Moreover, when disasters like the initial COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan occur, the world sees firsthand how autocratic regimes respond. They hide information by punishing whistleblowers and stifling the free flow of important data to the rest of the world. In other words, they act to preserve their own power at the price of global health and security – not to mention the well-being of their own people. In contrast, good governance and democratic principles promoted by the United States promote the common good for Americans and the rest of the world. The American-led system of economic alliances rebuilt Europe after World War II. It guided governments in Europe and Asia to their present prosperity and has raised billions out of poverty in developing nations. In addition, with the right political priorities, this is valuable for Americans not just as consumers, but producers as well. In general, stable markets and law-abiding states allow for durable contracts in long-term business relationships. One of the most important goals of the Marshall Plan, for example, was to develop a European market overseen by democratic leaders that would buy American goods.

However, for a country like the United States, a mutually beneficial relationship is not possible when dealing with an authoritarian rival constantly looking to undercut its would-be business partner.

The threats, however, that authoritarian regimes pose to Americans extend beyond reduced economic opportunity. These regimes also give rise to threats to our national security that directly harm Americans. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad's autocratic rule and prolonged war have spurred the uprising of jihadist terrorist groups that have gone on to kill Americans and others. Moreover, in Tehran, the regime's devotion to funding terrorist organizations has meant countless lives lost, including Americans, at the hands of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Bashar al-Assad's autocratic rule and prolonged war, the uprising of jihadist terrorist groups, the regime's devotion to funding terrorist organizations, a mutually beneficial relationship, to undercut its would-be business partner, to see firsthand how autocratic regimes respond, to wake up to the dangers of partnering with Beijing or its state-run firms, with the right political priorities, stable markets and law-abiding states allow for durable contracts in long-term business relationships, to doubt its legitimacy, to offer an effective toolkit for repression and graft for corrupt elite, allowing enriched dictators to paint a façade of economic success, to sell its authoritarian tools abroad, to undermine norms of good governance, vulnerable nations, to harm future economic opportunity for millions worldwide, the ruthless exploitation of the country's rural population for the benefit of an urban upper class, the American-led system of economic alliances, to thuggishly compete with private companies abroad, ethnic minorities imprisoned in extrajudicial internment camps, to make goods to export abroad, to gain access to critical technological

infrastructure of foreign nations, mystery, to slowly seize everything that makes firms successful, production techniques, trade secrets, and human resources, to transfer assets to CCP-controlled domestic competitors, foreclosing any possibility of fair competition, using forced labor to make personal protective equipment amid the COVID-19 pandemic, durable contracts in long-term business relationships, to use debt-trap diplomacy to exert control over the political systems and economies of countries, predatory economic practices, domestic repression and narcotics trafficking, proponents of a robust U.S. foreign policy, to tend to protect individual freedoms, respect their people's rights, and rarely cause significant problems for regional stability, to be outright hostile to other nations, moral obligation, authoritarian regimes lack the secure foundation of natural rights, they inexorably move toward instability, a direct impact on Americans, mystery, depriving the American people of stable, dignified work, surveilling and jailing religious and ethnic minorities or denying the nation basic liberties, to review new security cooperation arrangements with the United States and our allies, to open economic relations that would help Sudan rebuild, a new market for exports, and potentially even pursue a Sudanese-Israeli peace agreement, comparing democratic nations to regimes like that of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a rise in authoritarian regimes, both economically powerful and overtly hostile to civil society, the most potent and malign example, indeed, to use sophisticated new tools through the internet and social media to carry out the repression of its citizens, sustainable. the yearning for freedom, intrinsic to every human being, transcending culture, ethnicity, and socioeconomic conditions, moreover, long-term costs and consequences, for billions worldwide, more powerful example of the irrepressibility of the human desire for freedom eventually joined by Beijing residents and Chinese from the provinces, a lack of economic opportunity, inflation, and the corruption of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, to escalate into calls for freedom and democracy,

courageously, in the face of near-certain death as Chinese People's Liberation Army tanks, to violently strike down thousands of protesters, a powerful inspiration, to defend democracy and advance the cause of freedom, long-cherished freedoms have been eroded for years, to break promises and international commitments to Hong Kong's autonomy, extraditions, to expose people to the CCP's corrupt judicial system, a million protesters from all backgrounds to the streets, likely, with brutality, beating and arbitrarily detaining protesters, meanwhile, to shift from anger over economic mismanagement and corruption to demands for political and social freedoms, violently suppressing the protests, weaponizing its food supply, committing crimes against humanity such as killings, torture, and disappearances, thankfully, to take swift measures to support the Venezuelan people in their struggle, to restore the rule of law and democratic order, fueled by anger over corruption, poor economic conditions, lack of governance, repression, and egregious human rights violations, the ousting of corrupt dictator, indicted war criminals, a decade, to shake off the oppressive bonds of Islamic theocracy and demand their God-given rights, a moment of triumph for the universal longing for freedom, widespread ballot fraud, ushering in the largest protests, a stunning failure of U.S. foreign policy, to change the trajectory of Iran's future, rally, on behalf of the oppressed, to deprive Iranian women and minorities of their basic human rights, financed terrorist groups, to make the region and world unsafe, to erupt across the globe, to maintain control over freedom-loving peoples, to transcend geographic boundaries and social classes, afflicting our allies, adversaries, and partners alike, painfully, to be an impartial observer, a deafening signal to corrupt, dictatorial regimes, to strip away their citizens' identities and freedoms with impunity, morally reprehensible, in the aftermath of World War II, to undermine these values worldwide, in the long run, a rise in authoritarian regimes, both economically powerful and overtly hostile to civil society, the most potent and malign example, sustainable.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. However, for a country like the United States, a _____ beneficial relationship is not possible when _____ with an authoritarian rival _____ looking to _____ its would-be business partner.
2. It is in our national interest to have a stable, _____ government that is accountable to its people and able to _____ pressures from Vladimir Putin or other _____ actors.
3. The United States would be able to: _____ discussions on removing Sudan from the State Sponsor of Terror list; _____ new security cooperation _____ with the United States and our _____; open economic relations that would help Sudan _____ while also providing the United States and others with a new _____ for exports; and _____ even pursue a Sudanese-Israeli _____ agreement.
4. Proponents of a _____ U.S. foreign policy should view populist _____ of U.S. involvement abroad as an _____ to sharpen their arguments by grounding the _____ for American leadership in the common _____ of the American people and _____.
5. The _____ of Hong Kong's autonomy is not only a tragedy for its people but has major _____ implications, including _____ weakening the city's status as an international economic _____.
6. Over the next _____, the Iranian regime _____ crushed additional protests, _____ Americans, continued to _____ Iranian women and minorities of their basic human _____, financed _____ groups, and generally made the region and world _____.
7. Since the fall of Bashir's _____ regime, a joint military-civilian-led _____ government has worked hard to _____ a path toward _____ and peace, despite many _____.

8. Besides depriving the American people of stable, _____ work, Beijing's _____ intellectual property theft also comes with a _____ price tag to our economy: between \$225 billion and \$600 _____ per year.

9. One of the most _____ goals of the Marshall Plan, for example, was to develop a _____ market overseen by democratic _____ that would buy American _____.

10. For Belarusians, this is a critical opportunity to _____ decades of Soviet-style control – marked by continued arbitrary _____ and _____ at the hands of the KGB – and replace it with a _____ government and the ability to decide their own _____.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

Surveilling, proponents, nation, trafficking, on behalf of, to carry out, consequences, to preserve, to mention, governance.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. In China, the ruthless exploitation of the country's rural population for the benefit of an urban upper class no longer provides high economic growth, and nations abroad are starting to wake up to the dangers of partnering with Beijing or its state-run firms.

2. Most recently, reports surfaced that the Chinese government was using forced labor to make personal protective equipment amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

3. For decades, workers in the United States have suffered because of China's predatory economic practices, and in recent years, U.S. investors have increasingly found themselves deprived of the market access they were promised.

4. Now, China is working to try to sell its authoritarian tools abroad and undermine norms of good governance.

5. Last year, protests erupted across the globe as authoritarian rulers fought to maintain their control over freedom-loving peoples from Caracas to Khartoum, Moscow to Hong Kong – a struggle whose outcome will define the 21st century.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 11. THE SHIFTING SANDS OF GLOBAL ORDER

The resistance to diplomatic solutions today is common to most of the major conflicts affecting world peace. Vladimir Putin's revisionism has launched NATO into the biggest military buildup on Russia's borders since the Cold War. An Arab-Israeli peace is as elusive as the chance of an imploding broader Middle East making peace with itself anytime soon. Moreover, in East Asia, China's challenge to U.S. military hegemony threatens to corral these two powers into a Thucydides trap. A similar strategic deadfall was in Sir Eyre Crowe's mind when he predicted in his famous 1907 memorandum that Germany's defiance of British naval hegemony was bound to lead to war – which it did in 1914.

Understanding Middle East Disorder

A military response can always temporarily change the balance of power, but it does not offer durable solutions, be it in East Asia, Syria, Palestine, or Ukraine. It certainly cannot resolve situations that stem from deeply rooted cultural and religious convictions, like the rise of Islamist extremism. Young people are being drawn to jihadism out of a quest for status and belonging to a

wider community. Young men in a state of emotional deprivation embrace religion as a way to extricate themselves from a life of hopelessness and failure. A religious mission, even when it leads to death and destruction, is their way to greater meaning.

The current Middle East mayhem is largely due to America's oscillation between two destructively destabilizing approaches. First, it was George W. Bush's "constructive instability" strategy – he eventually left the region at the instability stage – and then Obama's vacillation between withdrawal and timid engagement.

Yet, the crisis in the lands of Islam is fundamentally a civilizational and homegrown conflict. The lesson from Iraq and from Israel's war with Hamas and Hezbollah is that forging international and regional alliances around a legitimate objective and an educated understanding of complex historical conditions are more adequate than sheer military capacity for tackling complex religious and cultural conflicts. Israel's way against Hamas – two eyes for an eye – represents a nihilistic decline into a permanent state of war. After a long, inconclusive war in Afghanistan, Washington finally accepted that negotiating with the Taliban is no anathema.

Engaging political Islam needs to be a central component of a new reform and peace strategy in the Middle East. The challenge is not how to destroy Islamic movements, but how to turn them away from revolutionary politics by allowing them legitimate political space. The tense equation between the incumbent Arab regimes and political Islam cannot be a zero-sum game, as Egyptian President Sisi pretends. Taking religion out of the public square is a Western liberal model that cannot work in the Arab world. The region has a formidable and historic task of building a modern state for devout people.

Eradicating the mother of all jihadists, the Islamic State, is of course a noble mission. Yet, it is conducted within a tension between values and highly uncertain strategic benefits. The Islamic State is the symptom, not the root

cause, of the meltdown of artificial Arab states. The only true antidotes to the group are strong and solid Arab states. The borders of its expansion are functional Sunni states with a firm national identity, like Turkey, and solid nation-states, like Iran and Israel. Should the Islamic State try to expand toward Jordan, it would meet an orderly state whose survival is a primordial Israeli concern.

Sunni warlords are bound to be a persistent phenomenon in Arab lands as long as the socio-political environment that has produced them remains unchanged. The indigenous Islamist groups operating beyond the Caliphate borders – in Sinai and North Africa – might have sworn allegiance to al-Baghdadi, but they neither owe their existence to him, nor will they disappear if the Islamic State's core is defeated.

The challenge posed by the Russia–Iran–Hezbollah axis is far more robust than that of the Islamic State, and its strategic goals are already being attained. They go beyond just consolidating a resurrected Syria and Iraq as unfriendly nations to the West. An Assad victory in the Syrian war would mean the end of Sunni communities as a social and political force in the space stretching from the liberated Damascus–Aleppo arch down to the Lebanese border. The Iranian Shia Empire would then consist of a contiguous belt stretching from Tehran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It also has footholds in the Shia areas of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Yemen, where the Houthis have become Iran's proxy in the local war.

The United States has lost the will and capacity to challenge this radical reshaping of the strategic game in the Middle East, a region that will remain for a long time vital to the security of the West. The irony of it all is that Washington is almost exclusively focused on fighting the Islamic State, precisely the one piece of the puzzle that counterbalances the Moscow-led axis. America is now paving the way, through its obsession with the Islamic State and its estrangement from its Sunni allies in the region, for the consolidation of a

takeover of the Middle East by Moscow and Tehran in connivance with Turkey, a NATO member that is closer these days to Moscow than to Washington.

The Islamic State may or may not be defeated, but the United States is bound to once again betray its most efficient allies in the war, the Kurdish Peshmerga. Washington's strategic trap is such that compensating the Kurds with their longed for statehood would be torpedoed by all of America's reluctant allies and foes, including Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. It is certainly not going to be a Wilsonian post-war ideal for the Kurds.

Missing Multilateralism

The world would be a better place if powers, small and big alike, moved past their penchant for unilateral action. Multilateralism was definitely vital in solving conflicts, such as those in the Balkans. A growing multilateral consensus was also responsible for the successful negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and the climate change deal reached in Paris.

But in the conflict theaters where nothing less than world peace is at stake, such as the Middle East and East Asia, actors are either going their own way or are incapable of devising convincing multilateral solutions. Stymied by domestic constraints, Washington has become an utterly ineffective broker in the Palestine process – it would do well to relinquish its monopoly over it. A multilateral enterprise along the lines of the negotiations with Iran would definitely be more effective.

Conspicuously, the most important emerging world actor, China, has traditionally been indifferent to multilateralism, a concept entirely alien to its political vocabulary. What China is looking for in its strategic vicinity is mastery, not a multilateral order. Beijing wants a return to the principles of the Westphalian system, namely no interference in its own internal affairs on matters of human rights. It also opposes circumventing this principle through Western-inspired concepts such as the so-called responsibility to protect, be it in Syria or North Korea.

There is nothing more dangerous in international relations than a strong power that is also insecure. Israel's penchant for overreaction on security matters and Iran's nuclear adventure and anti-status-quo strategy are cases of two encircled and isolated powers whose regional behavior stems from a genuine sense of existential vulnerability.

China is no different – it is an insecure giant. Its rise is compounded by fear and uncertainty. Its encirclement by what it considers a foreign power, the United States that threatens to encroach on its territorial integrity and Westphalian sovereignty is bound to turn Beijing into a revolutionary force bent on changing the status quo in East Asia. Before China and the United States overstep each other's boundaries, it is advisable to abandon the language of “primacy” and “containment” in favor of a regional concert of big Asian powers capable of solving differences and reducing tensions.

Winners in a Changing Global Order

With Putin's revisionism and Donald Trump's supposed isolationism, China may still emerge, however, as the real champion of the established global order. Throughout history, as we learned from Thucydides, it was the rising power, not the established one, which worked to upset the normal order. To prevent a revolutionary behavior of lesser powers, the global power should have an interest in upholding international institutions. Now it is America that has assumed with Trump a revolutionary position, while China defends global governance, the WTO, the Paris climate accord, and the international community's nuclear deal with Iran.

Military buildup in East Asia is compounded by a real war closer to Europe. To Vladimir Putin, the 1945 Yalta agreement did not die; its borders simply moved eastward. Putin is no Hitler, but he shares with him two ominous traits. One is his tendency to push the inherent laxity of democracies to fight back to the limits, and the other is the ambition to create a territorial contiguity with Russia's ethnic minorities beyond its borders.

Trump arrived in the White House after Putin had already upset the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East, and assumed the task of undoing the European Union. Russian banks saved Marine Le Pen's campaign after she was refused credits by French banks. Eastern Europeans are being drawn back to their core identity as Christians and Slavs, and Russian state-sponsored propaganda is already driving former Soviet republics away from the EU. Pro-Russian governments are now in place in Moldova, Bulgaria, and Estonia. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been campaigning for the end of "this nonsense," as Czech President Milos Zeman called the EU sanctions on Russia.

We hope that Trump's fascination with Putin will not prevent him from redressing the balance of power as part of, if not as a condition for, a true reset with Moscow. What kind of a realist would Trump be if he did not use a united Western alliance to reset relations with Moscow before acquiescing to a Yalta-style division of spheres of influence as if the Berlin Wall never fell?

Portraying Putin as the movie's bad guy will solve nothing, however. Of all people, it was George Kennan, the man who defined America's Cold War strategy, who also warned against NATO's enlargement. Instead of expanding a hostile military alliance up to Russia's borders, what was required was a strategy for engaging Russia and respecting its legitimate security concerns and sense of status.

The West is left with practically no cards to play in the Syrian war. It is then Ukraine that holds the key to reaching an understanding with Moscow. The February 2015 decentralization project for Ukraine, a key demand of Moscow, is still a dead letter. Europe, a "patient in an iron lung," as Arthur Koestler defined it 70 years ago, is now going through another momentous existential crisis, and it is truly pathetic to think that its embrace of Ukraine as a potential member, an idea fiercely opposed by Putin, could be the solution to Kiev's colossal financial problems.

This is not about resuscitating the Soviet empire; it is about reordering its dangerously chaotic dismemberment and ultimately engaging Russia in a benign cooperation with the West while strictly limiting Russian revisionism. Russia has a right to feel free from NATO's presence in its immediate near-abroad, provided Moscow acknowledges the territorial integrity of its neighbors.

Sanctions are not going to bring Russia to its knees. Its vast geography, nuclear capabilities, and immense cultural baggage make it a power to be reckoned with. A global superpower it is not, but Russia can be a highly dangerous global spoiler.

The Coming Global Order

No modern autocrat can survive through naked power alone – a doctrine and a mission are always required. That emerging powers, such as China, Russia, Turkey, and a plethora of non-state actors, are challenging a world order they had no part in drafting represents, in essence, the assertion of civilizational distinctions. The Western-inspired order of political correctness, the primacy of human rights, and international rules of conduct over the Westphalian concept of national sovereignty are incompatible with the traditions of the new rising powers and the major civilizations that are now asserting their presence with particular virulence.

Due to the evident exhaustion of Western universalism, Henry Kissinger's recipe in his latest book, *World Order*, of a return to the Westphalian system and the balance of power is gaining ground. President Trump's abhorrence of multilateralism, his promise of a spectacular boost to military budgets and nuclear arsenals, and his departure from America's enlightened global mission in the name of an "America First" idea with its ugly echoes from its own history are steps in that very direction. In this context, the possible withdrawal of South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia from the International Criminal Court, along with calls from the African Union for a mass withdrawal, are part of an illiberal

zeitgeist that is gaining ground both in domestic politics and in the international sphere.

It might, however, be premature to declare the death of multilateralism. The world's economies are too interdependent and trade wars would prove to be self-defeating. The compelling reality of climate change is bound to defeat its deniers and environmental challenges can only be tackled collectively. Wars can be declared unilaterally, but the resolution of conflicts, even when there seems to be an apparent winner as in the case of Syria's war, will always require a concert of nations. In the case of the Israel–Palestine situation, we have even seen Donald Trump advocate a “regional solution.”

Moreover, what about those areas and groups that have not even reached the Westphalian stage, including a great part of the Arab and Muslim Middle East? What about the spaces where no one is in charge and non-state actors and secondary states are starting to set their own agendas and are not deterred by the balance between world powers?

Allowing these foci of world concern to go through the entire historical cycle until they are fully “Westphalianized” is too dangerous for world peace. If global anarchy is to be averted, world powers – the Euro-Atlantic community with an engaged Russia – and regional actors need to facilitate transitions to more stable arrangements.

Universal peace is a dream for the fullness of time. Repeatedly, the attitude of Europe's public officials in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars (as it was interpreted in Henry Kissinger's *A World Restored*) that the optimal objective is not universal peace but periods of stability as prolonged as possible has been vindicated. However, even this requires that we are blessed with leaders that do not start a war out of anger or fight a battle out of spite.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

The resistance to diplomatic solutions, most of the major conflicts affecting world peace, revisionism, to launch NATO into the biggest military buildup on Russia's borders, as elusive as the chance of an imploding broader Middle East making peace, U.S. military hegemony, a Thucydides trap, a similar strategic deadfall, memorandum, Germany's defiance of British naval hegemony, to lead to war, a military response, to temporarily change the balance of power, to offer durable solutions, to stem from deeply rooted cultural and religious convictions, jihadism, in a state of emotional deprivation, to extricate themselves from a life of hopelessness and failure, a religious mission, the current Middle East mayhem, due to America's oscillation between two destructively destabilizing approaches, at the instability stage, vacillation between withdrawal and timid engagement, to be fundamentally a civilizational and homegrown conflict, forging international and regional alliances around a legitimate objective, an educated understanding of complex historical conditions, sheer military capacity for tackling complex religious and cultural conflicts, to represent a nihilistic decline into a permanent state of war, inconclusive war in Afghanistan, no anathema, to destroy Islamic movements, by allowing them legitimate political space, the tense equation between the incumbent Arab regimes and political Islam, a zero-sum game, a Western liberal model, a formidable and historic task of building a modern state for devout people, eradicating the mother of all jihadists, a noble mission, the symptom, not the root cause, of the meltdown of artificial Arab states, with a firm national identity, solid nation-states, a primordial Israeli concern, to be a persistent phenomenon, the socio-political environment, the indigenous Islamist groups operating beyond the Caliphate borders, allegiance, robust, a resurrected Syria and Iraq as unfriendly nations, stretching from the liberated Damascus–Aleppo arch down to the Lebanese border, a contiguous belt stretching from, proxy in the local war, to challenge

this radical reshaping of the strategic game in the Middle East, vital to the security of the West, to be exclusively focused on fighting the Islamic State, precisely, the one piece of the puzzle that counterbalances the Moscow-led axis, through its obsession, to betray its most efficient allies in the war, Washington's strategic trap, compensating the Kurds with their longed for statehood, to be torpedoed by all of America's reluctant allies and foes, to move past their penchant for unilateral action, multilateralism, a growing multilateral consensus, to be responsible for the successful negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and the climate change, at stake, to be incapable of devising convincing multilateral solutions, stymied by domestic constraints, an utterly ineffective broker in the Palestine process, to relinquish its monopoly over it, conspicuously, the most important emerging world actor, indifferent to multilateralism, a concept entirely alien to its political vocabulary, strategic vicinity is mastery, a multilateral order, no interference in its own internal affairs on matters of human rights, to oppose circumventing this principle through Western-inspired concepts, insecure, Israel's penchant for overreaction on security matters, Iran's nuclear adventure, anti-status-quo strategy, a genuine sense of existential vulnerability, an insecure giant, by fear and uncertainty, encirclement, to encroach on its territorial integrity and Westphalian sovereignty, advisable to abandon the language of "primacy" and "containment" in favor of a regional concert of big Asian powers, capable of solving differences and reducing tensions, supposed isolationism, the real champion of the established global order, throughout history, to prevent a revolutionary behavior of lesser powers, in upholding international institutions, to defend global governance, the WTO, the Paris climate accord, the international community's nuclear deal with Iran, the 1945 Yalta agreement, two ominous traits, to push the inherent laxity of democracies to fight back to the limits, the ambition to create a territorial contiguity with Russia's ethnic minorities beyond its borders, to upset the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East, Russian state-sponsored

propaganda, fascination, before acquiescing to a Yalta-style division of spheres of influence, to warn against NATO's enlargement, to expand a hostile military alliance up to Russia's borders, respecting its legitimate security concerns and sense of status, a "patient in an iron lung," momentous existential crisis, truly pathetic to think that, resuscitating the Soviet empire, reordering its dangerously chaotic dismemberment, to be a highly dangerous global spoiler, a doctrine and a mission, emerging powers, a plethora of non-state actors, in essence, the assertion of civilizational distinctions, the Western-inspired order of political correctness, the primacy of human rights, international rules of conduct over the Westphalian concept of national sovereignty, the major civilizations, asserting their presence with particular virulence, exhaustion of Western universalism, abhorrence of multilateralism, boost to military budgets and nuclear arsenals, enlightened global mission in the name of an "America First" idea with its ugly echoes, self-defeating, the compelling reality of climate change, to be tackled collectively, a concert of nations, the entire historical cycle, to facilitate transitions to more stable arrangements, repeatedly, the attitude of Europe's public officials in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the optimal objective, vindicated.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. What kind of a _____ would Trump be if he did not use a united Western alliance to _____ relations with Moscow before _____ to a Yalta-style division of spheres of _____ as if the Berlin Wall never fell?
2. Israel's _____ for overreaction on security matters and Iran's nuclear _____ and anti-status-quo _____ are cases of two encircled and _____ powers whose regional behavior stems from a _____ sense of existential _____.

3. The Western-inspired order of political _____, the primacy of human rights, and international rules of _____ over the Westphalian _____ of national sovereignty are _____ with the traditions of the new rising powers and the major _____ that are now asserting their presence with particular _____.
4. Due to the evident _____ of Western universalism, Henry Kissinger's _____ in his latest book, *World Order*, of a return to the Westphalian _____ and the balance of power is gaining _____.
5. Of all people, it was George Kennan, the man who defined America's Cold War strategy, who also _____ against NATO's _____. Instead of expanding a _____ military alliance up to Russia's borders, what was required was a strategy for _____ Russia and respecting its _____ security concerns and _____ of status.
6. _____ history, as we learned from Thucydides, it was the _____ power, not the established one, which worked to _____ the normal order. To prevent a _____ behavior of lesser powers, the global _____ power should have an interest in _____ international institutions.
7. Wars can be declared _____, but the resolution of _____, even when there seems to be an _____ winner as in the case of Syria's war, will always require a _____ of nations.
8. The lesson from Iraq and from Israel's war with Hamas and Hezbollah is that forging international and regional _____ around a _____ objective and an _____ understanding of _____ historical conditions are more _____ than sheer military capacity for _____ complex religious and cultural conflicts.
9. But in the conflict _____ where nothing less than world peace is at _____, such as the Middle East and East Asia, actors are either going their own way or are _____ of _____ convincing multilateral solutions.

10. The _____ of it all is that Washington is almost _____ focused on fighting the Islamic State, _____ the one piece of the _____ that _____ the Moscow-led _____.

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

Multilateral, primacy, fascination, alien, sovereignty, to resist, to facilitate, interference, vicinity, to betray.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. Beijing wants a return to the principles of the Westphalian system, namely no interference in its own internal affairs on matters of human rights.
2. A similar strategic deadfall was in Sir Eyre Crowe's mind when he predicted in his famous 1907 memorandum that Germany's defiance of British naval hegemony was bound to lead to war – which it did in 1914.
3. Stymied by domestic constraints, Washington has become an utterly ineffective broker in the Palestine process – it would do well to relinquish its monopoly over it.
4. No modern autocrat can survive through naked power alone – a doctrine and a mission are always required.
5. Sunni warlords are bound to be a persistent phenomenon in Arab lands as long as the socio-political environment that has produced them remains unchanged.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.

LESSON 12. THE FAILED DIVORCE OF SERBIA'S GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZED CRIME

“Here is the question – still unanswered – who are the masterminds behind Duca, Legija, and Zveki? Although some politicians have hinted and part of the public is convinced they exist, the official investigation has not clearly indicted anyone.... The process of returning Serbia to a normal state and its transformation into a well-governed country appears to be irreversible. However, what has the assassination of Zoran Djindjic brought to those who were using political dogmas, prejudices, and ideology as an excuse for this crime?

Djindjic's assassination was not only a personal loss for his family and friends, but it was also a defining event of the period that came after the toppling of Dictator Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. It was also an attempt to secure impunity for war criminals still active in the Serbian police and military forces. It was a show of power that serves even today as a warning to anyone who dares to democratize Serbia by building strong democratic institutions and securing the rule of law. In this sense, the bullet that went through Djindjic's heart was aimed directly at the future of democracy in Serbia. As long as the political sponsors responsible for his murder are not put on trial, this bullet will continue to rip through weak Serbian institutions and serve as a warning to any progressive individual or group not to rock the boat. Additionally, given that, Serbia is one of the most influential countries in the western Balkans; such obstacles to emerging democratic institutions could have ramifications for the stability of the region. Therefore, it is crucial for both Serbia and the region to probe into the political background of the assassination and to prosecute those responsible to the fullest extent of the law.

In November 2010, seven years after the assassination, Srdja Popovic, Djindjic's family lawyer, filed criminal charges against the Special Operations Unit (JSO), for its participation in the 2001 rebellion. The rebellion is a crucial

event for understanding the political background of the assassination. The JSO was an elite police unit founded in the 1990s by Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic, the chief of the State Security Service. The State Security Service was later renamed the Security Information Agency (BIA). Led by Milorad Ulemek, an ex-French Foreign Legionnaire, the unit served Milosevic and his wife by conducting political assassinations, smuggling operations, and other tasks to protect the regime in general. Ulemek had strong personal ties with the criminal underground in Serbia, especially with the Zemun Clan, whose bosses were Dusan “Siptar” Spasojevic and Mile “Kum” Lukovic. The clan’s drug trafficking network extended from Bulgaria and Macedonia in the north, through Kosovo in the south, and stretched into Western Europe. This nexus between state officials, special police forces, and multiethnic organized crime groups with cross border activities, established during the 1990s and best described in the popular saying, “every state has its mafia, but only in Serbia the mafia has its state,” managed to survive long after Milosevic was toppled in 2000.

According to an investigative reporter with expertise in organized crime, Dejan Anastasijevic, the main source of revenue for the Zemun Clan before Djindjic’s assassination – apart from kidnappings, extortion, and contract murders – was drug trafficking. For this, the Zemun Clan tapped the routes that were used to traffic oil and cigarettes during the UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s. These routes were controlled by the BIA, whose role was to ensure a smooth transition of goods through Serbian territory. The final destination for most of the shipments was Western Europe. Interestingly, these operations involved organized crime groups not only from Serbia, but also from neighboring countries. One of the best examples of this nexus is given by Anastasijevic below, whose work earned him an assassination attempt in 2007 – a hand grenade went off right outside the bedroom window of his downtown Belgrade apartment.

An interesting insight into the way the crime gangs cooperate can be gleaned from the case of Qamil Shabani, an ethnic Albanian from Urosevac. Shabani was a close associate of Metush Bajrami, an ethnic Albanian from Macedonia with a Bulgarian citizenship, who supervised heroin transports via Turkey, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. However, Shabani was also linked with the Serbian crime ring known as the Zemun Clan. Until the ring was busted, members of the Zemun gang were regularly picking up heroin shipments from Shabani's warehouse in Urosevac and transported them into Serbia through the Presevo valley; thanks to their connections with BIA, their vehicles were often escorted by Serbian security officers, ensuring that trucks could pass through police checkpoints without being searched. The scheme worked until the leaders of the Zemun Clan and their BIA accomplices were arrested in 2003, after they organized the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's Prime Minister.

In November 2001, the JSO rebelled against the Serbian government because it feared that Djindjic's cooperation with the Hague tribunal could lead to the arrest of many JSO members and their protectors for committing war crimes during the 1990s. The JSO, fully armed and with the use of combat vehicles, occupied part of the highway that runs through the center of Belgrade to prevent this outcome. After the 2001 rebellion, Djindjic practically lost even the very limited oversight he had of the BIA, while control over the army and its secret intelligence arm, the Military Security Agency (VBA), was never achieved. He tried to regain some control over the BIA in 2002 and in the first few months of 2003, came very close to succeeding. Resolved to crushing the JSO and allied mafia clans, he declared 2002 the year of the fight against organized crime. The Djindjic government even adopted the Law on the Fight against Organized Crime in July of that year. However, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and their Montenegrin allies blocked the passage of the law in federal parliament until December 2002. After learning that the mafia was obtaining secret security information

from the BIA, Djindjic decided in January 2003 to replace the deputy chief of the BIA, who was said to be allied with Ulemek. Exactly one week before the assassination, a new office of the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime was formed in Belgrade, and a new special prosecutor was appointed by Prime Minister Djindjic to serve in the post. On 11 March 2003, the special prosecutor had testimonies signed by crucial witnesses from the newly established witness protection program in Serbia and was ready to issue warrants for the arrest of Ulemek and other important figures. Unfortunately, the assassins struck first. On 12 March 2003, at 12:25 p.m., Dr. Zoran Djindjic, a sniper in front of a government building in downtown Belgrade killed the first democratically elected prime minister of Serbia.

During the trial in 2010, apart from the members of the JSO, including those already convicted for the assassination such as Ulemek and Zvezdan Jovanovic, criminal charges were also filed against Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time of the rebellion, and his chief of the VBA, Aco Tomic. The charge was filed against Kostunica because, “contrary to the constitution, as the commander of the state armed forces, he did not end the uprising of the special operations unit.” Instead, Kostunica expressed his support and understanding for the rebels. Furthermore, Aco Tomic, was accused of frequently meeting with Ulemek and Spasojevic, one of the Zemun Clan bosses, both at the Army Security Directorate building and in Tomic’s private apartment before the assassination. As commander in chief of the armed forces, Kostunica was directly responsible for appointing him to this post. In addition to this, the national security adviser in Kostunica’s cabinet, and later the chief of the BIA, met with Tomic, Ulemek, and Spasojevic during the rebellion.

Several months later, and only a day before the eighth anniversary of Djindjic’s assassination, on 11 March 2011, the state prosecutor for organized crime stated that Kostunica would be questioned during the investigation into

the political background of Djindjic's assassination. On the same day, the minister of justice expressed hopes of uncovering the backers of the 2001 rebellion, which she alleged was a precursor to the assassination. The only response from Kostunica was a brief statement in which he accused the state prosecutor of becoming a puppet of the government and anticipated that any prosecution against him would be a political show trial staged by those who wanted to destroy Serbia. Apart from some public statements made by other DSS members, this was Kostunica's only move. It was a strangely calm reaction from someone who was about to be questioned and possibly accused of a very serious crime. However, a whole year passed before the state prosecutor decided to turn his words into action. On 9 March 2012, three days before the ninth anniversary of Djindjic's assassination, the state prosecutor for organized crime pressed charges against eight former JSO members for organizing the armed rebellion. No charges were filed against Kostunica, however. According to the prosecutor, despite all the aforementioned evidence, his involvement could not be proven. It can be surmised, however, that someone had instructed the prosecutor to act on this case at a time when the Serbian public was most likely to remember Djindjic – on his death anniversary.

Still, the lack of political will is not only evidenced by Kostunica's de facto amnesty, but also by the fact that to this day, the government has not published the Korac's Committee Report in its entirety. The report deals with the failures of the system that was supposed to protect Prime Minister Djindjic, and the committee also investigated the role of the BIA and VBA in the assassination. Such an investigation was justified by the fact that the JSO was a military wing of the BIA – a truly unique case, at least in Europe, that an intelligence agency has a military branch – and by the fact that Kostunica's chief of the VBA, Tomic, had direct contacts with Ulemek and Spasojevic right before the assassination. In an interview given to a Serbian broadcaster in 2008, Zarko Korac, deputy prime minister in Djindjic's government and head of the

committee, said that the Serbian police and the BIA without any explanation rejected the report. He added that, although the report's conclusion clearly pointed at some people within the Serbian police and military, an indictment had never been raised; instead, the report had been declared a state secret. The former deputy minister of the interior of Djindjic's government, and one of the closest allies of the late prime minister, surmised that a possible reason why the current Serbian government was keeping parts of this document under the veil of secrecy was the lack of reform within the secret agencies in Serbia. While the BIA has gone through some changes in the last decade, the VBA remains untouched.

Of particular importance is the fact that during the JSO rebellion in 2001, one of the demands was for the resignation of the BIA chief appointed by Djindjic. Djindjic, left with no choice, agreed, and lost his already weak control over the BIA. The fact that a military unit founded by Milosevic was trying to control the top appointment of a state organ shows that somebody else was directing them. Furthermore, whoever that person or group was, it is clear that control of the BIA was at the top of their agenda. When Kostunica became Prime Minister in 2004, the BIA was allegedly purged of all so-called negative elements, which allowed most of the Milosevic's old cadre to become active again. In addition to this, Kostunica's security adviser – arrested after the assassination, along with Tomic, for having contacts with Ulemek and Spasojevic – became the head of the BIA. The role of the VBA and BIA in Djindjic's assassination was never seriously looked into, nor was any internal investigation ever carried out by these institutions. Moreover, to this day, some of those who worked for the Milosevic regime continue to occupy senior posts in the security services and government. For example, the recently appointed chief of staff to the minister of justice has been accused by the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Vuk Draskovic, of being a member of an infamous "sixth department" of the State Security Service (the precursor to the

BIA), whose purpose was to physically eliminate political opponents of Milosevic. This department consisted of five of the most loyal State Security agents and seven Special Operation Unit soldiers under Ulemek's command. The head of this department, along with two other agents, was sentenced in June 2012 to twenty-two years in prison for the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic in 2000. The sixth department was dissembled in 2001, immediately after Djindjic's government came to power.

Furthermore, five years after the assassination, Boris Tadic, former president of Serbia and president of the "purged" Democratic Party, decided that the time had come for national unity. He signed a political declaration of reconciliation between the Democratic Party and Milosevic's unreformed Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), represented by Ivica Dacic. The comeback of Milosevic's cronies, now in control of the Serbian government, makes the probability of Kostunica's prosecution highly unlikely. He is protected politically, because any deeper investigation into the background of the assassination would necessitate an investigation into the BIA and VBA. Such an investigation is unacceptable to many in Serbia today because it threatens to reveal much more than what is necessary for charging only Kostunica. As a result, the BIA and VBA present an obstacle not only to discovering the political background of the assassination, but also to the process of democratization in Serbia. In the words of a former BIA agent, "if you throw a bomb into this cesspool [the BIA] everyone will be covered in shit. But that is something we have to do." Unfortunately, the last person who was capable and ready to throw this bomb was "removed" on 12 March 2003. At the same time, by purging the Democratic Party of all elements associated with Djindjic, those within the BIA and VBA have ensured that no one like him can threaten them again. Djindjic's assassination served not only to halt reforms but also to warn anyone against acting courageously like him in the future.

After the elections in May 2012, Ivica Dacic became prime minister of Serbia while continuing in his position as minister of interior. This means that the BIA today is under the control of Milosevic's SPS party, led by Dacic. Furthermore, the current president of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolic, and Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vucic, are both former allies of Vojislav Seselj, who is the president of the extremist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Seselj is currently in the Hague tribunal standing trial for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war. None of these people would have been able to hold political office in the modernized and democratic Serbia that Djindjic and his allies had envisioned. Moreover, Kostunica's protection from further investigation by the state prosecutor and the prevention of the full release of the Korac's Committee Report justifies the suspicion that there is a lack of political will for revealing the political background of the assassination.

Still, one recent arrest by the Spanish police is probably unsettling for some people in Belgrade. On 9 February 2012, four men were arrested while dining in a restaurant in Valencia in eastern Spain. One of them had been sentenced in absentia to thirty-five years in prison for his involvement in the assassination of Djindjic. Another was Luka Bojovic, who is alleged to have been a member of the Serbian paramilitary group, known as "Arkan's Tigers." A judge and representative for Serbia's organized crime court said that the indictment against Bojovic "alleged that he took over and organized the fugitive members of the gang that killed Djindjic – resumably the Zemun Clan – after they fled Serbia in the aftermath of the killing." Two years earlier, in August 2010, Sretko "The Beast" Kalinic, another member of the Zemun Clan, was extradited from Zagreb, Croatia to Belgrade more than three years after he was convicted to thirty years in prison for his role in the assassination of Djindjic. After his arrest in Croatia, Kalinic admitted to involvement in the murders of two witnesses and alleged that Bojovic had ordered the murder of the third witness linked to the Djindjic assassination trial. For these and other murders, he

had received orders and instructions from Luka Bojovic. Currently, Bojovic and the others are still waiting to be extradited from Spain to Serbia.

Given that Ulemek has been in prison since May 2004, the question that remains to be answered is who was giving instructions and information to Bojovic for these murders? Two of the murdered witnesses, both former members of the Zemun Clan, were ready to talk about the connections between the clan and the state institutions. One of them testified that the clan leader, Spasojevic, had funded Vojislav Seselj's election campaigns and the construction of his house and had even given him a jeep as a present. According to the testimony, Spasojevic also tried to convince Seselj not to surrender to the Hague tribunal. Another protected witness, who is still alive, allegedly revealed that Spasojevic was Seselj's informer, and that the character Laufer, on whom Seselj based his two books, was indeed Spasojevic. Current president, Tomislav Nikolic, who served as Seselj's deputy in 2006, tried to defend Seselj and discredit this witness by saying that he was ready to implicate anyone to conceal his own responsibility. In addition, Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan mentored Bojovic. Until he was killed in 2000, Arkan was the leader of "Arkan's Tigers" and the Serbian underworld, and had very strong ties with the BIA, which could have been useful to Bojovic.

The trial was recently postponed, and there is even speculation that Bojovic will stand trial in Spain instead of being extradited to Serbia. If that happens, he will face charges only for crimes committed on Spanish territory and not for those committed elsewhere, including the murders of witnesses in Djindjic's trial. For those in Belgrade hoping that the instigators behind Djindjic's assassination will never be known, this will be the best outcome. Kalinic recently confessed that he committed murders for Bojovic out of friendship. He is no longer mentioning the issue of murdered witnesses in light of the Djindjic trial. The question that remains is why Kalinic is confessing now, and whether this is a smoke screen to make the public look in the wrong

direction. Finally, we should not forget that the Zemun Clan and their allies in the world of transnational organized crime have managed to amass an enormous amount of material wealth that is visible in parts of Europe. A street in the southern Spanish city of Marbella is locally known as Serbian Street because of the sheer number of Serbian-owned real estate properties and businesses on it.

Wealth aside, Bojovic and his gang are accused of committing “twenty murders in Serbia, Holland and Spain and are under investigation in Switzerland, Romania, Holland, Spain, and the United States for several robberies and drug trafficking.”

Such massive wealth gained through international drug trafficking can certainly have an impact on weak and corrupt Serbian state institutions. Whether Bojovic has some of that money at his disposal is not known, but the fact that there is a possibility that he will not be extradited to Serbia where he would have faced charges for witness elimination in Djindjic’s trial should raise some concerns. Prosecuting those responsible for organizing Djindjic’s assassination will open the possibility of finally cracking down upon what are likely two of the last unreformed secret intelligence agencies in Europe, namely the BIA and VBA. Such a process may reveal that these two agencies are really the powerhouses of organized crime in Serbia and the region. In addition, Kostunica’s prosecution could also politically remove at least some of the most influential nationalists gathered around him in the Serbian public scene. The society would benefit from such a prosecution not only for the sake of justice, but also politically, since it would return Serbia back on the path to becoming a stable state with strong democratic institutions. Finally, removing the extremists from the political stage in Serbia would be beneficial for regional stability in the western Balkans and would foster good neighborly relations as “the nexus between organized crime and political extremism can be a serious challenge to enduring democratic reform.”

Unfortunately, we are facing the possibility that weak Serbian institutions will succumb to the power of drug money, in which case those responsible for Djindjic's assassination will never face justice. Serbia today lacks democratic potential and the political will to fight systemic corruption and reform the security sector, which has been infiltrated by the organized crime networks that extend far beyond state borders. One thing that is lacking in Serbia more than any other is a leader with the intellect, courage, and integrity of Zoran Djindjic. By toppling Milosevic, Zoran Djindjic made Serbia better and changed the face of the Balkans. The least Serbia can do in return is to bring those responsible for his murder to justice.

EXERCISE №1. Make sure you know the meaning of these words and word expressions. Translate them into Ukrainians.

Masterminds, politicians, the official investigation, transformation into a well-governed country appears to be irreversible, However, the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, using political dogmas, prejudices, and ideology as an excuse for this crime, the toppling of Dictator Slobodan Milosevic, an attempt to secure impunity for war criminals, securing the rule of law, murder, to put on trial, to rip through weak Serbian institutions, to rock the boat, to have ramifications for the stability of the region, therefore, crucial for both Serbia and the region to probe into the political background of the assassination, to file criminal charges against the Special Operations Unit (JSO), participation in the 2001 rebellion, the chief of the State Security Service, the Security Information Agency (BIA), smuggling operations, to have strong personal ties with the criminal underground in Serbia, drug trafficking network, nexus between state officials, special police forces, and multiethnic organized crime groups, expertise in organized crime, apart from kidnappings, extortion, and contract murders, during the UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s, to ensure a smooth transition of goods through Serbian territory, final destination, a close associate, to pick up

heroin shipments from Shabani's warehouse, through police checkpoints without being searched, the Hague tribunal, for committing war crimes, the secret intelligence arm, the Military Security Agency (VBA), to regain control over, allied mafia clans, to adopt the Law on the Fight against Organized Crime, obtaining secret security information, to replace the deputy chief of the BIA, the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime, the newly established witness protection program, rebellion, the state armed forces, to express hopes of uncovering the backers of the 2001 rebellion, to become a puppet of the government, a political show trial, a strangely calm reaction, despite all the aforementioned evidence, the lack of political will, de facto amnesty, under the veil of secrecy, at the top of their agenda, Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), to physically eliminate political opponents of Milosevic, to dissemble, to sign a political declaration of reconciliation, trial for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war, the state prosecutor, the Serbian paramilitary group, to extradite, involvement in the murders of two witnesses, to surrender to the Hague tribunal, to postpone, to amass an enormous amount of material wealth, robberies and drug trafficking, a prosecution, beneficial for regional stability, to foster good neighborly relations, to fight systemic corruption and reform the security sector, far beyond state borders, justice.

EXERCISE №2. Complete the following sentences with the appropriate term/terms from the text.

1. None of these people would have been able to _____ political _____ in the modernized and _____ Serbia that Djindjic and his _____ had envisioned.
2. The former _____ minister of the _____ of Djindjic's government, and one of the closest allies of the late _____ minister, surmised that a possible reason why the _____ Serbian government was keeping parts of this document

under the _____ of secrecy was the lack of reform within the _____ agencies in Serbia.

3. In November 2001, the JSO _____ against the Serbian government because it feared that Djindjic's _____ with the Hague _____ could lead to the arrest of many JSO members and their _____ for committing war _____ during the 1990s.

4. Such an _____ is unacceptable to many in Serbia today because it _____ to reveal much more than what is _____ for charging only Kostunica.

5. One thing that is lacking in Serbia more than any other is a _____ with the intellect, _____, and _____ of Zoran Djindjic.

6. _____, we should not forget that the Zemun Clan and their _____ in the world of _____ organized crime have managed to _____ an enormous amount of material _____ that is visible in parts of Europe.

7. It can be _____, however, that someone had _____ the prosecutor to act on this case at a time when the Serbian _____ was most likely to remember Djindjic – on his _____ anniversary.

8. In the words of a _____ BIA agent, “if you throw a bomb into this _____ [the BIA] everyone will be _____ in shit. But that is something we have to do.”

9. According to an _____ reporter with _____ in organized crime, Dejan Anastasijevic, the main _____ of revenue for the Zemun Clan before Djindjic's _____ – apart from _____, _____, and contract murders – was _____ trafficking.

10. However, what has the _____ of Zoran Djindjic brought to those who were using political _____, prejudices, and _____ as an excuse for this crime?

EXERCISE №3. Suggest the synonyms or antonyms for the following terms.

To extradite, security, expertise, investigation, prejudice, to dissemble, to ensure, to postpone, beneficial, therefore.

EXERCISE №4. Put all possible types of questions to the proposed sentences.

1. Report justifies the suspicion that there is a lack of political will for revealing the political background of the assassination.
2. When Kostunica became Prime Minister in 2004, the BIA was allegedly purged of all so-called negative elements, which allowed most of the Milosevic's old cadre to become active again.
3. Djindjic's assassination served not only to halt reforms but also to warn anyone against acting courageously like him in the future.
4. After the elections in May 2012, Ivica Dacic became prime minister of Serbia while continuing in his position as minister of interior.
5. Unfortunately, we are facing the possibility that weak Serbian institutions will succumb to the power of drug money, in which case those responsible for Djindjic's assassination will never face justice.

EXERCISE №5 Discussion.

For the student: Divide the text into some sense-fragments, entitle each one in question-form, and present your partner with a chance of answering them. The questions are desirable to be offered in some variants.

For the teacher: Group or pair discussion.